Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K.R. Subbaraya Mudaliar vs Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam on 29 July, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(5)ALD322
JUDGMENT B.S.A. Swamy, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the respondent-plaintiff against the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 79 of 1999, dated 05.11.2002 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupathi. The appellant herein is the defendant in that suit.
2. The parties herein are referred to as tenant and Devasthanam for the sake of convenience.
3. The factual matrix of the case is that O.S. No. 122 of 1997 filed by the Devasthanam on the file of the I Additional District Munsif, Tirupathi was transferred to the Court of the Principal Civil Judge and the same was numbered as O.S. No. 79 of 1999. In this suit, the Devasthanam pleaded for recovery of vacant possession of A, B and C-schedule properties from the possession of the tenant and also for payment of arrears of rent and damages, till the date of surrender of possession of A, B and C-scheduled properties to the plaintiff-Devasthanam and for costs. The tenant resisted the suit on the ground that the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and as per the provisions of Section 118 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act (herein after called as 'the Act') the Commissioner, Endowments Department is the specified authority to enquire into the matter, before whom the eviction proceedings of an encroacher have to be initiated by the Tirumala Tirupathi Devastanam. It is also seen from the record that the tenant filed O.S. No. 624 of 1997 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati, against Devasthanam, seeking the relief of permanent injunction in respect of item No. 2 of the plaint schedule property. On transfer of the suit to the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, it was re-numbered as O.S. No. 193 of 2000. Likewise, he also filed O.S. No. 203 of 1995 against the Devasthanam, seeking similar relief of permanent injunction. But at a later stage, the tenant got amended the plaint and sought for a declaration that he is a permanent lessee. While upholding the objection raised by the defendant, the Senior Civil Judge, Tirupathi dismissed all the suits by passing a common order, dated 05.11.2002 by holding that all the three suits are not maintainable before the Civil Court and any dispute arising under Section 83 of the Act relating to the properties of Devasthanam have to be adjudicated by the Commissioner, Endowments, under Section 118 of the Act. Now surprisingly, the defendant has taken a round about turn and filed the present appeal against the Judgment and decree in O.S. No. 203 of 1995 only by contending that the Commissioner, Endowments who is a party to the proceedings of the Trust Board, dated 11.11.1990 and 31.03.1994 cannot exercise quasi-judicial function under Section 118 of the Act, since no party can be a Judge in his own case and if the defendant is forced to appear before the Commissioner, being the designated officer, he will not get justice and sought for remand of the case to the trial Court for disposal of the suit on merits.
4. (1) CIVIL COURT'S JURISDICTION:
Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Senior counsel for the appellant cited number of decisions to show that when the parties seek the relief, which is not covered by the special enactment, the Civil Court only has got jurisdiction to settle the dispute, but not the designated authority. Since I have no quarrel with the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel, I am not specifically adverting to these decisions rendered in this judgment and I would like to proceed with the case on the premise that the Civil Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. To be more emphatic, I should not be understood that under the special enactment, in all the cases, the civil court is having jurisdiction to decide the issues by-passing the designated authority and the issue in question open in the light of the arguments advanced by Sri Ramesh Ranganatham, learned counsel for the Devasthanam.
5. (2) WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DISPOSE OF THE CASE WITHOUT REMANDING THE MATTER TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FRESH CONSIDERATION:
Now, the question that arises for consideration would be "whether the relief of remand sought for by the defendant has to be granted in the circumstances of the case or this court can go into the rival contentions of the parties and decide the lis, since all the relevant material both oral and documentary are available on record".
6. While considering the power of the appellate authority under Section 54 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1924, a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in THE STATE OF KARNATAKA V/s M.G. CHOWDE GOWDA, held as follows:
"The section confers wide powers to the appellate authority including the power to annul, reverse, modify or confirm the order appealed from. It also empowers the appellate authority to make such enquiry by itself by taking such additional evidence as it thinks fit. It could also direct any of the subordinate officers to make further inquiry or to take additional evidence on such points as may be specified. These powers, in our view, are not hedged by the limitations imposed by Rules 23 and 25 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it is a recognized principle that the appellate power should not be exercised arbitrarily, by resorting to an improper order of remand. The appellate authority must first go into the merits of the matter, and if there is enough evidence on record, it must dispose of the appeal by itself and should not abdicate its responsibility by remanding the matter to its subordinate officers."
7. In KAILASHPATI NARAIN SINGH V/s BHOLA SANANI, , the effect of Rules 24 to 27 of Order 41 read with Section 151 of C.P.C., a learned Single Judge of Patna High Court held as follows:
"The short point is: Whether this type of remand order can be passed under Section 151 of the Code or not? The Appellate Court remanded the matter for delivering a fresh judgment on the basis of the existing evidence on the record. In my opinion, the order of remand under Section 151 of the Code should not be passed where an appeal can be disposed of under Order 41, Rule 24, 25 and 27 of the Code. Under Order 41, Rule 24 of the Code, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, the Appellate Court shall pronounce the judgment on the basis of the evidence on the record. In the present case, the evidence was sufficient on the record to decide issues 3 and 5. Issues 3 and 5 were as follows:
"3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties?
5. Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation and adverse possession?"
8. In respect of issue No. 3, the trial Court held that it was not pressed before it. The trial Court discussed issue No. 5 on the basis of the materials on the record. The Appellate Court remanded issue No. 5 mainly on the ground that the trial court did not consider the evidence of the witnesses in cross-examination. The Appellate Court could have decided issue No. 5 on the evidence on the record. Ordinarily, the Court should not invoke the aid of Section 151 of the Code when an appeal can be decided under Order 41, Rules 24, 25 and 27 of the Code. If the Appellate Court is of opinion that the trial Court omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, the Appellate Court may frame the issue and refer the case to the trial Court and direct the trial Court to take additional evidence required. After trying the issue and recording such evidence, the trial Court shall return the file to the Appellate Court who will decide the matter raised in the appeal. Under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code, the Appellate Court can admit additional evidence in accordance with law and decide the appeal on merit. If under these provisions, the Appellate Court can determine the dispute, then in that case the Appellate Court should not invoke the aid of Section 151 of the Code. The appellate Court can invoke the aid of Section 151 of the Code for remanding the case where the Appellate Court cannot determine the issues under Order 41, Rules 24, 25 and 27 of the Code. In other words, if the Appellate Court thinks that retrial is needed, then in that case only the Appellate Court can take the aid of Section 151 of the Code."
9. From the above two decisions it is seen that the power of remand has to be exercised in the event that the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it can not decide the dispute on its own with the material available on record but not otherwise. The Appellate Court must go into the controversy and if there is sufficient material on record, it should itself decide the appeal.
10. After going through the entire factual background of this case and the fraud played by the tenant is all pervasive by filing one suit after the other and without allowing any of the suits to be disposed of on merits, he is continuing in possession of the suit schedule properties for almost three decades. Another peculiar aspect of this case is that with the active connivance of the officers as well as the Trust Board members, the tenant managed to get favourable orders and thereafter withdraws the cases. How he managed the things, I will advert to them later, at the appropriate stage in the judgment. Hence, I am afraid, if the matter is remanded, the tenant may easily drag on the proceedings for another two decades or even more, inasmuch as people in office in this Country are capable of squandering away the public properties and escape the clutches of Law by using their political clout. Therefore, instead of remanding the suit to the trial Court for fresh disposal, I think that it would be better to decide the matter by this Court itself.
11. (3) C.M.P. NO. 10704 OF 2003 FILED BY DEVASTHANAM SEEKING PERMISSION OF THE COURT TO PROSECUTE THE TENANT FOR PERJURY:
It is seen from the record that the tenant preferred this appeal in the year 2002 and obtained orders of status quo from this court. Accordingly, he is continuing in possession of the suit schedule properties. During the pendency of this appeal, the plaintiff-Devastanam filed C.M.P.10704 of 2003 seeking permission of this court to prosecute the tenant under Section (a) to (e) of Sub-Section 341, Chapter XXIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the offences committed by him Under Sections 193 and 196 of I.P.C., which have been referred to in Section 195(1)(v)(i) of Cr.P.C. for filing Ex.B1 and Ex.B12-fabricated version of the letters of the Devasthanam, dated 24.11.1978 and 18.11.1990 respectively, knowing fully well that those documents are false. The case of Devastanam, Tirupathi is that the proceedings issued by the Executive Officer in Roc. No. S3/9968/74, dated 24.11.1978, fixed the standard rent at Rs. 596/- per month for the canteen premises occupied by the tenant and as per the proceedings dated 11.09.1978 issued by the Devasthanam bearing the same number. But from Ex.B12 it is seen that the Devasthanam agreed to provide the schedule premises on permanent lease basis on payment of standard rent of Rs. 596/- per month to the plaintiff and he can enjoy the same with full rights. In the last paragraph of the alleged proceedings, dated 24.11.1978 (Ex.B12) it is stated that Devasthanam's Law Officer will arrange to circulate the Agenda to the Honourable Chairman and members of the Board of Trustees for information in this regard and for modification as per the directions of the Shah Commission to give an impression that Devasthanam allotted the premises on permanent basis as per the direction by the Shah Commission, which is absolutely false and according to me, the proceedings do not convey any sense. If the Board has to pass a resolution, the wording should be that "Officer should place the Agenda item before the Board for ratification of the action of the Executive Officer" should be used. If it is for information of the Board, the wording "for information" should be used. At any rate, no evidence is produced to show that the Law Officer circulated the agenda and obtained orders of the Chairman. Like wise, in proceedings issued by the Deputy Executive Officer in R.O.C. NO. PO-4/226/AEO(Rev)/TML/78, dated. 18.11.1990 Devasthanam informed the tenant that his request to continue in the Central Canteen has been examined at length and the specified authority of Devasthanam passed a resolution No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 agreeing to allow him to continue in the existing place, subject to the withdrawal of all cases, which were filed by the tenant against the Devasthanam. But from the proceedings bearing the same number and date marked as Ex.B1 it is seen that the specified authority was pleased to continue the tenant in the existing places as permanent lessee on payment of prescribed standard rent as originally fixed without any kind of interference by TTD in future also, subject to the withdrawal of all the cases mentioned therein. The contents of these two documents are completely at variance to the resolutions adopted by the Board. In order to prove that Ex.B1 & Ex.B12 are fabricated documents, the Devasthanam filed voluminous record and also the material including statements of the Officers working at the relevant point of time to the effect that the documents marked in the suit are not original letters emanated from Devasthanam officials. Without giving an opportunity to the tenant to deny or admit the allegations made by the Devasthanam, it is not possible to record any finding. Hence, I am not inclined to consider the request of Devasthanam, which sought the permission of this Court to prosecute the tenant. But the Devasthanam is given liberty to file criminal complaint and prosecute the tenant for the offences alleged against him.
12. (4) C.M.P. NO. 9619 OF 2004 FILED BY DEVASTHANAM FOR RECEIVING DOCUMENTS AS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE:
The Devasthanam also filed C.M.P. No. 9619 of 2004, to receive the original proceedings, dated 18.11.1990 and 24.11.1978 purported to have been issued by the Devasthanam as additional evidence and the affidavits given by its Officers to prove that Ex.B1 & B.12 are fabricated documents. I am not inclined to receive these documents as additional evidence at this stage for the reasons recorded already. For the present, I am inclined to proceed with the matter by taking into consideration both oral and documentary evidence available on record.
13. MERITS OF THE CASE:
14. (5) WHETHER THE WHOLE CASE OF THE TENANT IS VITIATED BY MALA FIDES:
The plaint allegations made by the Devasthanam in O.S. No. 79 of 1999 are that Devasthanam is the absolute owner of the suit schedule properties and vide proceedings No. S2/PO4/226/Ro-III/TML/78, dated 11.9.1978, the plaintiff Devastanam permitted the tenant to run a canteen in the plaint 'A' schedule premises, which is adjacent to the old bus stand, till it is dismantled on payment of standard rent and usual water and electrical charges. On 13.09.1978, the tenant occupied the premises. Thereafter, the plaintiff-Devasthanam vide its letter, dated 24.11.1978 informed the tenant that the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 596/- per month. Subsequently, at the request of the tenant, additional accommodation in 'B' & 'C' schedule property in O.S. No. 111 of 1981 was also given to the tenant on lease and the rent was enhanced to Rs. 1,221/- per month with effect from 01.05.1979 and as per notice, dated 16.12.1980 the tenant was asked to pay the enhanced rent as seen from O.S. No. 111 of 1981. As the tenant is capable of getting any order from the Trust Board, he got the rent reduced to Rs. 596/-. But the details did not see the light in this case. I noticed this fact during the course of arguments. In view of the above, one can imagine how the Trust Board of the Devasthanam is safeguarding the properties of Lord Venkateswara Swamy.
15. O.S. No. 111 of 1981:
When the tenant failed to pay this meager amount of rent, the Devasthanam was forced to file O.S. No. 111 of 1981, on the file of the Additional Sub-Court, Tirupathi, seeking recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 15,103/- along with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum, till the date of realization, eviction and future damages for use and occupation of the premises and for costs. The tenant stated in his written statement that the building where he was running a hotel was acquired by the Devasthanam for the implementation of master plan and was demolished on 13.08.1976. On a representation made by him, the then Executive Officer allotted plaint 'A' schedule property to him, subject to the payment of standard rent, on a specific condition that the tenant could run the canteen as long as the bus stand remains in that area on 11.09.1978. It is also stated that as per the proceedings, dated 24.11.1978 and 11.09.1978, only 'A' schedule premises was allotted for running canteen. Subsequently, the Devasthanam seemed to have allotted B, C & D schedule properties but the terms and conditions of allotment have not come on record. After filing of this suit, the tenant induced Devasthanam to settle the matter after appreciating the loss of the tenant as per his own statement. The reasons are not known. However, the Devasthanam offered another premises in Anjanadri Nagar area and imposed certain conditions, which are under negotiations. With regard to the payment of rents, the case of the tenant is that he is ever ready and willing to pay the rents for various premises, which are under his occupation, but they have to be calculated by taking into consideration the deprivation of the sites and amenities to him. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the Sub-Court, Tirupathi, by its Judgment & Decree, dated 29.01.1990 held that Devasthanam is entitled to recover Rs. 12,096-50 ps. from the tenant towards arrears of rent for the A, B & C schedule properties. As regards the plea of possession, it was held that in view of the subsequent event of entering into compromise, Devasthanam is given liberty to file fresh suits for eviction in respect of A & B items, i.e., New Central Canteen & Anjanadri Canteen given on lease during the pendency of O.S. No. 111 of 1981, since the tenant has vacated C & D schedule premises during the pendency of the suit. As seen from the proceedings of the Devasthanam dated 19.11.1981 (Ex.A1) and 30.03.1982 (Ex.A2) while lease period of the Central canteen is from 15.11.1981 and expires by 31.03.1983 the lease period of Anjanadri Canteen will come to an end either by 31.03.1983 or till the dismantling of the building whichever is earlier, at the standard rent plus water and electrical charges to be consumed. It is clearly stated in both the proceedings that the tenant has to execute a separate lease deed for both the premises. But those lease deeds were never executed. Subsequently, the Office of the Reception Officer-III, Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam issued Ex.A3-proceedings in Roc. No. S2/226/ROIII/TNL/78, dated 14.05.1982 fixing the standard rent for Anjanadri Canteen at Rs. 1500/- per month, in addition to the other charges. After some time, the tenant was also put in possession of S.N.C. Cottage of 'C' schedule item for the residence of the staff of the canteen, on payment of Rs. 186/- per month for the occupation of the Central New Canteen, Anjanadri Canteen, as well as the S.N.C. Cottage. In all, the tenant is expected to pay rent of Rs. 2,262/- per month. In fact after expiry of the lease period, the Devasthanam issued quit notice on 21.01.1983 and kept quite. During the pendency of O.S. 111 of 1981, the tenant filed O.S. No. 125 of 1982 on the file of the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupathi seeking allotment of the plaint schedule property in the extended building and for a permanent injunction restraining the Devastanam from allotting the same to the second defendant in that suit or anybody and for costs. In this case, his case is that after demolition of the original premises, the Devastanam allotted Central New Canteen premises along with the abutting building to him for the purpose of running a hotel with an assurance that he can raise structures on the adjacent site and after he constructed the extension building, the Devastanam is intending to lease out the premises to the second defendant. The Devastanam denied the allegation that the tenant was permitted to construct the extension building with an assurance that the same will be allotted to him. In fact, the T.T.D. having run its canteen departmentally up to June, 1982 decided to lease out the premises. In that suit the tenant was examined as PW.1 and he seemed to have admitted that there is no written assurance with regard to the allotment of the canteen to him. In these circumstances, the learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment and decree, dt.29.01.1990 dismissed the suit by holding that in the absence of any documentary evidence, the self-serving oral testimony of PW.1 cannot be believed. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment, the tenant preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 28 of 1990 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Chittore.
16. During the pendency of A.S. No. 28 of 1990, the tenant filed three more suits O.S. No. 320 of 1987, O.S. No. 98 of 1988 and O.S. No. 269 of 1988.
17. O.S. No. 320 of 1987: From the agenda note to resolution of the specified authority, dated 11.11.1990 it is seen that Devasthanam served another quit notice in 1987 for Anjanadri Canteen, since it is coming in the way of free movement of the vehicles. Having given a reply that he is not going to vacate, filed this suit seeking permanent injunction restraining the Devasthanam and its subordinates from interfering with his possession in Anjanadri Canteen ('B' schedule property).
18. O.S. No. 98 of 1998: This suit was filed seeking injunction restraining Devasthanam and its officers from interfering with his possession in S.N.C. Cottage old No. 73(A) & (B) with new No. 312 (A) & (B) in Seshadri Nagar ('C' schedule property in the present suit i.e., O.S. No. 203 of 1995).
19. O.S. No. 269 of 1988: This suit is filed seeking mandatory injunction against Devasthanam to allot Anjanadri Canteen to him only.
20. NO INTENTION TO CONTINUE UNWANTED LITIGATION:
During the pendency of all these suits, perhaps having made necessary arrangements he submitted a representation on 08.11.1990 (Ex.A6). As per his representation, he has no intention to enter into the un-wanted litigation and even now, all the litigations can be avoided if all the rights are viewed in proper perspective. If the Central New Canteen Premises and Anjanadhri Nagar Canteen premises and S.N.C. Cottage No. 312 are confirmed under fresh proceedings to him on a permanent basis by prescribing standard rents as was done before. All these litigations can be avoided at a stretch. Basing on the representation of the tenant, an Agenda note in Item No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 was prepared by the Office of the Devasthanam. It is surprising to see the note wherein it is stated that the Shah Commission constituted to enquire into the emergency excesses, recommended to the Executive Officer to consider the request of the tenant for allotment of a site for running a hotel in Tirumala on humanitarian grounds and his request was considered by the then Board of Trustees and the Board was pleased to allot alternative site adjacent to old R.T.C. bus stand duly constructing a building and allotted to him as long as the bus stand remains in the area adjacent to Choultry-II. It is an admitted fact that the tenant has taken the premises from one K. Meenamma, on a monthly rent of Rs. 240/- and he was running a hotel there. In the year 1976 for the construction of Mighty Queue Commercial Complex under the master plan, all the structures in Mada street were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and paid compensation to the displaced persons. In that process, even the possession of the premises where the tenant was running a canteen was also taken and the structure standing thereon was dismantled. Thereafter, taking advantage of the constitution of Shah Commission to enquire into the emergency excesses, the tenant seemed to have sent an undated representation to the Shah Commission about the demolition of the canteen, which was under his occupation, by suppressing the fact that the premises along with the other structures were acquired under a notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act. There after, the Secretary to the Shah Commission of Inquiry, New Delhi, addressed a letter, dated 01.10.1977 to the Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, to enquire into the allegations and submit a report within a period of four months from the date of receipt of that letter. In para-3 of that letter it is stated as follows:
"It is also requested that the State Government may please take suitable remedial action wherever it deems fit, without waiting for the final disposal of the cases by the commission"
21. There after, the Commission did not pass any orders on his petition. Perhaps, the language in this para was interpreted by the Devasthanam employees to the effect that the Shah Commission has given a direction to consider the request of the tenant on humanitarian grounds for allotment of an alternative site and incorporated in the agenda note in 1990 for the first time though the tenant was in possession of these premises since 1979. The note further went ahead and stated that the Board was pleased to allot alternative site, which is adjacent to old R.T.C. bus stand. But luckily, they stated that the building was allotted to him as long as the bus stand remains in that area and nowhere it is stated that these premises were allotted to him on permanent basis. Even in his representation he never stated that these premises were allotted to him on the basis of Shah Commissions recommendations. He only stated that if these premises are allotted on permanent basis, he will withdraw all the cases filed by him, which are pending in various courts.
22. From the agenda item, it is seen that the Devasthanam after considering the representation, suggested to the tenant that another vacant site, which is adjacent to A.N.C. canteen would be allotted to him on lease basis on condition that he constructs a new canteen on his own accord, on payment of monthly lease amounts. But the tenant has given a fresh representation, which has not seen the light of the day in these proceedings. But as per the Agenda note it is seen that in the subsequent representation, the tenant wanted the following benefits to be given to him to withdraw the suits;
i) To allot the sub canteen run by the TTD, opposite to queue complex and to permit to supply the eatables for the pilgrims in queue complex, or
ii) To construct a hotel building in the vacant site adjacent to A.N.C. sub enquiry and also to allot cottage Nos.472 and 473, or
iii) To allot the hotel constructed in the R.T.C. bus stand in lieu of A.N.C. Canteen, or
iv) To shift Murali Caf and to allot the premises to him in lieu of A.N.C. Canteen. But the proprietor of Murali Caf is continued under court stay for not dispossessing him from the premises since he was allotted as an alternative accommodation, or to continue him in the present Central Canteen, ANC Canteen and Cottage No. 312 S.N.C. area on the same rents.
v) To continue him in the present Central Canteen, A.N.C. canteen and cottage No. 312, S.N.C. area on the same rents."
23. On the basis of the above agenda item the specified authority passed a cryptic resolution No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 allowing the tenant to continue in the existing place, subject to withdrawal of all cases. It is not known what are the compelling reasons for passing this resolution. May be the authority might have felt that it is difficult to fight the litigation with an unscrupulous tenant and agreed to compromise the matter. The specified authority simply stated that it is resolved to allow him to continue in the existing place, subject to withdrawal of all cases. It is also not known whether the specified authority intended to give permanent lease of the existing places or it is only a stop gap arrangement, since regularly constituted Trust Board is not in office. Assuming for a moment that the specified authority agreed to grant permanent lease of the premises, since no registered lease deed was executed and the resolutions is not in consonance with the statutory provisions governing the permanent lease.
24. The alleged consequential order issued by the Executive Officer in Roc. No. PO4/226/AEO(Rev)/Tml/1978, dated 18.11.1990, said to have been communicated by the Devasthanam was marked as Ex.B1 by the tenant, wherein, it is stated that the authority was pleased to agree with the request of the tenant to allow him to continue in the existing place as a permanent lessee, on payment of standard rent. But in the affidavit filed in support of the petition C.M.P. No. 9619 of 2004, to receive the alleged original proceedings of Ex.B1 document as additional evidence, it is stated that in the proceedings dated 18.11.1990, the tenant was informed that the specified authority by its resolution No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 has agreed to allow the tenant to continue in the existing places, subject to the withdrawal of all cases but not as a permanent lessee as contended by the tenant. But, this document was not marked by the Devasthanam before the trial Court. Since I am not going into the question whether this Ex.B1 is a fabricated document or not, I can only observe that the consequential order issued by the Executive Officer is not in conformity with the resolution passed by the specified authority.
25. Secondly, after demolition of the canteen premises for construction of Queue Complex, in the year 1977, considering the request of the tenant, the Board agreed to provide an alternative premises to the tenant to run the canteen, but that lease period was not specified. But as per the proceedings issued under Ex.A1 and A2, dated 19.11.1981 and 30.03.1982 while allotting Anjanadri Canteen premises during the pendency of O.S. No. 111 of 1981 it is clearly stated that the term of the lease of both the premises is only upto 31.03.1983. Thereafter, there was no extension, whatsoever, at any time. In any of these orders, there is no reference either to Shah Commission or its orders. Likewise, in these two proceedings, the term of the lease period is prescribed and there is no basis for the plea of the tenant that it is a permanent lease. If we look at the averments made by the tenant as a defendant in O.S. No. 111 of 1981 and as a plaintiff in O.S. No. 125 of 1982, O.S. No. 320 of 1987, O.S. No. 269 of 1988, O.S. No. 98 of 1988 and O.S. No. 269 of 1988, he never pleaded that the lease in his favour is a permanent lease. On the other hand, a specific contention was made by him that his possession cannot be disturbed and he cannot be evicted from the premises, without following the due process of law. While the tenant was continuing in possession of the suit schedule properties by obtaining orders from the Courts, he might have found a favourable atmosphere and came up with a compromise proposal on 08.11.1990, wherein he used the word 'permanent basis', but nowhere in the resolution it is stated that the specified authority was considering the request of the tenant for permanent lease. What all the note says was that the tenant was asking for permanent lease and when the specified authority agreed to provide alternative site for construction of a building by the tenant himself, he came up with alternative proposals wherein he did not seek permanent lease. The representation of the tenant wherein he gave alternate proposals was not marked, but the proposals were extracted in the agenda note. From this he himself gave up the request for permanent lease. Hence, the question of passing a resolution granting a permanent lease by specified authority does not arise. Subsequently, the suits were dismissed on 12.12.1990 and 13.12.1990 as withdrawn. Having seen the royal treatment enjoyed by the tenant, the other lessees started approaching Devasthanam for conferring similar favour to them also. In those circumstances, the Board seemed to have obtained the opinion of its Advocate, who seemed to have opined that the specified authority did not mention in its resolution as to how long the tenant should be continued in the premises and he has also brought to the notice of the Board that Rule 146 of the Rules framed in G.O.Ms. No. 311, Revenue (Endowments-1) dated 09.04.1990 and requested the Board to rescind the resolution. Accordingly, an agenda note was put up before the Board for rescinding the resolution, dated 11.09.1990. After considering the Agenda Note, the Board passed a resolution, dated 31.03.1994 (Ex.A8) rescinding the Resolution No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 passed by the specified authority. The Devasthanam issued three quit notices to the tenant in Ex.A9, Ex.A11 and Ex.A12 on 20.09.1995 for the three premises and he was asked to quit the premises by 29.09.1995. It is also interesting to note that though the Board passed the Resolution in March 1994, till 20.09.1995 (ie) for one and half year no quit notices were served on the tenant.
26. O.S. No. 203 of 1995:
Having received the quit notices, the tenant filed O.S. No. 203 of 1995 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tirupathi, seeking permanent injunction, restraining the Devasthanam and its officers or any other persons from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the schedule items of the property, until he is duly evicted under due process of law. In para 10 of the plaint, he has stated that the Devasthanam in Resolution No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 allowed the tenant to continue in possession of the schedule items on permanent basis, provided, he withdraws all the suits. But in para 17 of the plaint, he has stated that as per the terms of the Resolution, dated 11.11.1990, he is entitled to continue in possession, till he is duly evicted under due process of law. The same is repeated in paragraph 18 of the plaint. In paragraph 21 of the plaint, he sought for the relief of permanent injunction, restraining the Devasthanam from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties until he is duly evicted under due process of law. From the above, it is seen that though the tenant made a feeble plea that it is a permanent lease, he only sought for a permanent injunction till he is duly evicted under due process of law and he did not seek any declaration that he is a permanent lessee of the plaint schedule properties.
27. He also filed I.A. No. 863 of 1995 in that suit, seeking temporary injunction. In view of the admitted possession of the tenant, the trial Court passed status quo orders, directing both the parties to maintain status quo. At the same time, the order made it very clear that "however, this order will not come in the way of T.T.D. to take steps with regard to the eviction as per law". In the year 1999, he filed I.A. No. 574 of 1999 in O.S. No. 203 of 1995 seeking amendment of the plaint and sought for a declaration, that he is a permanent lessee of the plaint schedule property and he is entitled to remain in possession of the property in terms of the T.T.D. Rules, Board Resolution No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 and the consequential relief of injunction as already sought for. That I.A. was allowed on 04.08.1999. Again in the year 2002, he filed another I.A. No. 267 of 2002 in O.S. No. 203 of 1995 seeking amendment of the plaint and sought for a declaration that Resolution No. 1305, dated 30/31-03-1994 rescinding the earlier Resolution No. 708, dated 11.11.1990 is illegal, arbitrary and abusive of the powers of the Board of Trustees and against the principles of natural justice. On 18.03.2003, that application was dismissed by the Court below and on a revision filed by the tenant before this Court in C.R.P. No. 1284 of 2002, this Court allowed the revision petition by order, dated 28.06.2002, on the ground that before passing of the resolution on 30/31.03.1994 the T.T.D. has not given any notice to the tenant. With regard to the limitation, this Court held that since the suit was filed in the year 1999, the amendment sought for is well within time.
28. O.S. No. 437 of 1997:
During the pendency of this suit the tenant filed two more suits. O.S. No. 437 of 1997 was filed on the file of the Sub-Court, Tirupati, seeking permanent injunction, restraining Devasthanam either from starting or opening a new hotel near the Central Reservation Office and Anjanadri Canteen, which were shown in 'C' schedule in that plaint, by contending that under a compromise entered into between the parties, the Central New Canteen and Anjanadri Canteen were allotted to him. It is also contended that very close to the schedule premises, the T.T.D. wants to start a new canteen and if the said canteen is opened, his business will be adversely affected. In paragraph '7' of the plaint, he admitted that the lease and sub-lease shall be continued in his favour as long as the bus stand remains in that area. The other allegations in the plaint need not be adverted to, since they have no relevancy to the issue under consideration. In this case also, except stating that the properties, which were shown in plaint A, B & C schedule of the plaint were allotted to him under a compromise, he never claimed that the lease entered into by him with Devasthanam is a permanent one. By order, dated 20.04.2001, the Sub-Judge dismissed the suit for default.
29. O.S. No. 624 of 1992:
Another suit in O.S. No. 624 of 1997 was filed on the file of the I Additional District Munsif Court, Tirupathi, seeking permanent injunction against the Devasthanam and its officials from demolishing the structures near A.P.S.R.T.C. bus stand. Subsequently, it was transferred to the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge and the same was re-numbered as O.S. No. 193 of 2000 to be heard along with O.S. No. 203 of 1995 and O.S. No. 79 of 1999.
30. O.S. NO. 79 OF 1999 FILED BY DEVASHANAM:
In September 1996, the Devasthanam filed a suit against the tenant on the file of the 1st Additional District Munsif, Tirupathi, which was numbered as O.S. No. 122 of 1997, seeking delivery of vacant possession of A, B, C & D of plaint schedule properties and to direct the tenant to pay arrears of damages at the rate of Rs. 9,01,287/- to the Devasthanam and also further damages at the rate of Rs. 1200/-, Rs. 2,000/- and Rs. 500/- per month, for each of the schedule items of the property, till the date of surrender of possession of A, B & C schedule properties and other reliefs on the ground that the lease of the suit schedule properties granted in favour of the tenant expired on 31.03.1983 itself and there after, there was no extension. As such, under Explanation 1(2) of Section 83 of the Charitable Endowments Act, the tenant has to be treated as an encroacher of suit schedule properties. The Devasthanam also claimed that the principles of "tenant holding over" or "tenant by sufferance" enunciated in the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable, as the tenant continued in possession even after the expiry of lease as an encroacher, but not as a tenant. Subsequently, the suit was transferred to Principal Senior Civil Judge, Thirupathi to be tried along with the suits filed by the tenant and the same was renumbered as O.S. No. 79 of 1999. Subsequently, the Civil Court by its order, dated 05.11.2002, dismissed O.S. No. 79 of 1999 filed by T.T.D. as well as O.S. No. 193 of 2000 and O.S. No. 203 of 1995 filed by the tenant on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide any of the disputes that have arisen in all the suits and they have to approach the Commissioner, Endowments Department under Section 118 of Act 30 of 1987.
31. FRAUD IS ALL PERVASIVE:
From the above narration of events the following facts emerged:
1) The premises in which the tenant was originally running a hotel was acquired by the Devasthanam for the construction of 'Queue Complex' under a master plan and under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the owner concerned was paid the compensation.
2) The tenant approached various authorities seeking allotment of alternative accommodation to eke out his livelihood.
3) Devasthanam in its Resolution No. 4158, dated 18.07.1977, was pleased to provide alternative accommodation to the tenant, adjacent to R.T.C. bus stand to run the canteen as long as the bus stand remains in that area, subject to payment of standard rent. Executive Officer was authorized to decide the terms and conditions of the lease.
4) Though it was specifically averred in the consequential order (Ex.A15) dated 11.09.1978 of the Executive Officer that the lease deed will be communicated separately for executing it. There is no evidence to show that the lease deed was executed by the tenant.
5) Additional accommodation was also provided prior to O.S. No. 111 of 1981.
6) But tenant stopped payment of rents and Devasthanam filed O.S. No. 411 of 1981 for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction.
7) During pendency of O.S. No. 111 of 1981 the tenant induced Devasthanam to lease out Anjanadri Canteen by promising to surrender B, C & D Schedule properties in that suit.
8) In Ex.A1 and Ex.A2, the Executive Officer while allotting Anjanadri Canteen premises made as per the dictates of the tenant made it clear that the lease of both the premises expires by 31.03.1983 and the tenant has to execute regular lease deeds for both the canteens separately at his own cost. But nothing of that sort has taken place.
9) Though Devasthanam gave quit notice on 21.01.1983 and directed the tenant to handover the vacant possession of both the premises by 31.03.1983, he could see that no action was taken by Devasthanam and the tenant continued in the above said premises till 1987 without any extension orders.
10) In 1987 when Devasthanam issued quit notice to vacate Anjanadri Canteen, the tenant filed O.S. No. 320 of 1987 and by obtaining interim injunction, he continued in possession.
11) Prior to this suit and after the suit he went on filing suits seeking one relief or the other against Devasthanam and he was waiting for an opportunity to get favourable orders from Devasthanam extending lease in his favour.
12) In the absence of Trust Board, when specified authority consisting of bureaucrats were administering the affairs of Devashanam, the tenant found favourable atmosphere and submitted representation on 08.11.1990 (Ex.A6) by stating that "Even now all the litigations can be avoided if my rights are viewed in the proper perspective"...... if fresh proceedings are issued on permanent basis.
13) Since Devasthanam is at the mercy of the tenant, the entire machinery jumped at once to clinch this offer.
14) From the agenda note the meeting of specified authority, dated 11.11.1990 it is seen that Devasthanam offered vacant site initially. But the tenant while accepting that offer made counter proposal by giving up the plea of permanent lease.
15) For the first time, the agenda note refers to Shah Commission and its non-existing recommendation to the Executive Officer and projected the issues as if the Executive Officer allotted the premises in 1978 acting on that recommendation.
16) As per the resolution of the Specified Authority, dated 11.11.1990 (Ex.A7) the tenant was allowed to continue in the existing premises, subject to withdrawal of all the cases. It is interesting to note that the representation of the tenant is dated 08.11.1990. On that, the Board agreed to allot open site initially. On that, the tenant gave counter proposal. Thereafter the resolution i.e., within three days the representation was considered and lease was extended, since Devasthanam cannot get a fair offer than this from the tenant.
17) Trust Board having reviewed the whole issue in the light of similar requests from others rescinded the resolution dated 11.11.1990 on 31.03.1994 (Ex.A8) again for one and half years the officials of Devasthanam did not move in the matter to give effect to this resolution.
18) After receiving Ex.A9, Ex.A11 and Ex.A12 quit notices issued by the Devasthanam as per its Resolution No. 1305 of 1995, dated 31.03.1994 (Ex.A8), the tenant filed O.S. No. 203 of 1995 seeking permanent injunction restraining the Devasthanam from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties.
19) In paragraph 10 of the plaint, though he made a vague averment that the lease is a permanent one, he did not seek any relief on that ground initially.
20) The tenant filed I.A. No. 267 of 2002, seven years after the suit was filed seeking amendment of the plaint and sought for a declaration that he is a permanent lessee of the suit premises and in support of his case, he got marked Ex.B1-letter dated 18.11.1990, the alleged proceedings of the Executive Officer after the resolution, dated 08.11.1990 and Ex.B12 dated 24.11.1978 the alleged proceedings of the Executive Officer, at the time of initial allotment of the premises to show that the schedule premises were allotted to the tenant on permanent lease basis, apart from relying on the oral evidence of PW1, the Assistant Executive Officer, who stated that in Ex.B1 it is stated that it is a permanent lease. But Devasthanam's case is that these two documents were fabricated.
21) Be that as it may, from the long drawn letters in the Court since 1981, he never contended that he was a permanent lessee. For the first time he raised this plea in 2002.
22) If Ex.B12, dated 24.11.1978 is a true and genuine document and if it is in existence, it is not known why tenant did not raise any objection against proceedings Ex.A1 & Ex.A12, dated 19.11.19881 and 30.03.1982 respectively, wherein Devasthanam specifically stated that lease of both the premises are terminable by 31.03.1983.
23) Assuming for a moment that Ex.B1 is a true document, it is contrary to the resolution of the Board and the same cannot confer any rights on him.
24) No words can be read into the Resolution, dated 11.11.1990 as if the specified authority granted a permanent lease in his favour.
25) Assuming for a moment that under resolution dated 11.11.1990 (Ex.A7) the lease is a permanent one, under the statutory rules, the authority has no power to grant permanent lease without public auction and the lease shall not exceed three years.
26) Under Section 17 of the Registration Act as well as under the statutory rules issued by the Government, all leases for more than one year are compulsorily registerable and under Rule 145 of the Rules, no lessee shall be allowed to exercise his rights under the lease, until he has executed the lease deed. It is seen from the record that from 1978 onwards, till this day, the tenant never executed any lease deed at any time, except filing suits after suits and trying to manage the officials as well as the Trust Board members in his favour.
27) In fact, PW1 in the cross examination stated that if any resolution is not in accordance with law, again the same will be placed before the Board or specified authority. He also stated that T.T.D. did not accept any permanent lease to any individuals or the Government of Karnataka. He also denied the suggestion that it is a permanent lease. When the resolution is contrary to the rules, it is not known why the officials did not place the matter again before the Board. From the above, it can be safely concluded that the witness simply stated that in Ex.B1 it is mentioned that it is a permanent lease. When Devasthanam is not generally giving permanent leases, the tenant could not give any special reason for granting permanent lease in his favour, except Shah Commission's recommendations, which is not in existence.
28) It is also seen that the tenant is in the habit of taking contrary stands from time to time to suit his convenience to drag on the proceedings without any end. The classic example is that the tenant having taken a plea before the trial Court, that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try these suits and all the disputes have to be adjudicated by the Commissioner under Section 118 of the Act and got the suits dismissed now takes a round about turn and contending that Civil Court alone is having jurisdiction. By contending so, he seeks remand of the matter so that he can continue in the premises forever.
29) It is also seen from the record that apart from the original lease in 1978, he got into possession of other premises but was not paying rents. In those circumstances, the T.T.D. was forced to file O.S. No. 111 of 1981 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Tirupathi, seeking recovery of arrears of rent as well as eviction.
30) From proceedings issued in Ex.A15, dated 11.09.1978, the Central New Canteen was allotted to the tenant on payment of standard rent of Rs. 596/- and he was allowed to raise a temporary shed and compound wall for running his business over the adjacent site, as long as the bus stand remains in that area. As additional accommodation was provided to the Central New Canteen Building, the rent was revised at the rate of Rs. 1,221/- per month from May 1979. Thereafter, the tenant made a representation to the authorities of Devasthanam and got the rent reduced to Rs. 596/- per month. It is also a known fact that the affairs of T.T.D. are being run by the human beings i.e., the Devasthanam officers. It is also a known fact that there is over flow of money into the coffers of the God and Devasthanam is spending monies for public purposes like education, health and propagating Hindu religion, apart from having reserves running into crores of rupees. At the same time, the Devasthanam is not rendering free services and the devotees have to pay monies from shelter to prasadams. The rates of every service were increasing enormously over the years, while the standard of services is going down consistently. But people like the tenant in this case receives royal treatment and everyone involved in the administration will be at the beck and call of this type of persons. This fact is amply proved from the fact that this tenant is continuing in the leased premises for two and half decades by paying rent fixed in the year 1978. I do not know whether all the lessees are enjoying the same benefit at the cost of the devotees or not.
31) From his conduct it is seen that he drew Devasthanam into an endless litigation for showing sympathy and allotting the new Central Canteen on lease basis till the R.T.C. bus depot was removed and went on changing his stand from time to time. Since the affairs of Lord Venkateswara, Kaliyuga deity are being managed by the human beings who are easily amenable to the people who can manage them, he could get the orders in what ever fashion he wanted for so many years.
32) From various averments made by the tenant in various suits during all these years show that he is speaking utter falsehood and he has no faith in speaking truth and the entire proceedings are the result of fraud played by him in collusion with the Trust Board members as well as the employees of T.T.D. to knock away the properties belonging to the God, without any fear of the existence of God.
32. In this sorry state of affairs if I accept the contention of the tenant and remand the matter back to the trial Court, he will not allow the court below to dispose of the matter by making new innovations. Since the tenant has not approached the court with clean hands and the whole case of the tenant is based on fraud, the tenant cannot be granted the relief and he should be non-suited since his very conduct is nothing but abuse of the process of Court. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.P. CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU V/s JAGANNATH, observed as follows:
"The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.......
Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage".
33. In INDIAN BANK V/s M/S. SATYAM FIBERS (INDIA) PVT.LTD, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularly and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practiced upon that Court. Similarly where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order".
34. WHETHER THE LEASE IN FAVOUR OF THE TENANT IS BASED ON COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE PARTIES:
Since the matter was argued elaborately on merits, I would like to deal with the merits of the case. The first contention raised by Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel on behalf of the tenant is that permanent lease is the result of a compromise entered into between the parties. The factual background of this case shows that the tenant is in the habit of going to Court often and now he seeks allotment of the schedule premises on permanent basis. In his representation, dated 08.11.1990 (Ex.A6) he stated that "even now, all these litigations can be avoided if my rights are viewed in a proper perspective". The counsel contends that since the specified authority extended the lease basing on this representation the lease has to be considered as a result of the compromise between the parties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel cited a Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.A. Nos.884 and 885 of 1990, dated 08.11.1990. I have gone through the facts of the case. In that case, initially there was an agreement between one Damodaram and T.T.D., wherein Damodaram agreed to surrender 5162 square feet of land in T.S.Nos.10 and 11 in exchange so as to enable the T.T.D. to widen the road up to a width of 40 feet and in exchange the T.T.D. agreed to hand over the land of an extent of 2,830 square feet of land, apart from agreeing to provide two shops for the appellant as already agreed to. Thereafter, so much correspondence has taken place between the parties and ultimately, at the instance of the Government, the appellant therein was granted alternative site of 2,830 square feet of land in T.S. No. 9 at a different place with a permission to construct a residential house. On that basis, the second settlement came into existence on 18.09.1986. The terms of the settlement were also reduced into writing and the same was published in the Gazette, dated 19.07.1975. But subsequently, the second settlement entered into between the parties was cancelled by resolution, dated 18.09.1986. Questioning the said Resolution, Damodaram filed W.P.Nos.492 of 1987 and 4523 of 1987 before this Court and those writ petitions were dismissed. On an appeal filed by Damodaram, their Lordships have taken the view that Resolution No. 37, dated 18.09.1996 is not an administrative order passed by the T.T.D. in exercise of its normal administrative powers, but it is an embodiment of mutual agreement entered into by the appellant and the T.T.D. In other words, it is a record of compromise or settlement between the TTD and the appellant, whose title was in dispute and whose possession was sought to be disturbed by the T.T.D. Their Lordships further observed that even assuming that the T.T.D. has an authority to take any such unilateral decision, they could not find any subsequent facts, which could have permitted the T.T.D. to cancel or modify the earlier resolution. In those circumstances, their Lordships held that no fresh facts came to the knowledge of the T.T.D. either after passing the Resolution, dated 18.09.1986 or before the passing of the second resolution No. 771, dated 06.03.1987. Their Lordships further held that T.T.D. could not have gone back on the earlier compromise without the consent of the appellant whatsoever or arrived at by way of a compromise or settlement could not have been unilaterally cancelled by way of a resolution.
35. From the above judgment it is seen that the resolution No. 397, dated 18.09.1986 is not an administrative order and it contains the terms and conditions of the compromise. In fact, a Gazette notification was also issued under the Survey & Boundaries Act, dated 19.07.1975. Thereafter no fresh facts came to the notice of the T.T.D. to cancel the resolution more so, unilaterally, even if it is having the power to do so.
36. In the case on hand, first of all, Ex.A7-Agenda & resolution, dated 11.11.1990 is cryptic and it simply observed that the lessee could continue in the existing premises and no where it is stated that the resolution is based on any compromise. Even Ex.B1 the alleged consequential order said to have been issued by the Executive Officer did not say that the lease was granted pursuant to the compromise between the parties. This alleged letter speaks of Shah Commission's recommendation, which was not in existence and which was not pressed into service by the tenant in the long drawn civil litigation between the parties. Further basing on this concession given by the specified authority to the tenant, several other people started approaching the Board for conferring the same benefit on them. In those circumstances, the Board has taken a decision to rescind its earlier resolution, since the specified authority has no competency to extend the lease contrary to the statutory rules. Hence, this judgment is not of any help to the tenant. I hold further that Ex.A7 resolution, dated 11.11.1990 cannot be termed as a compromise for the reason that though the tenant asked for extending the lease on permanent basis, initially, in his subsequent representation he requested for several benefits and gave up the plea of permanent lease. The Specified Authority simply extended the lease for the time being. Hence, I reject the contention of the learned counsel that Resolution, dated 11.11.1990 is the result of a compromise entered into between the parties.
37. WHETHER LEASE CAN BE TERMED AS A PERMANENT LEASE:
I have elaborately dealt with this issue while dealing with the fraud played by the tenant on the deity. To prove his case that he is a permanent lessee of the premises, he pressed into service two proceedings of the Executive Officer i.e., Ex.B1 dated 18.11.1990, the alleged consequential order issued pursuant to the resolution, dated 11.11.1990 and Ex.B12, dated 24.11.1978 another alleged consequential order issued pursuant to the resolution of the Board, dated 18.12.1977 at the time of initial allotment of the premises to the tenant. Devasthanam has taken the stand that both the documents are fabricated. Without going into the controversy, it is suffice to state that the tenant never claimed that the lease in his favour is a permanent one in the long drawn civil proceedings from 1980. For the first time he produced this letter in the present proceedings. Secondly, if the initial lease in his favour is a permanent lease, when additional accommodation "Anjanadri Canteen" was allotted, in Ex.A1 & Ex.A2 it was made clear that the additional lease as well as initial lease comes to an end by 31.03.1983 and two separate lease deeds have to be executed by him with his own cost. That was not done. At the time of quit notice, dated 21.01.1983 or at the time he filed O.S. No. 320 of 1987, the tenant never raised this plea. Coming to the lease pursuant to the resolution of Specified Authority, dated 11.11.1990, the consequential order, dated 18.11.1990 (Ex.B1) did say that the lease is a permanent one. If the specified authority wants to give the existing premises on lease for a period of more than one year, it has to be compulsorily registered under Section 17(d) of the Indian Registration Act, 1899. Further, the rules framed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of its rule making power, under Section 97 read with Section 153 of the Act framed in G.O.Ms. No. 311, Revenue (Endowments-I), dated 09.04.1990 with regard to administration of the affairs of the Devasthanam, (for short 'Rules') came into force by that time. Chapter X1X of the Rules deals with the leases of lands. Under Rule 138 all leases of lands, buildings, sites and other immovable properties and rights belonging to the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams shall be given by public auction held at the places in which the properties are situated or the right exists. Under Rule 145, registered lease deeds shall be obtained from lessee, wherever so required by law and no person shall be allowed to exercise his rights under the lease till he has executed the lease deed. Under Rule 146, notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, leases otherwise than by public auction may be resorted to by the Executive Officer in special cases for reasons to be recorded in writing. In such case the Executive Officer shall also fix fair rent to be paid, security to be taken, etc. Under Rule 147, the period of the lease in every case falling under Rule 146 shall not ordinarily exceed one year, but the lease may be renewed from year to year on the same terms and conditions but in no case the total period shall exceed three years. Under Rule 148, all leases stipulating an annual rental of Rs. 15,000/- or more or its equivalent in paddy or other produce, shall be reported to the Board of Trustees for approval. Within one month from the date of report to the Board of Trustees, if no orders confirming or canceling the lease is received, the lease shall be deemed to have been approved. Under Rule 150, the Board of Trustees shall have power to lease out the buildings, lands and any other property belonging to the T.T.D., on nomination for any number of years not exceeding 99 years in favour of public institutions or public purposes only after duly recording the reasons in writing and subject to ratification by the Government. Rule 150 of the Rules cannot be pressed into service in this case, since the lease is in favour of a private individual. At any rate, neither any reasons are given in the Board Resolution nor its mind is reflected as to what does it mean by that resolution. From the above rules, it is seen that any lease of immovable property shall be made by way of a registered lease deed and the lease shall not exceed one year at a time and the lease shall not exceed three years in all. In fact, on the first occasion, when the Executive Officer has given the newly constructed Central Canteen on lease in the year 1978 vide proceedings, dated 11.09.1978 under Ex.A15, it is clearly mentioned that the lease deed will be communicated separately for executing the deed. At the time of giving 'B' schedule property on lease, Clause-9 of the proceedings issued in Roc. No. S2/PO4/226/ROIII/TML/78, dated 19.11.1981 specifically speaks of execution of a registered lease deed by the tenant at his own cost duly incorporating all the terms and conditions mentioned therein immediately after receipt of the order. When a representation was made by the tenant for reducing the rent, the Devasthanam issued another proceedings in Roc. No. S2/PO4/226/ROIII/TML/78, dated 30.03.1982. Sub-clause 5 of para 2 of the above said proceedings categorically states that there shall be two separate lease deeds for the two premises i.e., Central New Canteen and Anjanadri Canteen, treating the lease as new lease from 01.04.1982 onwards. Clause-6 of the terms and conditions of the proceedings says that the lessee shall execute two registered lease deeds separately for two buildings at his own cost duly incorporating all the terms and conditions within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order. Though the first order, dated 19.11.1981 did not specify any period for the execution of the lease deed, the second order, dated 30.03.1982 specifically specified the time limit for registration. But the defendant did not choose to execute any lease deed in favour of the Devasthanam and while continuing the possession over the buildings dragged Devasthanam to a long drawn battle by changing his versions from time to time.
38. Assuming for a moment that Ex.B1, dated 18.11.1990 is a bona fide document, since the written lease was not executed by the tenant and the same was not registered, Ex.B1 proceedings cannot confer any rights, whatsoever, on the tenant, more so, in the light of Rule 145 of the Rules, where under it is stated that no person shall be allowed to exercise his rights under the lease, until he has executed the lease deed. Coming to the admission made by the Assistant Executive Officer as PW1 in the witness box, I already observed that he admitted that in Ex/B1 it is stated that it is a permanent lease. On that ground it cannot be presumed that he admitted that the lease is a permanent one, without considering the evidence in its entirety. He might have stated in Ex.B1 that it is a permanent lease. At any rate, any such evidence contrary to the evidence cannot be given much credence. Hence, the tenant cannot take shelter under the evidence of PW1 to contend that the lease is a permanent one.
39. In RAMACHANDER V/s MOHAN LAL, 1982 ALT 240, a learned Single Judge of this Court had an occasion to consider whether the permanent lease of immovable property can be validly created without a valid instrument and observed as follows:
"The principal question if not the only question that arises in this case is whether a permanent lease of immoveable property can be validly created without a registered instrument.
Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act enacts the mode in which a lease may be made. It provides that a lease of immoveable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent can only be made by a registered instrument. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act enacts a rule for the duration and determination of leases in cases not governed by local law, contract or usage. The section lays down that a lease of immoveable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable, on the part of either lesser or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy. A lease of immoveable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable on the part of either lesser or lessee by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy. The lease itself has been defined under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act as a transfer of the right of enjoyment of immoveable property for a certain time in consideration of a price paid or promised to be paid to the transferer by the transferee who accepts the transfer.
The specific defence taken by the defendant in the written statement as well as both the Courts below was that the lease granted to him was a permanent lease by the first owner, i.e., late Hariprasad and therefore, the lease was terminable. In his evidence as D.W.1 he stated that he took for the first time the vacant land of lease from Hariprasad from 1954. According to him, it was an oral lease. Subsequently, however, he obtained permission from late Hariprasad under Ex.B1 to construct a tin-sheet shed and two rooms and a wall on 20.6.1954. He, there after constructed the rooms and the shed. He has admitted that he took it agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. 40/- per month for the site. There is no dispute that the lease was not created by any registered instrument. But the registration of a lease of immoveable property for more than one year is compulsory. If the registration is compulsory under Section 107, then any un-registered lease for more than one year would be void under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act."
40. To the same effect, a Division of the Patna High Court in DARBARI LAL MUDI V/s BANEEGANI COAL ASSOCIATION LTD, AIR 1944 PATNA 30 held as follows:
"A permanent settlement not created by registered instrument is void under the provisions of S.107 and the tenancy is under S.106 deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable either on the part of the lessor or the lessee by 15 days notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy. A permanent tenancy cannot be created by estoppel without a registered instrument."
41. The effect of non-registration of a lease involving immovable property was considered by the Supreme Court in RAGHUNATH V/s KEDARNATH, , wherein their Lordships held as follows:
"For these decisions have been superseded by subsequent legislation i.e., by the enactment of Act 21 of 1929 which by inserting in Section 49 of the Registration Act the words 'or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", has, made it clear that the documents in the supplemental list i.e., the documents of which registration is necessary under the Transfer of Property Act but not under the Registration Act fall within the scope of Section 49 of the Registration Act and if not registered are not admissible as evidence of any transaction affecting any immoveable property comprised therein, and do not affect any such immovable property."
42. From the above it is seen that a document, which has to be registered under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and not registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, the document falls under Section 49 of the Registration Act and the same is not admissible in evidence of any transaction affecting any immovable property.
43. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in SATISH CHAND MAKHAN V/s GOVARDHAN DAS BYAS, held as follows:
"The unregistered draft lease agreement Ex.B-2 was clearly inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act, except for the collateral purpose of proving the nature and character of possession of the defendants. The document Exh.B-2 was admissible under the proviso to Section 49 only for a collateral purpose of showing the nature and character of possession of the defendants. The proviso to Section 49 was however not applicable in the present case inasmuch as the terms of a lease are not a "collateral purpose" within its meaning. It follows that the unregistered draft lease agreement Exh.B-2 was inadmissible in evidence to prove the transaction of lease. It was also ineffectual to create a valid lease for a renewed term of nine years for want of registration as required under S. 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act."
44. From the above Judgment it is seen that an unregistered document is admissible in evidence for collateral purpose to show the nature and character of the possession of the person but not to prove the very transaction itself. In the case on hand, there is no lease deed at all in existence. Hence, it cannot be said that the lease in favour of the tenant is a permanent lease. For all the above reasons, I hold that the lease in favour of the tenant is not a permanent lease and the issue is accordingly answered.
45. WHETHER THE QUIT NOTICE IS BAD IN LAW:
The question that falls for consideration is whether the quit notices served on the tenant in Exs.A9, 11 and 13 relating to the suit schedule premises, dated 20.09.1995 are in conformity with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
46. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 contemplates that in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable by 15 days notice on either side.
47. Whether this is a lease for manufacturing process or lease from month to month basis, the quit notice do not fulfill the time limit prescribed under the Act. Hence, Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel contends that the action of the Devasthanam is hit by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
48. In THE JOINT COMMISSIONER, ENDOWMENTS DEPARTMENT, A.P., HYDERABADE V/s SHAIK MEERA SAHEB, AIR 1977 AP 100, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:
"From a reading of the above provisions, the tenants of Religious or Charitable Institutions who continue to be in possession, after the expiry of lease, or after the cancellation of lease are termed as "encroachers". The Commissioner before the order of eviction is passed in the prescribed manner under Section 75 is required to give notice to them as to why the lease be not terminated or cancelled as the case may be. The above section contemplates the three sets of persons as encroachers viz (1) a lessee whose term of the lease has expired; or (2) a lessee who even after notice continues in possession and (3) a lessee whose lease is cancelled by the Commissioner. Under Cl.(2) of Section 78, the affected persons may file objections before the appropriate authority and under sub-section (4) the authorities are to pass the appropriate orders. A revision under Section 82 is provided against the orders of eviction. In the event of an encroacher not delivering possession, the mode of eviction is prescribed in Section 76 of the Act.
These provisions together lead us to the conclusion that provisions under the Act are a self-contained Code. They provide mode and the manner the leases are to be terminated or cancelled. Further, if the encroachers have not delivered the property, the Commissioner to approach the First Class Magistrate of the area and other incidental matters are set out in sub-clause (2) of that Section. The provisions of Transfer of Property Act, therefore, do not apply and no (notice for) termination of the tenancy is required to be issued.
Having regard to these special provisions, in Act 17 of 1966, we are of the view that the provisions of the Act, especially the Chapter XI of the Act are 'local laws' as contemplated under Section 106 of the Act and a Code for the purpose of determination or for "cancellation" of tenancies. In view of these special provisions, the requirement of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable".
49. A Division Bench of the Supreme Court in SHANTI DEVI V/s AMAL KUMAR, AIR 1981 SC 1550 held that in case, the lease is for a definite term and expired by afflux of time by reason of S. 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. So, the service of a notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary.
50. Admittedly, in this case, Ex.A1, dated 19.11.1981 and Ex.A2, dated 30.03.1982 are two proceedings under which lease deeds relating to the plaint schedule premises, according to which, the allotment of the building is purely temporary and the tenant has to vacate the building as soon as the bus stand is shifted from the present place or present lease period comes to an end (ie) 31.3.1983, which ever is earlier. In this case, the lease period expired long back and even the bus stand was demolished in the year 1987. But the tenant did not choose to vacate the premises and dragged the Institution into an endless litigation. Hence, following the judgment of the Supreme Court in SHANTI DEVI's case (supra-10), I hold that no quit notice need be given to the tenant, since the lease in his favour expired by afflux of time way back in 1983. Assuming for a moment that quit notice is necessary in this case, the notices given by Devasthanam on 20.09.1995 directing the tenant to vacate the premises by 29.09.1995 were received by the tenant on 27.09.1995 and on the ground that notice is not in conformity with unamended Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the notice cannot be declared as invalid in the light of amending Act of 2002.
51. Sub-section 3 of the amended Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is made clear that notice issued under Sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, when a suit or proceedings is filed after expiry of the period mentioned in that Section. This amendment is made applicable to all pending proceedings at the commencement of the Act and even to those cases where quit notices were issued before commencement of the Act and the proceedings were initiated after commencement of the Act. In this case, Devasthanam stated in the quit notice dated 20.09.1995 that the tenant has to vacate the premises by 29.09.1995 and the notice was received by the tenant on 27.09.1995 before expiry of the time limit specified for vacating the premises, the eviction suit was filed in 1997 (ie) one and half years after the expiry of the quit notice.
52. WHETHER THE TENANT CAN BE CONSIDERED AS TENANT HOLDING OVER:
The next question to be considered is whether the defendant can be treated as a tenant by holding over.
53. From the factual background of this case it is seen that practically the parties are in Court since 1981, one claiming vacant possession of the premises and the other continuing in possession by managing the officers in getting extension orders or under the interim orders of the Court. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the defendant cannot be treated as a tenant holding over the property.
54. The position of a tenant holding over the property was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION Ltd., V/s KHWAJA ASADULLAH BAIG, 1996(2) ALD 258 9(D.B.) to the following effect:
"We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being a tenant at sufferance need not pay anything more than the rent stipulated under the lease. It is fairly well settled that in a case of tenancy at sufferance, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. It is an admitted case that the respondent did not accept the rent and the position of the appellant after the expiry of the lease is without the permission or consent of the landlord. Such possession, although it may amount to judicial possession and the person in possession cannot be evicted except by due process of law, it is not on the same footing as a tenant at will. M.N. Venkatachalaiah, J., as he then was, sitting in a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court explained the concept of tenancy at sufferance in the following words (vide M/s. Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. V. L.D. Souza(3) "If, after the expiry of the period of lease or after its determination, a tenant merely holds over without the landlords' consent there is no tenancy of any kind at all. If in such case, the tenant continues in possession without landlord's consent, he becomes what in English law is called a 'tenant by suferance'. This is really no tenancy at all in the strict sense and requires no notice to determine it, the expression being merely a fiction to avoid the continuance of possession operating as a trespass. It is different from the concept of a tenancy at will which arises by implication of law in certain cases of permissive possession. No notice is necessary to terminate a tenancy at sufferance. But the case of tenancy by holding over is different and is governed by the provisions of Section 116, T.P. Act. Tenancy by holding-over is a creature of a bilateral consensual act and does not come into existence by a mere unilateral intendment or declaration of one of the parties".
In the case of unlawful possession of a tenant at sufferance, the liability arises ex delicto and he will be liable for damages in the form of mesne profits. Therefore, in ultimate analysis, whether the position of the appellant is that of a trespasser or a tenant at sufferance, it hardly makes any difference as far as the liability of the defendant to compensate".
55. From the above, it is seen that in case of a tenancy by sufferance, in the direct sense, there is really no tenancy and notice is required to determine it. Assuming for a moment that the tenant is holding over the property, the only benefit that he can derive from the judgment is that he need not pay any amount towards damages over and above the stipulated rent till he is evicted. The case of tenancy by holding over, is covered by the provisions of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. The tenancy by holding over is a creator of Bilateral Consensual Act and does not come into existence by a mere unilateral intendment or declaration of one of the parties. From this, the tenant cannot contend that he is a tenant holding over, since there was no consent from the Devasthanam to continue him as a tenant holding over and by his mere unilateral intendment or declaration the tenancy do not confer on him the status of a tenant holding over the property.
56. WHETHER RESOLUTION OF THE TRUST BOARD DATED 31.03.1994 IS BAD ON THE GROUND OF NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUDI ALTERM PARITERM:
Nextly, whether the resolution No. 1305 dated 31.03.1994 rescinding the earlier resolution, dated 11.11.1990 (Ex.A7) of the Board of T.T.D. violates the principles of natural justice.
57. It is true that the above resolution was passed without giving any notice to the tenant.
58. Now the question falls for consideration is whether the resolution has to be declared as an illegal and void resolution.
Firstly, I am of the opinion that the very resolution of the specified authority dated 11.11.1990 is contrary to the statutory rules framed by the Government as well as the Law of the land and it is a void one. Since it is a void resolution, no rights can be conferred on the tenant under the said resolution. Hence, I am of the view that the Devasthanam is justified in withdrawing the said resolution by a subsequent resolution, dated 31.03.1994. Assuming for a moment that this resolution is a void one, the Court may in appropriate cases decline to grant relief even if it holds that the order is void. In state of RAJASTHAN V/s D.R.LAXMI, the Supreme Court held to the following effect:
" The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for, the award of the Court under Section 26 enhancing the compensation was also accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. Under those circumstances, the acquisition proceedings having become final and the compensation determined also having become final, the High Court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6."
59. Further, except contending that no notice was given before the impugned resolution was passed by the Devasthanam, the tenant did not place any material to show how his interests are affected and how the resolution is bad in law. First of all, I am of the opinion that it is an administrative decision taken by the Board and no notice is required to be given.
60. In K.L.TRIPATHI V/s STATE BANK OF INDIA, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"Shri Sharma conducted the investigation between 9th June to 23rd June, 1974 and in the course of investigation, he visited Deoria and Gorakhpur. On 9th September, 1974, charges were framed. The information Shri Sharma could gather was that M/s. Jamuna Prasad Munni Lal Jaiswal, Station Road, Deoria was a sole proprietorship concern with Shri Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal as the sole proprietor. Their business was to deal in scrap iron, which they purchased from Sugar Mills around Deoria and from other sources. The firm maintained a current account only with an average balance of Rs. 10,000/-. There was no opinion reporting on record with the Branch. It appeared that the firm had no experience in oil business. Shri Sharma enquired from Mr. Tripathi. From the report of Shri Sharma, it appears that in respect of all relevant entries upon which he has based his conclusion, he asked Shri Tripathi, after giving him the gist of the relevant materials gathered from other person in the absence of the appellant and asked his opinion or explanation in respect of those. We have examined the report of Shri Sharma and find that at all stages in respect of all the matters mentioned in the report, the appellant was associated with the preliminary investigation and his versions or explanations were sought for and recorded".
61. In ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY V/s MANSOOR ALIKHAN, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows:
"As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta V. Union of India there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Govt. of A.P., it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice.
Chinnappa Reddy, J in S.L. Kapoor case laid down two exceptions (at scc P.395) namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception....
The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. Since K.L. Tripathi vs. State Bank of India, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.(as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wade's Administrtive Law (5th Edn., p.p. 472-75), as follows: (SCC P.58, para 31) It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent...., There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth".
Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala V. S.K. Sharma. In that case, the Principle of "prejudice" has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P."
62. From this it is seen that even assuming for a moment that without admitting that a notice is required to be given to the tenant before canceling the ex facie illegal resolution, dated 11.11.1990, the tenant did not say what prejudice he suffered by not giving the notice to him. Since the very resolution on which he placed a strong reliance, is a void resolution and no rights were accrued to him under that resolution. A person in whose favour no rights were conferred under a void resolution, need not be put on notice before canceling the illegal resolution. Hence, I reject this contention also.
63. WHETHER THE TENANT IS AN ENCROACHER:
Sri S. Ramachandra rao, learned counsel also contends that on expiry of lease, a tenant cannot be treated as an encroacher. In support of his contention, he cited a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in NALLI SANYASI NAIDU V/s MAHARAJA ALKA NARAYANA SOCIETY OF ARTS & SCIENCES (MANASA), REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, VIJAYANAGARAM, . In this case, the lands in possession of the tenant are agricultural lands and after striking down of Section 82 of the Endowments Act, relating to the agricultural lands, all tenancies relating to agricultural lands have to be dealt with under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Act. Dealing with such a situation, his Lordship observed as follows:
"After expiry of the lease, the tenant in possession cannot be treated as an encroacher, under the provisions of Section 82 of the Endowments Act. Merely on the ground that the period of lease expired and therefore, he becomes as an encroacher".
64. The case on hand falls under Section 83 read with Section 118 of the Endowments Act dealing with non-agricultural lands. Hence, that judgment has no application.
65. The learned counsel also cited the judgment of DAMODARAM's case. Since I have already held that resolution, dated 11.11.1990 is not the result of a compromise entered into between the parties, the judgment would not come to the aid of the tenants contention before canceling the earlier resolution.
66. Hence, for the foregoing reasons, both on fraud and merits, I have no option except to set aside the judgment of the trial court in O.S. No. 203 of 1995 filed by the tenant, holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the disputes relating to the tenancy of the building under the Endowments Act is held to be wrong in the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the relief sought for in O.S. No. 203 of 1995 after amendment of the relief, that he is a permanent lessee cannot be granted and it is accordingly dismissed. With regard to the direction given by the trial Court in O.S. No. 79 of 1999 filed by the Devasthanam, since the tenant did not file any appeal, with regard to the finding recorded by the Trial Court, the Devasthanam authorities are at liberty to work out their remedies as per law.
67. In the last Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel submitted that in the event of deciding the case against his client, he must be given three months time to vacate the premises. Having seen the conduct of the tenant, I am sure, even if one day time is given, he is capable of maneuvering the things and can squat over the property for any length of time or he may even manipulate things in his favour and get the lease renewed in his favour permanently and the court is expected to extend its helping hand to the clients who come to the court with clean hands but not to the clients who abuse the process of the court and defeat the law of the land. In this case, the tenant tried to cheat Kaliyuga Daiva and not the human beings, without any fear or apprehension that God may harm him. Perhaps, in his view, the God would not punish the sinners. Hence, I am not inclined to grant any time to the appellant-tenant to vacate the premises, since he has enjoyed the premises for more than two and half decades, with the active connivance, co-operation and co-ordination of the officers of the T.T.D., more so by paying the rent fixed in 1978 without any enhancement. Hence, the appellant-tenant should vacate the premises immediately and hand over the vacant possession to the Devasthanam. I am fortified in my view by a judgment of a Division Bench of this court in W.A. No. 1802 of 2001, dated 26.11.2001, wherein it was held that "as rightly pointed out by the Devasthanam in their letter dated 26.11.2001, the continuance of the appellant/tenant in the premises in question is not only illegal, but also unlawful. The appellant/tenant is, therefore, directed to vacate the premises in question within two days from today, failing which, Devasthanam is at liberty to seek police aid for removing the appellant/petitioner from the premises in question and thereupon put the highest tenderer in possession."
68. For the above said reasons, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.