Karnataka High Court
Bangalore Development Authority vs Vishwa Bharathi House Building ... on 27 November, 1991
Equivalent citations: ILR1991KAR4407, 1992(1)KARLJ523
Author: Chief Justice
Bench: Chief Justice
JUDGMENT S.A. Hakeem, J.
1. This Appeal by the Bangalore Development Authority is directed against the order of the learned single Judge directing the appellant to consider and dispose of the respondent's application for sanction of the lay-out plan in accordance with law within ninety days of the receipt of the order.
2. Brief facts are as follows:-
The respondent is a Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. The Society along with the All Karnataka Young Writers and Artists Association, Bangalore, preferred an application on 5/10th February 1986 under Section 32(2) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (the B.D.A. Act) seeking approval for the formation of a residential lay-out in Sy. Nos. 26, 28, 29 and 30 of Avalahalli Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, in accordance with the lay-out plan submitted with the application. That application was made in their capacity as the owners of the said land. By his communication dated 11th April 1986 (Annexure C) addressed to the Secretary of the All Karnataka Young Writers and Artists Association, the Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, rejected the application for the reasons set out therein. Aggrieved by the said communication, the Society had sought for the following reliefs in the Writ Petition:-
"(1) Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other order to quash Annexure-C the order dated 11-4-1986 passed by the Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, in No. BDA/TPM/40-86-87;
(2) Declare that no order of conversion under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is necessary in respect of Sy. Nos. 26, 28, 29 and 30 of Avalahalli village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore, for which the petitioner had made an application to the Bangalore Development Authority, for approval of a lay-out under Section 32 of the Act;
(3) Declare that no order of exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is necessary in respect of the aforesaid lands owned by the petitioner and held by it as owner on the date of the coming into force of the Act;
(4) Issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to grant permission to the petitioner to form a layout in Sy. Nos. 26, 28, 29 and 30 of Avalahalli Village, in accordance with law;
(5) Pass such other order/orders as may be just and necessary in the circumstances of the case."
3. The Bangalore Development Authority, in its counter, raised various contentions. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Judge raised the following point for consideration:-
"Whether the impugned order under Annexure-C rejecting the application of the petitioner is sustainable in law and whether failure to furnish necessary documents and records along with the application for grant of approval for the formation of layout without affording an opportunity to produce the same is in accordance with law."
4. On a consideration of the contentions urged by the parties, the learned Judge allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the impugned order under Annexure-C. He has held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no order of conversion under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 ('the L.R. Act') is necessary, and further, that, the Society need not seek exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 ('the Land Ceiling Act'). However, if any documents or further information was required from the Society, it was open for the Bangalore Development Authority to call for such documents and records and to proceed to dispose of the application for grant of approval of the layout in accordance with law.
5. Sri H.K. Vasudeva Reddy, learned Counsel for the Bangalore Development Authority, raised the following contentions:-
(1) that, the land in question being an agricultural land, the Society could not have purchased the same subsequent to 1-3-1974 in view of the bar under Section 79B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 ('the Land Reforms Act'). Hence, the transactions are unlawful, null and void, notwithstanding the permission to purchase the land accorded by the City Improvement Trust Board (predecessor authority to the Bangalore Development Authority) which cannot validate such transactions;
(2) that, the nature of the land being agricultural, conversion of the same for non-agricultural purpose under Section 95 of the L.R. Act was necessary, in the absence of which the Bangalore Development Authority was justified in rejecting the application;
(3) that, since the land is included in the Outline Development Plan (O.D.P) and the Comprehensive Development Plan (C.D.P) under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, f961 ('the Planning Act') written permission of the Planning Authority was required for change in the land use, viz., for non-agricultural purposes; and (4) that since the land in question fell within the Bangalore Urban Agglomeration, exemption under Section 20 of the Land Ceiling Act was necessary for seeking sanction of the layout plan.
6. Although initially the learned Counsel took the above contentions, he did not seriously press the contentions at Sl. Nos. 2 and 4 and confined his arguments to the contentions at Sl. Nos.1 and 3. Even otherwise, once the land fell within the O.D.P. or C.D.P., the Deputy Commissioner ceases to have any power under 95 of the L.R. Act in view of the overriding effect given to the provisions of the Planning Act under Section 76M thereof over all other laws, including the L.R. Act. This view has been taken by this Court in SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER v. NARAYANAPPA, . Insofar as the requirement of seeking exemption under Section 20 of the Land Ceiling Act is concerned, by virtue of Section 19 of the said Act the provision is not applicable to any vacant land held by any Housing Co-operative Society registered or deemed to be registered under any law relating to the Co-operative Societies for the time being in force.
7. On the other hand, Sri T.S. Ramachandra, learned Counsel for the Society, contended that the grounds for refusing sanction of a private layout are clearly specified in Sub-section (6) of Section 32 of the B.D.A. Act. That Sub-section (4) of Section 32 of the B.D.A. Act, inter alia, provides that the Bangalore Development Authority could ask for further information with respect to the application. It is, therefore, urged that all that the Bangalore Development Authority could do in the circumstances of the instant case was to ask for information regarding the valid title and possession of the land by the Society, and was not justified in rejecting the application under the impugned order Annexure-C on the grounds stated in paras-3 and 4 thereof. As rightly observed by the learned Judge, a perusal of Annexure-C would disclose that the Bangalore Development Authority had rejected the application mainly for the nonfurnishing of the necessary documents and records along with the application for grant of approval of the layout, which the appellant could not have done in view of the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 32 of the B.D.A. Act under which it could have asked for further information from the Society. It appears from the application preferred by the Society under Section 32(2) of the B.D.A. Act that the land had been purchased by the Society under various sale deeds mentioned in the application in its earlier name i.e., "Writers and Artists House Building Co-operative Society Limited". The Society has further made it clear that if any further information is required for consideration of their application, they are ready to furnish the same. The full information regarding the sale deeds and the connected records were later furnished to the B.D.A.
8. In so far as the learned Counsel's contention based upon the interpretation of Section 79B of the Land Reforms Act and Section 14(2) of the Planning Act to justify the action of the Bangalore Development Authority is concerned, there does not appear to be any merit for the reasons stated hereunder:-
9. The contention of Sri Vasudeva Reddy is that in view of the prohibition against holding of agricultural land, inter alia, by Societies imposed under Section 79B of the Land Reforms Act, the sale of the land in favour of the Society does not vest any title in it. Since the transaction itself is illegal, being prohibited under law, the Bangalore Development Authority is justified in refusing to accord sanction of the layout in respect of such land. It is not disputed, and indeed cannot be disputed, that the relevant authority under the B.D.A. Act itself is not vested with any power to declare any such sale as invalid and to reject the application on the said ground. The learned Counsel is not in a position to show any provision or authority under which the Bangalore Development Authority can declare such transaction to be void or bad. However, it is submitted that having regard to the law governing the holding of agricultural land, the Bangalore Development Authority can take into account the right of the applicant to hold such land, in deciding upon the application made for sanction of the layout plan.
10. In MYSORE FEEDS LTD. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that even if any agricultural land is held in contravention of the prohibition imposed under Section 79B of the Land Reforms Act, such land cannot ipso-facto be deemed to have vested in the State on the appointed date. Vesting provided under Section 79B(3) is the consequence of an enquiry and declaration made by the Deputy Commissioner under the said provision. It is further observed therein that the fact that the State is required to pay compensation to the land owner under Section 79B(4) shows that the title of the disabled person continues till the date of the declaration under Sub-section (3) of Section 79B. When the statute says that the Deputy Commissioner shall declare that land "shall vest" in the State Government, it can only be prospective, to be operative on making the declaration. We are in respectful agreement with that view. No other view is possible on an interpretation of the relevant provisions.
11. The next contention of the learned Counsel is based on his interpretation of Section 14 of the Planning Act which reads as under:-
"Enforcement of the Outline Development Plan and the Regulations:- (1) On and from the date on which a declaration of intention to prepare an outline is published under Sub-section (1) of Section 10, every land-use, every change in land-use and every development in the area covered by the plan shall, subject to Section 14A, conform to the provisions of this Act, the Outline Development Plan and the regulations, as finally approved by the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 13.
(2) No such change in land use or development as is referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be made except with the written permission of the Planning Authority which shall be contained in a commencement certificate granted by the Planning Authority in the form prescribed.
XXX XXX XXX"
12. It is not disputed that in pursuance of the declaration of the intention of making the O.D.P., the land in question is meant for residential use. Even otherwise, the land is not being used for agricultural purposes. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Planning Act provides that no change in land use shall be made except with the written permission of the Planning Authority. Since the land is declared to be meant for residential purposes under Section 10 of the Planning Act, the question of seeking permission to change the land use did not arise at all. Since the fact that the land in question falls within the Bangalore Planning Area and the declared use thereof being residential is not disputed, the question of seeking permission from the Planning Authority under the Planning Act to change the user of the land does not arise.
In the view we have taken above, there is no valid ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge. Hence, the Appeal has to fail and it is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.