Himachal Pradesh High Court
Gurbachan Singh vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Another on 9 September, 2016
Bench: Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chander Bhusan Barowalia
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CWP No. 1224 of 2016 Reserved on: 05.09.2016 Decided on: 09.09.2016 .
__________________________________________________________________ Gurbachan Singh.
.....Petitioner.
Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & another.
of ......Respondents.
__________________________________________________________________ Coram rt The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chander Bhusan Barowalia, Judge. 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the petitioner: Mr. Dheeraj K. Vashisht, Advocate.
For the respondents: Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Advocate General, Mr. Anup Rattan, Mr. Romesh Verma, Mr. Varun Chandel, Additional Advocate Generals and Mr. Kush Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.
__________________________________________________________________ Chander Bhusan Barowalia, Judge.
The present petition is maintained by the petitioner for directing the respondents to make reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to the learned District Judge, Una, after setting aside the order 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 2passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, H.P.P.W.D., (North Zone) Kangra. Respondent No. 2 refused to make reference with respect to Award No. 20, dated 16.08.2007, qua the land alongwith trees of .
the petitioner in Village Bhadhori, Tehsil Haroli, District Una, H.P., for enhancing the compensation alongwith all consequential benefits available to the petitioner under the Act.
2. The petitioner pleaded that his father was owner of 14 of kanals, 10 marlas of land, situate in Village Bhadhori, Tehsil Haroli, District Una, H.P., comprised in Khasra No. 352, measuring 0-13-80 hectares.
rt As per the petitioner, for the purpose of setting up a tubewell, the State of Himachal Pradesh, through the officials of Irrigation and Public Health Department approached his father, who agreed for 5 marlas of land for setting up a tubewell.
Thereafter, respondent No. 2 passed Award No. 20 on 16.08.2007 and the compensation was assessed without associating the petitioner or his father in the proceedings at any point of time and only in the month of September, 2008, the petitioner got the knowledge of the said award, when he was asked to receive the compensation. As per the petitioner, he showed his dissatisfaction about the award, being on the lesser side, as the compensation was not paid with respect to trees standing on the land.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 33. It is further pleaded by the petitioner that he wrote letter dated 09.09.2008, but the same was not replied and subsequently the petitioner wrote letters on 13.10.2010, 25.04.2011 .
and 26.04.2011. When no compensation was paid to the petitioner, he moved a petition before the learned Land Acquisition Collector, H.P.P.W.D., (North Zone), Kangra, for making reference to learned District Judge, Una, and vide impugned order, the petition of the of petitioner was dismissed by the Land Acquisition Collector, H.P.P.W.D. (North Zone), Kangra, hence the present petition.
4. rt Reply, on behalf of respondent No. 1, to the petition was filed and the replying respondent denied the contents of the petition. It is averred therein that an amount of Rs.1,13,029/- (rupees one lac thirteen thousand and twenty nine) was paid to the petitioner, Shri Gurbachan Singh, and other co-owner, Shri Parkash Singh, in equal shares. As none of them has objected to the award at the time of receipt of award amount, the present petition is not maintainable. It is further averred that at the time of passing of the award, the petitioner was present. As he was also present at the time of receiving the award amount in the year 2008, if any tree was uprooted he could have objected at that time, but he received the compensation alongwith other co-sharer without any protest.
5. The only question which arose for consideration and ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 4 determination before this Court is whether the petition is maintainable after such a long delay?
6. It is admitted that the award was announced in the .
year 2007 and the petitioner alongwith his co-sharer received the amount in the year 2008 without any protest. He only after considerable delay tried to make vain attempts to get something more without any basis and foundation. The petition was presented of before the learned Land Acquisition Collector, H.P.P.W.D (North Zone), Kangra, for enhancing the award amount, in 2013.
7. rt In the given circumstances, the petitioner has not explained the delay, which has crept in. It is apt to record herein that the other co-sharer has not questioned the adequacy of compensation nor sought any remedy. The petitioner has, in fact, tried to misuse the process of law only with an object to grab more money. It has also come in the petition that as the tubewell was being installed for the welfare of the local people, including the petitioner, for supplying the water for agriculture purpose, his father agreed for the acquisition of the land. Whether his father agreed for the acquisition or for giving the land for the welfare purpose is still a point which can only be answered, had the father of the petitioner been alive, but the respondents at their own paid handsome amount of compensation to the petitioner and other co-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 5sharer. The petitioner after six years approached the Land Acquisition Collector, H.P.P.W.D (North Zone), Kangra, to make a reference to the Court of learned District Judge, Una, and the same .
was dismissed by the Land Acquisition Collector on 21.02.2014 and even thereafter he waited for more than two years to maintain the present petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
of
8. In our view the delay, in absence of plausible explanation, is not to be brushed aside cursorily. Our view is fortified rt by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in R & M Trust vs. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others, (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 91, wherein in para 34 of the judgment, the facet of delay is discussed as under:
"34. There is no doubt that delay is very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution. We cannot disturb the third party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why should the Court come to the rescue of a person who is not vigilant of his rights?"
9. The question qua delay and laches has been aptly discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board vs. Kirshan Kumar Vij & another, AIR 2010 Supreme Court 3342, para 39 thereof is reproduced hereinbelow in extenso:
"39. Yet, another question that draws our attention is with regard to delay and laches. In fact, respondent No. 1's petition deserved to be dismissed only on that ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 6 ground but surprisingly the High Court overlooked that aspect of the matter and dealt with it in a rather casual and cursory manner. The appellant had categorically raised the ground of delay of over eight years in approaching the High Court for grant of the said relief. But the High Court has simply .
brushed it aside and condoned such an inordinate, long and unexplained delay in casual manner. Since, we have decided the matter on merits, thus it is not proper to make avoidable observations, except to say that the approach of the High Court was neither proper nor legal."
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jammu & of Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and others, JT 2015 (9) SC 214, explicated that Courts have to remain alive to the nature of claim and rt unexplained delay by the writ petitioner. Apposite paras 26 to 28 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
"26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ Court.
27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches and already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias" 'thanks to God'.
28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, nee less to emphasize, did not justify adjudicate. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present."::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 7
11. In yet another case the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration and Others vs. Kaushilya Thakur and another, AIR .
2012 Supreme Court 2515, it has been held as under:
"10. We have heard Shri H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri Rishikesh, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and perused the record. In our view, the impugned order as also the one passed by the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside because;
(i) While granting relief to the husband of respondent of No. 1, the learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that the writ petition had been filed after almost 4 years of the rejection of an application for allotment of 100 sq. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ petitioner made further rt representations could not be made a ground for ignoring the delay for more than 3 years, more so because in the subsequent communication the concerned authorities had merely indicated that the decision contained in the first letter would stand.
It is trite to say that in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot entertain belated claims unless the petitioner offers tangible explanation State of M.P. v.
Bhailal Bhai (1964) 6 SCR 261."
12. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 108, after deliberating upon the whole conspectus of law, that delay cannot be brushed aside without any reason. Paras 13 to 17 of the judgment, being relevant, are extracted below for ready reference:
"13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329, the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 8 Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, which is as follows: (Balwant Regular Motor Service case, AIR 1969 SC 329, AIR pp. 33536, para 11)"
"11. .Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would .
be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which of otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially rt equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.' (Lindsay Petroleum Co. case, PC pp/ 239 40)"
14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683, while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that:
(SCC p. 692, para 19) "19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct."
15. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251, the Court observed that : (SCC p. 594, para 24) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 9 " 24. .........it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic."
.
It has been further stated therein that:
(Nandlal Jaiswal case, (1986) 4 SCC 566: AIR 1987 SC 251, SCC p. 594, para 24)"
"24. ........If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction."
of Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated rt stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 10 is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of .
some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons who compete of with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the rt petition overboard at the very threshold."
13. This Court in LPA No. 228 of 2012, HIMURJA and another vs. Bikram Singh, and other connected matters, decided on 17.05.2016, has held as under:
"23. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in LPA No. 48 of 2011, titled as Shri Satija Rajesh N versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 26th August, 2014; LPA No. 150 of 2014, titled as Mr. Inderjit Kumar Dhir versus State of H.P. and others, decided on 17th September, 2014; LPA No. 107 of 2014, titled as Amit Attri and others versus Anil Verma and others, and other connected matters, decided on 3rd December, 2014; and LPA No. 270 of 2010, titled as Bhim Sen Sharma versus H.P. University and another, decided on 2nd May, 2016.
24. Having said so, it can be safely held that the mandate of Limitation Act cannot be given a slip by filing representations, that too, at belated stage."::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 11
14. In the instant case, as noticed above, the petitioner wrote four letters to the respondents qua his claim, but he did not prefer the petition before respondent No. 2 for six years, therefore, .
his claim has become time barred and now he cannot take advantage of communication exchanged inter se the petitioner and the respondents. In a like case, State of Tripura and others vs. Arabinda Chakraborty and others, (2014) 6 Supreme Court Cases of 460, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that simply by making representations in absence of any statutory provision/appeal, rt period of limitation would not get extended. Relevant para 18 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:
"18. It is a settled legal position that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which the cause of action takes place. Had there been any statute giving right of appeal to the respondent and if the respondent had filed such a statutory appeal, the period of limitation would have commenced from the date when the statutory appeal was decided. In the instant case, there was no provision with regard to any statutory appeal. The respondent kept on making representations one after another and all the representations had been rejected. Submission of the respondent to the effect that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which his last representation was rejected cannot be accepted. If accepted, it would be nothing but travesty of the law of limitation. One can go on making representations for 25 years and in that event one cannot say that the period of limitation would commence when the last representation was decided. On this legal issue, we feel that the courts below committed an error by considering the date of rejection of the last representation as the date on which the cause of action had arisen. This could not have been done."::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 12
15. It has further come in the pleadings of this writ petition, that the father of the petitioner consented for 5 marlas of land for .
installing a tubewell, which was installed for the welfare of the public, including the petitioner's land.
16. From the above, it seems that first of all the father of the petitioner made the department to install a tubewell, however, the of State of Himachal Pradesh paid handsome compensation of Rs.1,13,029/- (one lac thirteen thousand twenty nine) to the rt petitioner and other co-sharer in two equal shares, which the petitioner did not object at that time, but with greed to have more money without any basis the petitioner approached the Land Acquisition Collector after six years to make reference to the learned District Judge and when the learned Land Acquisition Collector refused to make the reference, after two years the petitioner approached this Court. From the pleadings it is clear that the petitioner is a vigilant and literate man, therefore, the petition is not maintainable due to delay, laches, waiver and acquiescence.
The conduct of the petitioner assumes great importance, is suggestive of the fact that he has misused the process of law without there being any cause in his favour and the petition is required to be dismissed alongwith costs.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 1317. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wardington Lyngdoh and others vs. The Collector, Mawkyrwat, reported in AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2340, has held that no person who had received the amount .
without any protest would be entitled to make application under Section 18 of the Act. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 5 of the said judgment hereunder:
"5. It will thus be clear that the persons interest in the of land are entitled to receive compensation awarded by the Collector under S. 11 under protest and entitled to object to the compensation determined by the Collector. No person who had received the amount otherwise than under protest should be rt entitled to make the application under S. 18. In other words, the receipt of the amount under protest is a condition precedent to make an application under S. 18 within the limitation prescribed under the proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 18 together with the grounds on which the objections have been taken. Thereon the Collector is enjoined to make a reference to the Civil Court with the statement in the manner stated in S. 19"
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Land Acquisition Officer vs. Shivabai and others, reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2642, has held in paragraph 8 of the said judgment as under:
"8. Shri C. Sitaramiah, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, contends that on the Division Bench's direction to make an enquiry into the matter, the Land Acquisition Officer himself has referred the matter. Unless there is a proof of service of the notice of the award under sub- section (2) of Section 12, the limitation does not start. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel. It is now settled law that it is not necessary that the award or its copy should be served on the claimant along with notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. If the parties are not present on the date ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 14 the award came to be passed, then Collector/Land Acquisition Officer shall give immediate notice of his award. The limitation begins to run from the date of the notice as per proviso to Section 18(2). The date of the award and the date of the receipt of the compensation was incidentally the same date.
.
Under these circumstances, it must be presumed that they were present on the date when the award was made and the compensation was received without any protest. Under these circumstances, they are not entitled to seek any reference."
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das & others of vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 1629, has expounded the similar principle.
20. rt Section 18(3)(b) of the Act provides limitation period for seeking reference, which reads as under:
"18(3)(b). If the Deputy Commissioner does not make a reference to the court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application, the applicant may apply to the court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference, and the Court may direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such time as the Court may fix."
21. At the cost of repetition the petitioner has not availed the remedy as prescribed under Section 18(2) of the Act, as discussed above, and his right has already extinguished. Even otherwise the same was not available to him.
22. In State of Karnataka vs. Laxuman, reported in AIR 2006 Supreme Court 24, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in case the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 15 claimant does not enforce the right available to him within the time prescribed by law in that eventuality the remedy of the claimant to have reference gets extinguished. It is apt to reproduce .
paragraphs No. 14, 15 and 21 of the said judgment hereunder:
"14. Extinguishment of a right can be expressly provided for or it can arise by the implication from the statute. Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka sets out a scheme. Having made an application for reference within time before the Deputy Commissioner, the claimant may lose his right by of not enforcing the right available to him within the time prescribed by law. Section 18(3)(a) and Section 18(3)(b) read in harmony, casts an obligation on the claimant to enforce his claim rt within the period available for it. The scheme brings about a repose. It is based on a public policy that a right should not be allowed to remain a right indefinitely to be used against another at the will and pleasure of the holder of the right by approaching the court whenever he chooses to do so. When the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference on the application of the claimant under Section 18(1) of the Act stands extinguished on the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of application for reference, and the right of the claimant to move the Court for compelling a reference also stands extinguished, the right itself looses its enforceability and thus comes to an end as a result. This is the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as adopted in the State of Karnataka. The High Court is, therefore, not correct in searching for a specific provision bringing about an extinguishment of the right to have a reference and on not finding it, postulating that the right would survive for ever.
15. Under the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka, thus the claimant loses his right to move the Court for reference on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of his making an application to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18 (1) of the Act within the period fixed by Section 18(2) of the Act. This position is now settled by the decision of this Court in The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore vs. Thakoredas, Major and others (supra). This loss of right to move ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 16 the court precludes him from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. This loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek an enhancement of compensation. To say that the Deputy Commissioner can make a reference even after the .
right in that behalf is lost to the claimant, would be incongruous. Once the right of the claimant to enforce his claim itself is lost on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, there is no question of the Deputy Commissioner who had violated the mandate of sub-Section 3(a) of Section 18 of the Act, reviving the right of the claimant by making a reference at his sweet-will and pleasure, whatever be the inducement or occasion for doing so. On a harmonious understanding of the scheme of the Act of in the light of the general principle that even though a right may not be extinguished, the remedy may become barred, it would be appropriate to hold that on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of an application for reference made rt within time under Section 18(1) of the Act, the remedy of the claimant to have a reference gets extinguished and the right to have an enhancement becomes unenforceable. The Deputy Commissioner would not be entitled to revive a claim which has thus become unenforceable due to lapse of time or non- diligence on the part of the claimant.
21. Then the question is, whether in the context of Section 18 of the Karnataka amendment, the decision of this Court in Thakoredas (supra) and our discussion as above, Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked or would apply to an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. This Court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before the Collector or Deputy Commissioner here, while entertaining an application for reference. We see no reason not to accept that position. Then arises the question whether Section 5 could be invoked before the Land Acquisition Court while making an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. We have held in agreement with the earlier Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, that the right to have a reference enforced through court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP 17 held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all. Since in that sense it is an .
extinguishment of the right, the right cannot be revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We may incidentally notice that in Thakoredas (supra) this Court rejected the application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act which was beyond time, though, of course, there was no specific discussion on this aspect."
23. As a result of the above discussion, the petition is not of maintainable being without any merit. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed and the petitioner is saddled with costs of Rs. 10,000/-
rt (rupees ten thousand) to be deposited within two months from today, payable to the respondents. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of.
(Mansoor Ahmad Mir) Chief Justice (Chander Bhusan Barowalia) Judge September 09, 2016 (virender) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:12:48 :::HCHP