Allahabad High Court
Jagan Nath And Others vs D.D.C. And Others on 4 January, 2024
Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:1100 Reserved on 13.12.2023 Delivered on 04.01.2024 Court No.36 Case :- WRIT - B No. - 8439 of 1984 Petitioner :- Jagan Nath And Others Respondent :- D.D.C. And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- H.C. Saxena,B.G.Yadav,N.K.Saxena,R.K.Yadav,Vijay Chaurasia Counsel for Respondent :- S.K. Srivastava,A.K.Srivastava,Avinash Swroop,D.S.Yadav,Devendra Singh,S.C.,Sandeep Kumar,Vinod Swroop Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
1. Heard Sri Manvendraa Nath Singh, Advocate, holding brief of Sri Amit Kumar Verma, learned counsel for petitioners and Sri R.C. Singh,learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Devendra Singh, learend counsel for respondents.
2. Present case is an outcome of consolidation proceedings and dispute is in respect of Plot Nos.364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370 and 371 of Khata No.124, of Village:Dwasi, Pargana: Kulpahar, District-Hamirpur.
3. According to averments made in writ petition in basic year aforesaid plots were recorded in Khata No.124 in the name of original respondent nos.2 and 3. However, Pankhiya, brother of the petitioners was in continuous possession over above referred land in dispute, even before Zamindari was abolished, in his own rights as tenure-holder.
4. During consolidation proceedings, said Pankhiya filed an objection that names of original respondent nos. 2 and 3 were illegally recorded and it was alleged that they have no right, title, interest and possession over land in dispute. It was further alleged that petitioners were paying land revenue and irrigation dues throughout. It was further averred in writ petition that one Kenda was illegally recorded as tenure holder and after his death, his widow Gauri Dulhan was also illegally recorded. She died leaving a daughter Puniya (original respondent no.4). It was further alleged that names of respondent nos. 2 and 3 were illegally recorded.
5. Respondent nos.2 and 3 also filed objections claiming themselves to be legal heirs of Kenda and Gauri Dulhan, alleging that they have acquired rights over land in dispute on basis of adverse possession. However,original respondent no.4 Smt. Puniya, daughter of Kenda, also filed objection alleging herself to be legal heir of Gauri Dulhan. She has alleged that she, Kenda and Gauri Dulhan, were all disabled persons and as such Pankhiya will not get any right over the land in dispute on basis of his alleged possession.
6. The Consolidation Officer considered rival submission and vide order dated 14.9.1980 allowed objections filed by Pankhiya and it was held that he was in possession over land in dispute before abolition of zamindari. It was further held that original respondent nos. 2 and 3 have no right, title or possession over land in dispute and cultivatory possession of Pakhiya was adverse and he has matured his rights over land in dispute. Relevant part of aforesaid order is reproduced hereinafter:
"उपरोक्त बयान से स्पष्ट है कि फरीकैन के दरयिमान नजदीकी रिश्ता नहीं है नजदीकी रिश्ता तथा आपस में एक दूसरे की विश्वास की बात साबित नहीं है जहाँ तक सवाल केन्डा गौरी दुल्हन व पुनिया के अक्षम होने का है इस पर विचार तभी करना उचित होगा जब पुनिया को जेड०ए० एण्ड एल०आर० ऐक्ट की धारा 157 की प्रोटेक्शन हासिल हो। जेड०ए०एल०आर० ऐक्ट की धारा 157 के लिये खातेदार का केवल इन्टेरेस्ट होना पर्याप्त नहीं है बल्कि साथ साथ यह भी जरूरी है कि डिसऐबुल्ड व्यक्ति ने अपनी भूमि को पट्टे पर जुतवाया है। अक्षम व्यक्ति के खिलाफ भी कब्जा मुखालफना के अाधार पर काबिजदार को जेड०ए०एल०आर० ऐक्ट की धारा 210 के अन्तर्गत तहकूक हासिल होते है केवल अक्षम होने के आधार पर ही कोई व्यक्ति जेड०ए० एण्ड एल०आर० ऐक्ट की धारा 157 का लाभ पाने का हकदार नहीं है। अक्षम व्यक्ति को कानून के केवल यह सहूलिया दी गई है यदि वह चाहे को अपनी जमीन को किसी आसामी को पट्टे पर उठा सकता है कन्ट्रेक्ट आफ टेनेंसी साबित होना जरूरी है।
इस मुकदमें में यह कंट्रेक्ट साबित होने की बात तो अलग रही कन्ट्रेक्ट पुनिया की तरफ से प्लीड नहीं किया गया है बात केवल इमदाद लेने की कही गई है और साथ में यह कहा गया कि इस इमदाद के बदले में पंखिया को उचित प्रतिफल दे दिया जाता था। ऐसी कोई बात प्लीडिंग्स में या सबूत में नहीं कही गई कि पंखिया को आराजी नजाई पट्टे पर उठाई गई थी। बटाई पर देने की बात भी नहीं कही है केवल इमीदाद की बात कही गई है इस प्रकार पुनिया को जेड०ए०एल०आर० ऐक्ट की धारा 157 की प्रोटेक्शन हासिल नहीं है। वादी पुनिया ने अक्षमता का आधार केवल जेड०एल० एण्ड एल०आर० ऐक्ट की धारा 157 की लाभ उठाने के लिये था और चूँकि यह प्रोटेक्शन उपरोक्त विवरण के अनुसार हासिल नहीं है अतः वाद विन्दु नम्बर 8 व 13 को तय करने की आवश्यकता नहीं है। उपरोक्त विवरण के आधार पर आराजी निजाई पर वादी पंखिया का कब्जा मुखालफना 1357 प० से साबित है 1359 प० को कल्टीवेटरी पजेसन के आधार उसे अधिवासी से सीरदारी हकूक निजाई में हासिल हो चुके थे। आल्टरनेटिव में जमाना जमीदारी के बाद भी लगातार कब्जा मुखालफना के आधार पर उसे आराजी निजाई में संक्रमणीय भूमिधरों के अधिकार प्राप्त हो चुके है। अतः वाद बिन्दु नम्बर 5 नकारात्मक रूप में वाद बिन्दु नम्बर 6 तथा 7 स्वीकारात्मक रूप में तय किये जाते हैं।"
7. Above referred order was challenged before Settlement Officer of Consolidation by respondent nos. 4, 2 and 3 respectively by way of filing two appeals bearing nos. 270/391 and 269/390, which were dismissed by vide order dated 16.9.1981, and relevant part thereof is reproduced hereinafter:
"उपरोक्त तर्क के एक विधि का प्रश्न अपीलकत्री की ओर से लिया गया है कि मु०पुनिया एक अक्षम व्यक्ति है। उत्तरवादी पंखिया का कब्जा चाहे किसी भी सूरत से हो मान ही लिया गया है। मु० पंखिया के पुर्नविवाह करने पर भी पंखिया के वि० अधिवक्ता का तर्क महत्वहीन हो जाता है। कि पुर्नविवाह लड़की का धारा 171 ज० एक्ट में विरासत खारिज नहीं करता और यदि ऐसा कुप्रभाव मु० पुनिया के स्वत्व निरस्त करने में आवे भी तो उसका प्रभाव पंखिया को विरासतन भूमि का प्रश्न पाने के लिए नहीं हो सकता है इस तर्क का लाभ तो केवल अंकित राम रतन व दशरथ लड़की के लड़के ही पा सकते है अब वाद का तमाम बिन्दु एक ही जगह रहा कि यह कब्जा पंखिया का रूप क्या होगा।यह तथ्य स्पष्ट है कि श्री पंखिया जमींदारी उन्मूलन एक्ट से पूर्व लगभग 1357 फ० से पूर्व ही काबिज है उस समय अक्षम व्यक्ति श्री केन्डा बताये गये उनके श्री पंखिया उत्तरवादी आसामी बने मगर श्री केन्डा के वाद श्रीमती गौरी दुल्हन बेवा एक दूसरे अक्षम व्यक्ति रही और अन्त में श्रीमती गौरी दुल्हन बेवा एक दूसरे अक्षम व्यक्ति रही और अन्त में श्रीमती पुनिया भी अक्षम बताई। जमींदारी उन्मूलन एक्ट में यह विशेष व्यवस्था है कि ......... शब्द है। यदि एक के बाद दूसरे तीसरे .......... होते है तो जब तक पुनः .......... उनके द्वारा सिद्ध न हो यह नही माना जा सकता कि तमाम भविष्य की ............ उसका लाभ उठाती रहेगी। जमींदारी उन्मूलन एक्ट की धारा 157 में यह व्यवस्था है कि ............. भूमि का उठा सकती है मगर उठाने भूमि की कार्यवाही ही न हो तब यह ............ नहीं होगा कि पूर्व व्यवस्था पहिले ............ से बनी रही और पूर्व की तरह चल रही है। दूसरे व तीसरे अक्षम व्यक्ति द्वारा भी यह ............. सिद्ध करना पड़ेगा। यहां वर्तमान वाद में अपीलकत्री मु० पुनिया ने यह व्यवस्था सिद्ध नहीं की बल्कि उसके ही पुत्रगण श्री राम रतन व दशरथ सक्षम व्यक्ति है उसके निजी सक्षम व्यक्ति होने पर भी अक्षम होने पर कुप्रभाव पड़ेगा यहाँ वर्तमान वाद में माँ व बेटों का परस्पर विरोध नहीं है। अतएव सारांश यही रहा कि मु० पुनिया चाहे विधवा ही क्यों न हो उनके वि० अधिवक्ता द्वारा यह तर्क कि उनके पिता श्री कन्डे द्वारा यदि मान भी लिया जावे कि अक्षम व्यक्ति होने पर विश्वास के तौर पर श्री पंखिया को जुतवाते थे। ........... की व्यवस्था थी, तो भी यह व्यवस्था हर अक्षम व्यक्ति से होनी चाहिए अतएव इस तर्क में अब बल नहीं रहा।
यह तथ्य सिद्ध है कि मु० गौरी दुल्हन को मरे 10-12 साल हो गये ऐसा भी कोई ............. साक्ष्य नहीं है। श्री राम रतन आदि का नाम दर्ज है मु० पुनिया ने कोई भी इस मध्य में कार्यवाही नहीं की तब कब्जा श्री पंखिया गासवाना ही कहलायेगा तथा मु० गौरी दुल्हन की ओर से भी ........... की व्यवस्था सिद्ध नहीं है। ऐसी स्थिति में वि०च०अ० ने सही सही इकराया कि मु० पुनिया के हक समाप्त हो गये तथा पंखिया ने स्वत्व भूमिधरी धारा 210 प्राप्त कर लिये। अब अपीलकत्री के वि० अधिवक्ता ने आखिर में तर्क दिया कि पंखिया का कब्जा दर्ज नहीं है। ............. सिद्ध नहीं किया और ना ही ऐसे कब्जे को ........... नहीं है कोई खसरा प्रस्तुत नहीं है। श्री दशरथ के बयान दिया कि "मेरी माँ नाना व नानी आराजी निजाई को जुतवाने में पंखिया की मदद लेते थे" जब समय पूछा गया तो साफ नकारात्मक उत्तर दिया कि मुझे नहीं मालूम कि कब पंखिया मदद करते थे सींच की पर्ची प्रस्तुत नहीं की जब कि यह माना कि इस गाटों की सिचाई होती थी। इन गाटों की सिचाई पर्चे उलटे पंखिया ने दिये है एक यह तथ्य स्पष्ट हो गया कि कब्जा पंखिया का है एक और तथ्य सिद्ध हो जाने पर तमाम खसरे आदि साक्ष्य की कोई भी आवश्यकता नहीं है। अब यही तथ्य सुनिश्चित होता है कि पंखिया ही इन गाटों को बराबर जोत रहे है और उसके स्वत्व परिपक्व हो गये।
उपरोक्त स्थिति में वि०च०अ० के आदेश सही है तथा यह दोनों अपीलें निराधार है खारिज की जाती है।"
(Emphasis Supplied)
8.As referred above, both the authorities have held that Pakhiya has provided irrigation slips of many years which was considered to be a material evidence that he was in possession over land in dispute for many years and was doing agriculture over it and thus perfected his right.
9. Aforesaid orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation were challenged by way of filing two revision petitions bearing nos. 1988 and 1989. The Assistant Director of Consolidation, Hamirpur vide order dated 15.6.1984, allowed the revision petitions filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3, but dismissed the revision filed on behalf of respondent no.4 for want of prosecution. Relevant part of said order is reproduced hereinafter:
"उक्त वर्णित पंखिया द्वारा उनकी आपत्ति में तथा खण्डन में विरोध राम रतन आदि की ओर से किया गया, उसका अध्ययन करने के बाद यहाँ यह उल्लेखनीय है कि वाद में यह स्वीकृत तथ्य है कि केन्डा की मृत्यु के बाद मु० गौरी दुल्हन बेवा केन्डा बहैसियत वारिश हकदार हुई। गौरी दुलहन 10-12 साल हुए मर गई है उनकी पुत्री मु० पुनिया बेवा सुखलाल वारिस विवादित भूमि की नहीं है च०अ० ने तनकी नं०3 इस अम्र की बनायी कि क्या पुनिया केन्डा की पत्नी मु० गौरी दुल्हन की वारिस तनकी नं०4 इस अम्र की बनायी कि क्या राम रतन, दशरथ गौरी दुल्हन के जायज वारिस है। जनकी नं० 1 इस अम्र की बनायी कि क्या आराजी के स्वामी केन्डा थे। तनकी नं०2 इस अम्र की बनायी कि पुनिया के (का०फटा) की लड़की थी। इन तनकियों का निर्णय हो गया है उसके बाद केवल विचारणीय प्रश्न यह रह जाता है कि क्या कब्जे की विनह पर पंखिया सीरदारी अधिकार अपने पक्ष में उत्पन्न कर सकते हैं अथवा नहीं। यहाँ यह उल्लेखनीय है कि माँ और बेटा में परस्पर विरोध नहीं यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि पुर्नविवाह होना अधीनस्थ न्यायालय (दोनों) में नहीं माना गया है। यह तय है कि 10-12 साल पहले गौरी दुल्हन के मरने के साक्ष्य है ब०अ०च० ने अपने आदेश में लिखा है कि फौती रिपोर्ट नहीं है, इस विनह पर उन्होंने पंखिया का कब्जा गाशवाना माना है। इस विवेचन से मैं सहमत नहीं। विशेष कर जब कि यह सिद्ध है कि पंखिया खानदानी भतीजा था और केन्डा वृद्ध और अनपढ़ थे, उनकी वहीं देखभाल करता था और उस हालत में देखना यह है कि उसका कब्जा गाशवाना होगा अथवा लेसी का होगा। जैसा ऊपर कहा गया है कि आपत्ति में स्पष्ट अवकथन जमींदारी से पट्टा कराने का है लेसमात्र ऐसा सबूत नहीं, जिससे यह पता चलता हो कि जमींदार से पट्टा द्वारा आराजी अर्जित पंखिया ने की हो। जहाँ तक कानून व्यवस्था अधिवासी से सीरदारी अधिकार पाने की है न तो पंखिया आकूपेन्ड ही है और न 1359 फ० में खसरा ही कब्जा सम्बन्धित है। ऐसी स्थिति में अधिवासी से सीरदारी अधिकार उत्पन्न होने का प्रश्न ही नहीं। अधीनस्थ न्यायालय ने सीरदारी अधिकार देने में त्रुटि की है। यह तय है कि माल अभिलेखों में अर्थात खसरा या खतौनी में भी वहीं कब्जा है। इन्द्राज पंखिया के पक्ष में नहीं रहा है। लैण्ड रिकार्ड मैनूअल में वर्णित प्रक्रिया के अधीन कोई भी औपचारिकता देखने का प्रश्न ही नहीं रहता है। न तो वर्ग 9 और न प०क०-10 को तामीला पर ही विचार किया जा सकता है। अधीनस्थ न्यायालय ने आधार आदेश पंखिया को सीरदारी अधिकार का नकल खसरा, सिचांई 1380, 1381, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1385, 1386, 175, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1379, प्रस्तुत किये गये है। पर्चे आबपासी 1357, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1369, 1371, 1376 आदि प्रस्तुत किये गये है, केवल 1357 का पर्चा आबपासी अवश्य जमींदारी विनाश से पूर्व का है सम्भवतः पंखिया इसी पर्चे की विनह पर जमींदारी विनाश से पूर्व अपनी कब्जा कहकर सीरदारी अधिकार की मांग कर रहे है। अब यह देखना है कि क्या उस पर्चे की विनह पर कब्जा जमींदारी विनाश से पूर्व इनका माना जा सकता है और क्या इनको सीरदारी अधिकार दिये जा सकते है। वैसे तो कानूनी व्यवस्था का वर्णन पहले ही कर दिया गया है, जिससे इनको कोई लाभ नहीं मिलता है, पर्चा अधिवासी 1357 जो केवल जमींदारी विनाश के पूर्व की है, वहीं रह जाती है। 1362 फ० की खतौनी रामरतन आदि की ओर से है तथा खण्डन में ही 1386 फ० का खसरा भी है। माल अभिलेखों में कब्जा का वर्णन पंखिया के पक्ष में नहीं है। यह पर्चों आबपासी भी केवल 4 गाटों के सम्बन्ध में है, जो कि रसीद से पुष्टिकृत नहीं। मेरी समझ में यह पर्चों आबपासी विधिवत नहीं मानी जा सकती है। अधीनस्थ न्यायालय ने इसको आधार मानने में त्रुटि की है, जमींदारी से पूर्व बराबर गौरी दुल्हन का कब्जा रहा है।"
10. The Revisional Authority has denied right to petitioner over land in dispute only on basis of irrigation slips submitted by him. The Revisional Authority has placed reliance on revenue records which was not in favour of petitioners.
11. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that well reasoned orders of two authorities were erroneously disturbed by Revisional Court without reversing specific findings returned by two authorities i.e. Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation. It was further contended that petitioners were in possession over land in dispute even before abolition of zamindari. Even on partal they were found in possession over land in dispute.
12. Learned counsel further has placed heavy reliance on irrigation slips of Fasli years 1362, 1363, 1366, 1371, 1377 and 1378, submitted by petitioners that it was sufficient material and evidence to prove that they were in possession over the land in dispute and have been cultivating it and have acquired their own rights and payed irrigation dues also and further that contesting respondents have never tried to dispossess them.
13. Learned counsel for petitioners further referred relevant part of findings returned by Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer of Consolidation and submitted that respondents failed to prove their relationship with Pankhiya and Kenda and even oral examination of witnesses was completely overlooked by Revisional Authority.
14. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents submitted that petitioners' right was based only on irrigation slips, which could not be considered to be sole basis to prove their possession or right over land in dispute and in absence of any legal source of possession, said receipts could not be considered to be sufficient material.
15. Learned counsel also referred relevant part of impugned order and submitted that there were illegality and irregularities committed by two lower authorities and as such Revisional Authority, who has wide jurisdiction, has rightly interfered and set-aside orders passed by Consolidation Officer as well as Settlement Officer of Consolidation. In order to prove adverse possession, P.A.10 has to be prepared, however, it was not even prepared or mentioned in revenue records.
16. Learned Senior Counsel, in order to give buttress to his submissions has placed reliance on a judgment of this court in Mata Din Singh Vs. D.D.C. & Ors, 2023:AHC:158629, and relevant paragraphs 25, 27 and 28 thereof are reproduced hereinafter:
"25. In this regard, it would be relevant to reiterate the observations made in Gurmukh Singh (supra) that the entries will have no evidentiary value, if are not entered, in accordance with the provisions of 'the Manual'. As referred above, in the present case, no finding was returned by Courts below that the procedure prescribed in 'the Manual' was duly followed. Even there is no material before this Court to hold that while making the entries, procedure prescribed under 'the Manual', such as whether the lekhpal has prepared the changes in triplicate, a copy thereof was handed over to the Chairman, Land Management Committee, changes were reported, statement was submitted to the supervisor kanungo, partal of the village was conducted, procedure prescribed under Para 102-C, etc. were duly followed. Therefore, only on basis of entries being under clause (9) of Part II of Para A-124 of 'the Manual', it could not be held that contesting respondents were in continuous possession on the land in dispute for a period of 12 years and thus perfected their right on the strength of adverse possession.
X x x
27. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer a judgment of Supreme Court in Hemaji Waghaji Jat (supra) wherein following relevant paragraphs of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others Vs. Revamma and others, 2007 (6) SCC 59 were reiterated with approval that-:
"24.In a relatively recent case in P.T.Munichikkanna Reddyv.Revamma[(2007) 6 SCC 59] this Court again had an occasion to deal with the concept of adverse possession in detail. The Court also examined the legal position in various countries particularly in English and American systems. We deem it appropriate to reproduce relevant passages in extenso. The Court dealing with adverse possession in paras 5 and 6 observed as under : (SCC pp. 66-67) "5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. (See Downing v.Bird [100 So 2d 57 (Fla 1958)];Arkansas Commemorative Commission v.City of Little Rock [227 Ark 1085 : 303 SW 2d 569 (1957)]; Monnotv.Murphy[207 NY 240 : 100 NE 742 (1913)];City of Rock Springs v. Sturm[39 Wyo 494 : 273 P 908 : 97 ALR 1 (1929)].)
6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, p. 81.) It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of adverse possession, especially in the backdrop of limitation statutes, that the intention to dispossess cannot be given a complete go-by. Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim."
(Italic part is emphasised in original and underline part is emphasised by this Court)
28. Recently the Supreme Court in Uttam Chand (Dead) through LRs vs. Nath Ram (Dead) through LRs and others, 2020 (11) SCC 263 has reiterated earlier judgments and observed that-:
"15.The matter has been examined by a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das [M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1] wherein, it has been held that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the title of the other. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 703-706, paras 1142-1143 & 1147-1150) "1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed.
xxx 1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. Reading Para 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long, exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence.
*** 1147. In Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038], R.S. Sarkaria, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the concept of possession is "polymorphous" embodying both a right (the right to enjoy) and a fact (the real intention). The learned Judge held: (SCC p. 278, para 13) '13. ... It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of "possession" uniformly applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of "possession". Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. "Possession", implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.)' These observations were made in the context of possession in Section 29(b) of the Arms Act, 1959.
1148. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy [P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, 1957 SCR 195 : AIR 1957 SC 314], Jagannadhadas, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court dwelt on the "classical requirement" of adverse possession: (AIR pp. 317-18, para 4) '4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. (See Secy. of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan [Secy. of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan, 1933 SCC OnLine PC 65:(1933-34) 61 IA 78] IA at p. 82.) The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor.' The Court cited the following extract from U.N. Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Limitation and Prescription: (AIR p. 319, para 7) '7. ... "An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive claim (arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation), to hold the land against him (sic) who was in possession. (Angell, Sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession." ' [ 6th Edn., Vol. I, Lecture VI, at p. 159] This Court held: (AIR p. 319, para 7) '7. ... Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a person implies that the person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the requisite animus.' 1149. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779], S. Rajendra Babu, J. speaking for a two-Judge Bench held that: (SCC p. 785, para 11) '11. ...Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed.' The ingredients must be set up in the pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law.
1150. In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam [Annakili v.A. Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC 308], this Court emphasised that mere possession of land would not ripen into a possessory title. The possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. Moreover, he must continue in that capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act."
17. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on judgment passed by Supreme Court in Udai (Dead), though L.R.'s Vs. D.D.C. Varanasi & Ors, A.I.R. 1990 SC 471, and Vidya Shanker v. Suresh Chandra, 2020 (149) R.D. 671. Relevant parts of aforesaid judgments are reproduced hereinafter:-
Udai (Dead), though L.R.'s (supra):-
"9. The facts in Amba Prasad v. Abdul Noor Khan [AIR 1965 SC 54 : (1964) 7 SCR 800] were more complicated. But, for our present purposes, it is sufficient to extract the facts as set out in the headnote. Before the coming into operation of the Act, Amba Prasad was the zamindar of the disputed land. The names of the respondents had been recorded in the khasra for 1356 Fasli as persons in possession of the disputed land but they had been dispossessed after 30-6-1949. They claimed adhivasi rights under Section 20 on the strength of the record for 1356 Fasli and were successful in their claim before the Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court dismissed Amba Prasad's appeal. Hidayatullah, J. (as His Lordship then was) analysed the terms of Section 20 and its explanations thus: (SCR pp. 807-808) "The scheme of the section may now be noticed. The section, speaking generally, says that certain persons 'recorded' as 'occupants' of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which Section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivasis and shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them, after the date of vesting which was 1-7-1952. Such persons do not include an intermediary (Explanation IV). Such persons must be recorded as occupants in the khasra or khatauni for 1356 Fasli (1-7-1948 to 30-6-1949). If such a person is in possession he continues in possession. If he is evicted after 30-6-1943 he is to be put back in possession notwithstanding anything in any order or decree. By fiction such persons are deemed to be entitled to regain possession (Explanation I). The emphasis has been laid on the record of khasra or khatauni of 1356 Fasli and 30-6-1948 is the datum line. The importance of an entry in these two documents is further apparent from Explanations II and III. Under the former, if the entry is corrected before the date of vesting (1-7-1952), the corrected entry is to prevail and under the latter the entry is deemed to be corrected (even though not actually corrected, if an order or decree of a competent court ordering the correction had been made before the date of vesting and the order or decree had become final. There are thus two date lines. They are 30-6-1948 and 1-7-1952, and the title to possession as adhivasi depends on the entries in the khasra or khatauni for the year 1356 Fasli."
His Lordship then observed:
"Before we proceed to decide whether the answering respondents satisfy the above tests we must consider what is meant by the terms 'occupant' and 'recorded'. The word 'occupant' is not defined in the Act. Since khasra records possession and enjoyment the word 'occupant' must mean a person holding the land in possession or actual enjoyment. The khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the subtenant and other person in actual possession, as the case may be. If by occupant is meant the person in actual possession it is clear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant, and between a tenant and the subtenant the latter and between him and a person recorded in the remarks column as 'dawedar qabiz' the dawedar qabiz are the occupants. This is the only logical way to interpret the section which does away with all intermediaries. If rights are not to be determined except in the manner laid down by the section, the entries must be construed as explained by the four explanations. Once we find out the right person in the light of the explanations, that person continues as an adhivasi after 1-7-1952, provided he is in possession or was evicted after 30-6-1948. If he was evicted after 30-6-1948 he is entitled to regain possession in spite of any order or decree to the contrary. The word 'occupant' thus signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Mediate possession, (except where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor), is of no consequence. In this way even persons who got into occupation when lands were abandoned get recognition. The section eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by accepting the records in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 Fasli, or its correction before 1-7-1952. It was perhaps thought that all such disputes would have solved themselves in the four years between 30-6-1948 and 30-6-1952."
His Lordship concluded by touching upon the question whether the person claiming rights under Section 20 should prove actual possession in 1356 Fasli and, observing that this question had been left open in the Upper Ganges case [AIR 1961 SC 143 : (1961) 1 SCR 564] , said there was no reason to disturb a long established line of decisions of the Allahabad High Court answering the question in the negative. In the result, Amba Prasad's appeal was dismissed.
10. It is necessary to refer to yet one more decision of this Court and that is Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue [AIR 1968 SC 1351 : (1968) 3 SCR 498] . In this case, the village records showed the respondents as subtenants from the appellants of the lands in question. One R who was the tekhedar of the proprietary rights, sued to eject the appellants and respondents alleging that the sub-letting was illegal. The suit was dismissed in March 1946 (i.e. towards the end of 1353 Fasli) on the ground that there was no sub-letting and that the entries in the records to this effect were not correct. Despite the decision in the suit, no attempt was made by anyone to correct the entries in the village records and the respondents continued to figure as subtenants in these records, until 1358 Fasli. When the lekhpal, on his own, removed those entries from the year 1358 Fasli. In 1952 (i.e. 1360 Fasli), after the Act came into force, the respondents claimed adhivasi rights and sued to recover possession of the lands. They succeeded before the Board of Revenue and the High Court declined to interfere under Article 226. In an appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court held that the court had to go by the entry in the record of rights, that it was not necessary to enquire whether the respondents had become subtenants after the decision in the suit filed by R and that, as between the tenant and the sub-tenant, the entry in the record of rights in favour of the subtenant made him the occupant entitled to the adhivasi rights under Section 20. The court followed the decisions in Upper Ganges [AIR 1961 SC 143 : (1961) 1 SCR 564] and Amba Prasad [AIR 1965 SC 54 : (1964) 7 SCR 800] . As to the former decision the court observed:
"This case establishes that a person recorded as an occupant on the relevant date although found by courts of law to have no right to possession even prior thereto, is not to be denied adhivasi rights."
As to the latter, the court quoted, with apparent approval, extensive extracts from the judgment of Hidayatullah, J x x x x x x x x
13. The argument is ingenious but we do not think it is open to the respondent in view of the categorical decision in Nath Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1351 : (1968) 3 SCR 498] . Contention (4) as set out at p. 501 and the conclusion at p. 504 of the above judgment leave no doubt regarding this. Shri Swarup's argument indirectly asks us to go behind the entry in the village records and enter into a discussion as to whether the person recorded as subtenant was in possession or not, was entitled to possession or not and, if yes, in what capacity he was entitled to, or was in, such possession, a plea that goes directly in the teeth of all the three decisions. The discussion in Upper Ganges [AIR 1961 SC 143 : (1961) 1 SCR 564] does not negative this position. That discussion was in the context of repelling a specific contention urged before the court by the landlord, which derived inspiration, perhaps, from the specific exclusion of "tekhedar" from the definition of the expression "tenant" in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1936. That contention viz. that the company's possession was either on behalf of the court or was on behalf of the landlords was negatived. That decision cannot, therefore, be treated as laying down that occupancy as a subtenant would not be sufficient for the purposes of Section 20(b)(i). So far as Amba Prasad [AIR 1965 SC 54 : (1964) 7 SCR 800] is concerned, the observations in the judgment show that even the tenant and subtenant can be regarded as occupants vis-a-vis the proprietor and the tenant respectively. It is only where, although the name of the tenant or subtenant is shown in columns (5) and (6) of the khasra, some other person is shown in the remarks column as the actual occupant that the tenant or subtenant cannot be regarded as the "recorded occupant". In our opinion, therefore, Amba Prasad [AIR 1965 SC 54 : (1964) 7 SCR 800] and Nath Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1351 : (1968) 3 SCR 498] are decisive of the issue in the present case."
(Emphasis supplied) Vidya Shanker (supra):-
"38. In Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji v. Shah Ranchhoddas Kalidas, AIR 1970 SC 2025, Court held that a party cannot be allowed to set up a case wholly inconsistent with that pleaded in its written statement.
39. In the matter of plea of adverse possession, mutually inconsistent or mutually destructive pleas must not be taken in the plaint. Whenever the plea of adverse possession is raised, it pre supposes that onwer is someone else and the person taking the plea of adverse possession is not the actual owner but has perfected his title by prescription since the real owner failed to initiate any proceeding for restoring the possession within the prescribed period under the statute.
40. In P. Periasami v. P.Periathambi and others, 1995 (6) SCC 523, it was said:
''Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property.''
18. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the records.
19. The claim of petitioners was based on an averment that Kenda, was Kudh Kashtkar over land in dispute and after his death, his widow, Gauri Dulhan, and even after her death, names of Ram Ratan and Dashrath (i.e. respondent nos. 2 and 3) were wrongly recorded in revenue records.
20. Further case of petitioners was that they were in possession over land in dispute since 1359 Fasli and they were regularly doing agriculture over it and were regularly paying agriculture and irrigation rent and receipts thereof were issued in their names.
21. Learned counsel for petitioner in his aforesaid submission has referred judgment passed by Consolidation Officer and the Appellate Authority to contend that possession of Pakhiya was proved from revenue records and on basis of cultivatory possession, initially he became 'Adivasi' and later on became Sirdar, therefore, impugned order has erroneously disturbed findings recorded by two lower authorities and it was wrongly held that irrigation slips could not be considered to be a sole basis to determine ownership.
22. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents in his aforesaid submissions has contended that claim of petitioners on adverse possession was not proved since Form P.A.10 was either not prepared and if prepared, due procedure was not followed.
23. I don't find any merit that plea of adverse possession could be considered since Form P.A.10 was not even prepared or recorded in revenue records.
24. Petitioners have also not laid much stress upon plea of adverse possession. Entire case of petitioners was based on irrigation slips to claim their continuous possession over land in dispute and that its legal consequence will follow.
25. It is well settled that in order to give recognition to cultivatory possession, an Authority has to give a specific finding that such possession must be lawful and there must be a lawful right vested with a person who claims to be in possession.
26. Petitioners have vehemently claimed that they entered into possession and started paying irrigation rents and they have never tried to dispossess respondents, therefore, perfected their right over land in dispute.
27. Irrigation slips are just a recognition or acknowledgement of payment of irrigation dues. There are certain oral evidence which suggests that petitioners were allowed to use the land since Kenda, the original tenure holder had great confidence on him. There is oral evidence to the effect that original tenure holders used to give money to opposite parties who in turn use to make payment of irrigation dues. This evidence could not be ignored. It appeared that there was a permission from respondents to petitioners to use land in dispute, whereas respondents used to give money to petitioners for payment of irrigation dues and other related works, therefore, only on basis of irrigation rents receipts being issued in names of petitioners, did not create any right over land in dispute.
28. At this stage it would be apposite to mention relevant part of judgment passed in Udai (dead) Supra which is as under:
"If by occupant is meant the person in actual possession it is clear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant, and between a tenant and the subtenant the latter and between him and a person recorded in the remarks column as 'dawedar qabiz' the dawedar qabiz are the occupants. This is the only logical way to interpret the section which does away with all intermediaries. If rights are not to be determined except in the manner laid down by the section, the entries must be construed as explained by the four explanations. Once we find out the right person in the light of the explanations, that person continues as an adhivasi after 1-7-1952, provided he is in possession or was evicted after 30-6-1948. If he was evicted after 30-6-1948 he is entitled to regain possession in spite of any order or decree to the contrary. The word 'occupant' thus signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Mediate possession, (except where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor), is of no consequence. In this way even persons who got into occupation when lands were abandoned get recognition. The section eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by accepting the records in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 Fasli, or its correction before 1-7-1952. It was perhaps thought that all such disputes would have solved themselves in the four years between 30-6-1948 and 30-6-1952."
29. Last argument of petitioners counsel was that Revisional Authority has wrongly interfered on concurrent findings of two authorities. There is no dispute that after amendment in Section 48 of the Act of 1953, the Revisional Authority has wide power to scrutinize order/s passed by lower authority as to its regularity of the proceedings or as to its correctness, legality or propriety.
30. As discussed above, the Revisional Authority has considered and scrutinized correctness and legality of orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Appellate Authority by legally sustainable reasons has set-aside the finding retuned by referred two authorities.
31. The outcome of above discussion is that Revisional Authority has within its jurisdiction as provided under Section 48 (as amended) by Act of 1953, has interfered with concurrent finding of his authorities since there was illegality committed by these authorities, which goes to the root of the case that irrigation payment slips could not be sole ground to grant right to petitioners even when there was no other evidence in revenue record to support the case of petitioners.
32. Petitioners are unable to prove their right over the land in dispute.
33. In view of above discussion, interference caused by Revisional Authority in the impugned order does not require any interference.
34. Impugned order is legally justified.
35. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
Order Date :-4.1.2024 SB