Allahabad High Court
Bablu @ Nand Kumar vs State Of U.P. on 6 May, 2022
Bench: Rajan Roy, Saroj Yadav
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH ` A.F.R. RESERVED ON 11.2.2022 DELIVERED ON - 6.5.2022. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW BENCH, LUCKNOW. Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1255 of 2016 Appellant :- Bablu @ Nand Kumar Respondent :- State of U.P. Counsel for Appellant :- Shri Rehan Ahmad Siddiqui Counsel for Respondent :- Shri Chandra Shekhar Pandey, Additional Government Advocate Hon'ble Rajan Roy,J.
Hon'ble Mrs. Saroj Yadav,J.
( per Mrs. Saroj Yadav,J for the Bench )
1. This criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant/convict Bablu @ Nand Kumar against the judgement and order dated 14.7.2016 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Court No.VIII, District Faizabad in Sessions Trial No.57 of 2015 convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( in short 'I.P.C.') with life-imprisonment, under Section 323 I.P.C. with six months' imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/-and in default of fine, one month's additional simple imprisonment, under Section 326 I.P.C. with seven years' imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of fine, six months' additional simple imprisonment, under Section 498-A I.P.C. with two years' imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of fine, three months' additional simple imprisonment, under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act with one year's imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of fine, two months' additional simple imprisonment.
The main grounds of challenge in memo of appeal are that the impugned judgement and order is not sustainable in the eye of law and deserves to be quashed because the trial court has awarded maximum punishment provided under Section 304-B I.P.C. Prosecution witnesses have not supported the prosecution story. The statement-in-chief and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses are contradictory but this aspect has not been considered by the learned trial court. The offences under Section 498-A, 304-B, 323 and 326 I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act ( in short 'D.P.Act.') are not made out against the appellant. The statements of prosecution witnesses are highly doubtful. The learned trial court has not considered the arguments of the appellant and evidence on record, in the right perspective. Learned trial court has failed to apply its judicial mind while passing the conviction order. No independent witness was examined by the prosecution. The learned trial court has committed illegality in disbelieving the defence version. There is no eye-witness of the crime. The appellant is innocent and has committed no crime. The trial court has wrongly disbelieved the evidence of appellant and the fact that he himself got burnt while trying to save the life of his wife, the deceased.
2. The facts necessary for disposal of this appeal in short are as under :-
An F.I.R. was registered at Case Crime No.592/2014 on the basis of written report dated 5.11.2014 submitted by the complainant Raghuveer at Police Station Kotwali Ayodhya, Faizabad. it was mentioned in the written report that daughter of the complainant named Saloni aged about 24 years was married to Bablu @ Nand Kumar about 4 years' back according to Hindu customs and rites. The appellant and other family members used to harass her for extra dowry and asked for motorcycle and Rs.20,000/- in cash and other goods. Deceased Saloni used to tell about this to her mother and the complainant whenever she came to her parental home. Bablu @ Nand Kumar told her that he will go on 1.11.2014 to the parental house of the deceased and if the demands were not fulfilled, then he will beat and burn the deceased after pouring kerosene oil. The complainant tried to fulfil the demands of the appellant and his family members but on 2.11.2014, Bablu set ablaze the daughter of the complainant after pouring kerosene oil. His daughter was being treated in burn-ward of Faizabad Hospital.
3. After investigation, chargesheet was submitted against the appellant/convict only, under Sections 323, 326, 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the D.P. Act. The concerned magistrate took cognizance and committed the case to the court of Sessions for trial. The Sessions Court framed charge under Section 304-B I.P.C. and in alternative, charge under Section 302 I.P.C. The charges under sections 498-A, 323, 326 of I.P.C. and under Section 4 of the D.P.Act were also framed.
4. The prosecution in order to prove its case, examined seven witnesses in toto. These witnesses are P.W.-1 Raghuveer the complainant, P.W.-2 Renu the sister of the deceased, P.W.-3 Smt. Kunta Devi mother of the deceased, P.W.-4 Rajendra Kumar Nishad a witness of the vicinity, P.W.-5 Dr. Vipin Kumar who conducted the post mortem on the cadaver of the deceased, P.W.-6 Shri Vinit Kumar Naib Tehsildar who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased and P.W.-7 Shri Dinesh Kumar Dwivedi, Circle Officer who investigated the case. Apart from oral evidence, documents, Exhibit Ka-1 to Exhibit Ka-10 were also proved. The genuineness of chargesheet Exhibit Ka-7, carbon copy of concerned G.D. Exhibit Ka-9, Specimen seal Exhibit Ka-11, information of death by medical officer Exhibit Ka-12, Memo regarding death of the victim Exhibit Ka-13, Police Papers Exhibit Ka-16 and Exhiit Ka-17, Exhibit Ka-14, Exhibit Ka-15 and Exhibit Ka-18 were not disputed by the counsel of the appellant and made endorsement on these documents to that effect. Thereafter, the statement of the appellant/ convict was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.') firstly on 2.1.2016 wherein the convict denied the fact of torturing the deceased for non fulfilment of demand of dowry and the unnatural death of his wife. He also stated that the witnesses had deposed falsely and refused to adduce any evidence in defence. He also stated that he is innocent, and also that he got burnt while trying to save his wife and remained hospitalised for nine days and was still not well completely. The additional statement of appellant/ convict under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 25.3.2016 wherein he was asked specifically about dying declaration of the deceased and he stated that dying declaration was recorded illegally. The certificate from the doctor appears to be taken afterwards and there is over-writing on timing. The deceased has given no statement against him and the statement was recorded of someone else maliciously. He has also stated that investigating officer has submitted the chargesheet without any basis. The complainant and other witnesses of facts have stated nothing against him and all have stated that the appellant is innocent. The dying declaration is forged and witnesses P.W.-6 and P.W.-7 have given false evidence against law. He also stated that he wanted to adduce evidence in defence. He got examined D.W.-1 Dr. Hari Om Srivastava in defence.
5. After hearing the arguments of both the sides, on the basis of evidence available on record, the trial court came to the conclusion that the delay in lodging the F.I.R. has been explained by the father of the deceased who is complainant of the case. It is also proved that the deceased died an unnatural death i.e. due to burn injuries which have been proved by the doctor P.W.-5. who conducted the post mortem on the cadaver of the deceased. It is also proved that the incident took place within seven years of marriage of the deceased with the appellant/convict. As far as the demand of dowry and act of cruelty in that regard soon before the death is concerned, the father of the deceased who has been examined as P.W.-1 has proved very well all these facts in his examination-in-chief though in his cross examination, he has not supported what he has stated in the examination-in-chief but has proved Exhibit Ka-1 his written report, lodged by him. Other witnesses of facts examined as P.W.-2, P.W.-3 and P.W.-4 have turned hostile but there is no contradiction on the point that the deceased Saloni was married to Bablu @ Nand Kumar and her parents gave dowry according to their capacity. There is no dispute that the deceased died of burn-injuries. The accused has nowhere stated in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he never demanded any dowry and his wife Saloni got burnt herself or was set-ablaze by someone else or accidentally, he has only stated that he is innocent and he also got burnt while trying to save his wife. The incident took place in the matrimonial home of the deceased so the persons living in the matrimonial home should have explained the real cause of burn i.e. how she got burnt but nothing has been stated by the appellant/convict in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. explaining or disclosing the fact how the deceased got burnt. The deceased in her dying declaration has stated that the appellant/convict poured kerosene-oil over her and set her ablaze. When the deceased was asked, that did anybody else torture or harass her, she denied and categorically answered that only Bablu her husband, was there and he burnt her after dousing with kerosene oil. The learned trial court has further concluded that the dying declaration has been proved by P.W.-6 Shri Vinit Kumar, Naib Tehsidar and it is also proved that dying declaration was recorded after following required formalities. The deceased has also told P.W.-6 that appellant/convict used to beat her everyday after consuming liquor. The deceased has not implicated anybody else except her husband. The trial court relied upon the dying declaration of deceased as well as on examination-in-chief of the P.W.-1 the complainant and also the medical witness P.W.-5 who conducted the post-mortem and appellant has been convicted under Sections 304-B, 323, 326, 498-A of I.P.C. and also under Section 4 of the D.P.Act.
6. Being aggrieved of his conviction, this appeal has been preferred.
7. Heard Shri Rehan Ahmad Siddiqui assisted by Mohd. Ehsan and Shri Chandra Shekhar Pandey, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondent State.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant/convict during arguments, emphasised on the point that the extreme punishment has been awarded by the trial court under Section 304-B I.P.C. and it is not a case deserving the extreme punishment. The minimum punishment under Section 304-B is seven years and the appellant/ convict has already undergone a period of nine and a half years, so his sentence i.e. imprisonment for life under Section 304-B, be converted into the period undergone by him.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant/convict also submitted that P.W.-2 Renu, sister of the deceased, P.W.-3 Kunta, mother of the deceased who are witnesses of facts have turned hostile. Even P.W.-1 Raghuveer, the complainant, father of the deceased has given contradictory statement, to what What he has stated in his examination-in -chief and written in written report Exhibit ka-1 on the basis of which F.I.R. was registered.
10. Learned counsel also assailed the dying declaration of the deceased by arguing that dying declaration was not recorded after following all due formalities. The deceased was burnt upto 95%, so she was not in a position to give a dying declaration, hence the sentence should be modified to that effect.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant/convict relied upon the following case laws :-
(a). Jayamma and another Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2021) 6 SCC 213 (b). Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana reported in (1994) 6 SCC 727. (c ). G.V. Siddaramesh Vs. State of Karnataka. reported in (2010) 3 SCC 152. (d) Govind Singh Vs. State of Chattishgarh ( 2019) 17 SCC 812. (e). Amrish Kumar Kashyap Vs. State of U.P. reported in Criminal Appeal Nos.303 and 316 of 2016 decided on 4.5.2016. (f). Ashadeen and others Vs. State of U.P reported in 2018 (102) ACC 807. (g). Mahesh Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2017(6) ALJ 75. (h). Pravin Khimji Chauhan Vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in Criminal Appeal NO.978 of 2012 decided on 15.2.2022.
12. To the contrary, learned A.G.A. Shri Chandra Shekhar Pandey submitted that there is evidence that the appellant set ablaze the deceased after dousing with kerosene oil, so it is a case of murder and appellant/convict should have been punished under Section 302 I.P.C. instead of under Section 304-B I.P.C. He also argued that dying declaration of the deceased was recorded promptly by authorised executive magistrate i.e. Naib Tehsildar after observing all due formalities. He took certificate of the doctor before recording the dying declaration and also at completion. The dying declaration is genuine, as the deceased very genuinely stated that the appellant/convict set her ablaze after dousing her with kerosene oil. She had not named any other family member of the convict, hence the appeal should be dismissed as minimum punishment under Section 302 I.P.C. is life imprisonment.
12. Considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the original record.
13. Evidence available on record reveals that there is no dispute about the fact that the deceased was married with appellant/convict about 4 years back of the incident and she got burnt in her matrimonial home on 2.11.2014 at the time mentioned in the F.I.R. and subsequently died of burn injuries on 9.11.2014 in hospital during treatment. Only fact remains how she got burnt or who burnt her. In this regard, P.W.-1, the complainant father of the deceased has proved in his examination-in-chief that he solemenised marriage of his daughter with the appellant/convict after giving dowry according to his status/capacity but the appellant/convict demanded extra dowry after marriage and started torturing and harassing the deceased and continuously harassed and tortured her for dowry and ultimately set her ablaze after dousing her with kerosene oil. He has proved his written report Exhibit Ka-1 and also proved his signature on it. He has explained the reason for delay in lodging the F.I.R. that he remained busy in treatment of her daughter so could not lodge the F.I.R. promptly. It is proved that deceased was admitted in the hospital after she got burnt, on the same night. The hospital authority informed the executive authority for recording her dying declaration. P.W.-6 Naib Tehsildar reached the hospital to record the same on the same night. He recorded the dying declaration after taking fitness certificate from the doctor and he got it certified after completion of dying declaration that the deceased was fit for giving the statement. The thumb impression of the deceased put on the Dying declaration is not in shape which shows that it was in burnt condition. On behghalf of the appellant/convict, no suggestion has been made to P.W.-6 Naib Tehsildar that the thumb impression is not of the deceased rather it has been suggested that the thumb impression of the patient was taken afterwards, after getting the dying declaration prepared somewhere else. Perusal of dying declaration Exhibit Ka-6 shows that it is in question answer form and very precise. The deceased has categorically stated that her husband Bablu set her ablaze after pouring kerosene oil. She has also stated that nobody else was present there. She has not implicated any other person or family member of the appellant/convict. On being asked, she has answered that she has two children, one daughter and one son. The daughter is elder and the son is younger. On being asked, she has also stated that the appellant/convict used to abuse her and beat her daily after consuming liquor. Again, upon being asked, she has stated that none else used to torture her. The dying declaration has been duly proved by P.W.-6 though there is an over writing on time but P.W.-6 has explained it and denied the suggestion that dying declaration was written at the house of the witness. The certificate of the doctor shows the time of starting as 11.35 P.M. and 11.50 P.M. as time of completion. In such a situation, this argument about over writing of time has no force.
15. It is settled law that the conviction can be based on dying declaration alone without corroboration if the court finds the dying declaration trusthworthy and genuine.
16. In Jayamma and another Vs. State of Karnataka (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court after quoting the principles regarding dying declaration, summarised by the Apex Court in Shyam Shanker Kankariya Vs. State of Maharashthra (2006) 13 SCC 165 has observed that "it goes without saying that when the dying declaration has been recorded in accordance with law, and it gives a cogent and plausible explanation of the occurrence, the court can rely upon it as the solitary piece of evidence to convict the accused."
17. In Shyam Shanker's case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has summarised the principles governing dying declaration as follows :-
"11. .... (i). There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
(ii). If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration.
(iii). The court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. the deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.
(iv). Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
(v). Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.
(vi). A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.
(vii). Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
(viii). Equally, merely because it is brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.
(ix). Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
(x). Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.
(xi). Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted."
18. In State of U.P. Vs. Ram Sagar Yadav and others : 1985(1) SCC 552, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :-
"13. It is well-settled that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration. There is not even a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. The primary effort of the court has to be to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no question of corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not clear or convincing that the court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying declaration."
19. In the present matter, as noted above, dying declaration Exhibit Ka-6 has been duly proved by the executive magistrate who recorded the same and certificate of fitness has been obtained before starting and after completion. This dying declaration was recorded at the time when even F.I.R. was not lodged by the father or any other kith and kin of the deceased. She was admitted in a burnt state in the hospital and hospital authority sent information to the executive authority for recording the same. So there remains no possibility that dying declaration was recorded at the behest of the kith and kin of the deceased or after tutoring by any kith and kin of the deceased. The dying declaration is in question answer form and a very genuine dying declaration wherein deceased has implicated only the culprit and none else. This dying declaration is worthy of credence and it raises confidence of the court that it is genuine and is not a result of tutoring.
20. The case laws Jayamma and another Vs. State of Karnataka (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant/convict is of no help to appellant/convict because in Jayamma's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court found that direct or indirect dominance of the police officer appears to have influenced the answers only in one direction. The narration of events were so accurate that even a witness in the normal state of mind cannot be expected to narrate. The person making statement was very old to narrate the incident with precision as what was made. There was sufficient evidence that the victim was under the effect of sedative pain killers. The dying declaration was recorded by a police officer and not by an executive or judicial magistrate. There were contradictions in the statement of the doctor and the police officer recording the statement. The thumb impression of the victim allegedly put on the dying declaration was very natural. There was no sign of burnt on the thumb impression. The police officer did not take the certificate of witnesses before recording the dying declaration. Judicial or executive magistrate was not called for recording of dying declaration though there was opportunity. In the present matter, dying declaration was recorded by executive magistrate and after taking fitness certificate, before starting recording of dying declaration and also after completion of the dying declaration. The deceased was a young lady married with appellant/convict just 3-4 years ahead of the incident.
21. Hem Chand's case(supra) is also of no help to the appellant/ conviction because in that case, the accused was held guilty on the basis of presumption raised under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, therefore the Hon'ble Apex Court converted the sentence of life imprisonment into 10 years' imprisonment but in the present case, the evidence on record is there that the deceased was set ablaze by the appellant/convict. The dying declaration is a genuine one, having won confidence of the court.
22. In Govind Vs. State of Chattishgarh (supra), during the verbal quarrel, accused threw chimni lamp on the deceased resulting in burn injury to the deceased. Since the incident took place at the spur of moment, so the apex court converted the sentence awarded under Section 302 I.PC. to Section 304(2) of I.P.C. The situation in the present case is altogether different. There is evidence on record that the appellant/ convict used to beat and abuse the deceased everyday after consuming liquor.
23. Similarly, rest of the case laws cited on behalf of the appellant/convict are of no help due to the difference in facts and circumstances of the present case.
24. In the matter at hand, dying declaration was recorded by the executive magistrate upon the information received from hospital authorities. the dying declaration is a genuine and trustworthy and inspires confidence in the court. It was a fit case where the Sessions Judge ought to have convicted the appellant/convict under Section 302 I.P.C. i.e. for the alternative charge already framed instead of convicting under Section 304-B I.P.C. However, the Sessions Judge has awarded maximum punishment provided under Section 304-B I.P.C. i.e. sentence for life imprisonment, that is very well warranted considering the facts and circumstances and evidence available on record.
25. Now considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, analysed as above, we deem it fit to modify the finding of the trial court to the effect that the appellant/ convict is guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. for alternative charge already framed and the punishment awarded by the trial court for life imprisonment to the appellant is confirmed under Section 302 I.P.C.instead of under Section 304-B I.P.C. for the reasons that, there is evidence on record which indicates that the deceased was burnt alive by the appellant and appellant alone. The dying declaration of the deceased noted and analysed above has established beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the appellant. The dying declaration is trustworthy and genuine. There is nothing on the record to doubt the credibility of the dying declaration made by the deceased. Here we made it clear that it is not an enhancement of punishment as the trial court has already awarded sentence of imprisonment for life.
26. However, the sentences awarded under Section 323, 326, 498-A I.P.C. and under Section 4 of the D.P. Act are not sustainable. The appellant cannot be convicted under Section 323 and 326 I.P.C. for inflicting simple and grievous injuries on the person of the deceased if he is being punished under Section 302 I.P.C. for causing death.
27. In Sundar Singh and others Vs. State of U.P 1954 SCC Online Allahabad 30 (FB), the Full Bench of this Court has observed as under :-
"23. Every offence, i.e., a separate offence, has a distinct, punishment prescribed for it. There are, however, certain exceptions whereby a series of successive offences have to be treated as "one offence" for the purposes of punishment; apart from this rule, or exception, a man is answerable & punishable for each offence that he commits. A man who sets upon another with a lathi and beats him with it by delivering successive blows is, strictly speaking, guilty of so many separate offences as the blows that he delivers.
"24. If a man causes simple hurt by one blow and grievous hurt by another, then he can be convicted but not punished both under Sections 323 and 325, I.P.C. Section 235, Criminal P.C., makes provision for the trial of a person for more offences than one when such offences are committed during the course of the "same transaction", though at the same time a man may be tried for acts constituting one offence as also constituting another offence when combined together. Sub-section (4) of this section, however, says : "Nothing contained in this section shall affect the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 71."
25. Section 71 of the Penal Code, is in these words :
"Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences, unless it be so expressly provided.
Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any Law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or Where several acts of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the court which tries him could award for any one of such offences."
26. This section provides two illustrations. Illustration (a) is worded thus :
"A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have committed the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to Z by the whole beating, and also by each of the blows which make up the whole beating. If A were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be imprisoned for fifty years, one for each blow. But he is liable only to one punishment for the whole beating."
27. This illustration, to my mind, clearly indicates the scope and the true meaning of the first part of Section 71. The meaning of the important word in that section, namely, the word "parts" has got to be understood in the light of this illustration, otherwise, there is likely to be, as unfortunately there has been, a complete misunderstanding of the meaning which the Legislature intended for that word, or the sense in which that word was used by the Legislature in that section.
28. The second illustration, namely, illustration (b) is in these words :
"But if, while A is beating Z, Y interferes, and A intentionally strikes Y, here, as the blow given to Y is no part of the act whereby A voluntarily causes hurt to Z, A is liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to Z, and to another for the blow given to Y."
29. This illustration further clarifies the position, for it makes it clear that when an offence is committed by an individual as against two separate persons, though, broadly speaking, both the offences may have been committed during the course of one transaction, he is made liable for the assault on both the individuals. It is Important to note that the first part of Section 71, I.P.C., really deals with a case in which the whole of the act is punishable under the same section or under allied sections, namely, where a series of offences partake of the same nature. This part of the section, to my mind, does not deal with a case where a part of man's action constitutes one kind of offence and another part of his action, though committed in a sequence in the course of one transaction, falls under another section, not allied.
30. The second part of Section 71 of the Code makes provision for a contingency when the same act constitutes more offences than one."
28. There is no evidence of demand of dowry as the witnesses produced to establish the fact have turned hostile. hence, the conviction under Section 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act is also set aside.
29. To sum up, the appellant is held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C., for alternative charge already framed and the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court is hereby confirmed but under Section 302 I.P.C. instead of under Section 304-B I.P.C. The conviction of the appellant/convict U/S 323, 326 and 498-A I.P.C. and U/s 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act is hereby set aside.
29. The appeal is partly allowed, accordingly.
30. Since the the appellant/ convict is already in jail, he shall serve his sentence in jail, confirmed hereinabove.
31. Let copy of this judgement alongwith original record of trial court be sent to the trial court concerned for information and necessary action.
(Smt. Saroj Yadav,J) (Rajan Roy,J) Order date : 6.5.2022.
Shukla.