Delhi District Court
Pavan Chawla And Anr vs Alape Kaur Kand Ors on 3 September, 2025
IN THE COURT OF DISTRICT JUDGE- 01,
NEW DELHI DISTRICT, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS,
NEW DELHI
Presided over by :- SH. DHARMENDER RANA (DHJS)
DLND010081522019
RCA DJ No. 49/2019
1. Shri Pawan Chawla,
Son of Late Sh. G.D. Chawla,
Resident of C-50, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi-110027.
2. Shri Pankaj Chawla,
Son of Late Sh. G.D. Chawla,
Resident of C-50, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi-110027
Appellants
Versus
1. Mrs. Alape Kaur Through LRs.,
(a) Mr. Andrea Aftab Pauro.
Son of Late Mrs. Alape Kaur,
R/O 224, Jor Bagh, New Delhi-110003.
RCA DJ 49-2019
PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS
Page No. 1 of 30
(b) Ms. Amrita Giovanna Pauro,
D/O Late Mrs. Alape Kaur,
R/O 224, Jor Bagh, New Delhi-110003.
2. Shri Indrave Singh Μann,
Son of Shri Savinder Singh Mann,
R/o 10, Sardar Patel Marg, New Delhi-110021.
3. M/S Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd.,
Regd. Office At: Office No. 8, First Floor,
Atma Ram Mansion (Scindia House),
Connaught Circus, New Delhi-110001.
Respondents
Petition presented on : 08.05.2019
Arguments Concluded on : 30.08.2025
Judgment Pronounced on : 03.09.2025
JUDGMENT
1 By way of the instant order, I propose to dispose of an appeal filed by the appellant assailing the decree and judgment dated 05.03.2019 whereby the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff for declaration, specific performance and permanent injunction was partly decreed.
RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 2 of 30 For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be hereinafter referred to with their original connotation as before the Ld. Trial Court.
2 The case of the plaintiff as set up before the Ld. Trial Court is adumbrated herein as under:-
2.1 Succinctly, the plaintiffs have asserted that they are tenants of the flat bearing no. G-73, Connaught Circus, New Delhi situated on the first floor of Block G (hereinafter referred to as 'suit property') and the said property was let out to the plaintiffs by defendant no.1 alongwith one S. Rajdev Singh, S. Gopalinder Singh and S. Indrave Singh vide registered lease deed dated 16.10.1990 on the terms and conditions incorporated therein. It is averred that defendants no.1 and 3 are the original landlords of the plaintiffs and defendant no.2 has purportedly purchased the share of S. Gopalinder Singh.
It is further averred that vide letter dated 18.10.1990, defendant no.1 alongwith S. Rajdev Singh, S. Gopalinder Singh and defendant no.3 acknowledged and confirmed the right of the plaintiffs to seek renewal of the lease deed dated 16.10.1990 after the expiry of every five years "any number of times".
2.2 It is further averred that the landlords further undertook to execute a fresh lease deed on every renewal of every five RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 3 of 30 years and in case, the landlords did not so renew the said lease deed at the option of the plaintiffs, then the lease deed shall be deemed to have been extended on same terms and conditions as contained in the lease deed dated 16.10.1990 read with letter dated 18.10.1990 on expiry of term of every five years. It is further averred that on 09.10.1995 before the expiry of the first term of five years of the term of tenancy, the plaintiffs called upon the defendants to renew the lease deed vide registered letter and execute a fresh lease deed for renewal in their favour. However, the defendants despite receipt of the said letter, failed to renew the lease deed and thus, the tenancy of the plaintiffs in the suit property stood automatically extended for a further period of five years.
2.3 It is further averred that plaintiffs have paid the rent regularly to the defendants since 16.10.1990, which was accepted by the defendants without any objection. It is further claimed that an eviction petition has also been filed by the defendants against the plaintiffs, which is pending in the Court of Rent Controller, New Delhi, Patiala House Courts New Delhi. It is further averred that on failure of the defendants to renew the said lease deed or execute a fresh lease deed despite repeated offers on the part of the plaintiffs, the said lease deed thus duly stood extended on each occasion and lastly on 08.10.2010 for a period till 15.10.2015 as well as on 01.10.2015 for a further period till 15.10.2020.
RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 4 of 30 2.4 Accordingly, the plaintiffs approached the Ld. Trial Court by instituting a suit for declaration, specific performance of contract and permanent injunction against the defendants.
3 The claim of the plaintiff was jointly contested by the respondents (hereinafter referred to as defendants) by filing a detailed written statement.
3.1 It is claimed in the written statement of the defendants that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and has been filed after 17 years from the date of accrual of cause of action and the lease deed mentioned in the plaint was executed on 16.10.1990 between the plaintiffs and the defendants and was for a period of five years only. It is further averred in the written statement that according to the clause no. 2 of the lease deed, the deed was to be renewed at the end of the expiry of five years by means of a fresh lease deed. It is further stated in the written statement of the defendants that suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable as there is no registered document by which lease rights were created in favour of the plaintiffs, after expiry of the lease deed dated 16.10.1990. It is further stated in the written statement that prayer for declaration and injunction is barred by limitation since the plaintiffs seek declaration in respect of the documents dated 16.10.1990 and 18.10.1990 and the suit RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 5 of 30 having been filed after a gap of 22 years is liable to be dismissed with costs. It is further stated in the written statement that no fresh registered lease deed was executed between the parties and the renewal of clause of lease deed dated 16.10.1990 i.e. clause 2 the lease was to be renewed by means of a fresh lease.
4 Based upon the pleadings, Ld. Trial Court framed the following issues:
PRELIMINARY ISSUE
1. Whether the present suit is barred by limitation and is hence liable to be dismissed? OPD.
MAIN ISSUES
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of declaration against the defendants that the lease deed dated 16.10.1990 r/w letter dated 18.10.1990 is a binding contract between the parties as per the terms and conditions contained therein? OPP.
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific performance against the defendants to perform the terms and RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 6 of 30 conditions of lease deed dated 16.10.1990 r/w letter dated 18.10.1990? OPP.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering into the peaceful enjoyment of the suit property on the terms and conditions of lease deed dated 16.10.1990 r/w letter dated 18.10.1990? OPP.
4. Whether there can be implied renewal of lease deed in view of provisions of Transfer of Property Act as well as Registration Act? OPD.
5. Relief.
5 Evidence was led on behalf of both the parties and upon conclusion of the trial, vide impugned judgment dated 05.03.2019, Ld. Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for the relief of declaration and specific performance whereas the relief of permanent injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff herein.
6 Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit with respect to the relief of declaration and specific performance, the plaintiffs have now instituted the present appeal.
RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 7 of 30 7 Let us now deal with rival contentions of the litiganting parties issue wise:-
8 Preliminary issue no. 1: Whether the present suit is barred by limitation and hence liable to be dismissed? OPD 8.1 It is argued on behalf of the counsel for the plaintiffs that Ld. Trial Court has erred in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs on the ground of limitation. It is pointed out that DW-1 in his testimony has himself admitted that since the defendants have terminated the tenancy of the plaintiff in July, 2010, therefore, they were not accepting the rent from the plaintiffs. It is argued that the defendants witness has categorically testified that the tenancy came to be terminated in July, 2010 only and accordingly the suit was filed on 07.08.2012, well within limitation. It is submitted that in the case at hand, there is a continuing cause of action in favour of the plaintiff and thus the suit cannot be argued to be beyond limitation.
8.2 On the contrary, counsel for the defendant has forcefully argued that as per clause no. 2 of the lease deed dated 16.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/1), it is specifically recorded that 'fresh lease deed on the same terms' will be executed on expiry of five years. It is argued that the parties have specifically agreed that there shall not be any automatic RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 8 of 30 renewal of the lease. It is submitted that a fresh lease deed is required to be mandatorily executed in terms of the clause no. 2 of the lease (Ex. PW-1/1) read with section 107 of the TPA and section 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act. Counsel for the defendant has drawn my attention to the paragraph no. 5 and 9 of the amended plaint wherein it is recorded that the plaintiffs called upon the defendants to 'execute a fresh lease deed for renewal in their favour'. Counsel for the defendant has further drawn my attention to paragraph no. 6 of the amended plaint wherein it is specifically averred by the plaintiffs that the defendants have failed to renew the impugned lease. Counsel for the defendant has also drawn my attention to the paragraph no. 7 of the amended plaint wherein it is specifically averred that on 09.10.2000, the plaintiffs again called upon the defendants to execute a fresh lease deed and paragraph no. 8 records that the defendants have failed to renew the said lease. It is argued that cause of action in the instant matter arose on 09.10.1995 itself, when as per the plaintiffs own claim the defendants have refused to renew the impugned lease in favour of the plaintiff. It is submitted that a lease for a period exceeding 11 months can only be executed by way of a registered lease deed and when the defendants have refused to execute the lease deed in favour of the defendants on 09.10.1995 the cause of action arose in favour of the plaintiff herein. It is submitted that the suit came to be filed on 07.08.2012 way RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 9 of 30 beyond the period of limitation. It is thus argued that the Ld. Trial Court has rightly decided the issue in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
8.3 As per article 54 of the schedule appended with Indian Limitation Act, the limitation period for specific performance of a contract is three years and cause of action would arise on the date fixed for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused. The plaintiffs herein are seeking performance of the contract, alleged to be executed by way of letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2). Admittedly, no date of performance is stipulated in the letter dated 18.10.1990 and thus for the purpose of limitation, we are required to assess as to when the defendants refused the performance of the obligation on their part under the said agreement. The lease deed dated 16.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/1) specifically stipulates in paragraph no. 2 that a fresh lease deed on the same terms will be executed on expiry of five years. Meaning thereby that under the said lease, the plaintiff could have sought execution of a fresh lease on 15.10.1995. The plaintiffs herein are seeking execution of a lease deed for a period of five years, which could have only been done by a registered lease deed. In the plaint itself, the plaintiffs have alleged that on 09.10.1995 they called upon the defendants to renew the lease in favour of the plaintiffs, however, the defendants failed to renew the said lease deed. Similarly, in paragraph no. 7 and 8 of the RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 10 of 30 plaint, it is averred that on 09.10.2000, plaintiffs called upon the defendants to renew the said lease deed but the defendants have failed to renew the said lease deed. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the cause of action for specific performance of a contract to get fresh lease deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs certainly arose in the year 1995 when the defendants refused to execute the lease deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The admission on the part of the DW-1, as highlighted by the counsel for the plaintiff, shall not come to the rescue of the plaintiff herein. The statement is to be read contextually and cannot be read out of context in isolation. DW-1 has claimed about the termination of the tenancy of the plaintiffs in July, 2010 but the witness has nowhere claimed that they have not refused to execute a registered lease deed as required under the law. It is settled proposition of law that it is not the statement of parties rather their relationship with the documents which is relevant to assess the issue at hand. Reliance can be placed upon judgment of the Hon'ble Privy Council in the matter of Alluri Venkatapathi Raju and Anr. Vs Dantuluri Venkaranarsimha Raju and Ors. (1936 SCC OnLine PC 45 : (1935-36) 63 IA 397 : (1936) 38 Bom LR 1238 :
(1936) 44 LW 408 : 1936 All LJ 1039 : AIR 1936 PC 264 :
(1936) 71 Mad LJ 558 : 5 1936 OWN 673 : ILR 1937 Mad 1 : (1936) 71 Mad LJ 558 (PC) : 1936 MWN 1249) wherein it has been observed that :-
RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 11 of 30 "It sometimes happens that persons make statements which serve their purpose, or proceed upon ignorance of the true position; and it is not their statements, but their relations with the estate, which should be taken into consideration in determining the issue."
The termination of tenancy and execution of lease deeds are two separate issues. There cannot be any estoppel against the law mandating u/s 107 of TPA and 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act that any lease deed beyond a period of 11 months is required to be mandatorily registered and any admission on the part of the witness would not absolve the parties of their obligations under the statutory provisions. Mere acceptance of rent by the lessor would not result into an automatic renewal of the lease deed. The above quoted admission on the part of DW-1 would not absolve the parties of their obligations u/s 107 of the TPA and 17(i)(d) of the Indian Registration Act. In my opinion, cause of action in the instant matter, as per the plaintiffs own claim, arose in October, 1995 when the defendants failed to renew the lease deed. The suit at best could have been filed by 15.10.1998 whereas the same came to be filed on 07.08.2012. Accordingly, I find no legitimate reasons to disagree with the detailed and well reasoned finding of the Ld. Trial Court on this issue and I am of the considered opinion that the Ld. Court has rightly RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 12 of 30 decided the issue at hand in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
9 Issue no. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the main issues are taken up together being interconnected.
MAIN ISSUES:-
Issue No. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of declaration against the defendants that the lease deed dated 16.10.1990 r/w letter dated 18.10.1990 is a binding contract between the parties as per the terms and conditions contained therein? OPP.
Issue No. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific performance against the defendants to perform the terms and conditions of lease deed dated 16.10.1990 r/w letter dated 18.10.1990? OPP.
Issue No. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering into the peaceful enjoyment of the suit property on the terms and conditions of lease deed dated 16.10.1990 r/w letter dated 18.10.1990? OPP.
RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 13 of 30 Issue No. 4. Whether there can be implied renewal of lease deed in view of provisions of Transfer of Property Act as well as Registration Act? OPD.
10 It is forcefully argued by the counsel for the plaintiffs that Ld. Trial Court has grossly erred by refusing to act upon the letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex.PW-1/2). It is submitted that the letter dated 18.10.1990 was a complete and binding contract in itself and the parties have specifically agreed that the plaintiffs shall be entitled for the extension of the lease deed by simply informing the defendants about the exercise of the option to renew the lease for a further period of 5 years, any number of times. It is forcefully argued that the Ld. Court has grossly erred by rejecting the said concluded contract merely on account of its non-registration. Counsel for the plaintiffs has argued that not only the plaintiffs extended the lease deed under the undisputed contract dated 18.10.1990 (PW-1/2) but even the defendants acted upon the same and continued to receive the rent thereunder. It is pointed out that the letter dated 18.10.1990 cannot be rejected merely on account of non-registration as the proviso appended with section 49 of the Indian Registration Act specifically stipulates that an unregistered document affecting any immovable property may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance. It is forcefully argued that ignoring the statutory mandate, Ld. Trial Court has refused to take cognizance of RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 14 of 30 the letter dated 18.10.1990 merely on account of non- registration. It is submitted that the suit before the Ld. Trial Court was admittedly for specific performance of contract and thus Ld. Trial Court was duty bound to consider the said document under the proviso appended with section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. Counsel for the plaintiffs has placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Muruganandam Vs. Muniyandi (Died) Through LRs MANU/SC/0652/2025; Civil Appeal No. 6543 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP © No. 10893 of 2021) DOD 08.05.2025 to contend that for the purpose of specific performance even an unregistered document can be permitted in evidence. It is submitted that once the contents of letter dated 18.10.1990, which is also not disputed by the defendants herein, are admitted there was absolutely no legitimate reasons for the Ld. Trial Court to deny the relief of declaration and specific performance. It is submitted that at best the Ld. Trial Court could have impounded the said letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2) as required u/s 35 of the Indian Stamp Act but in any case the same could not have been ignored. It is submitted that the findings of the Ld. Trial Court on this account are patently illegal and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
11 On the contrary, counsel for the defendants has forcefully argued that the contents of the registered lease deed dated RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 15 of 30 16.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/1) could have been altered, rescinded, novated, substituted or annulled only by way of a subsequent registered document. It is submitted that the letter dated 18.10.1990, being an unregistered document, is squarely hit by the provisions of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. It is submitted that section 17(i)(d) of Registration Act and section 107 of TPA specifically mandates that a lease deed beyond a period of 11 months can only be executed by way of a registered document. Counsel for the defendant has placed heavy reliance upon the paragraph no. 15 of the judgment titled Chandrakant Shankarrao Machale Vs. Parubai Bhairu Mohite (2008) 6 SCC 745 to contend that the terms of the registered lease dated 16.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/1) could not have been altered or novated by a subsequent unregistered document i.e. letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2). It is further argued that from the terms of lease deed dated 16.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/1), it is evident that the parties never intended to go in for an automatic renewal of the lease deed. It is submitted that before the renewal of the lease deed, certain terms and conditions were required to be reworked and that is why the parties have specifically stipulated that the renewal of lease shall be subject to increase of rent and fresh lease deed shall be executed on expiry of 5 years. It is submitted that even the subsequent letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2) does not alter the factual position on this count. Counsel for the defendant has placed heavy reliance upon the RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 16 of 30 judgment of division bench of the Hon'ble High court of Delhi in the matter of Modern Food Industries (India) Limited Vs. I.K. Malik and Others, 98(2002) Delhi Law Times 593 (DB) to contend that unregistered document cannot be looked into for the purpose of renewal of lease. Counsel for the defendant has further placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of Uptron Powertronics Ltd. vs Shri G.L. Rawal : 1999 IV AD (DELHI) 861, AIR 1999 DELHI 377, 80 (1999) DLT 706, 1999 (50) DRJ 719. Counsel for the defendant has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High court in the matter of Abhinav Outsourcing Pvt Ltd. Vs. Sunita Seth 186 (2012) DLT 689 to contend that there is no concept of automatic renewal of the lease by mere exercise of option by lessee.
12 During the course of arguments, upon being pointed out regarding the effect of section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, counsel for the plaintiff has argued that contract is not determinable in nature and thus section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act is not applicable in the case at hand. Counsel for the plaintiff has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the matter of DLF Home Developers Ltd Vs. Shipra Estate Limited and Ors. MANU/D/2977/2021 and Golden Tobacco Ltd. Vs. Golden Tobie Pvt Ltd. MANU/DE/2461/2021 to contend that the RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 17 of 30 contract in hand is not determinable in nature. It is further argued in the matter of Abhinav Outsourcing Pvt Ltd. Vs. Sunita Seth (supra) there was no subsequent letter of extension and thus the judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts.
13 With respect to the issue of permanent injunction (Issue No. 3 of the main issues), it would be pertinent to observe here that neither of the parties has challenged the findings of the Ld. Trial Court on this issue. Ld. Trial Court, in my considered opinion, has rightly injuncted the defendants from interfering with the settled possession of the plaintiffs without adopting due process of law. Therefore, the conclusive findings of the Ld. Trial Court on this count calls for no interference. Let us now deal with the remaining issues.
14 The execution of the letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2) has not been disputed by the defendants. During the course of arguments, counsel for the defendants has admitted the execution of the said document. In my considered opinion, the Ld. Trial Court has clearly erred by refusing to take cognizance of the letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex.PW-1/2) on account of its being an unregistered document. The proviso appended with section 49 of the Indian Registration Act specifically stipulates that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be received as evidence of contract RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 18 of 30 in a suit for specific performance. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judmgent of the Hon'ble Apex court in the matter of Muruganandam (supra) wherein Hon'ble Apex court has observed herein as under:
"10. In Kaladevi (supra), this Court has held that an unregistered document may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit seeking specific performance. The relevant portion from the decision is as follows:
"12. The main provision in Section 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. The proviso, however, would show that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of the proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an immovable property of the value of Rs 100 and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 19 of 30 performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act." (emphasis supplied)
11. It is also evident from the plaint that the document dated 01.01.2000 is referred to and in fact a photocopy of the said document is filed along with the plaint. It is the case of the appellant that the document sought to be brought on record is intended only to be used as a proof of the oral agreement of sale and that it is permitted under Section 49 of the Registration Act. Under these facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellant can be permitted to introduce the said document dated 01.01.2000. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the contents of the document and it is also open for the respondent/defendant to raise and contest the relevancy and validity of the document as are permissible in law and it is for the Trial Court to consider the RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 20 of 30 submissions and pass appropriate judgment/order as it considers appropriate."
15 However even if, arguendo, we take into consideration the letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2), even then I have no reasons to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the Ld. Trial Court.
15.1 As per provisions of section 107 of the TPA, a lease beyond a period of one year is required to be compulsorily registered. The letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2) can merely be considered as an agreement for lease and being an unregistered document, in accordance with the section 106 of the TPA, a lease shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month determinable at the option of the parties by 15 days notice. Though clause (1) of section 106 of TPA starts with word 'in the absence of any contract' and it can be argued that deeming fiction of law with respect to month to month tenancy is subject to the contract between the lessor and lessee. Admittedly, vide letter dated 18.10.1990 (Ex. PW-1/2), parties had agreed to create a tenancy for 5 years. However, when we read clause no. 1 of the section 106 with section 107 of the TPA, it is evident that a contract for a period of lease beyond an year can only be executed by a registered instrument. In the absence of a lease contract by way of a RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 21 of 30 registered instrument, the lease period cannot be presumed to be extending beyond a period of 11 months. The deeming fiction of law envisaged under section 106 of the TPA is attached with the duration of the lease or its determination by 15 days notice and not with the manner of its execution provided u/s 107 of the TPA.
16 I am fortified in my observation with the judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the matter of HP Corporation Limited Vs. R.P. Agarwala and Brothers Pvt Ltd. AIR 1986 Calcutta 403 wherein Hon'ble High Court has observed that an option for renewal of a lease for a further period of 25 years cannot be exercised by a letter but must be done by a registered instrument.
17 Reliance can also be placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of Modern Food Industries Limited (supra) wherein Hon'ble Delhi High Court has observed herein as under:
"11. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the record, we are of the considered view that the Clauses of the lease deed or renewal of deed dated 3.7.1992 cannot be looked into for want of registration. If a document is inadmissible for non-registration, all its terms are inadmissible including the one dealing with the landlord's RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 22 of 30 permission for the renewal of the lease and the increase of the rent. The letter dated 3rd July, 1992 cannot be dis- associated from the initial lease of 1972 purported to have been executed between the erstwhile landlord and the appellant containing the terms and conditions of the tenancy. We are told at the Bar that even the initial lease was not registered, therefore, the contention of Mr. Sudhanshu Batra, counsel for the respondents that the terms as stipulated in letter dated 3rd July, 1992 cannot be looked into for want of registration appears to be correct. Fazal Ali, J. in Sachindra Mohan Ghose v. Ramjash Agarwalla, AIR 1932 Patna 97 observed that if a decree purporting to create a lease is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of the terms of the lease can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause in the lease is not using it as a collateral purpose.
12. Admittedly the letters dated 1st June, 1992 and 3rd July, 1992 constitute a lease or at least an agreement to renew the lease falling within the provisions of Section 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act, since the agreement to renew the lease by virtue of these two letters in writing and these having not been registered, no right can be enforced by the appellant on the basis of these two letters. Since the lease in question as per appellant's own showing was for a RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 23 of 30 period of more than one year consequently the provision of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act becomes applicable. The terms of unregistered lease cannot be looked into for the purpose of enforcing a right flowing there from.
13. The argument of Mr. Amitabh Narayan is that proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act protects the appellant to the extent that these unregistered letters can be received in evidence for the purpose of enforcing the right under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. We find no force in this submission. At best the appellant can use this unregistered document for the purpose of proving the nature of possession but it does not create any right in favor of the appellant to continue as tenant for a year or more. The Supreme Court in the case of Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Ratiram, Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1966, decided on 28th January, 1969, reported in U.J. (S.C.) 21 (69), page 86 observed that:-
"A document required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property, but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts, or for any collateral purpose, that is for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 24 of 30 limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property.
14. Therefore, a document which requires compulsory registration is not admissible for want of registration to prove the terms of the lease. It is admissible only to prove the character of the possession of the person who holds the property. Therefore, even the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act is of no help to the appellant. At best the appellant can prove the nature of his possession but not the terms of the lease. Admittedly creation of lease is not a collateral purpose nor the terms of the lease are collateral within the meaning of Section 49 of the Registration Act as held by Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chand v. Goverdhan Das AIR 1984 SC 413.
15. As already pointed out above, a lease or a renewed lease even though a letter if not registered, its terms cannot be looked into. It has been so held by the Supreme Court in the case of Durga Chand Kaushik (Supra) which observations are reproduced as under:
"A renewal of lease is really the grant of a fresh lease. It is called a 'renewal' simply because it postulates the existence of a prior lease which generally provides for renewals as of right. In all other aspects, it is really a fresh lease."
RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 25 of 30 (Emphasis supplied) 18 The contention that the parties, contrary to the statutory obligation under section 107 of the TPA, are free to enter into a lease agreement beyond a period of one year by way of an unregistered lease deed is hit by section 23 of the Indian Contract Act as the object of such a contract would, if permitted, tend to defeat the statutory provisions u/s 107 of the TPA and 17(i)(d) of the Indian Registration Act.
19 Further, the impugned contract dated 18.10.1990 (Ex.
PW-1/2) cannot be enforced as the same is hit by section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, being determinable in nature. In the matter of DLF Home Developers Ltd. Vs. Shipra Estate Limited (supra), it was observed herein as under:
"79. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, it is at once apparent that the contract is in its nature determinable if the same can be terminated or its specific performance can be avoided by the parties. Thus, contracts that can be terminated by the parties at will or are in respect of relationships, which either party can terminate; would be contracts that in their nature are determinable. If a party can repudiate the contract at its will, it is obvious that the same cannot be enforced against the said party.
80. However, if a party cannot terminate the contract as long as the other party is willing to perform its RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 26 of 30 obligations, the contract cannot be considered as determinable and it would, in equity, be liable to be enforced against a party that fails to perform the same. Almost all contracts can be terminated by a party if the other party fails to perform its obligations. Such a contract cannot be stated to be determinable solely because it can be terminated by a party if the other party is in breach of its obligations. The party who is not in default would, in equity, be entitled to seek performance of that contract. In such cases, it cannot be an answer to the non-defaulting party's claim that the other party could avoid the contract of the party seeking specific performance, had breached the contract; therefore, the same is not specifically enforceable. Thus, the question whether a contract is in its nature determinable, must be answered by ascertaining whether the party against whom it is sought to be enforced would otherwise have the right to terminate or determine the contract even though the other party are ready and willing to perform the contract and are not in default.
(Emphasis supplied)
20 Evidently, in order to ascertain as to if the contract by its very nature is determinable or not, the Court is required to ascertain whether the party against whom it is sought to be enforced would otherwise have a right to terminate or RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 27 of 30 determine the contract irrespective of the other party intending to carry it forward. In light of section 106 read with section 107 of the TPA and 17(i)(d) of the Indian Registration Act, I have absolutely no hesitation in observing that the lease created by way of an unregistered document by its very nature is determinable in nature and the lessee cannot seek its enforcement.
21 Further, Ld. Trial Court has rightly observed that there cannot be any automatic renewal of lease. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon Abhinav Outsourcing Pvt Ltd. Vs. Sunita Seth 186 (2012) DLT 689 wherein Hon'ble Delhi High Court has observed herein as under:
4. In my opinion, both the arguments as raised on behalf of the appellant are wholly devoid of substance. The first aspect as to whether by mere exercising an option of renewal, a person can continue for a fixed period in the tenanted premises, though there is no lease for the fixed period was the subject matter of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Company, VI (2007) SLT 597-III (2007) CLT 161 (SC)=2007 (5) SCC 614. The Trial Court has referred to this judgment in para 17 of the impugned judgment.
The Supreme Court in the decision in the case of Hardesh Ores (supra) has specifically observed that to give effect to RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 28 of 30 a renewal of a lease, a document has to be executed evidencing the renewal of the agreement of lease and there is no concept of automatic renewal of the lease by a mere exercise of option by the lessee. This proposition of law that mere exercise of option cannot automatically mean entitlement of continuation in a tenant for a fixed period without any lease being executed, is on account of the provisions of Section 17(1)(b), Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. By virtue of these provisions, there cannot be a lease for a fixed period in excess of one year, unless, there is a registered lease deed for the fixed period:
The argument as raised on behalf of the appellant flies in the face of the aforesaid provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which require that a lease deed for a period in excess of 12 months has necessarily to be only by means of a registered instrument, and, there cannot be estoppel against law i.e. these statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Registration Act, 1908. Therefore, the argument as raised on behalf of the appellant is misconceived." (Emphasis supplied.)
22 As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the detailed and well reasoned judgment of the Ld. Trial Court calls for no interference. The RCA DJ 49-2019 PAVAN CHAWLA AND ANR Vs. ALAPE KAUR KAND ORS Page No. 29 of 30 appeal is found to be bereft of merits and the same is accordingly dismissed.
23 Parties to bear own costs.
24 Copy of order be sent to Ld. Trial Court.
Digitally signed by DHARMENDER DHARMENDER RANA RANA Date: 2025.09.03 17:26:23 +0530 (Dharmender Rana) District Judge - 01 PHC/New Delhi/03.09.2025 RCA DJ 49-2019
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