Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jawahar Singh And Others vs State Of Punjab And Others on 3 May, 2013
Author: G.S. Sandhawalia
Bench: G.S. Sandhawalia
CWP No. 6476 of 1987 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP No. 6476 of 1987
Date of Decision:- May 3rd, 2013
Jawahar Singh and others ..............PETITIONER(S)
vs.
State of Punjab and others ...........RESPONDENT(S)
CWP No. 6960 of 1987
Amar Singh and others ..............PETITIONER(S)
vs.
State of Punjab and others ...........RESPONDENT(S)
AND
CWP No. 8018 of 1987
Mehar Singh and others ..............PETITIONER(S)
vs.
State of Punjab and others ...........RESPONDENT(S)
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA
Present:- Mr. M.L. Sarin, Sr. Advocate,
with Mr. Nitin Sarin, Advocate,
for the petitioners (except petitioner no. 2).
Mr. Sumeet Mahajan, Sr. Advocate,
with Mr. Amit Kohar, Advocate,
for petitioner no. 2.
Mr. Aman Bahri, Addl. A.G., Punjab,
for responders no. 1 and 3.
1. To be referred to the Reporters or not?
2. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
G.S. SANDHAWALIA, J.
1. The present judgment shall dispose of three writ petitions i.e. CWP Nos. 6476, 6960 and 8018 of 1987. However, since the facts and question of law are common, the pleadings of CWP No. 6476 of 1987 are being referred to. CWP No. 6476 of 1987 2
2. The petitioners are challenging the order dated 09.07.1984 (Annexure P-10) passed by the Collector, Ludhiana wherein, he had held them to be in unauthorized occupation of the public premises named Faridkot House Chaura Bazar, Ludhiana and ordered their eviction under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (for short 'the P.P. Act') and directed them to vacate the premises within 30 days while giving liberty to claim the recovery of arrears of rent. The appeal filed before the Commissioner, Patiala was dismissed on 12.08.1987 and is also subject matter of challenge in this petition.
3. The pleaded case of the petitioner is that Faridkot House Chaura Bazar, Ludhiana originally belonged to the erstwhile State of Faridkot and on formation of Pepsu, Faridkot House became the property of Union Government and on the subsequent re-organization of the Punjab State, the property devolved upon the Punjab State under the provisions of the State Re-organization Act, 1966. The premises had been leased out to Late Shri Jhanda Singh, father of Shri Daljit Singh, Advocate-respondent no. 4. The said respondent had further leased out the property to the petitioners as the right was given to him and they were all tenants and in occupation even before the premises were leased out to respondent no. 4 on 10.02.1949. However, some of the petitioners were inducted as tenants by Jhanda Singh. After the death of Jhanda Singh, his son Daljit Singh-respondent no. 4 attorned in favour of the said premises as a lessee and the petitioners attorned in his favour and started paying rent to him.
4. The Punjab Government, vide notification dated 29/31 March, 1957, formed a committee known as the State Disposal Committee (for short 'SDC') with a view to dispose of uneconomic or surplus properties of the erstwhile Pepsu State outside Punjab. Thereafter, vide notification dated 08.08.1958, the SDC could deal not only with the disposal of uneconomic surplus government properties of the erstwhile Pepsu State outside Punjab but could also deal with all CWP No. 6476 of 1987 3 surplus government properties in the custody of PWD situated at Delhi or other places within or outside the State of Punjab. On 16.03.1964, the lease in favour of respondent no. 4-Daljit Singh was terminated w.e.f. 31.03.1964. Thereafter, the petitioners, who were tenants were contacted for negotiations for the sale of the property and a meeting was held on 10.08.1964 by the SDC. On 06.03.1965, a meeting was held between the petitioners and the SDC wherein, it was agreed to sell the premises in question namely Faridkot House in dispute to the petitioners for a sum of `3,50,000/- and certain conditions were agreed upon namely whereby the petitioners were asked to deposit 1/4th of the money of the sale price and the arrears of rent upto 31.03.1965. The said sale consideration was to be recovered in four equal annual instalments and 6% interest was to be charged thereon. The first instalment was deposited on 01.04.1965. No rent was to be charged and they were to be treated as owners of the premises in occupation. In compliance with the said minutes of the meeting, the petitioners deposited the arrears of the rent and the instalment of sale price. However, in a meeting dated 22.12.1965, the then Finance Minister observed that the rate of `3,50,000/- was too low and a good amount could be fetched in open auction after getting it vacated from the present tenants. Accordingly, it was decided that the building be got vacated from the petitioners and sale be made in the open auction. The petitioners approached the SDC to deposit the balance amount in four equal annual installments but they refused to perform their part of the contract and accept the balance amount with interest at the rate of 6%. The petitioners continued to remain in possession of the property on account of having deposited 25% of the sale price and were ready and willing to pay in terms of the agreement. Thereafter, they were served a notice under Sections 4 and 7 of the P.P. Act for their ejectment on 16.10.1975. The ejectment was claimed on the ground that on the termination of the lease of respondent no. 4, the possession of the petitioners was unlawful and they were in unauthorized occupation.
CWP No. 6476 of 1987 4
5. The petitioners filed the reply to the application and took the plea that they were in lawful and authorized possession and the Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The remedy lay before the Civil Court and protection under Section 53A of the The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short 'the T.P. Act') on account of part performance of the contract on account of having paid 25% of the sale price was claimed. The termination of the lease in favour of Daljit Singh also had no effect as far as the possession of the petitioners was concerned. The Sub Divisional Officer, while exercising the powers of the Collector, vide order dated 17.02.1981 held that the petitioners were in unauthorized possession of the premises and passed an order of ejectment. The claim for damages was given up with liberty to file separate petition. In the appeal filed before respondent no. 2-Commissioner, the same was allowed by him on 15.02.1982 and the matter was remanded to consider the issue whether there was any agreement between the government and the petitioners regarding the sale of the property and its effect, whether there was revocation by the competent authority and whether the provisions of the Act could be resorted to. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 09.07.1984 (Annexure P-10) was passed wherein, it was held that the decision to sell the premises for a sum of `3,50,000/- was revoked on 22.12.1965 and the petitioners have become unauthorized occupants. They were accordingly not entitled to seek claim under Section 53A of the T.P. Act and held that the remedy was to file a suit for specific performance. The principle of promissory estoppel put forth by the petitioners was also rejected. Thereafter, the appeal was dismissed on 12.08.1987 (Annexure P-11) by the Commissioner on the ground that whether the revocation was valid or invalid could be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court and the petitioners had failed to approach the Civil Court. Accordingly, the petition was filed on the ground that the petitioners were in possession in pursuance of part performance and the government had the remedy to approach the Civil Court. The decision to sell the property had been taken and CWP No. 6476 of 1987 5 the petitioners had remained in possession and were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and deposited the first installment and no fault could be found against them and proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of the P.P. Act could not be initiated. The action of the authorities was illegal and there was no opportunity of hearing given at the time of revocation of agreement. The proceedings had been initiated after a lapse of 10 years in October, 1975 and the silence on the part of the government for such a long time signified the acquiescence of the agreement to sell dated 06.03.1965.
6. The State, in its reply submitted that the petition had been filed to grab the said property and the SDC had merely proposed to sell the property to the sub-tenants in the building who failed to deposit 25% of the sale consideration within the specified period and the proposal was revoked. Under Article 299 (1) of the Constitution of India, compliance was necessary and the remedy open to the petitioners was to file a suit for specific performance of the agreement, if any, at the time of revocation and Section 53 A of the T.P. Act was not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Faridkot House had become the property of the Pepsu Government on its formation and on subsequent re-organization, the property had devolved upon the Punjab Government under the provisions of the State Re-organization Act, 1966 which had been leased out to Late Shri Jhanda Singh, who was authorized to sub-let the same to any other person. As per the lease deed, the lessee was to hand over the vacant possession of the premises after the expiry of the lease period. The petitioners were not in occupation of the premises as tenants when it was leased out to Shri Jhanda Singh on 10.01.1949. The SDC, in its meeting held on 06.03.1965, had proposed to sell the premises in dispute to the occupants for a sum of `3,50,000/- which was accepted by the occupants, however, no contract, agreement or whatsoever of any nature was made by the SDC with the sub-lessees. The said offer was withdrawn on 22.12.1965 on account of the fact that the price of sale was too low in view of the location of the CWP No. 6476 of 1987 6 property in a most commercial area, the heart of the city. The occupants had been asked to deposit 1/4th of the sale price plus arrears of rent upto 31.03.1965 but some lessees had failed to comply with this order within the stipulated period. There was no agreement to sell the property and it was a mere proposal of sale and since the sub-tenants failed to deposit 25% of the sale price within the stipulated period, the petitioners had never became owners of the property in terms of the proposal put forth by the SDC. The Finance Minister had brought to the notice of all that the price was too low for the building which had been inspected by him and a huge amount could be fetched by selling it in open auction after getting it vacated from the present sub-tenants.
7. Accordingly, a decision was taken that the building be got vacated at the earliest and the sale should be made in an open auction conducted by the Chief Engineer and 25% of the sale price deposited by the sub-tenants was refunded to them. The petitioners had never approached the SDC to deposit the balance of installments in pursuance of the proposal made by the said committee and the balance amount could not now be accepted. The refund of 25% was remitted back to the sub-tenants and most of them had refused to accept the same and as such their possession over the portions of the building was illegal and unauthorized. The petitioners were served with notice under Sections 4 and 7 of the P.P Act and could not be protected under the T.P. Act on a proposal made by the SDC. There was no contract or agreement of sale between the sub-tenants and the SDC and the sub-tenants could not be treated as owners of the property in dispute. The lease in favour of Daljit Singh-respondent no. 4 having been terminated, the possession of the property by the sub-tenants became unlawful and the Collector was fully competent to entertain the application under Sections 4 and 7 of the P.P. Act as the property was a public premises. The Collector, vide order dated 17.02.1981, held that the petitioners are in unauthorized occupation and an order of ejectment had been passed. The Commissioner, in appeal, had remanded CWP No. 6476 of 1987 7 the case after raising certain objections. Thereafter, vide order dated 09.07.1984, the Collector had come to a conclusion that there was revocation of the sale agreement and the petitioners had no right or reason to remain in occupation of the premises and they were not entitled to claim part performance. The remedy to file a suit for specific performance had not been invoked by them and the provisions of the T.P. Act were not applicable in this case. The Commissioner, in appeal, vide order dated 12.08.1987 had held that the proceedings of 06.03.1965 were violative of Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the order under challenge was sought to be justified on the ground that there was no agreement of whatsoever nature made by the Committee with the petitioners and it was not necessary to call the petitioners before setting aside the proposal of sale, it being a policy matter. The proceedings under the Act were started in the year 1965 itself and was dismissed by the Collector in the year 1966 as the Act was declared ultra vires by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The fresh application under the amended Act was filed on 15.10.1975 for ejectment and the petitioners had efficacious remedy by way of filing a civil suit in the court of competent jurisdiction.
8. The writ petition was admitted on 11.01.1988 and it was directed that the petitioners shall not be dispossessed provided they deposit balance of the money indicated in the proposal dated 06.03.1965. If they failed to deposit the same, the said order would stand vacated.
9. Perusal of the paper book goes on to show that vide order dated 17.02.1981 initially, the Collector had ordered ejectment by holding that the petitioners were in unauthorized occupation of the building which was public premises and held a joint petition was sufficient. Liberty had been given for filing a separate petition for recovery of the arrears of rent. In the appeal filed by the petitioners, it had been urged that various points were arising and the Collector had not taken the same into consideration while passing the impugned order and had not applied his judicial mind and accordingly, the case was remanded to the CWP No. 6476 of 1987 8 Collector for fresh disposal vide order dated 15.02.1982. It is the said subsequent order of ejectment which is now the subject matter of writ petition which has been upheld in appeal.
10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has raised several issues for consideration before this Court in order to punch holes in the impugned orders and submit that the orders were not justified. It has been contended that vide the decision dated 06.03.1965 (Annexure P-4), the petitioners had been asked to deposit 25% of the price determined which was `3,50,000/- alongwith the arrears of rent upto 31.03.1965. They were not required to pay the rent thereafter being sub-lessees and had become owners thereafter since the contract had been accepted. Secondly, it was argued that under Article 299 of the Constitution of India, the contract need not be in writing and correspondence was good enough to show that the parties had agreed in essence and accordingly the principle of promissory estoppel was pressed into play on the ground that the parties had materially altered their possession by deposit of the 25% of the price determined. Thirdly, it was submitted that the petitioners were not unauthorized occupants and the summary procedure could not be adopted by the State which should have gone to the Civil Court and it could not be held that the petitioners were in unauthorized occupation under Section 3 of the P.P. Act. Fourthly, the decision dated 22.12.1965 was only a proposal to cancel and to get the building vacated and put it to auction on the ground that the amount fixed was too low which had never been communicated and was a unilateral cancellation which could not bind the petitioners. Fifthly, it was submitted that under Section 53A of the T.P. Act, only a defence could be taken and it would not give any right to the petitioners to file a suit as they have never launched any proceedings against the State. The State only had a right of recovery of the balance amount. The order dated 22.12.1965 had never been communicated and it was a void order and need not be challenged as the Minister was not a Member of the SDC. The Government had concealed the CWP No. 6476 of 1987 9 factum of the agreement and the subsequent revocation and was not entitled to file the petition and no public purpose is involved and only contractual rights had to be decided. Lastly, it was submitted that part performance had been performed by the petitioners who were willing to deposit the amount and they had deposited the balance amount of the sale price when the writ was admitted for regular hearing as directed and thus continued in possession. Mr. Sumeet Mahajan, learned senior counsel further submitted that rate of rent had been fixed from 01.04.1965 which was to be charged at the same rate and, therefore, the petitioners were not in unauthorized possession and it had not been pleaded by the State in the eviction petition.
11. Mr. Aman Bahri, Addl. A.G. for the State, on the other hand, vehemently submitted that as per the admitted position, the petitioners in the written statement themselves before the Collector, had admitted that Rakha Mal Pran Chand, proprietor of M/s. New Calcutta House had not deposited the amount whereas all of them were supposed to deposit the amount. No challenge had been made to the revocation dated 22.12.1965 which was by a validly constituted Committee and it was in public interest that the said decision had been taken since the sale price was less. It was submitted that under Articles 166 and 299 of the Constitution of India, it was an unauthorized contract and the Committee constituted on 06.03.1965 was not a properly constituted Committee and the Chairman was not present in the meeting. It was only a proposal which never materialized and the cheques had been sent back. The promissory estoppel principle could be repelled if there was public interest involved and the Government could turn back on any said proposal. Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India was referred to submit that the public auction would be the correct way of disposal of public property and there was no dispute regarding the possession of the petitioners which was illegal and they had never filed any suit to show their ready and willingness of the specific performance of the agreement, if CWP No. 6476 of 1987 10 any, and the money had been refunded to them which they had refused. Only the principles of T.P. Act were applicable to the State of Punjab and not the complete Act as such.
12. From the pleadings of the parties and the arguments raised hereinabove, necessary issues which have to be decided by this Court would be:-
(a) Whether there was an concluded contract under Article 299 of the Constitution of India between the petitioners and the State for which the State could be stopped from taking the proceedings under the P.P. Act and whether the proceedings dated 06.03.1965 were mere minutes of the meeting only and whether the principle of promissory estoppel would be there against the State?
(b) Whether the issue could be decided in a summary manner by the Collector and the Commissioner or the said matter should have been decided by the Civil Court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties?
13. A perusal of the notification dated 29/31st March, 1957 would show that the SDC was constituted by the Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Finance Department as the Chairman and a Representative of the Finance Department not below the rank of the Deputy Secretary was to be nominated by the Department along one representative of the PWD (B&R) not below the rank of an Executive Engineer and one representative of the Law Department not below the rank of Assistant Legal Remembrancer to Government of Punjab. By partial modification on 08.03.1958, the Committee was given the powers to deal with the disposal of the uneconomic or the surplus government properties within the State of Punjab also. In its 40th meeting conducted on 06.03.1965, it was decided by the Committee to fix the sale reserve price of the building at `3,50,000/- and the offer was made to the sub-tenants, which was allegedly accepted. The said offer never crystalized into any agreement or a concluded contract which was necessary to be in the name of Governor of the State and had to be executed by such persons who may be authorized to execute the same as per Clause 299 of the Constitution of CWP No. 6476 of 1987 11 India. Rather, before any such agreement was executed, the Finance Minister, in a meeting dated 22.12.1965 alongwith the PWD Minister and the Chief Engineer, PWD (B&R) and the Ex-Chief Engineer Sh. G.C. Khanna, who had been Chairman of the meeting dated 06.03.1965 alongwith the Deputy Secretary and the Deputy Legal Remembrancer, took a decision to reject the earlier proposal of sale of the building for the sum of `3,50,000/-. It was decided that the amount was too low and a better amount could be fetched by getting the building auctioned in open market by getting it vacated from the present sub-tenants. Article 299 of the Constitution of India reads as under:-
"299. Contracts.-(1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise.
(2) Neither the President nor the Governor shall be personally liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed for the purposes of this Constitution, or for the purposes of any enactment relating to the Government of India heretofore in force, nor shall any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of any of them be personally liable in respect thereof."
14. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mulamchand vs. State of M.P., 1968 AIR (SC) 1218, came to the conclusion that contracts to the Government have to be executed on behalf of the Governor General and to be executed by officers duly appointed in such manner as may be directed or CWP No. 6476 of 1987 12 authorized. Accordingly, it was held that the said provisions had been enacted for safeguarding the government against unauthorized contracts. Accordingly, the appeal filed was dismissed on the ground that the contract was a void and could not be enforced. Similar view was taken by the Constitution Bench in K.P. Chowdhry vs. State of M.P. and others, 1967 AIR (SC) 203 to hold that there could be no implied contract between the Government and the appellant. In State of Punjab and others vs. M/s. Om Parkash Baldev Krishan, 1988 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 722, it was held that under Article 299 of the Constitution of India, three conditions had to be satisfied for the contract (i) it must be expressed to be made by the Governor (ii) it must be executed and (iii) the execution should be by such person in such manner as the Governor might direct or authorize. The said principles were laid down on the ground that it was in public policy that such a contract should be in writing and there could be no estoppel in the absence of such a contract. The relevant paragraphs read as under:-
"9. It was urged on behalf of the appellants by Shri Nayar that a valid binding contract might come into existence even without a formal agreement duly signed by the parties. According to the learned advocate if one party made an offer in writing and the same was accepted by a letter to the first party, these two documents might be sufficient to spell out a contract. Assuming that it is right, it is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal in the view we have taken to decide that the tender submitted and the letter sent by the Engineer did not create in the facts of this case a binding contract. The acceptance letter, at least, must conform to the requirements of Article 299(1) of the Constitution and since this letter was indisputably not in the name of the Governor, this contention cannot be accepted. The acceptance letter or CWP No. 6476 of 1987 13 any work letter sent to the respondent had been written by the Executive Engineer on behalf of the Governor (sic). Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention that there was a valid binding contract.
10. Shri Nayar further sought to urge that Article 299 was for the Governments' protection in order to protect it against unauthorised contracts being entered on behalf of the Government. In the instant case, according to Shri Nayar, the Executive Engineer had issued the tender and had accepted the tender, authority to accept the tender on behalf of the Governor, is thus established. Shri Nayar submitted that once that authority is established and it is made clear from the evidence that the authorities have acted on that basis, then it must be presumed that the contract had been entered into in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution. ln view of the clear position in law, it is, however, not possible to accept this submission.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
12. In this case, the Executive Engineer has signed the contract but nowhere in the contract it was offered and accepted or expressed to be made in the name of the Governor. The constitutional requirement enjoined in Clause (1) of Article 299 of the Constitution is based on public policy. This position has been made clear by this Court in The State of Bihar v. M/s. Karam Chand Thapar & Brothers Ltd., [1962] 1 S.C.R. 827. There a dispute between the respondent and the Government of Bihar over the bills CWP No. 6476 of 1987 14 for the amount payable to the company in respect of the construction works carried out by it for the Government was referred to arbitration. Section 173(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the Federal Railway authority, all contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of the Federation or of a province shall be expressed to be made by the Governor- General, or by the Governor of the Province. as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that authority shall be executed on behalf of the Governor-General or Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise."
13. This Court reiterated that under that section a contract entered into by the Governor of a Province must satisfy three conditions, namely, (i) it must be expressed to be made by the Governor; (ii) it must be executed; and (iii) the execution should be by such persons and in such manner as the Governor might direct or authorise. These three conditions are required to be fulfilled. This position was reiterated by this Court again in Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v.
Union of India, [l962] 2 S.C.R. 880. This Court explained that three conditions as mentioned in State of Bihar v. M/S. Karam Chand Thapar (supra) had to be fulfilled, and further reiterated that the object of enacting these provisions was that the State should not be saddled with liability for unauthorised contracts and, hence, it was provided that the contracts must show on their faces that these were made by CWP No. 6476 of 1987 15 the Governor-General and executed on his behalf in the manner prescribed by the person authorised. It is based on public policy. No question of waiver arises in such a situation. If once that position is reached, and that position is well-settled by the authorities over a long lapse of time, no question of examining the purpose of this requirement arises. In Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 164, this Court again reiterated that the agreement under arbitration with the Government must be in accordance with section 175(3) of the Government of lndia Act, 1935. These principles were again reiterated by this Court in Timber Kashmir Pvt. Ltd. etc. etc. v. Conservator of Forests, Jammu & Ors. etc., [1977] 1 S.C.R. 937. There, the Court was concerned with section 122(1) of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution which corresponded to Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India. In that case all the three applications filed by the respondent State for a reference to an arbitrator under section 20 of the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitrator Act, were dismissed by a single Judge of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court on the ground that the arbitration clause was, in each case, a part of an agreement which was not duly executed in accordance with the provisions of section 122(1) of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution which corresponded to those of Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India. But the Division Bench allowed the appeals holding that if contracts were signed by the Conservator of Forests in compliance with an order of the Government, the provisions of section 122(1) of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution could not be CWP No. 6476 of 1987 16 said to have been infringed. This Court held that the contract could not be executed without the sanction.
Nevertheless, if the sanction could be either expressly or impliedly given by or on behalf of the Government, as it could, and, if some acts of the Government could fasten some obligations upon the Government, the lessee could also be estopped from questioning the terms of the grant of the sanction even where there is no written contract executed to bind the lessee. But, once there has been a valid execution of lessee by duly authorised officers, the documents would be the best evidence of sanction. In that case, the contracts were executed on behalf of the Government of Jammu & Kashmir. The only question with which the Court was concerned in that case was whether the contracts executed by duly authorised officials had been proved or not. lt was held that it was so proved."
15. The said view was followed subsequently in Sohan Lal (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Union of India and another, (1991) 1 SCC 438 and recently in Shanti Sports Club and another vs. Union of India and others (2009) 15 SCC 705 in which case the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the Government's decision not to exempt the land under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Articles 77 and 166 alongwith the reasoning that mere noting in the file could not give right to the parties was taken into consideration while rejecting the plea of the petitioners. The relevant paragraphs read as under:-
"41. The issue deserves to be considered from another angle. All executive actions of the Government of India and the Government of a State are required to be taken in the name of the President or the Governor of the CWP No. 6476 of 1987 17 concerned State, as the case may be [Articles 77(1) and 166 (1)]. Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be, are required to be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be [Articles 77(2) and 166(2)].
Article 77(3) lays down that:
"77. (3) The President shall make rules for more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business."
Likewise, Article 166(3) lays down that:
166. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business insofar as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion."
42. This means that unless an order is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on behalf of the Government.
43. A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the competent authority records its opinion in the file on the merits of the matter under CWP No. 6476 of 1987 18 consideration, the same cannot be termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Article 77(1) and (2) or Article 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
52. As a result of the above discussion, we hold that the noting recorded in the official files by the officers of the Government at different levels and even the Ministers do not become decision of the Government unless the same is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in the name of the President or Governor, as the case may, authenticated in the manner provided in Articles 77(2) and 166(2) and is communicated to the affected persons. The notings and/or decisions recorded in the file do not confer any right or adversely affect the right of any person and the same can neither be challenged in a court nor made basis for seeking relief. Even if the competent authority records noting in the file, which indicates that some decision has been taken by the concerned authority, the same can always be reviewed by the same authority or reversed or over-turned or overruled by CWP No. 6476 of 1987 19 higher functionary/authority in the Government."
16. Thus, from the position of law which has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the triple test had to be satisfied for the petitioners to contend that there was a contract which had been concluded between them and the State which could stop it from denying the petitioners to hold out that the contract had been finalized on 06.03.1965. It is clear from the record that no contract was executed by the Governor or in the name of the Governor regarding the minutes of meeting recorded on 06.03.1965 though the said minutes were in pursuance of the power given to the Committee to sell the uneconomical and surplus properties. However, mere minutes of the meeting would not give any indefensible right to the petitioners and stop the Government from revoking the said proposal. Merely because the petitioners who are sub-tenants had been asked to deposit the first installment and most of them had acted on the same, it could not be held that a concluded contract had come into picture. The said minutes of the meeting were never confirmed and put into writing in the name of the Governor or on his account as provided under Article 229(1) of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the subsequent decision taken on 22.12.1965 whereby, the said proposal was revoked gave the Government the right to proceed ahead against the petitioners.
17. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. vs. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 1968 SC 870 to submit that the contract need not be in writing and correspondence given would have been enough. However, a perusal of the said judgment would show that the issue before the Hon'ble Apex court was that the acquisition under Section 4 read with Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was under challenge. The submission was that the Under Secretary who had signed the notifications under Section 6 was not duly authorized and, therefore, the notifications were invalid and were of no effect. A large number of affidavits had been filed in that CWP No. 6476 of 1987 20 case including by the Minister Incharge wherein, stand had been taken that necessary instructions had been given to the concerned Under Secretary and thus, certain observations had been made that the Minister could leave the matter to his Secretaries. Thus, the said judgment is of no help in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
18. Similarly, reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Raghuvinder Sahai vs. Shri Sri Krishan Kapania and others, 1979 (1) SLR 851 would also be of no help to the petitioners since it was a case pertaining to a dispute of the seniority of typist, receptionist, telephone operators etc. and the merger had been done by the authority of the Speaker who thereafter had further passed orders for decadering. The Division Bench held that there was no legal impediment in such a case. Reference was also made to Beharilal and another vs. Bhuri Devi (Smt.) and others, (1997) 2 SCC 279 wherein, observations had been made that though the agreement was not in conformity with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India, the Court could read and find that the contract had been executed on behalf of the Governor. In the said case, the issue in question was whether the patta gave any right to the appellant. The Hon'ble Apex Court noticed that as per the rules which had been duly approved by the Raj Pramukh, the Mandi Committee which was represented by the Chairman and the Tehsildar, could allot plots of land to the traders and they did in fact in accordance with the Rules. A finding was recorded that the execution of patta was in conformity with the rules and thus was in substance on behalf of the Governor. Accordingly, it was held that the contract though not executed strictly in conformity with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India but being in conformity of the rules, was not void. In the present case, there are no rules governing the disposal of the said property and only a Committee had been set up and the contract, as noticed, was never executed between the parties for disposal of the public property and the triple test not being satisfied, the said judgment would have no applicability to the facts and CWP No. 6476 of 1987 21 circumstances of the present case.
19. Reliance upon Sardar Sucha Singh vs. Union of India and others, 1987 (Supp) SCC 127 was placed to submit that an oral argument would also give rights. In the said case also, there was an acceptance which was signed by the Engineer, Eastern Command on behalf of the President of India for the acceptance of tender notice and accordingly, the High Court had taken a view that the requirement of Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India stood satisfied which was upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The position in the present case is not similar in any manner as there is no acceptance in the name of the Governor and, therefore, reliance on the said judgment cannot be accepted. That a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co- operative Societiy Ltd. vs. Sipahi Singh and others, 1977 SCC (4) 145, while dealing with the fishery rights, came to the conclusion that the settlement was never made and executed in the manner prescribed by Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India and accordingly, it could not be said to be valid and binding on the State and the claim of the respondent could not be based on such an agreement. The earlier decision in Union of India and others vs. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd, AIR 1968 SC 718, on the basis of which the petitioner is placing reliance on the point of promissory estoppel, was also distinguished on the ground that it was not a case of a contractual right and it was only seeking compliance upon the obligations which had been laid down by the Textile Commissioner in the terms of the export promotion scheme for grant of incentives to exporter. Subsequently, in Sohan Lal (Dead) by L.Rs. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no contract was enforceable against the Union of India unless the mandatory requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution of India had been complied with. The facts of the said case were somewhat similar since the plaintiff in that case had sought specific performance of the sale of the house on the ground that he had entered into a contract with Union of India and an order had CWP No. 6476 of 1987 22 been made allotting the house but allotment had subsequently been cancelled and the plaintiff had been dispossessed and in his place Sohan Lal, the second defendant had been put into possession by allotting the same to him. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that in the absence of any formal order of allotment, the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for specific performance and set aside the decree granted by the Delhi High Court in the absence of any enforceable contract. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:-
"3. The case of the plaintiff is that he had entered to a contract with the Union of India in terms of which the Union of India had undertaken to allot to him the house in question and execute the necessary documents of title in his favour. Although the Union of India made an order alloting the house and the plaintiff was put in possession of it, the allotment was subsequently cancelled and the plaintiff was dispossessed of the house. In his place, the appellant-Sohan Lal - the second defendant, was put into possession of the house by alloting the same to him and executing the necessary documents of title in his favour.
4. No document has been produced by the plaintiff to show that the house was ever allotted to him by the Government. According to the Union of India, the plaintiff was not eligible for allotment. Since he was in unlawful occupation of the premises he was evicted. After making allotment of the house in favour of Sohan Lal - the appellant - defendant No. 2 on 31.7.52, the possession of the house was handed over to him, and subsequently the deed of conveyance was also executed in his favour on 11.7.1958. The appellant thus became the CWP No. 6476 of 1987 23 full owner in possession of the property. The deed of conveyance of building in favour of the appellant reads:
... This Indenture made the Eleventh day of July, 1958, between the President of India (hereinafter called the 'Vendor') of the one part and Shri Sohan Lal son of Lala Jai Dayal, 21/35, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi (hereinafter called 'Purchaser') of the other part.... Signed by the Settlement Commissioner Government Built Properties, for and on behalf of the President of India, this 11.7.58.
5. As stated earlier, no document has been produced to show that any order of allotment had been issued to the plaintiff -
the second respondent herein. Admittedly, no contract whatsoever has been entered into between the plaintiff and the Union of India in respect of the house in question. No formal contract is proved to have been executed in accordance with Article 299 of the Constitution between the Union of India and the plaintiff for sale of the house in question. In the absence of any such contract, we fail to see how the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance against the Union of India. Furthermore, in the absence of any contract between the appellant and the second respondent - the plaintiff - in respect of the house, no decree could have been passed in favour of the plaintiff for specific performance against the appellant.
6. No contract is enforceable against the Union of India, unless the mandatory requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution have been complied with. As stated by this CWP No. 6476 of 1987 24 Court in Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Limited v. Sipahi Singh and Ors. :
It is now well settled that the provision of Article 299 of the Constitution which are mandatory in character require that a contract made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State must satisfy three conditions viz. (i) it must be expressed to be made by the President or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be; (ii) it must be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor, as the case may be; and (iii) its execution must be by such person and in such manner as the President or Governor may direct or authorise. Failure to comply with these conditions nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable.
7. In the absence of any enforceable contract, the High Court was clearly wrong in passing a decree for specific performance against the Union of India. Similarly, in the absence of any contract between the plaintiff - the 2nd respondent and the appellant- the second defendant, the High Court was clearly wrong in directing "the second defendant to join in the sale and convey to the plaintiff his right, title and interest in the property in dispute including the superstructures erected thereon." The High Court, in our view, lost sight of the basic principle that no decree for specific performance can be made without proof of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.
20. It is also settled that the individual interest must give way to public interest and if the Government finds that the earlier policy or decision is not in CWP No. 6476 of 1987 25 larger public interest, the Courts could not debar it from reviewing its policy except in cases where the subsequent act of the Government could be shown not to be in public interest. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of India and another, (1995) 1 SCC 274 held that Courts are not to interfere with the economical and fiscal policies and the Government had to be left free to determine its priorities in the matter of utilization of finances and the doctrine of promissory estoppel would have no application in such facts and circumstances. In the present case, as noticed above, the Finance Minister alongwith the PWD Minister had taken a categorical decision not to act upon the minutes of the meeting whereby there was a proposal to sell and this Court cannot direct or issue a mandamus to the petitioners that the said minutes of the meeting must be acted upon in view of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. The relevant observations read as under:-
"23. The appellants appear to be under the impression that even if, in the altered market conditions the continuance of the exemption may not have been justified, yet, Government was bound to continue it to give extra profit to them. That certainly was not the object with which the notification had been issued. The withdrawal of exemption "in public interest" is a matter of policy and the courts would not bind the Government to its policy decisions for all times to come, irrespective of the satisfaction of the Government that a change in the policy was necessary in the "public interest". The courts, do not interfere with the fiscal policy where the Government acts in "public interest" and neither any fraud or lack of bona fides is alleged much less established. The Government has to be left free to determine the priorities in the matter of utilisation of finances and to CWP No. 6476 of 1987 26 act in the public interest while issuing or modifying or withdrawing an exemption notification under Section 25(1) of the Act."
21. That this Court only has to examine whether the decision of the Minister dated 22.12.1965 was arbitrary in any manner and as pointed out by counsel for the State, the said decision is not a subject matter of challenge since only the proceedings under the P.P. Act are subject matter of writ petition. The decision not to sell the property to the tenants who are in occupation was a decision taken by the then Ministers on the ground that the price of `3,50,000/- at that point of time was also very low and a higher amount could be fetched by ejecting the tenants and there is no mala fide against the then Minister who was acting in interest of the Government and did not approve the minutes of the meeting. That in Bannari Amaan Sugars Ltd. vs. Commercial Officers and others, (2005) 1 SCC 625, it has been held that while taking a policy decision, the Government is not required to hear the parties concerned, which was the case in hand also.
22. Thus, keeping in view the said observations and from the facts of the present case, it can be safely held that there was never any concluded contract between the petitioners and the State and the proceedings dated 06.03.1965 were only mere minutes of the meeting, which had been recorded. The petitioners themselves being aware of the fact that no legal and valid contract had been executed thus had never approached the civil Court for the enforcement of the same.
23. Counsel for the petitioner has also pressed into action the issue of promissory estoppel on the ground that they had materially altered their position by parting with money and depositing the first installment. Accordingly, reliance was placed upon Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd.'s case (supra) and M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1979 SC 621 CWP No. 6476 of 1987 27 (1). That as noticed above, since a finding has already been recorded that there was no concluded contract inter se the parties, the house of cards, which the counsel for the petitioner has built, has necessarily to collapse and the question of promissory estoppel would not come into play in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The principle of promissory estoppel is based on the principle of equity and a promise which has been held out by the Government is not a vested right. The Court has to strike a balance between the individual rights on one hand and larger public interest on the other hand and keep in mind that the Governmental contracts with private parties do not have the same freedom and are bound by the principles of administrative law and larger public interest has to be taken into account.
24. In the present case, the Minister in the meeting held on 22.12.1965 chose not to enter into an agreement with the petitioners for sale of the property on account of the public interest as he was of the opinion that the amount of `3,50,000/- was price far short of the market value. The decision which was taken could not be held to be against the interest of the Government.
25. Counsel for the State has rightly relied upon Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India to show that public property cannot be frittered away by persons who are not authorized and public auction would be the best way of disposal. Reliance has been placed upon Chuchura Reddy and another vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1986 (3) SCC 391, wherein, it has been held that apart from public property, property belonging to charity endowments have also to be treated with exemplary vigilance by the public officials. Similarly, in Aggarwal & Modi Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. New Delhi Municipal Council, 2007 (8) SCC 75 it was held that disposal of public property should be by invitation for participation in public auction. Relevant paragraph reads as under:-
"23. Disposal of public property partakes the character of trust and there is distinct demarcated approach CWP No. 6476 of 1987 28 for disposal of public property in contradiction to the disposal of private property i.e. it should be for public purpose and in public interest. Invitation for participation in public auction ensure transparency and it would be free from bias or discrimination and beyond reproach."
26. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also settled the issue that where a policy decision had been taken, it was open to the Government to change the policy for the purpose of balancing the equities even if the persons induced had taken certain steps which could entitle them to seek the plea of promissory estoppel. In M.P. Mathur and others vs. DTC and others, (2006) 13 SCC 706, the Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the decision of the Delhi Transport Corporation to change its policy to transfer the tenements which belonged to the corporation to the occupants in spite of the fact that earlier it had taken a decision to sell the said tenements. The suit filed by the employees was decreed on the ground of promissory estoppel but in appeal it was set aside and it was further carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein, it was urged that the persons in occupation had not applied for alternate accommodation and had been prejudiced on account of the change of the policy. Keeping in view the larger public interest and the Government's limitations in entering into a contract, it was held that it was not mandatory and the corporation was not obliged to sell the tenements under the scheme and it was open to it to accommodate in-service industrial workers in the said property which could not have been done if the service quarters were sold to the plaintiffs.
27. Similarly, in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2011) 5 SCC 29, the decision of the Government of Madhya Pradesh to allot 20 acres of land without advertisement and without inviting other similarly situated organizations to participate in the process of allotment was set aside on the ground that the State Government could not have allotted the said land without issuing an advertisement. The observations made in CWP No. 6476 of 1987 29 Common Cause (Petrol pumps matter) vs. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 530 were taken into consideration by noticing that the Minister being the Executive Head of the department and allocated by the Government, holds a position of trust on behalf of the people and has to deal with the people's property in a fair and a just manner. In the present case, the decision of the Minister thus cannot be faulted with whereby, the proposal and minutes of meeting dated 06.03.1965 were not approved and no fault can be found with the said decision.
28. Regarding the second issue as to whether the matter could be decided in a summary manner by the Collector and the Commissioner and whether the Civil Court would be a competent Court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties since the principle of promissory estoppel was pressed into play, counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Raj Kumar Divender Singh and another vs. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1973 SC 66, Haryana State through The Chief Secretary to Haryana Government, Chandigarh vs. Chander Singh (deceased) and others, (2005) 1 RCR (Rent) 334 and Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and another, AIR 1982 SC 1081. From the record, it would be clear that initially an order of ejectment was passed against the petitioners on 17.02.1981 and the Collector had ordered ejectment. The said order had been appealed against successfully before the Commissioner by the petitioners and they managed to secure the order of remand to the Collector on the ground that some points regarding the discussion had to be made by the Collector which had not been done. At that stage, the petitioners had never objected to the jurisidiction of the Collector and were happy with the remand since a direction had been issued that the Collector would take into consideration all the points which were being raised by the appellants and record a finding on the said and give cogent reasons for the eviction of the appellants. The said order became final inter se the parties and was never challenged by the petitioners themselves and they had thus CWP No. 6476 of 1987 30 surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Collector to decide the issue as directed by the Commissioner. Now, at this point, it is not justified on their part to contend that the matter being complicated, should have been relegated to the Civil Court. The definition of Public Premises under the P.P. Act is given in Section 2(e) and under Section 3, the persons who are deemed to be in unauthorized occupation of the public premises is defined. Sections 2(e) and 3 of the P.P. Act read as under:-
"2. Definitions -
xxx xxx xxx xxx
(e) "public premises" means any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government and includes any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by or on behalf of -
(i) any Municipal Committee, Notified Area Committee, Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samiti, Panchayat Or Improvement Trust;
(ii) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty - one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government; and
(iii) any Corporation [ not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a local authority] established by or under a Central Act as defined in clause (7) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, or a Punjab Act owned or controlled by the State Government;
3. Unauthorised occupation of public premises- For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorized occupation of any public premises--
(a) Where he has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant; or. CWP No. 6476 of 1987 31
(b) Where he being an allottee, lessee or grantee, has, by reason of the determination or cancellation of his allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled to occupy or hold such public premises; or
(c) Where any person authorized to occupy any public premises has, whether before or after of the commencement of this Act. -
(i) sub-let, in contravention of the terms of allotment, lease or grant, without the permission of the State Government or of any other authority competent to permit such sub-letting, the whole or any part of such public premises, or
(ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorized to occupy such public premises."
29. In the present case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that the applicability of the P.P. Act to the premises in question would apply on all fours. The property in question was leased out to Jhanda Singh on 30.02.1949 and by notice dated 16.03.1964, the lease of Jhanda Singh was terminated w.e.f. 31.03.1964. Thus, apart from the legal heirs of Jhanda Singh, the petitioners who were sub-tenants under Jhanda Singh also became unauthorized occupants of the public premises since the lease had been determined in favour of Jhanda Singh and they had no independent right and the property admittedly belong to the State. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and another vs. Punjab National Bank and others, (1990) 4 SCC 406, while examining the scope of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) CWP No. 6476 of 1987 32 Act, 1971 (The Central Act), came to the conclusion that the Act was enacted for the purpose of providing a speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorized occupants of public premises. It was held that there could be no distinction made for residential purposes or for commercial purposes and the Act would be applicable to all public premises. The definition under Section 2(g) of the Central Act was also considered to hold that the person in occupation whose lease is determined would, after such determination, be an unauthorized occupant and the protection of the Rent Act would not be applicable to him. The argument raised that complicated questions of law could not be determined by the Estate Officer were also rejected.
30. Similarly, in Corporation of Calicut vs. K. Sreenivasan, (2002) 5 SCC 361, it was held that the expression 'unauthorized occupant' would embrace within its ambit the case of the licensee as well as a lessee and there could be no distinction between a lessee and a licensee. In Commissioner, Jalandhar Division and others vs. Mohan Krishan Abrol and another, 2004 AIR (SC) 2060, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the lease executed by Smt. Chanan Kaur had expired and she had willed the property to the Government. On expiry of the lease, the authorities were competent to seek eviction under the P.P. Act. In the facts and circumstances of the present case also, on the termination of the lease of Jhanda Singh, the authorities were competent to file proceedings under the P.P. Act against the present petitioners. Raj Kumar Divender Singh's case (supra), in the present case, would not be applicable since in that case it was held that the property was not public premises since the appellants were in possession of the property before it was sold to the Government and, therefore, the notice issued under the Public Premises Act of 1959 and was held to be invalid. In the present case, the property has not been purchased from the prior owners and it devolved upon the State and thus, the facts of the said case are not applicable to the present case. Reliance upon Haryana State through The Chief Secretary to CWP No. 6476 of 1987 33 Haryana Government's case (supra) would be of no avail since a finding was recorded that the respondent-Chander Singh had entered into possession of the suit land as a tenant much before the State became its owner and, therefore, was in authorized possession of the land when the ejectment order had been passed. In Thummala Krishna Rao's case (supra) since a bona fide dispute of title was there between the Government and the occupant, it was held that the summary procedure is not an appropriate procedure and the appeals of the Government were dismissed upholding the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. In the said case, the property belonged originally to the family of Nawab Zainuddin and the respondents had claimed to have purchased the said property and in view of the question of title, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh had held that there is a dispute going back to 1942 regarding the vesting of the land in the Government and, therefore, it could not be dealt with in a summary manner under Section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905. The question of law propounded in the said judgment would thus not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
31. Accordingly, in view of the two issues decided against the petitioners, in the order, no fault can be found in the order of eviction passed against the petitioners which have been duly upheld by the Commissioner and the writ petition is dismissed. However, since the petitioners have been in possession of the property prior to 1965 and are using it for some commercial purpose and it would take some time for them to shift their place of business, the State would not take steps to dispossess them for a period of 4 months from the date of the order. Regarding the money which has been deposited by the petitioners in pursuance of the minutes of the meeting and vide the interim orders of this Court, the said amounts will be adjusted by the State since the petitioners have admittedly remained in unauthorized possession of the premises since 1964. The State shall, however, file appropriate proceedings for recovery of the damages for occupation CWP No. 6476 of 1987 34 of the premises as they had undertaken before the Collector who shall adjudicate on the said amount of damages and if any further amount is due, the same shall be recovered from the petitioners and in case it is found that the petitioners have deposited excess amount, then it would be liable to be refunded alongwith 7% interest by the State as per their proportionate shares.
03.05.2013 (G.S. Sandhawalia) shivani Judge