Madras High Court
A.Pavadai vs The Revenue Divisional Officer on 6 February, 2014
Author: S.Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 06.02.2014
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR
W.P.No.37980 of 2003
A.Pavadai ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The Revenue Divisional Officer,
Revenue Divisional Office,
Kallakurichi, Villupuram.
2. The Superintendent of Police,
Villupuram, Villupuram District.
3. The Station House Officer,
Chinna Salem Police Station,
Chinna Salem, Kallakurichi Taluk,
Villupuram District.
4. The Station House Officer,
Attur Police Station,
Attur, Salem District.
5. The Correspondent,
St. Little Flower Higher Secondary School,
Chinna Salem,
Kallakurichi Taluk,
Villupuram District.
6. The State of Tamil Nadu,
rep., by its Secretary to Government,
Home Department,
7. The State of Tamil Nadu,
rep., by its Secretary to Government,
Education Department,
Fort St. George, Chennai 600 009. ... Respondents
[Respondents 6 and 7 are impleaded,
vide order of this Court, dated 04.07.2012,
in W.P.M.P.No.226 of 2012]
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India praying for the issuance of Writ of Mandamus, directing the 5th respondent to pay the petitioner a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- towards compensation for the death of his son, P.Suresh, in the custody of the 5th respondent on 21.12.1999 and award costs.
For Petitioner : Mr.S.Ayyadurai
For Respondents 1 to 4 : Mr.K.V.Dhanapalan,
Addl. Govt. Pleader
For 5th Respondent : Mr.D.Nellaippan
O R D E R
The petitioner has sought for a Mandamus, directing St. Little Flower Higher Secondary School, Chinna Salem, Kallakurichi Taluk, Villupuram District, 5th respondent herein, to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation for the death of his son, Minor P.Suresh, who was in the custody of the 5th respondent-School on 21.12.1999 and award costs.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that his son, P.Suresh, aged about 5 years, was a student of Pre-Primary Class in St. Little Flower Higher Secondary School, Chinna Salem, 5th respondent. His daughter was also a student, in the same School. According to the petitioner, on 21.12.1999 Morning, he dropped his son in the said School and at 1.00 P.M., gave lunch. Around 4.00 P.M., when he went to the School to pick up his children, his daughter alone was there. His son was not found in the School premises. When he enquired the class teacher, Ms.Diana and other teachers, their reply was not satisfactory. Despite a thorough search and enquiry in all the places, his son's whereabouts were not known. Hence, at 8.00 P.M., he lodged a complaint with the Station House Officer, Attur Police Station, Salem District, 3rd respondent. But no receipt was issued.
3. The petitioner has further submitted that on 23.12.1999, his younger brother, Mr.Arumugam and one of his relatives, informed him that a boy's dead body was found in a well, at Ottanparai Village, about 30 Kms., away from Chinna Salem, where the School is situated. Hearing the news, he went to Ottanparai. Before he could reach the place, the Village Administrative Officer, Thulukkanoor Village, has lodged a complaint with Attur Police Station and based on the same, the Station House Officer, Attur Police Station, Attur, Salem District, 4th respondent herein, has registered a case in Cr.No.2787 of 1999, for the offence under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The body of the child was taken to Government Hospital, Attur.
4. The petitioner has further submitted that, as his son was aged 5 years, studying in Pre-Primary class, he could not have travelled alone, to such a long distance, from Chinna Salem to Ottanparai. According to him, further enquiry made with other students, revealed that the child was seen in the school. Probably the death would have taken place, due to the negligence of the 5th respondent-School.
5. The petitioner has further submitted that on 28.12.1999, he met the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Chinna Salem and complained about the inaction of the Police. On her direction, another complaint was lodged with Chinna Salem Police Station, 3rd respondent herein, against the School. Representations to the District Collector, Villupuram, and Hon'ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu were also made. There were agitations against the 5th respondent-School, for the death of his minor boy, P.Suresh.
6. The petitioner has further submitted that Crl.O.P.No.12956 of 2000 was filed before this Court, and by an order, dated 21.02.2001, this Court, directed the Police to investigate the case and file a report. On 12.06.2001, the petitioner also sent a petition to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, Chennai; the District Collector, Villupuram; and the Superintendent of Police, Villupuram, to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-, by the 5th respondent-School, for the death of his son. A lawyer's notice was also sent to the 5th respondent-School. But to the petitioner's shock, the 5th respondent sent a reply, stating that his minor son never studied, in the 5th respondent-School.
7. It is the further case of the petitioner that further enquires in the School revealed that there was a open sump, in the School premises and that the boy might have gone there and slipped into the sump and died. But the school authorities have concealed the death. According to the petitioner, the contention of the 5th respondent-School that the minor boy was not admitted to the School is false. The petitioner belongs to the weaker section of the society. Loss of minor boy has caused mental agony and hardship. Despite his humble request, respondents 1 to 4 have not conducted any proper enquiry and investigation, and in order to save the 5th respondent-School, the cause of death and the entire matter has been covered up.
8. In the case bundle, only a true copy of the counter affidavit, filed by the 5th respondent-School, is available. The school has opposed the maintainability of the writ petition. According to the deponent of the counter affidavit, though respondents 1 to 4 have been shown as parties, no relief has been sought for, against them. It is the contention of the deponent of the counter affidavit of the 5th respondent-School that the petitioner ought to have approached the Civil Court, if there is any grievance. It is her further contention that the official respondents 1 to 4 have been impleaded only to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9. Without prejudice to the objection, regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, the 5th respondent-School has submitted that there was no LKG or UKG class, in the School. Son of the petitioner, Minor P.Suresh was not admitted in any standard, in the School. Petitioner's daughter, Minor Sukandhi, alone was studying in the School. All other averments made in the supporting affidavit to the writ petition, have been denied. The 5th respondent-School has also denied the contention that there was an open sump in the School premises, for the hostel students, and that the Minor boy might have slipped into the sump and died, and that the School authorities, have concealed his death, fearing police action, is also denied. According to the 5th respondent-School, since the School was not the custodian of the boy, there is no question of payment of compensation, for the loss of life of the minor boy.
10. The petitioner in his reply affidavit, has reiterated that his minor boy was admitted in Kindergarden Classes, called as, Baby class, in the 5th respondent-School. He has expressed his anguish that it was unfortunate for the Correspondent of the 5th respondent-School, to have made a false statement in this Court that the child was not admitted in the School. He has further stated that the class teacher of the minor boy, Ms.Diana was subsequently removed from service.
11. It is the further contention of the petitioner that his neighbour's daughter, studying in the said School, has told the petitioner that she had seen the minor boy, sitting on the Wall of the sump, and playing there, by thumbing water. According to the petitioner, the 5th respondent-School, which was the custodian of the boy, has failed to protect his son, and therefore, liable to pay compensation.
12. As respondents 1 to 4 have not filed any counter affidavit. They were directed to produce the files, in connection with the Criminal case, registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C., on the file of Attur Police Station.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
13. Record of proceedings shows that in this Writ Petition, on 19.06.2012, this Court passed the following order, "Though on the last occasion, learned Additional Government Pleader was directed to find out the outcome of the investigation report said to have been submitted to the Criminal Court and the orders passed thereon, there is no response from the respondents. He also submitted that the original file, pertaining to the investigation of mysterious death registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C., is also not available and that efforts are being made to trace out the same. Post on 26.06.2012, for final adjudication and it is made clear that no further adjournments would be granted."
14. Vide order, dated 04.07.2012, in W.P.M.P.No.226 of 2012, the Secretary to Government, Home Department and Secretary to Government, Education Department, Chennai-9, have been impleaded as respondents 6 and 7, respectively.
15. Perusal of the file in Cr.No.2787 of 1999, registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C., on the file of Attur Police Station, Attur, shows that on 23.12.1999, an FIR has been registered, at the instance of Mr.R.Perumal, Village Administrative Officer, Thulukkanoor Village, Attur, to the effect that there was an unidentified body of a boy in Ottanparai Village, in Survey No.209, belonging to one Karuppiah of Ottanparai.
16. Mr.A.Ganesan, Inspector of Police, Attur Police Station, has taken up the investigation. The Village Administrative Officer, in his complaint, has stated that the deceased boy was wearing a brown colour pant and checked white colour full hand shirt. The Certificate issued by the Senior Civil Surgeon, General Hospital, Attur, dated 03.01.2001, did not state anything about the cause of death, as chemical report was awaited.
17. The available files pertaining to Cr.No.2787 of 1999, registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C., on the file of Attur Police Station, Salem District, reflects representation of the writ petitioner and the agitation by the local people, seeking action against the 5th respondent-School, for the mysterious death.
rpd;d nryk; g[dpj rpWkyu; nky; epiyg;gs;sppapy; goj;j 5?taJ rpWtd; Rnuc&; 21/12/99 md;W ku;kkhd Kiwapy; Mj;J}upy; tay; fhl;L fpzw;wpy; ,we;J fple;jhd;/ ,e;j Jau rk;gtk; rk;ke;jkhf gs;sp epu;thfj;jpd; kPJ g[yd; tprhuiz elj;j nfhupa[k; rpWtid ,He;J jtpf;Fk; FLk;gj;jpw;F ec&;l<L tH';f nfhupa[k;
,e;jpa $dehaf thypgu; r';fj;jpd; rhu;gpy;
Mu;g;ghl;lk;
ehs; 3/1/2000 jp';fl;fpHik fhiy 11/00 kzp ,lk; rpd;d nryk; tUtha; Ma;thsu; mYtyfk; Kd;g[ jiyik njhHu; P. gHdp DYFI xd;wpa brayhsu;
tpsf;;ft[iu njhHu;. P.Rg;gpukzpad; tp/bjh/r khtl;l jiytu;
njhHu; T. VGkiy njhHu; P. bja;tPfd;
DYFI khtl;l jiytu; CPM tl;l brayhsu;
njhHu; L. uhkrhkp njhHu; T. khupKj;J
tp/r/ tl;lj; jiytu; tp/bjh/r/ tl;lj; jiytu;
,tz;
DYFI
rpd;d nryk; xd;wpa FG
FoapUf;f kid ,y;yhj jhH;j;jg;gl;l. gpw;gLj;jg;gl;l kf;fs; midtUf;Fk; y";rk; CHypd;wp ,ytr kidg; gl;lh tH';Ff ! tajhd Kjpnahu; midtUf;Fk; bgd;c&d; tH';F ! jkpHf muR mwptpj;j go bgz;fSf;F tptrha ntiyf;F rl;lf; Typ U:/ 45 vd;gij mKy; gLj;Jf ! tpGg;g[uk; khtl;lj;jpy; fpuhk';fspy; "Mwhf tHpe;njhLk;" fs;sr; rhuhaj;ij jLf;f eltof;if vL ! rpd;;;;;d nryk; R.C.gs;spapy; goj;j 5 taJ rpWtd; Rnuc;& Mj;J}upy; ,we;J fple;j ku;kk; vd;d? R.C.gs;sp epu;thfpfis ifJ bra;J cz;ikia btspf; bfhz;L tUf! jkpHf munr! fhty; Jiwna! tpGg;g[uk; tl;lk; gs;spg[Jg;gl;L fpuhkj;jpy; fw;gHpj;J bfhiy bra;ag;gl;;l Fg;gk;khs; w/o.nfhtpe;jrhkp tHf;fpy; rk;ke;jg;gl;l bfhoatu;fis ifJ bra;f ! tpGg;g[uk; tl;lk; tGjht{u; fpuhkj;jpy; br';fy; R{isj; bjhHpyhsp f';fhnjtp w/o.fUzhgpufhrk; tHf;fpy; fw;gHpj;j fatu;fis ifJ bra;f ! Mu;g;ghl;lk;
ehs;: 10/2/2000 tpahHf;fpHik fhiy 11/00 kzpastpy;
,lk;: tUtha; MgP!; Kd;. rpd;d nryk;
jiyik njhHu; T. khupKj;J fy;iy tl;;;;lj; jiytu;.
tpsf;;ft[iu njhHu;. K.fypad; tp/bjh/r khtl;l brayhsu;
njhHu; P. bja;tPfd; njhHu; K. Jsrpjh!;
CPM tl;l brayhsu; CPM tl;l FG
njhHu; P. gHdp njhHu; L. Uhkrhkp
DYFI xd;wpa brayhsu; tp/r/ tl;lj; jiytu;
bfhLikfis fz;oj;J midtUk; jpuz;L thuPu; !!
,tz; ;
mfpy ,e;j;p;a t;ptrhaj; bjhHpyhsu; r';fk;
rpd;d nryk; gFjp
18. Files further disclose that Crl.O.P.No.12956 of 2000 has been filed by the petitioner, seeking for a direction to the Superintendent of Police, Cental Bureau of Investigation, Chennai, the 7th respondent therein, to investigate the crime, relating to the death of Minor Suresh. On the undertaking given by the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side), Government of Tamil Nadu, a direction has been given to the local Police to complete the investigation and file a final report, within two weeks.
19. Files also contain exchange of notices, between the petitioner and the 5th respondent-School. Though the 5th respondent-School has denied the contention that the deceased minor boy was not a student in the 5th respondent-School, perusal of the file indicates that the deceased was very much a student of the 5th respondent-School. Statement of Mr.R.Perumal, Village Administrative Officer, Thulukkanoor Village, Attur, recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Attur, indicates that the deceased was a school student:
"thf;FK:yk; : R. bgUkhs;. fpuhk eph;thf mYtyh; JYf;fD}h; fpuhkk;. Mj;J}h;
ehd; JYf;fD}h; fpuhk eph;thf mYtuhf gzpg[hpe;J tUfpnwd;/ ,d;W 23/12/1999Mk; njjp fhiy Rkhh; 8/30 kzpf;F ehd; vdJ mYtyfj;jpy; ,Ue;j nghJ vdJ cjtpahsh; gHdp te;J v';fs; fpuhkj;jpw;Fw;gl;l xl;lk; ghiw buapy;nt iyd; mUfpy; rh;nt vz;/209 Tj;jd; fUg;ghap vd;gtUfSf;F brhe;jkhd fpzw;wpy; xU rpWtd; gpnujk; fplg;gjhf jfty; brhd;djpd; nghpy; rk;gt ,lk; te;J ghh;j;njd; Rkhh; 8 taJ kjpf;f jf;f fhg;gp fyh; ngz;l; bts;is fl;lk; nghl;l gput[d; fyh; rl;il mzpe;j rpWtd; gpzk; ftpH;e;j epiyapy; kpje;J bfhz;L ,Ue;jJ/ ehd; mf;fk; gf;fKs;s Ch;fspy; cjtpahsh; K:yk; jz;nlhuh nghlr; brhy;yp tprhhpj;Jg; ghh;j;njd;/ xU jftYk; ,y;iy/ ,we;J nghd rpWtd; gs;spf;Tlk; gof;Fk; rpWtd; nghy; bjhpfpwJ/ ,J rk;ke;jkhf ehd; fhty; epiyak; te;J g[fhh; bfhLj;jjpd; nghpy; Mj;J}h; fhty; cjtp Ma;thsh; eP';fs; rk;gt ,lk; te;J ghh;itapl;L gfy; 12/00 kzpf;F ghh;it kf$h; jahh; bra;jPh;fs;/ mjpy; ehDk; cjtpahsh; gHdpa[k; ifbaGj;J nghl;nlhk;/ ,d;W ,J rk;ke;jkhf Mj;J}h; fhty; cjtp Ma;thsh; eP';fs; vd;id tprhhpf;f rk;gtk; gw;wpr; brhd;ndd;/ xg;gk;-= fhty; cjtp Ma;thsh;
Mj;J}h; fhty; epiyak;
23/12/99
20. Statement of one Mr.Palani of Thulukkanoor Village, is as follows:
"thf;FK:yk; : gHdp. taJ j/bg/ ,e;jpuh efh; JYf;fD}h; fpuhkk; Mj;J}h/;
ehd; Jyf;fD}h; fpuhkk; ,e;jpuh efhpy; vd; Flk;gj;Jld; FoapUe;Jf; bfhz;L JYf;fD}h; fpuhk cjtpahsuhf gzpahw;wp tUfpnwd;/ ,d;W 23/12/99 Mk; njjp fhiy vd; tPl;ow;F mUfpy; cs;s gf;fj;J Cuhd xl;lk; ghiw buapy;nt iyd; mUfpy; xU fpzw;wpy; xU rpWtd; gpnujk; fplg;gjhf Ch;fhuh; ngrpf; bfhz;ljpd; nghpy; te;J ghh;j;njd;/ gpnujk; fplf;Fk; fpzW rh;nt vz;/209 Tj;jd; fUg;ghap vd;gth;fSf;F brhe;jkhd fpzw;wpy; fple;jJ/ ehd; tprhhpf;f igaidg; gw;wpa jfty; vJk; bjhpatpy;iy/ gpwF fhiy 8\ kzp RkhUf;F vdJ fpuhk eph;thf mYtyh; mth;fsplk; mYtyfj;jpw;F brd;W jfty; bfhLj;njd;/ mjd; gpd;g[ ehDk;. vdJ VAOt[k; kWgo rk;gt ,lj;jpw;F te;J ghh;j;njhk;/ v';f VAOt[k; fhl;Lf;fhu';f kw;Wk; mf;fk; gf;fj;jpy; cs;sth;fsplk; tprhhpj;jhh;/ xU jftYk; ,y;iy/ mg;g[wk; eh';fSk; jz;nlhuh nghl;L jfty; brhy;ypg; ghh;j;njhk;/ xU jftYk; ,y;iy/ nkw;go ,we;J nghd rpWtd; gs;sp rpWtd; nghy; bjhpfpwJ/ ,J rk;ke;jkhf VAO mth;fs; Mj;J}h; fhty; epiyak; te;J g[fhh; bfhLj;J te;jjpd;nghpy; Mj;J}h; fhty; epiya cjtp Ma;thsh; eP';fs; gfy; 12/00 kzpf;F rk;gt ,lk; te;J ghh;itapl;L ghh;it kf$h; jahh; bra;jPh;fs;/ mjpy; ehDk; VAOt[k; cld; ,Ue;J ifbaGj;J nghl;nlhk;/ ,J rk;ke;jkhf vd;id eP';fs; tprhhpf;f ele;jij brhd;ndd;/ xg;gk;-= fhty; cjtp Ma;thsh;
Mj;J}h; fhty; epiyak;
Mj;J}h;/ 23/12/99
21. The Report, dated 24.12.1999, is as follows:
"Mj;J}h; fhty; epiya Fw;w vz;/ 2787-99 tHf;fpy; ,w;Jnghd Rnuc&; taJ 5. S/o.ghthil vd;gtuJ gpnujj;jpd; kPJ Mj;J}h; muR kUj;Jtkid rtf;fpl';fpy; 24/12/99 Mk; ehs; gpnuj tprhuiz bra;j mwpf;if 1/ g";rhaj;J egh;fspd; bgah;. tpyhrk;. tFg;g[ ($hjp) bjhHpy;
(1) khzpf;fk; 40 S/o.khhpft[z;lh;. fhe;jpg[uk;. td;dpah; Typ (2) e";rg;gd; 50 S/o.bghpad;dd;. xl;lk;ghiw ehl;Lft[z;lh; tptrhak;
(3) k/uhkrhkp 61 S/o.kUjKj;J xl;lk;ghiw td;dpah; tptrhak;
(4) f/uhkrhkp 60 S/o.fUg;gd;d gilahr;rp xl;lk;ghiw td;dpah; tptrhak;
(5) tp/nrfh; 32 S/o.tpuhrhkp xl;lk; ghiw Jyf;fD}h; eha[L O fil 2/ ,we;J nghdth; bgah;. mth; Mzh? bgz;zh? taJ. tFg;g[. bjhHpy;. jfg;gdhh;. bgah; tpyhrk;/ Rnuc&; - Mz; - 5 - thzpg";brl;oahh; - gs;spr; rpWtd; - j-bg ghthil - 6F tp$g[uk; rpd;dnryk;/ 3/ ,we;J fple;jij Kjypy; fz;lJ ahh;? vg;bghGJ v';nf?
23/12/99 Mk; njjp fhiy Rkhh; 6/30 kzp mstpy; fpzw;wpy; gpnujk; kpje;J bfhz;L ,Ue;jjij Kjypy; fz;lth; mf;fpzw;Wf;F brhe;jf;fhuhfpa fUg;ghap kfd; Tj;jd; Mthh;/ 4/ ,we;J nghdtiuf; filrpahf capnuhL fz;lJ ahh;? v';nf? vg;bghGJ? ahUld; Tl 21/12/99 Mk; njjp ,we;J nghd Rnuc&; rpd;dnryk; R.C. fpwp!;Jt gs;spapy; kjpa czt[ ntisapd; nghJ nkw;goahhpd; jfg;gdhh; ghthil vd;gtuhy; filrpahf capUld; ghh;j;jhf 5/ gpnujj;jpd; cauk;? epwk;? tpthpj;Jf; fhl;Lk; milahs';fs;
cauk; Rkhh; 3 mo 5 m';Fyk;
1/ ,lJ fhy; Kl;of;F fPH; xU fha jGk;g[ 2/ tyJ fhy; Kl;oapy; xU fha jGk;g[ 6/ jpUkzkhdtuh? jdp eguh? bgz;zhapUe;jhy;. mth; xnu kidtpjhdh?
gs;spr;rpWtd;
7/ gpnujj;jpd; epiyik. fha';fs; ,Ue;jhy; mitfisg; gw;wpa tptu';fs;. gpnujj;jpd; nky; fhzg;gLk; vy;yh brhj;Jf;fspd; gl;oay;
rtkhdJ Kfk;. fhJ kw;Wk; cly;fs; njhYhpe;j epiyapy; bts;is fl;lk; nghl;l gput[d; fyh; Kgif rl;il fhg;gp fyh; gput[d; ngz;l; mzpe;J fhzg;gLfpwJ/ 8/ gpnujk; fplf;Fk; ,lj;ijg; gw;wpa rhpahd tpguk;. jz;zPhpy; fhzg;gl;lhy; mjd; MHk;?
Jyf;fD}h; fpuhkk; xl;lk;ghiw rh;nt vz; 209 bfhz;l fUg;ghap vd;gtUf;F brhe;jkhd tptrhaj;jpw;fhf gad;gLj;jg;gLk; 45 mo MHKs;s fpzw;wpy; Rkhh; 44 mo jz;zPh; epuk;gps;sJ/
(m) fpzw;wpy; fhzg;gl;lhy;. me;jf; fpzW bghJ brhj;jh my;yJ jdp egh; brhj;jh? jdp egh; brhj;jhdhy; mJ ahUilaJ?
jdp egh; brhj;J fUg;ghap f-bg/ late m';frhkp xl;lk;ghiw vd;gtuJ fpzW/ (M) me;jf;fpzW bghJg; ghij my;yJ xw;iwaog; ghijf;F mUfpy; cs;sjh?
,y;iy (,) mjw;F ifg;gpor; RtUk;. bjg;gf;fl;ila[k;. ,Uf;fpd;wdth?
,y;iy 9/ vd;d fhuzj;jpdhy; kuzk; nehpl;ljhf njhd;WfpwJ vd;W tprhuiz bra;a[k; mjpfhhpapd; fUj;J 21/12/99Mk; njjp khiy gs;spapy; ,Ue;J fhzhky; nghdjhf Twg;gLk; ,we;J nghd Rnuc&; nkw;go njjpad;W gs;spf;F brd;Ws;sjhft[k; md;W khiy tHf;fk; nghy; my;yhky; neuj;jpDdlna (Kd; Tl;ona) gs;sp Koe;jgoahy;. miHj;J nghf jd; jfg;gdhh; me;j neuj;jpy; tutpy;iy vd;gjhy; tHp bjhpahky; gs;spia tpl;Lr; brd;W 2 jpd';fshf fhzhky; nghd rpWtd; new;W 23/12/99k; njjp xl;lk;ghiwapy; fpzw;wpy; kpje;jkha; kpje;Jf; bfhz;oUe;jjhf tprhuizapy; bjhpfpwJ/ 10/ bfhLik bra;ag;gl;L kuzk; nehpl;oUe;jhy; vd;d Ma[jk; gad;gLj;jg;gl;lJ?
gpnujk; ,wg;gpw;fhd kpfr; rhpahd fhuzk; bjspthf bjhpatpy;iy. tprhhpj;j tifapy; jz;zPhpy; K:H;fpajhy; kuzk; nehpl;oUf;fyhk; vd bjhpfpwJ/ 11/ (m) ve;j egh; kPJ re;njfk; ,Ue;jhy; ahh; kPJ? vd;d fhuzj;Jf;fhf vg;go?
,y;iy (M) ,we;J nghdth; v';fhtJ <l;LWjp bra;jpUe;jhuh?
bjhpatpy;iy 12/gpnujj;ij kUj;Jt ghpnrhjidf;F mDg;ghjpUe;jhy; Vd; mDg;gtpy;iy?
gpnuj tprhuiz Koj;J mDg;gp itf;fg;gLk;
13/ gpnujk; mDg;g;gl;lhy; vd;d fhuzj;jpw;fhf ahUila Mizapd;go ahh; K:ykhf vg;bghGJ mDg;gg;gl;lJ?
fhty; cjtp Ma;thsuhfpa vd;Dila cj;jputpd; nghpy; 24/12/99 Mk; njjpahd ,d;W Rnuc&; rtj;ij ,wg;gpd; rhpahd fhuzj;ij kUe;JthPjpahf mwpa[k; bghUl;L gpnuj ghpnrhjidf;fhf rtg; ghuh Kepfh 633 M/ghz;oad; vd;gth; K:yk; mDg;gp itf;fg;gLk;/ 14/ ahUila Mizapd;go gpnujk; g[[ijf;fg;gl;lJ. my;yJ bfhSj;jg;gl;lJ fhty; cjtp Ma;thsuhfpa vd;Dila Mizapd;go ,we;J nghd Rnuc&; rtj;ij gpnuj ghpnrhjidf;F gpd;dh; cwtpdh;fs; trk; FytHf;fg;go mlf;fk; bra;a xg;gilf;FkhW rtg;ghuh fhtyUf;F mwpt[Wj;jp mDg;gg;gLk;/ 15/ vd;d fhuzj;jpdhy; vt;tpjkhd kuzk; nehpl;lJ vd;w g";rhaj;jhh;fspd; fUj;J 21/12/99Mk; njjp fhiy gps;spf;F brd;w rpWtd; Rnuc&; kjpa czt[ ,ilntisf;F gpwF Kd; Tl;ona gs;sp Koe;Jtpl;ljhy; fhzhky; ngha; tpl;ljhf bjhpfpwJ/ gpwF 2 ehl;fs; njoa[k; rpWtd; 23/12/99Mk; njjpahd njjp fhiy xl;lk;ghiw mUnf cs;s fUg;ghap vd;gtuJ fpzw;wpy; gpzkhf kpje;Jf; bfhz;L ,Ue;jJ bjhpate;jJ/ nkw;go rpWtd; ,we;jJ jz;zPh; KH;fpajhy; Vw;gl;oUf;fyhk;/ Mdhy; rpd;d nryj;jpy; ,Ue;J ,';F te;J fpzw;wpy; te;J tpHe;jjw;fhd fhuzk; rhp tu brhpa tpy;iy/////////"
(emphasis supplied)
22. Both the parents of the deceased have given statements to the Police, to the effect that the boy, left in the School on 21.12.1999 Morning, did not return. They have also questioned, as to how the body of the minor boy, was found in a Well, at Ottanparai, 30 Kms., away from the School in Chinna Salem.
23. One Mrs.Prakashi, Head Master of St. Little Flower Higher Secondary School, Chinna Salem, has categorically stated that the minor boy was a student of the baby class. She has also deposed that on 21.12.1999, the boy had come to the School. Her further statement before the Police is to the effect that School boys used to take food near the sump. For the better details, her statement is extracted hereunder:
"thf;FK:yk; : gpufhc&;. Age : 47 D/o. RthpKj;J brl;oahh;/ rpWkyh; nky;epiyg;gs;sp/ rpd;dnryk;/ ehd; rpd;dnryk; rpWkyh; nky;epiyg;gs;spapy; jiyik Mrphpiaahf fle;j 3 tUlkhf ntiy ghh;j;J tUfpnwd;/ v';fsJ gs;spapy; nggp fpsh!; Kjy; 12k; tFg;g[ Koa khzt. khztpfs; goj;J tUfpwhh;fs;/ mnj rkak; bgz;fs;. khztpah; j';Fk; tpLjpapy; j';fp goj;J tUfpwhh;fs;/ mjpfhiy 5 kzpf;F khztpfis vGg;gpa[k; mjd; gpd; Fspj;jgpwF fhiy gpnuah; itj;J bjhGj gpd;g[ gog;gjw;F bry;tJ tHf;fk;/ rpd;dnryk; KUfd; nfhtpy; bjU ghthil brl;oahh; kfd; Rnuc&; vd;gtd; v';fsJ gs;spapy; nggp fpsh!; goj;J te;jhd;/ mtDf;F taJ Rkhh; 4 ,Uf;Fk;/ nkw;go gs;sp rpWtDf;F tFg;g[ Mrphpia lahdh Mthh;/ 21/12/1999k; njjp nggp fpsh!py; gof;Fk; Rnuc&; vd;gtd; fhiy gs;spf;F te;Js;shd;/ kjpa czt[ mtdJ jfg;gdhh; ghthil bfhz;L te;J bfhLj;Js;shh;/ gfy; 12 kzpf;F gs;sp kjpa cztpw;F bgy; moj;jJk; midj;J khzt khztpah;fs; m';F itffy; gpof;Fk; jz;zPh; bjhl;oapy; igg;gpy; jz;zPh; gpoj;J itj;J rhg;gpLthh;fs;/ mnjnghy; mjpfhiyapy; Fspf;Fk; khztpah;fs; m';F Milfis ghj;JUkpy; Rkhh; 2 mo cauKs;s bjhl;oapy; cs;s ePhpy; jhd; Fspg;ghh;fs;/ khiy 6 kzpf;F nkw;go bjhl;oj;jz;zPiu gpL';fp tpl;L njhl;lj;jpw;F gha;j;J tpLthh;fs;/ v';fsJ gs;sp tshfj;jpy; jpwj;j btsp fpzW VJk; ,y;iy/ jz;zPh; trjpf;fhf Ms;Jis fpzW njhz;o fk;gh;rh; itj;Jjhd; jz;zPh; ,iwj;J tUfpshh;fs;/ ,nj gs;spapy; nkw;go Rnuc&; vd;gthpd; mf;fhs; Rfe;jp v';fsJ gs;spapy; 3k; tFg;g[ goj;J tUfpwhs;/ 21/12/1999k; njjp kjpa czit ,uz;L FHe;ijfSf;Fk; bfhz;L te;J bfhLj;jJ ,UtUnk xd;whf rhg;gpl;Ls;shh;fs;/ mjd;gpwF khiy 3/30 kzp RkhUf;F fpwp!;Jk!; epfH;r;rpf;fhf ehlf xj;jpif ghh;g;gjw;fhf neukhfnt FHe;ijfis mDg;gp itj;Jtpl;nlhk;/ md;W jdJ kfd; Rnuc&; jdJ tPl;ow;F tutpy;iy vd;Wk; Rfe;jp kl;Lk; te;jhs; vd;Wk;. nkw;go FHe;ijfis Tl;or;bry;y te;j nkw;go ghthil jdJ kfidj; njo miye;Js;s tpguk; md;W ,ut[ v';fSf;F bjhpe;jJ/ mLj;j ehs; 22/12/99k; njjp fhiy gpnuahpy; vy;yh gs;sp khzt/ khztpfis ,iwtid tHpgL';fs; vd;Wk;. nkw;go rpWtd; fpilf;f ntz;Lk; vd;W brhy;ypa[k; nkw;go FHe;ij rhh;ghf eh';fSk; ,iwtid tHpg;gl;nlhk;/ mjd;gpwF 23/12/1999k; njjp Rnuc&; vd;w khztd; Mj;J}h; gf;fKs;s xl;lk;ghiw vd;DUf;fy; uapy;nt jhd; fUg;ghap vd;gtUf;Fr; brhe;jkhd fpzw;wpy; ,we;J fplg;gjhft[k; gpd;dh; brhy;yf; nfs;tpg;gl;nld;/ Mdhy; nkw;go rpWtd; v';fsJ gs;spapy; jz;zPh; tpGe;J ,wg;gjw;fhd rhj;jpa';fSk; ,y;iy/ vg;go jz;zPhpy; K:H;fp ,we;jhd; vd;w tpguk; vdf;Fj; bjhpatpy;iy/ ,d;W jiythrh; nghyP!; ,d;!;bgf;lh; kw;Wk; Mj;J}h; nghyP!; te;J tprhhpf;f ele;jijr; brhd;ndd;/ fhty; cjtp Ma;thsh;
Mj;J}h; fhty; epiyak;
02/01/2000
24. One R.Simbu Rose Kumari, aged 16 years and student of Standard 11, has also confirmed that Minor Suresh was a student of the baby class. Her statement is extracted hereunder:
"thf;FK:yk; : R. rpk;g[nuh!; Fkhhp taJ 16 D/o. rP/uh$g;gd;/ K:';fpy;Jidgl;L/ ehd; rpd;dnryk; rpWkyh; nky;epiyg;gs;spapy; 11k; tFg;g[ 'B' FU:g; goj;J tUfpnwd;/ nkw;go gs;spapy; 6k; tFg;g[ Kjy; goj;J tUfpnwd;/ ehd; cwh!;lypy; j';fp gof;fpnwd;/ v';fsJ gs;spapy; nggp fpsh!; Kjy; bfhz;L 12k; tFg;g[ tiu cs;sJ/ vd;Dld; ,d;Dk; rpy khztpfSk; cwh!;lypy; j';fp goj;J tUfpwhh;fs;/ jpdKk; fhiy 5 kzpf;F vGe;J fhiyf;fld; Koj;J Fspg;gjw;F fl;oitj;Js;s Rkhh; 2 mo cauKs;s bjhl;oapy; epwg;gpa jz;zPh; nkhe;J Fspj;Jtpl;L gpwF gpnuah; Koe;J fhiy cztUe;jp tFg;g[f;F bry;tJ tHf;fk;/ v';fsJ gs;spapy; nggp fpshrpy; gof;Fk; khzth; Rnuc&; vd;gth; Rfe;jp vd;w rpWkp 3k; tFg;g[k; goj;J tUtJ vdf;Fj; bjhpa[k; brd;w 21/12/99k; njjp gfy; 12 kzpf;F nkw;go Rnuc&; vd;w rpWtDk;. Rfe;jp vd;w rpWkpa[k; gs;spf;F te;Js;sdh;/ nkw;go FHe;ijfspd; jfg;gdhh; ghthil vd;gth; gfy; 12 kzp RkhUf;F nkw;go ,uz;L FHe;ijfSf;Fk; rhg;ghL bfhz;L te;J bfhLj;jij nkw;go ,uz;L FHe;ijfSk; rhg;gpl;Ls;sdh;/ mjd;gpwF md;W fpU!;Jk!; epfH;r;rpf;fhf ehlf xj;jpif ghh;g;gjw;fhf 21/12/99k; njjp khiy 3/30 kzp RkhUf;F gs;sp Koe;J mDg;gptpl;lhh;fs;/ Mdhy; Rnuc&; vd;w rpWtidf; fhztpy;iyvd;Wk; mf;fk; gf;fk; njoa[k; fpilf;ftpy;iy vd;Wk; nfs;tpg;gl;nld;/ 23/12/99k; njjp nkw;go fhzhky; nghd rpWtd; Mj;J}h; gFjpapy; xU fpzw;wpy; K:H;fp ,we;J tpl;ljhff; nfs;tpg;gl;nlhk;/ Mdhy; nkw;go rpWtd; gs;sp tshfj;jpy; jz;zPhpy;; K:H;Ftjw;F rhj;jpaf;TW VJk; ,y;iy/ nkw;go rpWtd; Mj;J}h; gFjpf;F vg;go nghdhd; vd;w jfty; vdf;F vJt[k; bjhpahJ/ ehd; nfs;tpg;gl;lij j';fsplk; ,d;W brhd;ndd;/ 21k; njjp khiyapypUe;J 23/12/99k; njjp fhy';fspy; ele;j gpnuahpy; v';fsJ jiyik Mrphpia mth;fs; nkw;go rpWtd; fpilf;f ntz;Lk; vd;Wk; eh';fs; gpuhh;j;jid bra;njhk;/ fhty; cjtp Ma;thsh;
Mj;J}h;
02/01/2000/
25. One Palani, DYFI, has given statement. In the letter, dated 04.01.2000, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Attur, Salem District, addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Salem Division, Salem, has stated that the cause of death may be due to drowning and no reasons could be deduced, as to how, a boy had come to Ottanparai Village from Chinna Salem. He has summarised the enquiry report as follows:
",t;tHf;fpy; g[yd; tprhuid nkw;bfhz;L. Rk;gt ,lj;jijg; ghh;ital;L rhl;rpfis tprhuiz bra;jjpy; ,Ue;J. ,t;tHf;fpy; ,we;Jnghd Rkhh; 5 taJs;s rpWtd; Rnuc&; vd;gtd; rpd;d nryk; g[dpj rpWkyh; gs;spapy; nggp fpsh!; goj;J te;jhd; vd;Wk;. nkw;go rpWtida[k;. mtdJ jk;f;if Rfe;jpiaa[k;. mth;fsJ jfg;gd; ghthiljhd; tHf;fkhf gs;spf;F Tl;o;r bry;thh; vd;Wk;. tHf;fkhf fhiyapntna kjpa czita[k; bfhLj;J mDg;gptpLthh;fs; vd;Wk;. 21/12/99k; njjp kjpa czt[ bfhLj;J mDg;ghjjhy;. Kjpa cztpid nkw;go FHe;ijfs;d; jfg;gdhh; gs;spf;F vLj;Jr; brd;W bghLj;J te;jjhft[k;. khiy 4/00 kzp RkhUf;F tHf;fkhf gs;spf;F;r brd;W gpisisfis Tl;o tur; brd;wjhft[k;. md;W gs;spia 3/30 kzpf;nf tpl;L tpl;ljhy; FHe;ijfs; vy;nyhUk; tPl;ow;F ngha;tpl;ljhf Twpajpd; nghpy;. nkw;goahh; tPl;ow;F;r brd;W tprhupf;f jd; kfd; tPl;ow;F tutpy;iy vd;Wk;. fhzhky;ngha;tpl;ljhf mwpe;J gy ,l';fspy; njoa[s;shh;/ Mdhy; nkw;go rpWtd;. Rkhh; 35 fpnyhkPl;lh; bjhiytpy; c;ss Mj;J}h; xl;lk;ghiw mUnf cs;s fpzw;wpy; ,w;eJfple;Js;shd;/ Rkhh; 5 taJs;s rpWtd; jd;de;jdpna 35 rpnyhkPl;lh; bjhiyJ}uk; tUtjw;fhd rhj;jpak; VJkpy;iy/ nkYk; nkw;go rpWtid khiy neuj;jpnyh ,ut[ neu';fspnyh. rk;gt ,lj;jpw;F mUfpy; ghh;j;jjhf. mf;fk; gf;fk; ,Ug;gth;fs; Twtpy;iy/ nkYk; ,we;Jnghd rpWtdpd; gpnujj;ij gpnuj ghpnrhjid bra;j kUj;Jt mYtyh;. nkw;go rpWtdpd; tapw;wpy; brhpf;fg;glhj czt[ cs;sJ vd;W Twpa[s;shh;/ nkw;go rpWtdpd; jfg;gdhh; jdJ thf;FK:yj;jpy;. kjpa ,ilbtspapd;nghJ jdJ kfid ghh;jJs;shh; vd;Wk;. khiy 4/00 kzpf;Fnky; fhztpy;iy vd;Wk; bjhptpj;J cs;shh;/ Mfnt tprhuizapy;. 5 taJ rpWtd; jd;de;jdpa Mj;J}Uf;F tu rhj;jpakpy;yhjjhYk;. nkw;go rpWtid rk;gt ,lj;jpw;F mUfpy; trpg;gth;fs; ahUk; ghh;f;fhjjhYk;. nkw;go rpWtid tapw;wpy; brhpf;fhj czt[ cs;sjhYk;. nkw;go rpWtdpd; ,wg;g[ 21/12/99 md;nw rpd;d nryj;jpnyna Vw;gl;oUf;fyhk; vd;w tprhuizapy; g[ydhfpwJ/ ,t;tHf;fpy; ,we;Jnghd rpWtdpd; FoYWg;g[f;fis ,urhad ghpnrhjidf;fhf mDg;gg;gl;Ls;sJ/ ,urhad ghpnrhjid mwpf;if fpilf;fg;bgw;W. Kuj;Jthpd; ,Wjp mgpg;gpuhak; bgw;W ,t;tHf;fpy; nky; eltof;if vLf;fg;gLk; vd;gij bjhptpj;Jf; bfhs;fpd;nwd;/"
26. In the CD file, copies of the Attendance Registers are enclosed, indicating that the deceased boy had attended the school. Chemical analysis report of Mr.R.Srinivasan, M.Sc.AIC.DEL., Assistant Chemical Examiner, to the Government and Assistant Director and Mr.A.Saravanan, Sci.Assistant, Grade I, reveals that the deceased appeared to have died, due to drowning, about 48 to 72 hours, prior to Post-Mortem. As the death had taken place within the jurisdiction of Chinna Salem, the case has been transferred to Chinna Salem. Thereafter, the Inspector of Police, Chinna Salem, has taken up the case of further investigation. He has recorded the statement of the petitioner, father of the deceased and others.
27. One Mr.Albert, working as Office Assistant in St. Little Flower Higher Secondary School, Chinna Salem, has given a statement before the Inspector of Police that the Head Master/Head Mistress of the School, called the name of the petitioner's son, Minor P.Suresh, in the Mic, when he was reported to be missing. Statements of Mr.Chinnappan and Mrs.Pushpa, found in the file are also to the same effect.
28. One Mrs.Madangarai, has given a statement that the deceased, minor boy and her sister, Suganthi, were used to be dropped in the School, by their father, Pavadai, petitioner herein. Mrs.Prakashi, Headmistress, has given a statement to the effect that she knew that the deceased Minor P.Suresh and his Sister, P.Suganthi, were studying in the 5th respondent-School.
29. Ms.Suganthi, daughter of Mr.Pavadai, petitioner herein, has given a statement that the deceased Minor Suresh, was also a student in the 5th respondent-School. She has narrated the incident, as to how, both of them used to sit together, and take lunch. Statements have been obtained from others, to the effect that the boy was missing and that the Headmaster/Headmistress of the School, had called his name in Mic. At this juncture, this Court is of the view that if Minor P.Suresh was not a student of the 5th respondent-School, as contended by the deponent of the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the 5th respondent-School, what is the necessity to call the name of the missing person in the Mic. There is a sketch in the file indicating existence of sumps in the school. The sketch has been prepared by the Police. There are other statements in the file.
30. When there is a clear evidence, as to the existence of a sump in the school premises, and that when statements are to the effect that students used to take water from the said sump, and further evidence to the effect that the minor deceased boy, P.Suresh was also a student of the 5th respondent-School, the averments in the counter affidavit, filed by the 5th respondent, to the effect that the deceased was never admitted to the said School and that there was no sump in the school premises, makes it clear that true facts are not placed before this Court. As stated supra, sketch prepared by the Police, found in the CD File, clearly shows existence of sumps at two places. Apparently, these facts have been concealed by the 5th respondent-School. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the true copy of the counter affidavit of the 5th respondent are extracted hereunder:
10. I deny the allegation in para 9 of the petitioner's affidavit that his son, P.Suresh attended our school on 21.12.1999. When the said P.Suresh was never admitted to our school, the allegations in para 9 of the petitioner's affidavit have no truth or relevancy at all.
11. As far as the allegations made in para 10 of the petitioner's affidavit are concerned, we have to say this. We hereby deny that there was an open sump in the school premises for the hostel students. The allegations that the boy might have gone there and slipped into the sump and died and the school authorities had concealed his death from the petitioner fearing police action, are nothing but assumptions or surmises. Since the petitioner's son never studied in our school, the question that our school or the management is the custodian of the boy, does not arise. We are therefore not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner's family."
31. When the Police on physical verification of the school premises, have prepared a sketch, depicting the existence of sumps, in the premises of the school, it is not known, as to how, the 5th respondent-School, can deny the very existence of the sumps in the school premises. The fifth respondent-School is stated to be a Government Aided School. Admittedly, death has occurred. The Police has a duty to thoroughly investigate, as to how the body of the deceased, was found in a Ottanparai Village, which is 30 Kms., away from Chinna Salem. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a boy aged about 5 years, studying in Baby Class, cannot on his own accord travel to such a far off place. There is also a finding to that extent by the Investigating Officer, who has recorded in the file that death would have occurred only in Chinna Salem and not in Ottanparai Village and that is why, the case has been transferred to Chinna Salem Police Station, and taken up for further investigation. Somebody might have taken his body from Chinna Salem, to a far off distance and thrown the same, into a well. The police cannot simply wash away their hands, by saying that no reasons have been found, as to how, boy's body was found in the Well. That does not reflect proper investigation.
32. Death of a minor boy, in the abovesaid circumstances, cannot be taken lightly. Agony of the parents cannot be brushed aside. As there is sufficient evidence to substantiate that the deceased boy was a student of the 5th respondent-School, it is certainly accountable for the safety of all the students. Though the petitioner has been running from pillar to post, investigation of the crime, has not lead to the culpability of the offenders.
33. On the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the clear view that something is attempted to be shielded. Files do not disclose that any final report has been filed before the competent Criminal jurisdiction. Files only disclose that it has been sent, with the following note. jw;fhypfkhf fz;Lgof;f Koatpy;iy." [temporarily could be found]
34. Though the 5th respondent-School is not a Government School, owned by any Local Body, yet the School is recognised under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder, and aided by the Government. Structural stability certificate from the Engineers of Public Works Department/Chartered Engineers (from the Engineers in the panel of qualified and registered Engineers maintained by the District Collectors) in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Public Buildings (Licensing Act, 1965 (Tamil nadu Act, 13 of 1965) has to be obtained. Adequate sanitary facilities, separately for teachers and pupils, (boys/girls separately) and a certificate to that effect has to be obtained from the local health authority.
35. The Grant-in-Code of the Tamil Nadu Educational Department applies to all the Schools, which receive grant from the Court and that there are provisions in the Code, dealing with safety measures, hygiene requirements, seating arrangements of the students, height of the classrooms, windows, details as to how grant received should be spent and other provisions. All the activities of the 5th respondent-School, recognised as a private school, under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, rules framed thereunder, and the Code, have to be in conformity with the statutory provisions and that the educational authorities have a pervasive control over such schools, recognised by the competent authorities, under the Act and the Rules, framed thereunder, although it is a private entity.
36. On the aspect, as to whether, any private educational institution is amenable to Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as to whether the petitioner should be driven to a Civil Court for compensation, this Court is of the view that imparting education is a public duty. Expression public duty means the duty in discharge of which, the State, Public or Community at large, has interest. Therefore, when the educational institutions discharges a public duty, in aiding the State in imparting education, a Writ Petition filed against a private educational institution is also maintainable. In the case on hand, the 5th respondent-School is an educational institution aided by the Government.
(i) In Andi Mukta Satguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others v. V.R.Rudani and others reported in 1989 (II) LLJ 324, the appellant was a Science College run by a Public Trust, affiliated to Gujarat University. At paragraphs 20 and 22, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are therefore not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied. (para 20) Mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. Judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should no come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. (para 22)"
In the above reported case, the Supreme Court has further held that, "To the Trust managing the affiliated college, public money is given as government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like Governmental Institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating university. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such Institution is not devoid of any public character. So are the service conditions of the academic staff. Their service conditions are not purely of a private character and such service conditions has super-added protection by university decisions creating a legal right duty relationship between the staff and the management. When there is existence of this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused."
(ii) In Rakesh Gupta v. State of Hyderabad reported in AIR 1996 AP 413, a Hon'ble Division Bench of the Andra Pradesh High Court considered the scope, extent of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the expression "any person or authority" occurring under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court observed as follows:
"The words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on that body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the duty is imposed; and The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartments. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of various circumstances.
(iii) In K.Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswar Hindu College of Engineering reported in 1997 (3) SCC 571, the appellant and six others were appointed on daily wages to the post of Lab Assistant as non-teaching staff in the respondent-private college. The Writ Petition and Appeal seeking equal pay were dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, they moved the Apex Court. The question which came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was when there were no statutory rules issued regarding pay scales to be fixed, on par with the Government employees and the private Institution, being not in receipt of any grant-in-aid, whether the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable? The Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 4, observed as follows:
"The question is when there are no statutory rules issued in that behalf, and the institution, at the relevant time, being not in receipt of any grants-in-aid; whether the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not; maintainable? In view of the long line of decisions of this Court holding that when there is an interest created by the Government in an institution to impart education, which is a fundamental right of the citizens, the teachers who impart the education get an element of public interest in the performance of their duties. ........We are of the view that the State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to the people to avail of the right to education. The Private Institutions cater to the need of providing educational opportunities."
(iv) In P.A.M. Sundaravel v. Chief Educational Officer and two others, reported in 1998 Writ L.R. 565, a student, sought for a Mandamus directing the respondents to select him in 11th Standard computer course during the year 1997-98, in a Private School recognised by the State Government. One of the objections was to the maintainability of the Writ Petition against a private institution. After considering the element of public duty involved in imparting education, this Court, at Paragraphs 8 and 10, held as follows:
"The school is a recognised one and is also governed by relevant Statute. Its activities are also controlled by first respondent, though the actual management is by the Board as per its own Bylaws. The School, while discharging its duties as per statute, and that too, while it is imparting education to children at large, cannot be said as not discharging a public duty. Though it is a private institution, it discharges a public function governed by relevant statutes, subject to the control of the Statutory authorities. Except for the Computer course, financial aid is also received from Government.
A writ can be issued the respondents and the first respondent is duty bound to see that the petitioner's son is not denied admission as he is legally entitled to the same."
(v) A Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in John Paulraj A.P. v. CBSE, Chairman, New Delhi, reported in 1999 (III) LLJ (Supp.) 628, considered a case, as to whether a Writ Petition filed against an unaided educational institution, can be brought within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In the said case, the appellant was terminated from service, without proper reasons. A learned single Judge, who adjudicated the validity of the said order, dismissed the Writ Petition, agreeing with the contention of the School that an unaided private school is not amenable to Writ jurisdiction, as it was contended by the School that it is not a State or instrumentality of the State within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Before the appeal, it was contended inter alia that availing grant or aid from the Government cannot by itself, be a deciding factor for holding that a Writ Petition, as maintainable. Taking into consideration, the nature of public duty, i.e., imparting of education to the students at large, as envisaged under Article 41 of the Constitution of India and after considering a catena of decisions, the Hon'ble Division Bench held that a Writ would still lie even against an unaided private educational institution also, if an element of public interest and a corresponding public duty is attracted, in the proceedings sought to be challenged in such Writ Petition.
(vi) A passage from the judgment in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andra Pradesh reported in AIR 1993 SC 2179, extracted in John Paulraj's case, would also be useful, and that the same is reproduced hereunder:
"The fact that these institutions perform an important public function coupled with the fact that their activity is closely intertwined with governmental activity, characterises their action as 'State action'. At the minimum, the requirement would be to act fairly in the matter of admission of students and probably in the matter of recruitment and treatment of its Employees as well.
The private educational institutions merely supplement the effort of the State in educating the people, as explained above. It is not an; independent activity. It is an activity supplemental to the principal activity carried on by the State."
(vii) In Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2003 SC 3724, the petitioners therein, were mostly unaided professional educational institutions, both minority and non-minority. It was inter alia contended that private unaided professional educational institutions, have been given complete autonomy not only as regards, admission of students, but also determination of their own fee structure. It was also contended that these institutions could fix their own fee structure, which could include a reasonable revenue surplus, for purposes of development of education and expansion of the institution, and that, so long as there was no profiteering or charging of capitation fees, there could be no interference by any Court. Per contra, on behalf of the Union of India, many State Governments and some students, who sought to intervene, submitted that right to set up and administer an educational institution was not an absolute right, and this right is subject to reasonable restrictions and that, this right is subject (even in respect of minority institutions) to national interest. It was further submitted that imparting education was a State function, but, due to resources crunch, the States were not in a position to establish sufficient number of educational institutions. Though the issue was with regard to fee structure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered as to whether the Government is denuded of its power to lay down any law, just because the Institutions were once recognised or affiliated to the examining body. At Paragraphs 217 and 219, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows:
"Although the minorities have a right to establish institutions of their own choice, they admittedly do not have any right of recognition or affiliation for the said purpose. They must fulfill the requirements of law as also other conditions which may reasonably be fixed by the appropriate Government or the University. (para 217) It cannot be said that once recognition has been granted, no further restriction can be imposed. There exist some institutions in this country which are more than a century old. It would be too much to say that only because an institution receives recognition/affiliation at a distant point of time the appropriate Government is denuded of its power to lay down any law in imposing any fresh condition despite the need of change owing to passage of time. Furthermore, the Parliament or the State Legislature are not denuded of its power having regard to restrictions that may satisfy the test of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India or regulations in terms of Art. 30 depending upon the national interest/public interest and other relevant factors. However, the State/University while granting recognition or the affiliation cannot impose any condition in furtherance of its own needs or in pursuit of the Directive Principles of State Policy. (para 218 and 219)"
(viii) In Sushmita Basu v. Ballygunge Siksha Samity and others in 2004 (4) LLN 195 (SC), teachers of a recognised Private School filed a Writ Petition, seeking for a prayer, for implementation of the third pay commission. The management, though implemented the recommendations of the third pay commission in the sense that, salaries of the teachers were hiked in terms of a report, the institution refused to give retrospective effect to the enhancement. In otherwords, the institution refused to give effect to the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission, with effect from 1st January 1988, as recommended by the Commission, and as implemented by the Government. Though the Hon'ble Supreme Court, accepted the views expressed earlier in K.Krishnamacharyulu and others v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering and another reported 1997 (3) SCC 571, that interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for issuing the Writ against a Private Institution, like the first respondent therein, would be justified if Public law element is involved and in Private law remedy, no Writ Petition would lie and that Writ of Mandamus cannot be issued to recognised Private School, to fix the salaries to teaching and non-teaching staffs to remove all the anomalies. Yet the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on principle, has affirmed the dictum that Writ Petition would lie against a Private Educational Institution, but disallowed the claim of the teachers for giving retrospective effect to the pay fixation.
(ix) In Binny Ltd.,v. Sadasivan reported in 2005 (6) SCC 657, the maintainability of a Writ Petition against private employers, was the moot question. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions, held that a Writ of Mandamus or remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though pre-eminently a public law remedy, is available against a private body or a person, if (a) such private body is discharging public function, (b) a decision sought to be corrected or enforced is in discharge thereof and (c) public duty imposed is not of a discretionary character. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of duty to be enforced rather than the identity of the authority, against whom it is sought. While explaining what is public function, the Apex Court, held that a body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies, therefore exercise public function, when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in public interest. The Dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as explained at Paragraphs 9 to 11 and 29, are extracted hereunder:
"9. The superior courts supervisory jurisdiction of judicial review is invoked by an aggrieved party in myriad cases. High Courts in India are empowered under Article 226 of the Constitution to exercise judicial review to correct administrative decisions and under this jurisdiction the High Court can issue to any person or authority, any direction or order or writs for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. The jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is very wide. However, it is an accepted principle that this is a public law remedy and it is available against a body or person performing a public law function. Before considering the scope and ambit of public law remedy in the light of certain English decisions, it is worthwhile to remember the words of Subba Rao, J. expressed in relation to the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in Dwarkanath v. ITO, This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression nature, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Court to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary from of Government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself.
10. The writ of mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or a statutory duty. The prerogative remedy of mandamus has long provided the normal means of enforcing the performance of public duties by public authorities. Originally, the writ of mandamus was merely an administrative order from the Sovereign to subordinates. In England, in early times, it was made generally available through the Court of Kings Bench, when the Central Government had little administrative machinery of its own. Early decisions show that there was free use of the writ for the enforcement of public duties of all kinds, for instance against inferior tribunals which refused to exercise their jurisdiction or against municipal corporations which did not duly hold elections, meetings, and so forth. In modern times, the mandamus is used to enforce statutory duties of public authorities. The courts always retained the discretion to withhold the remedy where it would not be in the interest of justice to grant it. It is also to be noticed that the statutory duty imposed on the public authorities may not be of discretionary character. A distinction had always been drawn between the public duties enforceable by mandamus that are statutory and duties arising merely from contract. Contractual duties are enforceable as matters of private law by ordinary contractual remedies such as damages, injunction, specific performance and declaration. In the Administrative Law (9th Edn.) by Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth (Oxford University Press) at p.621, the following opinion is expressed:
A distinction which needs to be clarified is that between public duties enforceable by mandamus, which are usually statutory, and duties arising merely from contract. Contractual duties are enforceable as matters of private law by the ordinary contractual remedies, such as damages, injunction, specific performance and declaration. They are not enforceable by mandamus, which in the first place is confined to public duties and secondly is not granted where there are other adequate remedies. This difference is brought out by the relief granted in cases of ultra vires. If for example a minister or a licensing authority acts contrary to the principles of natural justice, certiorari and mandamus are standard remedies. But if a trade union disciplinary committee acts in the same way, these remedies are inapplicable: the rights of its members depend upon their contract of membership, and are to be protected by declaration and injunction, which accordingly are the remedies employed in such cases.
11. Judicial review is designed to prevent the cases of abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities. However, under our Constitution, Article 226 is couched in such a way that a writ of mandamus could be issued even against a private authority. However, such private authority must be discharging a public function and the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in discharge of a public function. The role of the State expanded enormously and attempts have been made to create various agencies to perform the governmental functions. Several corporations and companies have also been formed by the Government to run industries and to carry on trading activities. These have come to be known as public sector undertakings. However, in the interpretation given to Article 12 of the Constitution, this Court took the view that many of these companies and corporations could come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution. At the same time, there are private bodies also which may be discharging public functions. It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a public function when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. In a book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf & Jowell in Chapter 3, para 0.24, it is stated thus:
A body is performing a public function when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. This may happen in a wide variety of ways. For instance, a body is performing a public function when it provides public goods or other collective services, such as health care, education and personal social services, from funds raised by taxation. A body may perform public functions in the form of adjudicatory services (such as those of the criminal and civil courts and tribunal system). They also do so if they regulate commercial and professional activities to ensure compliance with proper standards. For all these purposes, a range of legal and administrative techniques may be deployed, including rule making, adjudication (and other forms of dispute resolution); inspection; and licensing.
Public functions need not be the exclusive domain of the State. Charities, self-regulatory organisations and other nominally private institutions (such as universities, the Stock Exchange, Lloyds of London, churches) may in reality also perform some types of public function. As Sir John Donaldson, M.R. urged, it is important for the courts to recognise the realities of executive power and not allow their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and sometimes complexity of the way in which it can be exerted. Non-governmental bodies such as these are just as capable of abusing their powers as is Government.
29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel public/statutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act within their bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped to serve as a judicial control over administrative actions. This writ could also be issued against any private body or person, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action. Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between public law and private law remedies. According to Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 30, p.682, 1317. A public authority is a body, not necessarily a county council, municipal corporation or other local authority, which has public or statutory duties to perform and which perform those duties and carries out its transactions for the benefit of the public and not for private profit. There cannot be any general definition of public authority or public action. The facts of each case decide the point."
(x) In L. Nageswaran v. State of T.N., reported in 2009 (1) MLJ 729, there was revision of fee structure in the middle of the academic year by a Matriculation School, managed by the Bishop of the Madras CSI Diocese. The primary objection was with regard to the maintainability of the Writ Petition. A learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Matriculation School, though minority in character, administered by Dioceses, is exercising a public function and as such, it is amenable to Writ jurisdiction.
(xi) In Sendhilkumar v. Shri Angalamman College of Engg., & Technology reported in 2009 (3) MLJ 774, a dismissed non-teaching staff of a private unaided college run by a private trust, challenged the order of dismissal. The main objection of the college was that it does not get any aid from the Government and therefore, the Writ Petition filed against the College, is not maintainable. Following the decisions in Andi Mukta Satguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others v. V.R.Rudani and others reported in 1989 (II) LLJ 324, this Court held that the entire educational institution as a whole should be held to be as one unit which discharges its public duty of imparting education to the students and therefore, there cannot be any distinction between teaching and non-teaching staff, while applying Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Holding that the Writ Petition as maintainable, this Court has set aside the impugned order.
(xii) In The Governing Council of American College v. The Director of Collegiate Education, reported in 2009 (4) CTC 401, the issue before the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court was whether an aided minority college is amenable to Writ jurisdiction. Following the decisions in Andi Mukta Satguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others v. V.R.Rudani and others reported in 1989 (II) LLJ 324 and Secretary, Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T.Jose reported in 2007 (1) SCC 386, the Hon'ble Division Bench, at Paragraph 21, held as follows:
"21. At the outset, we wish to point out that the objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the institution is a Society, does not hold water any more. Article 226(1) empowers this Court to issue directions, orders or writs to "any person or authority". Therefore even a Society is amenable to the writ jurisdiction, provided there is an element of public duty. In Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani [1989 (2) SCC 691], a Trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, was held amenable to the writ jurisdiction. It was held therein that when public money is paid as Government aid, the aided institutions discharge public functions and they become subject to the Rules and Regulations of the Affiliating University. Therefore, the Supreme Court opined that employment in such institutions is not devoid of any public character. Again in K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering [1997 (3) SCC 571], the Supreme Court held a writ filed even by the employees of unaided private educational institution as maintainable on the ground that the teachers get an element of public interest in the performance of their duties. Hence the contention that a writ against a Society is not maintainable, cannot be accepted as of universal application, especially since the institution in question in these appeals, receives grant-in-aid from the Government."
(xiii) In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College (Three Hon'ble Judges), at Paragraph 79 of the judgment, has categorically held that, "79. The emphasis in this case is as to the nature of duty imposed on the body. It requires to be observed that the meaning of authority under Article 226 came to be laid down distinguishing the same term from Article 12. In spite of it, if the emphasis is on the nature of duty on the same principle it has to be held that these educational institutions discharge public duties. Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid does not detract from the nature of duty."
37. On the aspect, as to whether the petitioner has to be driven to a Civil Court for compensation, few decisions, are extracted hereunder:
(i) In Chinathambi, C. v. State of T.N., & Others reported in 2001 Writ L.R. 174, compensation was claimed for the death of two school children, when a water tank broke and fell on them. The school was a Government school. The tank was constructed by the Parent Teachers Association for the usage of the students and teachers. On the fateful day, when the children were washing the utensils in the recess time, the said water tank broke and fell down on two innocent children, crushing them to death. The Government granted Rs.5,000/- to each of them, by way of ex gratia payment The Government opposed the petition, on the ground that the ex gratia payment had already been made. Maintainability of the writ petition was also raised, on the ground that the petitioners therein, have to approach the Civil Court to establish the tortuous liability, if any. After considering the rival submissions, at Paragraphs 5 and 6, the Court made the following order, 5. Right of life enunciated in Article 21 has time and again been recognised by the Supreme Court and in its various ramifications. This was a case where the two innocent children had gone to the school and the accident actually took place during school hours. Even if it is considered that the said tank was constructed by the parent teachers Association it was undoubtedly the responsibility of the school authorities to see that the tank was properly constructed and erected and that it should not have been hazard to the lives of the children. There can be no dispute that in this case school authorities have not been careful enough to see that the construction was proper and in keeping with the rules. It beats ones understanding, as to how a tank which was constructed nearly in 1983-84 would collapse all of a sudden within eight years of its construction i.e. on 12-10-1992. The things do speak for themselves. There can be least doubt that the school authorities were not vigilant to their duties and that this being the Government School the Government would have a liability. There is no dispute that two young lives have perished predominantly because of the lack of care on the part of the school authorities. In my opinion the compensation of Rs. 5000/- by way of ex gratia payment would be a cruel joke. The petitioners have claimed the compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- each in their writ petitions.
6. Considering the age of the children, the social background that they come from the fact that these children were bona fide students and could have had a bright future, the compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- shall be on the lower side. I, therefore, allow both the petitions and direct the Government to make a payment of Rs. 1,50,000/- to each of the petitioners within two months from today. If the payment is not so made, it shall carry the interest at the rate of 12% p.a. till the actual payment is made.
(ii) In P.N.Kanagaraj v. The Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu reported in 2008 (6) CTC 144, the petitioner, who lost his son, aged about 16 years, studying in 11th Standard in a Government school, due to a sudden attack by another student, the 7th respondent therein, claimed compensation of Rs.10,00,000/-. The incident occurred during school hours. The school did not give any complaint. But on the complaint given by one of the classmates of the deceased, a case was registered in Crime No.8 of 2004 and lateron, the Juvenile Justice Board, Coimbatore, convicted the 7th respondent, for the offence under Section 302 IPC., and ordered to undergo a sentence for a period of five years in the Special Home, with a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to be in the Special Home, for one more year. In view of the fact that the death of the petitioner's son therein, was due to negligence and carelessness of the school authority, and after considering a catena decisions, this Court, directed the Government to pay compensation at Rs.6,00,000/-, with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, from the date of death of the petitioner's son.
(iii) In V.Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2009 (I) CTC 434, father of one Sathish @ Sathishkumar, aged 10 years and student of a Panchayat Union Elementary School in Standard 5, filed a Writ of Mandamus, directing the State Government to pay compensation of Rs.6,00,000/-, for the death of his son, due to the fall of a compound wall of the school. A criminal case was registered against the Headmaster of the School, for the offences under Sections 304-A and 336 IPC. The case ended in acquittal. There was no appeal against the same. However, in view of the pendency of the writ petition filed for compensation, the Headmaster was not allowed to retire and his retirement benefits were withheld. Therefore, he filed a separate writ petition, to quash the order, rejecting his request to retire and consequently, prayed for terminal benefits. Both the writ petitions were tagged together. Though the School denied the manner of accident and further contended that it was not due to negligence and carelessness of the School, this Court, after observing that the death had taken place, due to the fall of the compound wall, for which, the State of Tamil Nadu, represented by Secretary to Government, Education Department or the District Collector, Erode District, are vicariously liable to pay compensation, awarded a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- as compensation with interest, at the rate of 10% from the date of death of the petitioner's son. Some of the decisions, relied on by this Court, while considering the issue, as to whether, compensation can be ordered in a Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are as follows:
(i) The Honourble Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 513 (SAHELI a Women's Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi) awarded compensation for the death of a nine year old child due to the beating and assault by the Police Officer. In paragraphs 11 to 15 the Supreme Court held as follows: "11. An action for damages lies for bodily harm which includes battery, assault, false imprisonment, physical injuries and death. In case of assault, battery and false imprisonment the damages are at large and represent a solatium for the mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of liberty and death. As we have held hereinbefore that the son of Kamlesh Kumari aged 9 years died due to beating and assault by the SHO, Lal Singh and as such she is entitled to get the damages for the death of her son. It is well settled now that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. Respondent 2, Delhi Administration is liable for payment of compensation to Smt.Kamlesh Kumari for the death of her son due to beating by the SHO of Anand Parbat Police Station, Shri Lal Singh.
12. It is convenient to refer in this connection the decision in Joginder Kaur v. Punjab State, (1969 ACJ 28) wherein it has been observed that:
In the matter of liability of the State for the torts committed by its employees, it is now the settled law that the State is liable for tortious acts committed by its employees in the course of their employment.
13. In State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati (1962 Supp (2) SCR 989 = AIR 1962 SC 933) it has been held that: (SCR p.1007) Viewing the case from the point of view of first principles, there should be no difficulty in holding that the State should be as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act committed by its servant within the scope of his employment and functioning as such as any other employer. The immunity of the Crown in the United Kingdom, was based on the old feudalistic notions of justice, namely, that the King was incapable of doing a wrong, and, therefore, of authorising or instigating one, and that he could not be sued in his own courts. In India, ever since the time of the East India Company, the sovereign has been held liable to be sued in tort or in contract, and the Common Law immunity never operated in India.
14. In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters ((1989) 4 SCC 730) one of the labourers who was taken to the police station for doing some work and on demand for wages was severely beaten and ultimately succumbed to the injuries. It was held that the State was liable to pay compensation and accordingly directed that the family of the deceased labourer will be paid Rs.75,000 as compensation.
15. On a conspectus of these decisions we deem it just and proper to direct the Delhi Administration, respondent 2 to pay compensation to Kamlesh Kumari, mother of the deceased, Naresh a sum of Rs.75,000 within a period of four weeks from the date of this judgment. The Delhi Administration may take appropriate steps for recovery of the amount paid as compensation or part thereof from the officers who will be found responsible, if they are so advised. As the police officers are not parties before us, we state that any observation made by us in justification of this order shall not have any bearing in any proceedings specially criminal prosecution pending against the police officials in connection with the death of Naresh. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly."
(ii) Maintainability of the writ petitions claiming compensation against the State's inaction is considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2001) 4 SCC 452 (S.S.Ahluwalia v. Union of India). In paragraph 2, the Supreme Court gave the directions, which reads thus:
"....... Therefore, it would be appropriate for us to direct the High Courts of Delhi, Rajasthan, Orissa, Punjab and Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Patna, Madhya Pradesh, Allahabad and Bombay in the States of Delhi, Rajasthan, Orissa, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Goa to deal with the matter in respect of the allegations made herein in respect of the State falling in their jurisdiction by treating the writ petition as a petition filed in that High Court. These proceedings, therefore, shall stand transferred to the respective High Courts. A copy of the petition with annexures and response of the respective State Governments shall be sent to the High Court for appropriate action." The above direction was given since the claim in those writ petitions were made directly before the Supreme Court seeking compensation to the victims of riot, which took place in various places due to the assassination of Smt.Indira Gandhi.
(iii) In (2004) 8 SCC 610 (National Human Rights Commission v. State of Gujarat) the Supreme Court directed the High Court of Gujarat to consider the claims of riot victims of communal clash arose in the State of Gujarat due to the Godhra incident, which reads as follows:
"8. In our view, these all are issues which can be raised in the pending writ petitions before the High Court since the High Court would have the jurisdiction to consider each of the grievances raised. In fact, having regard to the nature of the claim it will be more appropriate, that the High Court should deal with the issues raised in the first instance."
(iv) The liability of the State to pay compensation even against the destruction of the property during communcal clash or riot or disorder is considered by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 2006 (5) CTC 97 (P.P.M.Thangaiah Nadar Firm v. Government of Tamil Nadu). In paragraph 11, the Full Bench framed the following questions:
"(1) What is the effect of deletion of Article 19(1)(f) ?
(2) What is the liability of the State regarding loss of life or damages to the properties during rioting ?
(3) What is the remedy available to a victim, that is to say, whether a Writ Petition can be filed or the victim is required to file a Suit for claiming compensation ?"
Question No.2 relates to the liability of the State regarding loss of life or damage to the properties during rioting, which is answered by the Full Bench in paragraph 38 of the Judgment, which reads as follows:
"38. .... The State is not necessarily liable in every case where there is loss of life or damage to the property during rioting. Where, however, it is established that the officers of the State ordained with duty of maintaining law and order have failed to protect the life, liberty and property of person and such failure amounts to dereliction of duty, the State would be liable to pay compensation to the victim. Such liability can be enforced through Public Law remedy or Common Law remedy. Where, necessary facts to establish culpable negligence on the part of the officials are available, the High Court under Article 226 can issue appropriate direction. Where, however, the main aspect relating to culpable negligence of the officer is seriously disputed, filing of suit may be more appropriate remedy. No hard and fast rule can be laid down on these aspects and obviously the availability of remedy under Article 226 would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Compensation for loss to the property can also be claimed under Article 226 and merely because right to property has been deleted from the Chapter of Fundamental Rights and has been recognised as a Constitutional right, would not disentitle the High Court to examine that question in any appropriate case."
(v) In the decision reported in (2008) 3 MLJ 160 (Litty Stanislaus v. Chairman, T.N.E.B.) this Court granted compensation of Rs.90,000/- to the widow of a person, who was electrocuted due to the negligence of the Electricity Board. In the said Judgment, Honourable Mr.Justice P.Jyothimani, followed the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Smt.Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1992 SC 2069) wherein a six year old boy died falling in 10 feet deep uncovered sewerage tank in the City of Madras was ordered compensation of Rs.50,000/- with 12% interest per annum from 1.1.1990.
(vi) In the decision reported in 2006 WLR 608 (Lakshmana Naidu & Another v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another), Honourable Mr.Justice K.Mohan Ram, in paragraph 12 held as follows:
"12. The High Court, being protector of Civil liberties of the citizen, has not only the power and jurisdiction, but also an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings. The State, of course has the right to be indemnified by and take such action as may be available to it against the wrongdoer in accordance with law through appropriate proceedings. The relief in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be granted once it is established that there has been infringement of the fundamental rights of the citizen." In the said decision a total compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- was ordered to the legal heirs.
(vii) In 2004 WLR 611 (The Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu & Others v. Mrs.R.Selvam), the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Honourable Mr.Justice A.S.Venkatachalamoorhy, (as he then was) & Honourable Mr.Justice P.K.Misra, confirmed the order of the Honourable Mr.Justice P.Sathasivam, (as he then was) in awarding Rs.5,00,000/- to the parents of one medical college student, who was killed in a college hostel by the miscreants. The Division Bench in paragraph 17 of its Judgment held as follows: "17. .... The parents while admitting their children, be it a boy or a girl, do so with the fond hope that their wards will be properly looked after. The hostel run by the Thanjavur Medical College is not a commercial establishment. It is the bounden duty of the hostel authorities to take every reasonable, possible and necessary step in providing security arrangements. They have to be more careful and vigilant when they take the responsibilities of providing boarding and lodging for the girl students. In fact, this Court is surprised with the stand taken by the appellants in the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition to the effect that they are not responsible since no separate amount was collected under the head 'for security arrangements'."
(viii) In 2004 WLR 346 (Smt.R.Dhanalakshmi v. Government of Tamil Nadu), Honourable Mr. Justice D.Murugesan, ordered to pay a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- to the legal heir of a person, who was killed while in custody.
(ix) In 2001 WLR 174 (C. Chinnathambi and others v. State of T.N. & Others) Honourable Mr.Justice V.S.Sirpurkar, (as he then was) awarded compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- with 12% interest per annum to each of the parents of two School Students who died when a water tank broke and fell on them. In the said decision in paragraph 5, the responsibilities of the school authorities are emphasised, which reads thus, "5. Right of life enunciated in Article 21 has time and again been recognised by the Supreme Court and in its various ramifications. This was a case where the two innocent children had gone to the school and the accident actually took place during school hours. Even if it is considered that the said tank was constructed by the Parent Teachers Association it was undoubtedly the responsibility of the School authorities to see that the tank was properly constructed and erected and that it should not have been hazardous to the lives of the children. There can be no dispute that in this case school authorities have not been careful enough to see that the construction was proper and in keeping with the rules. It beats one's understanding as to how a tank which was constructed early in 1983-84 would collapse all of a sudden within eight years of its construction i.e., on 12.10.1992. The things do speak for themselves. There can be least doubt that the school authorities were not vigilant in their duties and that this being the Government School the Government would have a liability. There is no dispute that two young lives have perished predominantly because of the lack of care on the part of the school authorities. In my opinion the compensation of Rs.5000/- by way of ex gratia payment would be a cruel joke. The petitioners have claimed the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- each in their writ petitions."
(x) In 2006 WLR 13 (C.Thekkamalai v. State of Tamil Nadu & 2 Others) the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Honourable Chief Justice A.P.Shah & Honourable Mr.Justice F.M.Ibrahim Kalifulla, enhanced the compensation from Rs.75,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/- to the person who was illegally arrested and raped by the Sub-Inspector of Police. In paragraphs 8 to 10 the Division Bench held as follows: "8. We find considerable substance in the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. Where a heinous crime of rape committed by the police personnel, who are public functionaries, the matter clearly relates to the violation of basic human rights as well as Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the vicvtim would be entitled to a fair and reasonable compensation. It is reported that the concerned Sub Inspector was convicted by the trial Court in S.C.No.90 of 1992 under sections 366, 376(2)(a)(1), 384 and 342 of I.P.C. and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay fine amount. The trial court also directed the accused to pay Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.50,000/- as compensation to Lakshmi and Thekkamalai respectively. In the appeal filed by the Sub Inspector of Police, the conviction under Sections 366 and 376(2)(a)(i) of I.P.C. as well as the payment of Rs.2,00,000/- as compensation to the victim Lakshmi was confirmed by this Court. It appears that the amount of compensation has not been paid by the accused, who is presently behind the bars.
38. The 5th respondent-School is stated to be an aided school. The Government have a pervasive control over any recognised school. But the question is whether the Government can be fastened with a liability to pay compensation for the death of a boy, stated to be a student of a recognised private school. Considering the material on record, this Court is of the view that when there was agitation by the public over the mysterious death of a minor boy, stated to be a student in a School recognised and aided by the Government, the Educational authorities, on their part, ought to have atleast conducted an enquiry into the incident and sent their report to the investigation officers. Though the Secretaries to the Home and Education Departments, have been impleaded as parties, they have not chosen to file any counter affidavit.
39. In Grewal, M.S. & another v. Deep Chand Sood & Another reported in 2002 (1) LW 491, on the fateful day (28th May 1995) students accompanied by five teachers, two mess boys, one supplier and the driver of the bus, along with two Eruopean ladies (GAP students) were in a picnic party. In the post lunch period, fourteen students along with two teachers, Shanmugam and S.P.Singh went down the river, for a considerable distance. However, they discovered a sudden 'dibber' of about 6-8 ft., deep, by reason wherefor, the teachers themselves along with the students fell into a great danger, whereas teachers could save themselves up, but the students fell a victim of utter neglect of the teachers. Compensation was claimed against the Chairman and Management of the School, to pay Rs.5 Lakhs to each of the parents of 14 students, who died in drowning and a sum of Rs.30,000/-, to each of the parents, who suffered due to drowning. The High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the Chairman and Management of the School to pay a compensation of Rs.5 lakhs to each of the parents of fourteen students, who died in the incident and a sum of Rs.30,000/- to each of the parents of students, who suffered due to the drowning incident, within two months with interest, at the rate of 12% per annum from 28th May, 1995 by depositing the same, in the registry of the High Court. The Management took the matter on appeal to the Apex Court. On the aspect of neglience and care to be taken by the Management of a School, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and the decisions relied on by the parties thereto, at Paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 22 and 24, the Hon'ble Apex Court, held as follows:
"13. Negligence in common parlance mean and imply failure to exercise due care, expected of a reasonable prudent person. It is a breach of duty and negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful disregard of safety of others. In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of the results which may follow from his act. Negligence is thus a breach of duty or lack of proper care in doing something, in short, it is want of attention and doing of something which a prudent and a reasonable man would not do (vide Blacks Law Dictionary). Though sometimes, the word inadvertence stands and used as a synonym to negligence, but in effect negligence represents a state of the mind which however is much serious in nature than mere inadvertence. There is thus existing a differentiation between the two expressions whereas inadvertence is a milder form of negligence, negligence by itself mean and imply a state of mind where there is no regard for duty or the supposed care and attention which one ought to bestow. Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (18th Ed.) sets out four several requirements of the tort of negligence and the same read as below:
(1) the existence in law of a duty of care situation, i.e. one in which the law attaches liability to carelessness. There has to be recognition by law that the careless infliction of the kind of damage in suit on the class of person to which the claimant belongs by the class of person to which the defendant belongs is actionable;
(2) breach of the duty of care by the defendant, i.e. that it failed to measure up to the standard set by law;
(3) a casual connection between the defendants careless conduct and the damage;
(4) that the particular kind of damage to the particular claimant is not so unforeseeable as to be too remote.
15. Duty of care varies from situation to situation - whereas it would be the duty of the teacher to supervise the children in the playground but the supervision, as the children leave the school, may not be required in the same degree as is in the play-field. While it is true that if the students are taken to another school building for participation in certain games, it is sufficient exercise of diligence to know that the premises are otherwise safe and secure but undoubtedly if the students are taken out to playground near a river for fun and swim, the degree of care required stands at a much higher degree and no deviation therefrom can be had on any count whatsoever. Mere satisfaction that the river is otherwise safe for swim by reason of popular sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a matter of fact the degree of care required to be taken specially against the minor children stands at a much higher level than adults: Children need much stricter care.
16. Incidentally, negligence is an independent tort and has its own strict elements specially in the matter of children the liability is thus absolute vis--vis the children. The school authorities in the contextual facts attributed negligence to the two teachers who stand convicted under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code as noticed above and Mr. Bahuguna appearing in support of the appeal during the course of hearing, however, also in no uncertain terms attributed utter negligence on the part of the teachers and thus conceded on the issue of negligence. Concession, if any, as noticed above, though undoubtedly a good gesture on the part of the school authority, but can the school absolve its responsibility and corresponding culpability in regard to the incident: Would they be termed to be a joint tort feasors or would it be a defence that the school has taken all due care having regard to its duty and it is irrespective thereof by reason of utter neglect and callous conduct on the part of the two of the teachers escorting them that has caused the injury Mr. Bahuguna contended that the school cannot be made liable under any stretch of imagination by reason of the happening of an event which is not within the school premises and has, in fact, happened by reason of the neglect of two of the teachers. It is on this score that Mr. Malhotra rather emphatically contended that the liability cannot simply be obliterated by reason of plea of utter neglect on the part of the two of the teachers: School concerned can be said to be liable even as a joint tort-feasor and in any event, Mr. Malhotra contended that applicability of the doctrine of vicarious liability cannot be doubted or be brushed aside, in any way whatsoever and since the issue of vicarious liability has been more emphatic and pronounced than the issue of joint tort-feasor, we deem it expedient to deal with the second of twin issues first as noticed above.
22. Turning attention however on to the issue of vicarious liability, one redeeming feature ought to be noticed at this juncture that to escort the children was the duty assigned to the two teachers and till such time thus the period of escorting stands over, one cannot but ascribe it to be in the course of employment the two teachers were assigned to escort the students : the reason obviously being the children should otherwise be safe and secure and it is the act of utter negligence of the two teachers which has resulted in this unfortunate tragedy and thus it is no gain-said that the teachers were on their own frolic and the school had done all that was possible to be done in the matter safety of the children obviously were of prime concern so far as the school authorities are concerned and till such time the children return to school, safe and secure after the picnic, the course of employment, in our view continues and thus resultantly, the liability of the school.
24. In view of the above, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions of Mr. Bahuguna that the doctrine of vicarious liability cannot in any event be made applicable in the facts of the matter under consideration. Liability of the school, in our view, in the contextual facts cannot be shifted for any reason whatsoever by reason of the factum of teachers being within the course of employment of the school at the time of the tragedy.
On the aspect of maintainability of the writ petition, the Apex Court, at Paragraph 25 to 27, held as follows:
"25. Next is the issue maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant though initially very strongly contended that while the negligence aspect has been dealt with under penal law already, the claim for compensation cannot but be left to be adjudicated by the Civil law and thus the Civil courts jurisdiction ought to have been invoked rather than by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This plea of non-maintainability of the writ petition though advanced at the initial stage of the submissions but subsequently the same was not pressed and as such we need not detain ourselves on that score, excepting however recording that the law courts exists for the society and they have an obligation to meet the social aspirations of citizens since law courts must also respond to the needs of the people. In this context reference may be made to two decisions of this court: The first in line, is the decision in Nilabati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera (through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) v. State of Orissa and Others (1993 (2) SCC 746), wherein this Court relying upon the decision in Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar & Anr. (1983 (4) SCC 141) decried the illegality and impropriety in awarding compensation in a proceeding in which courts power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution stand invoked and thus observed that it was a clear case for award of compensation to the petition for custodial death of her son. It is undoubtedly true however that in the present context, there is no infringement of States obligation unless of course the State can also be termed to be a joint tort-feasor, but since the case of the parties stand restricted and without imparting any liability on the State, we do not deem it expedient to deal with the issue any further except noting the two decisions of this Court as above and without expression of any opinion in regard thereto.
26. The decision of this Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal [(1997) 1 SCC 416] comes next. This decision has opened up a new vesta in the jurisprudence of the country. The old doctrine of only relegating aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits stands extended since Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was) in no uncertain terms observed:
The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family.
27. Currently judicial attitude has taken a shift from the old draconian concept and the traditional jurisprudential system affectation of the people has been taken note of rather seriously and the judicial concern thus stands on a footing to provide expeditious relief to an individual when needed rather than taking recourse to the old conservative doctrine of civil courts obligation to award damages. As a matter of fact the decision in D.K Basu has not only dealt with the issue in a manner apposite to the social need of the country but the learned Judge with his usual felicity of expression firmly established the current trend of justice oriented approach. Law courts will lose its efficacy if it cannot possibly respond to the need of the society technicalities there might be many but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice."
40. In W.P.Nos.8369, 8644 and 10476 of 2005, dated 17.09.2008 [Singaraj v. The State of Tamil nadu], fathers of their respective minor children, who were crushed to death, while playing near the 5th respondent-School gate. Facts of the unreported case are as follows:
"4. It is alleged by the petitioners that a compound wall is constructed in front of the school along with a an iron grill gate. It is stated that six months before before the accident, a lorry which came with building materials to the school hit against the wall. From that time onwards, the compound wall was in a dilapidated shape and ready to collapse at any time. The school management, (sixth and seventh respondents) never took any steps to carry on repairs to the damaged wall.
5. On 29.04.2005, when the children were playing near the wall, the compound wall collapsed and some children were caught under its weight. While five children died, some other children got grievous injuries. In the case of minor Gopinath, after he was hospitalised, he died on 1.05.2005. This news was widely covered in all the newspapers and a criminal case was registered against the respondents 5 to 7 by the Sethur police station in Crime No.97 of 2005 under Section 304 A IPC. The post-mortem conducted on the five children (only four parents are before this Court) clearly showed the nature of injuries was due to crushing by the broken wall along with the gate.
6. Each of the parents in these writ petitions sent representations to all the governmental authorities and sought for compensation for the death of their children due to the negligent act of the School Management. In W.P.8644 of 2005, the minor Karuppasamy was the only male hair for his parents. In W.P.10746 of 2004, Minor Gopinath was the only son for his parents. It was also stated that his mother had undergone family planning operation and therefore, there was no possibility of any child for them in the future.
7. Even after representations were sent by the petitioners to the various governmental authorities, proper relief was not given due to the death of the children of the petitioners. In view of the news published by the press, an ex gratia payment of Rs.50,000/- was paid to the parents by the Government."
On the contrary, the Chief Educational Officer, Virudhunagar and Secretary of Sri Rama Elementary School, Seihur, Virudhunagar District, have given their reply, by way of their respective counter affidavits. The same are extracted hereunder:
"10. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that on 29.05.2005 about 20 students after climbing onto the Iron Grill gate and were swinging it back and forth. It was stated that unable to bear their weight, the gate fell down on the students who were clinging onto the gate and crushed them. It is rather ironical that the Chief Educational Officer has described the incident as an "Act of God" and not due to any negligence or carelessness on the part of the management or teachers. It is stated that the ex gratia payment made by the Government for a sum or Rs.50,000/- was accepted by the parents and damages can be claimed only by filing appropriate Civil suit.
11. Thereafter, going by the stand of the management, the Chief Educational Officer, relied upon the Stability Certificate produced by the school for the period 01.08.2004 to 31.07.2007. It is also stated that the Tahsildar, Rajapalayam has given the building licence from 07.01.2005 to 08.01.2008. By stating it was an "Act of God", the Chief Educational Officer has concluded giving a clean chit to the respondents and stated that they are not liable to pay any damages to the petitioners.
12. Similarly, the 7th respondent had also filed counter affidavit dated nil (January, 2006). In that counter affidavit, the school management stated that the school is not an instrumentality of the State and hence no writ petition will lie. The accident did not take place during the school hours. In fact, on the last working day after 3.20 p.m., the accident had taken place. It was admitted that the Head Master was not in the school and had gone away to the town to collect the salaries of the Teachers and Staff. It was also admitted that there were no teachers or staff near the gate. While the Chief Educational Officer mentioned about 20 boys clinging onto the gate, the School Secretary has given the number as 15 boys. It was only because they were playing with the gate, the gate fell down along with the pillars on the children. They also relied upon the certificate regarding Stability and Building licence as well as Health and Fire Report to state that there was no deficiency in the building. It was also stated that the F.I.R. filed by the police is a false case. The incident that took place cannot be compared with the Kumbakonam incident."
After considering the rival submissions, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.Chandru, at Paragraphs 20 to 22, held as follows:
"20. In any event, when the children of tender age are sent to a State supported School, it is the responsibility of the School and the State to take care of the safety of the children. No negligence can be attributed to the children of tender age. Further, it is for the School Management to prevent the children from playing near the gate, as the children may not know the inherent danger. All these had taken place since the school does not have a good play area as admitted by the counsel for the School.
21. Regarding the safety of children and liability of the school authorities in case of any accident the Supreme Court dealt with such an issue in M.S.Grewal and another Vs. Deep chand Sood and others reported in AIR 2001 Supreme Court 3660. The following passages found in para 16 and 23 may be usefully extracted below:-
"16...As a matter of fact the degree of care required to be taken specially against the minor children stands at a much higher level than adults; Children need much stricter care. ....
23.. safety of the children obviously were of prime concern so far as the school authorities are concerned and till such time the children return to school, safe and secure after the picnic, the course of employment, in our view continues and thus resultantly, the liability of the school."
22. Per Contra, Mr.M.Jothibasu, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following judgments in support of his case:-
(i)S.Paramasivam Achari Vs. The Head Master Govt.High School, Amur, Musiri Taluk, Trichy District and others reported in 1999 Writ L.R.525.
(ii)C.Chinnathambi and others V. The state of Tamil Nadu rep.by its Secretary to Government Education, Science and Technology Department, Fort St.George Madras - 600 009 and others reported in 2001 Writ L.R.174.
(iii)D.Masta Gandhi v. Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board rep.by its Chairman, Madras reported in (2000) 2 M.L.J.830."
Adverting to the liability of the State and the Private School, the learned Judge, at Paragraphs 28, 29 and 30, held as follows:
"28. Therefore, the liability of the management to compensate the parents of the unfortunate child victims is a certainty. But the State also cannot wriggle out its responsibility in compensating the parents. Under Article 21-A of the Constitution, the State is bound to provide free and compulsory education for every child upto the age of 14 years. In the present case, the State is fulfilling its obligations by running Government Schools as well as providing grant-in-aid to private schools. When such schools impart education, they also participate in fulfilling its constitutional obligations imposed on the State. Law on the subject is well settled right from Mohini Jain's case, Unni Krishnan's case as confirmed by T.M.A.Pai's Foundation's case. Further, in this State there is also the Tamil Nadu Compulsory Education Act, while will punish parents if they do not send their children to Schools.
29. In the light of the above factual matrix and the legal precedents, can this Court deny compensation to the unfortunate parents of the four children whose lives were snatched away in their prime youth? Lights they would have lit up in their homes was blown out by their premature deaths. This Court cannot disappoint the parents (petitioners) by telling them the cause of the death of their children was an "Act of God" as irresponsibly suggested by the Chief Educational Officer, Virudhunagar.
30. Will a responsible Government Officer ever tell the parents to face the death of their children in a light hearted fashion and describe the 'Beauty of Death' as told by Kahlil Gibran, in a famous poem, which goes like this:-
"Leave me then, friends-leave me and depart on mute feet, As the silence walks in the deserted valley;
Leave me to God and disperse yourselves slowly, as the almond And apple blossoms disperse under the vibration of Nisan's breeze.
Go back to the joy of your dwellings and you will find there That which Death cannot remove from you and me.
Leave with place, for what you see here is far away in meaning From the earthly world. Leave me.
31. Therefore, in the above circumstances, the writ petitions are liable to succeed and the parents are entitled for compensation as sought for by them. Accordingly, the first and second respondents are directed to pay to each of the petitioners a sum of Rupees one Lakh as compensation. This will be in addition to the ex-gratia amount already paid by the State Government. The sixth and seventh respondents being the 'Educational Agency' of the Sri Rama Elementary School, Seihur are directed to pay Rs.50,000/- to each of the petitioners. This exercise shall be carried out by the respective respondents within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, the parties are allowed to bear their own costs. These writ petitions are ordered accordingly."
41. In W.P.No.42181 of 2006, dated 25.01.2012 [Minor Muthulakshmi v. Government of Tamil Nadu], the petitioner therein, represented by his father, Vellimalai, sought for a Mandamus directing the respondents to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- with interest to the petitioner, towards compensation for the loss of right hand, mental agony and loss of good marriage opportunity, to his daughter, due to the accident occurred in Ganapathi National Middle School, Kuthalam, Nagapattinam District, 5th respondent therein, a private school, due to the negligence on the part of the respondents. The facts considered by this Court, are reproduced hereunder:
"2. This is a pathetic case where the petitioner's daughter, a minor girl by name Muthulakshmi, has lost her right hand due to amputation on the ground of sustaining injuries while she was playing in a Rattinam outside the school campus and due to the alleged carelessness of the management of the fifth respondent school and the respondents, namely, Government officials.
3. The factual scenario of the case is that the petitioner's daughter Muthulakshmi was studying 5th Standard in the fifth respondent school. She is good looking and healthy girl and she hails from downtrodden and scheduled community. She was taking her lunch, as per the Noon Meal Scheme introduced by the Government, in the school premises. On the fateful day i.e., on 22.12.2003, during lunch time while the petitioner's daughter and other students were waiting for noon meal, some of the school children went outside the school to play Rattinam and the petitioner's daughter also went along with them. At that time, neither the school teachers nor the noon meal organizers or any assistants have taken care of the children including the petitioner's daughter by preventing them from going outside the school campus during lunch hours and without even taking noon meal and as a result, the petitioner's daughter Muthulakshmi sustained grievous injuries on her right hand at 1.15. p.m on 22.12.2003 while playing Rattinam.
4. The petitioner came to know about the occurrence as informed by the school authorities. The injured girl was taken to the Government Hospital, Mayiladuthurai and thereafter, referred to the Thanjavur Medical College Hospital. However, inspite of the treatment given in the Thanjavur Medical College Hospital, the Doctors decided to amputate the right hand of the petitioner's daughter.
5. In view of such an incident, an F.I.R was registered on the same day i.e., 22.12.2003 in Crime No.768/2003. It is mentioned in the F.I.R that the occurrence said to have taken place at 01.15 p.m on 22.12.2003. The said F.I.R was registered on the basis of the complaint preferred by the paternal uncle of the girl Muthulakshmi.
6. The petitioner gave several representations to the respondents seeking for the relief of compensation. Lastly, a representation was given on 09.09.2005. The fourth respondent, namely, District Educational Officer, Nagapattinam, on receipt of the said representation, has sent a communication to the District Primary Educational Officer, Napattinam and directed the petitioner to contact the said Officer as per the communication dated 21.11.2005. Thereafter, there was no further response from the respondents. Therefore, the petitioner has been constrained to approach this Court with the present writ petition with the above said prayer."
The submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, are as follows:
"7. Mr.M.Pari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that only due to the negligence on the part of the respondents, the petitioner's daughter suffered serious injuries on her right hand and ultimately, resulted in amputating the right hand itself. It is contended that even as per the admitted version of the respondents, the occurrence said to have taken place during school hours and that too, at the time of lunch hours for taking noon meal organized by the noon meal organizers of the Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that it is the paramount duty of the noon meal organizers and other staffs to take care of the children during lunch hours and upto the closing of the school hours, but, as far as the instant case is concerned, the school authorities as well as the noon meal organizers and other staffs members committed deliberate negligence in not taking care of the children studying in the fifth respondent school. It is further contended that if the school authorities as well as the noon meal organizers have taken care of the children, they could not have allowed the minor girl of the petitioner to go out of the school premises.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the occurrence, admittedly, taken place very nearer to the school premises and as such, the respondents cannot escape from their liability to compensate adequately in view of the loss of right hand, which caused mental agony and torture not only to the minor girl Muthulakshmi but also to the entire family members and her future prospects is also very much affected including marriage opportunity. It is contended that inspite of giving several representations, the respondents have not considered the representations of the petitioner and no action taken including the last representation submitted by the petitioner dated 09.09.2005. It is further contended that the petitioner can very well seek the remedy by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court in view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court also awarded compensation to the affected persons in several matters, on the ground of negligence on the part of the authorities concerned. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions, would place reliance on the following decisions: (i) Grewal, M.S. and another v. Deep Chand Sood and others reported in 2002-1-L.W.491 (ii) Matsa Gandhi,D. v. Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board reported in 2000 (III) CTC 24.
9. Per contra, Ms.V.M.Velumani, learned Special Government Pleader contended that the official respondents have not committed any negligence and they have taken care of the children of the fifth respondent school including the minor girl Muthulakshmi, who has suffered injuries in this matter. It is contended that the noon meal organizers and the assistants in the fifth respondent school have properly supervised the students and the school premises are also fenced and there is a gate at the entrance. It is further contended that the accident resulting in the amputation of the right hand of the petitioner's minor daughter took place outside the school premises while playing Rattinam run by a private person and the said Rattinam was fixed 200 meters away from the school premises and as such, the official respondents as well as the school authorities cannot be held liable for any negligence on their part. It is also contended that it is the duty of the watchman of the school to prevent the children from going out of the school premises and as such, noon meal organizers or assistants cannot be held liable. It is submitted that the petitioner's daughter went on her own accord to play Rattinam and suffered injuries.
10. Mr.A.Muthukumar, learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent school management contended that there is no fault on the part of the management of the school. It is contended that the students of the fifth respondent are properly supervised and controlled by the teachers and the noon meal organizers. It is submitted that the occurrence itself said to have taken place outside the school premises, while the petitioner's daughter was playing Rattinam which was run by a private person and as such, the school management cannot be held liable for any negligence. The learned counsel for the fifth respondent further submitted that the fifth respondent school is having properly fenced compound and gate and with all infrastructure facilities to safeguard the students. It is contended that the petitioner's daughter went on her own accord outside the school premises and played in the Rattinam and suffered injuries during lunch interval between 12.45 to 2.00 p.m and as such, the school management is not at all responsible in any manner for the accident that occurred outside the school premises. It is also submitted that the school has taken care of the minor girl by rendering medical assistance for taking treatment. The learned counsel for the fifth respondent lastly submitted that the quantum of compensation has to be fixed by the Civil Court and before awarding compensation, the said exercise should not be taken in a writ petition and it is for the petitioner to approach only the Civil Court."
After considering the entire material on record, this Court, at Paragraphs 12 to 18, discussed and ordered, as follows:
"12. At the outset it is to be stated that this is a very unfortunate and pathetic case wherein a minor girl has suffered amputation of her right hand due to the accident occurred nearer to the school premises during lunch interval while she was playing in the Rattinam, kept and displayed outside the school premises.
13. The fact remains that the petitioner's daughter was studying 5th standard in the fifth respondent school and the fateful incident said to have taken place on 22.12.2003 during lunch interval and the petitioner's daughter was one of the student enrolled for the noon meal scheme. It is pertinent to note that the occurrence said to have taken place on 22.12.2003 at 12.40 p.m as per the counter filed by the fourth respondent/District Elementary Educational Officer and as such, it is crystal clear that the occurrence said to have taken place only during the course of lunch interval and even the lunch time was not over. It is further seen that the fifth respondent school also stated in its counter that the occurrence said to have taken place at 01.15 p.m after taking noon meal in the fifth respondent school. It is not clear whether the petitioner's daughter has taken her noon meal or even before taking the noon meal, she has met with the unfortunate accident, but it is stated by the petitioner in the affidavit that his minor girl left for playing Rattinam along with other students even before taking lunch at the noon meal centre, as they were waiting for taking lunch. Be that as it may, the undisputed fact remains, as already pointed out, that the occurrence said to have taken place within the lunch hours as it is very much evident from the F.I.R produced before this Court and the perusal of the F.I.R makes it abundantly clear that the occurrence said to have taken place at 1.15 p.m on 22.12.2003.
14. The F.I.R was registered on the same day i.e., on 22.12.2003 on the basis of the complaint preferred by the paternal uncle of the minor girl of the petitioner. The fact of amputation of the right hand inspite of the treatment given at Thanjavore Medical College Hospital is also not disputed by the respondents herein, namely, official respondents and the fifth respondent/school management and the said factor is very much evident in view of the copy of the discharge summary produced by the petitioner herein before this Court. Considering the above said factual scenario and the admitted factors as already pointed out by this Court, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the unfortunate incident said to have taken place, resulting in serious injuries to the right hand of the petitioner's minor daughter and ultimately resulting in the amputation of the right hand itself, well within the school hours and that too, during lunch hours.
15. It is needless to state that it is the utmost and paramount duty of the school authorities to take care of the children during the school hours. As far as the official respondents are concerned, it is not disputed by the official respondents that the school is having a noon meal centre and the noon meal organizers apart from assistants were also present on the fateful date of occurrence in the school premises. Though it is stated in the counter by the fourth respondent, namely, District Educational Officer, Nagapattinam that proper action was taken by the school teachers as well as by the noon meal organizers and assistants, I am unable to countenance such contention for the simple reason that if such care was taken by the school authorities as well as by the noon meal organizers and assistants, petitioner's daughter could not have been allowed to go out of the school premises during school hours, that too, during lunch hours and suffered serious injuries while she was playing Rattinam, causing amputation of her right hand itself. Equally, I am unable to countenance the claim of the fifth respondent school authorities to the effect that they have taken care of the children and if such care was taken by the fifth respondent, the unfortunate incident could not have occurred, as it is the duty of the school authorities to take care of the children studying in their school by not allowing them to go out of the school premises during school hours without the permission of the school authorities and that too, if the children are upto 5th standard, who are in their tender age. The learned Special Government Pleader contended that even assuming that there is any negligence, liability to be fastened only on the school authorities as it is the duty of the school watchman to prevent the children from going out of the school premises. I am unable to countenance such contention of the learned Special Government Pleader for the simple reason that the occurrence, admittedly, said to have taken place during lunch hours, that too, at the time of supplying noon meal and at that time, the noon meal organizers and assistants were also present and by no stretch of imagination, the noon meal organizers and assistants are not at all liable for any negligence. It is to be reiterated that it is the utmost duty of the school authorities as well as the noon meal organizers and the assistants to take care of the tender children and that too, during school hours and more particularly, during lunch hours and during the supply of noon meal to the poor children.
16. The official respondents as well as the fifth respondent school authorities claim that the incident having taken place outside the school premises and as such, they cannot be held liable for any negligence, it is pertinent to that the incident occurred very nearer to the school premises and it is only 200 meters away from the school where the so called Rattinam was fixed by a private person, even as per the counter filed by the fourth respondent herein. It is curious to note that only the fifth respondent stated, as per its counter, that some enquiry was conducted by the fourth respondent, namely, District Elementary Educational Officer, in the month of January 2006 but the outcome of the enquiry is not known and the fourth respondent, namely, District Elementary Educational Officer, has not whispered a word about the so called enquiry conducted by him, in his counter. Therefore, it is crystal clear that both the school authorities and the official respondents conveniently withheld the material factor relating to the unfortunate incident and the enquiry conducted by the District Educational Officer, for the reasons best known to them.
17. The learned counsel for the petitioner rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Grewal, M.S. and another v. Deep Chand Sood and others reported in 2002-1-L.W.491. That was a case wherein the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court, granting the relief of compensation on the ground of death of the students while they were taken to the playground by the school authorities. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that Article 226 can very well be invoked for granting the relief of compensation depending on the circumstances of each case, particularly, on the ground of negligence to take care of the students by the school authorities. It is worthwhile to refer certain portions of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court as hereunder:
Be it placed on record that in assessing damages, all relevant materials should and ought always be placed before the Court so as to enable the Court to come to a conclusion in the matter of affectation of pecuniary benefit by reason of the unfortunate death. Though mathematical nicety is not required but a rough and ready estimate can be had from the records claiming damages since award of damages cannot be had without any material evidence: whereas one party is to be compensated, the other party is to compensate and as such there must always be some materials available therefor. It is not a fanciful item of compensation but it is on legitimate expectation of loss of pecuniary benefits. Negligence in common parlance means and implies failure to exercise due care expected for a reasonable prudent person. It is a breach of duty and negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful disregard of safety of others. In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of the results which may follow from his act. Negligence is thus a breach of duty or lack of proper care in doing something; in short, it is want of attention and doing of something which is prudent and a reasonable man would not do (vide Black's Law Dictionary). Though sometimes, the word 'inadvertence' stands and is used as a synonym to negligence, but in effect negligence represents a state of mind which, however, is much serious in nature than mere inadvertence. There is thus existing a differentiation between the two expression whereas inadvertence is a milder form of negligence, 'negligence' by itself means and implies a state of mind where there is no regard for duty or the supposed care and attention which one ought to bestow. Duty of care varies from situation to situation whereas it would be the duty of the teacher to supervise the children in the playground but the supervision, as the children leave the school, may not be required in the same degree as is in the play-field. While it is true that if the students are taken to another school building for participation in certain games, it is sufficient exercise of diligence to know that the premises are otherwise safe and secure, but undoubtedly if the students are taken out to playground near a river for fun and swim, the degree of care required stands at a much higher degree and no deviation therefrom can be had on any count whatsoever. Mere satisfaction that the river is otherwise safe for swim by reason of popular sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a matter of fact the degree of care required to be taken specially against the minor children stands are a much higher level than adults: Children need much stricter care. (emphasis supplied by this Court) Incidentally, negligence is an independent Tort and has its own strict elements specially in the matter of children the liability is thus absolute vis-a-vis the children.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the very same decision, observed as hereunder:
This plea of non-maintainability of the writ petition though advanced at the initial stage of the submissions but subsequently the same was not pressed and as such, we need not detain ourselves on that score excepting however recording that the law courts exist for the society and they have an obligation to meet the social aspirations of citizens since law courts must also respond to the needs of the people. Law Court will lost its efficacy if it cannot possibly respond to the need of the society technicalities there might be many, but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also, the minor girl of the petitioner was aged about 12 years at the time of occurrence and she said to have lost her right hand, as the same was amputated due to the injuries sustained by her and she suffered untold hardship, mental agony and torture. It is also relevant to note that the minor girl is also now put into lifelong handicap and she would be facing difficulties in respect of marriage prospects as well as in respect of employment opportunities. At the risk of repetition it is to be reiterated that in the case on hand, the occurrence said to have taken place during school hours as that of the facts of the case in the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court (cited supra). Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner is entitled to seek the relief of compensation from the educational authorities, namely, official respondents as well as the school authorities, namely, the fifth respondent herein, as the minor girl of the petitioner suffered amputation of her right hand only due to the negligence and carelessness of the school authorities as well as the noon meal organizers and assistants.
18. Now coming to the quantum of compensation, it is vehemently contended by Mr.A.Muthukumar, learned counsel for the fifth respondent, that this Court cannot fix the quantum regarding damages and it is for the petitioner to approach only the Civil Court. I am unable to countenance such contention for the simple reason that the occurrence, admittedly, said to have taken place within the school hours and it is the utmost and paramount duty of the school authorities as well as the noon meal organizers to take care of the children during the school hours and the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra has held that in such a situation, Law Court will lose its efficacy if it cannot possibly respond to the need of the society and the technicalities there might be many, but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice. This Court need not go deep in to the matter of assessing the damages, but can very well come to the conclusion and arrive at the quantum on the basis of the admitted facts and the prima facie materials placed before it."
Before parting with the case, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N.Basha made the following suggestions, "23. Before parting with this case, this Court is constrained to suggest the following measures to be taken by the State Government of Tamil Nadu with the object of protecting the interest of the school children, who are in their tender age, by formulating the rules as hereunder:
(i) Children studying up to 5th standard in every school including Government and Private Schools shall not be allowed to go out of the school premises during school hours, except with the prior permission to be obtained by parents/guardian or the authorized persons from the school authorities in view of frequent reports of accidents and kidnapping of children by the anti-social elements.
(ii) During lunch hours, particularly, in the Schools where noon meal scheme is followed, noon meal organizers and assistants shall also be made responsible for the safe custody of the school children along with the teachers and management of the school, who are the custodians of the children of tender age studying upto 5th standard.
(iii) Private persons operating Rattinam (merry-go-round), amusement devices etc., for the children to play outside and nearer the school premises should be prevented.
(iv) Sale of eatables outside and nearer the school premises should be prevented as most of them are unhygienic and cause serious health hazard to the children.
Children are the national assets and they are the torchbearers of future India and as such, it is an obligation of each and every citizen as well as the Government and Private School authorities to take utmost care to protect the interest of the children. It is high time that the Government should take effective steps keeping in mind the above said objects, in view of the frequent reports of accidents and other incidents causing serious threat to the safety, healthy and hygienic environment of the growing children."
42. In the case on hand, at the time of death, the deceased was stated to be aged 5 years. Though there is no specific method in determining the quantum of compensation to be paid, for the death of a student, in these circumstances, yet, considering the judgment of the Apex Court in R.K.Malik v. Kiran Pal reported in 2009 (1) TN MAC 593 (SC), this Court is inclined to award compensation of Rs.3,75,000/- with interest. The compensation amount has to be paid to the parents, by the Government, from the date of death, with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum. There shall be a direction to the State to pay the compensation, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
43. Before parting with this case, this Court wants to state that one may have a doubt, as to whether, God exists or not, but it is the belief of this Court that conscience of a person, if he has, is the real God. kdrhl;rpna bja;t rhl;rp. The deponent of the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the 5th respondent-School, should be certainly a believer of God, as she is a Rev. Sister and it is left to her true conscience, to consider, as to whether, what she had averred in the counter affidavit that the minor boy was not a student, in the baby class of the 5th respondent-School, is true to her conscience, when the Headmistress of the School and others have given specific statements to the Police, that the deceased boy was a student in the baby class. At this juncture, when no final report has been filed, the Court cannot give any finding, on the aspect. But the investigation clearly indicates that the deceased boy was a student of the 5th respondent-School. A person who buries his conscience, and pretends to be God fearing, can make any statement, contrary to truth. But this Court strongly believes that truth will always triumph and justice will never fails. But in some cases, the offender escapes. On completion of the investigation, if it comes to light that the school authorities have concealed the death, the compensation now ordered to be paid by the Government may be directed to be paid to the Government or suitable action be taken against the 5th respondent school, for realisation of the amount.
44. The Secretary to Government, Home Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 is directed to nominate an Officer, in the rank of Superintendent of Police to investigate the matter, thoroughly, and direct submission of a report, to the Court of competent jurisdiction, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If there is any incriminating evidence against the school authorities or any other person involved, including the police officers, suitable action be taken. The Investigating Officer has clearly recorded that the death had taken place only in Chinna Salem and that is why, the investigation has been transferred to Chinna Salem Police Station. The investigation officer, Chinna Salem, has also specifically recorded that the boy could not have travelled to a village, named Ottanparai, which according to the Investigating Officer, is 35 Kms, away from Chinna Salem. There is adequate evidence in the file that the boy was a student of baby class, in the 5th respondent-School and that on the fateful day, ie., on 21.12.1999, he was seen in the school. But the School, before this Court, has denied admission of the boy in the School and the very existence of a baby class. There is no reason, why the Investigation Officer, having recorded that there is an existence of a sump in the school, which is now denied by the School, the death has occurred only in Chinna Salem, has not proceeded to find out, as to how the dead body was missing from Chinna Salem. Is there any intentional omission on the part of the Investigation Officers, to bring the guilt, the Superintendent of Police, to be appointed by the Government, is directed to take suitable action. Law recognises good conscience, equity and justice. This Court honestly and sincerely expects the Investigating Officers, to apply the same to the investigations. It may happen to anybody's son.
45. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed with directions. No costs.
06.02.2014 To
1. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Revenue Divisional Office, Kallakurichi, Villupuram.
2. The Superintendent of Police, Villupuram, Villupuram District.
3. The Station House Officer, Chinna Salem Police Station, Chinna Salem, Kallakurichi Taluk, Villupuram District.
4. The Station House Officer, Attur Police Station, Attur, Salem District.
W.P.No.37980 of 200306.02.2014