Karnataka High Court
M/S Itc Infotech India Ltd vs Mr Venkataramana Uppada on 3 March, 2016
Equivalent citations: 2016 (2) AKR 361, (2016) 3 KANT LJ 8 (2016) 3 CURLR 559, (2016) 3 CURLR 559
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
1
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 3rd DAY OF MARCH, 2016
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO.27510/2015 (L-TER)
BETWEEN:
M/S ITC INFOTECH INDIA LTD.,
NO.18, PULIKESHINAGAR POST
BANASAWADI MAIN ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 005
REPRESENTED BY ITS
GENERAL MANAGER
MS. REMADEVI THOTTAHIL (MAJOR)
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI.KASTURI, SR.COUNSEL A/W
SRI. PRADEEP KUMAR J, ADVOCATE)
AND:
MR. VENKATARAMANA UPPADA
S/O LATE YELLAYYA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
R/O NO. 18, 2ND CROSS,
THINDLU POST,
APC LAYOUT, VIDYARANYAPURA
BANGALORE-560 097.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATARAMANA UPPADA- PARTY IN PERSON)
2
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER DATED 17.03.2015 PASSED BY THE III ADDL.
LABOUR COURT IN I.D.NO.6/2014 VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND
HOLD THAT I.D.6/2014 IS BARRED BY LIMITATION.
THIS WRIT PETITION BEING HEARD AND
RESERVED, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
In this Writ Petition, order dated 17.03.2015 passed in I.D.No.6/2014 by the Principal Labour Court, Bengaluru, Annexure-A is impugned.
2. A claim petition filed under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short `I.D.Act') came to be filed on 13.02.2014 by the respondent herein, questioning termination letter dated 11.02.2009 - Annexure-O. An interlocutory application under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 151 CPC -Annexure-P came to be filed seeking for condonation of the delay of 3 730 days in filing the claim petition. Said application having been allowed by the impugned order has been called in question by the employer - Management in this writ petition.
3. Heard Sri.K.Kasturi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner and Sri.Venkataramana Uppada, respondent appearing in person.
4. It is the contention of Sri.K.Kasturi, learned Senior counsel appearing for writ petitioner that Labour Court is not vested with the power to condone the delay under Section 2A(2) or under Section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act when claim petition is filed beyond three years from date of dismissal or discharge and as such application for condonation of delay filed by employee ought to have been dismissed by the Labour Court. He would 4 elaborate his submission by contending sub-Section (3) of Section 2A of I.D. Act mandates that an workman can make an application before expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise as provided under sub-section (1) and there being a delay of 5 years 2 days in filing the claim petition from the date of termination, Labour Court ought not to have condoned the delay. He would also submit that registry of the Labour Court itself had raised office objection with regard to maintainability of claim petition as noted in the order sheet Annexure-R and as such Labour Court ought to have sustained said office objection and it ought not to have condoned the delay in filing the claim petition by allowing the application filed by the respondent for condonation of delay. Hence, he prays for allowing the writ petition and 5 rejecting the application for condonation of delay and consequently dismissing the claim petition.
In support of his submissions, he has relied upon following Judgments:
(1) (1973) 1 SCC 115 Sri.Amar Chand Inani Vs The Union of India (2) (2000) 2 SCC 455 Nedungadi Bank Ltd., Vs K.P.Madhavankutty and others (3) (2005) 7 SCC 447 Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others Vs Zakir Hussain (4) (2005) 7 SCC 300 Damodaran Pillai and others Vs South Indian Bank Ltd.
(5) (2007) 1 SCC 283 Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs ArunKumar Madhavrao Sinddhaye and another 6 (6) (2015) 6 SCC 412 Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd., Vs Praveen D. Desai (7) AIR 1966 SC 153 Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others Vs Maruti Hari Jadhav and others (8) AIR 1989 SC 1854 Pyare Lal Sharma Vs Managing Director, Jammu and Kashmir Industries Ltd. and others (9) (2004) 107 FJR 155 (KAR) KSRTC Vs Abdul Azeez (Kar) (10) 2003-III- LLJ 118 Executive Engineer and others Vs Lokesh Reddy and others (11) Laws (SC)-1975-2-4 Commissioner of Sales Tax, UP Vs Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur (12) Laws (KAR) - 2003-4-5 Executive Engineer BRLBC Division, Shivamogga Vs Lokesh Reddy (13) Laws (SC) - 2005-2-87 Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank Vs Neelam 7 (14) ILR 2013 (KAR) 1024 Smt.Rukmini Bai and others Vs The Divisional Controller NEKRTC, Bidar (15) (1969) 2 LLJ -711 Nityanand M. Joshi and others and Life Insurance Corporation of India and others (16) Unreported Judgment rendered in W.P.18723/2015 dated 01.06.2015 -
The State of Karnataka Vs
Sri.K.Veergowda
(17) (1997) 7 SCC 556
P.K.Ramachandran Vs State of Kerala and another
5. Per contra, Sri.Venkataramana Uppada, respondent - party-in-person would support the impugned order by contending that unless Management demonstrates that prejudice would be caused to it, a claim petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay. He would submit that due to his lack of knowledge, he had raised a dispute before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Bengaluru, which was referred 8 to the appropriate Government by issuing G.O. and on account of said dispute not being maintainable, he withdrew the same and had filed the claim petition in question under Section 2A(2) of the Act with an application for condoning the delay and as such, period spent from the date of reference made by the appropriate Government till he withdrew the reference and filed the claim petition under Section 2A(2) of I.D. Act has to be excluded. Hence, he prays for dismissing the writ petition. In support of his submission he has relied upon the following Judgments:
(1) AIR 1987 SC 1353 Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and anr Vs Master Katiji and others (2) AIR 2007 SC 3012 Director, Food and Supplies, Punjab and Anr. Vs. Gurmit Singh (3) Unreported Judgment in W.P.1855/2006 and connected matters disposed of on 14.07.2011.9
6. Having heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and respondent appearing in person and having perused the records and also bestowing my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised, this Court is of the view that following points would arise for consideration:
(i) "Whether Labour Court can entertain a claim petition filed under Section 2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act,1947 after three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or services otherwise terminated?
(ii) Whether Labour Court was justified in condoning the delay of 730 days in filing claim statement though sub-
section (3) of Section 2A barred such claim?"
10
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
7. Respondent was appointed as an IT consultant by the petitioner on 05.07.2007. On 11.02.2009 respondent came to be terminated. Hence, a dispute was raised by the respondent before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bengaluru on 02.11.2012. The appropriate Government by order dated 03.06.2013- Annexure-N under Section 10(1)(c) of I.D. Act referred the dispute to the Labour Court, Bengaluru for adjudication. After seeking time to file a claim statement, memo came to be filed by respondent on 07.11.2013 seeking withdrawal of the reference contending interalia that said reference is not maintainable. Hence, seeking permission to file fresh application under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act, reference was sought to be withdrawn with liberty to file a claim 11 petition as indicated therein. Contents of Memo dated 07.11.2013 reads as under:
"1. The reference is made by the Government in the present application and I am advised that the reference is not maintainable under law.
2. I may be kindly permitted to file a fresh application under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D Act, 1947".
3. My application dated 07.08.2013 LD 389/IDM/2013, dated 08.08.2013 (IDA-2/CR-385/2012-13) submitted to the government has not yet been disposed off. Hence, the present application filed before this Hon'ble Court may be dismissed so as to facilitate filing of a fresh application under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947 OR pass any such other order OR orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of Justice and Equity."
On the strength of above referred memo, Labour Court by order dated 07.11.2013 - Annexure-M dismissed the reference.
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8. Thereafter, respondent-workman filed a claim petition -Annexure-O under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act for adjudicating the issue of termination of his services. Since there was delay in filing the claim petition, interlocutory application-Annexure-P came to be filed under Section 11-A of I.D. Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 151 CPC, seeking condonation of delay of 730 days. Said application came to be resisted by the writ petitioner before the Labour Court by filing counter statement as per Annexure-Q. Labour Court after considering rival contentions, by order dated 17.03.2015 - Annexure-A, in I.D.NO.6/2014 allowed the application and condoned the delay in filing the claim application which is impugned in the present writ petition by the Management.
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9. Section 2A of the I.D. Act enables the individual workman to raise a dispute connected with or arising out of his discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of his services by his employer and by legal fiction it would constitute "Industrial Dispute". No other type of dispute regarding an individual workman is contemplated by Section 2A. After the enactment of Section 2A, it is not necessary that a dispute relating to the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service of a workman must be sponsored by a trade union or a substantial number of workman. In other words, even if it is not sponsored by a trade union or a substantial number of workman, such a dispute will be deemed to be an industrial dispute. Section 2A of the ID Act reads as under:
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2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute -
"(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-Section(1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this 15 Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-
Section(2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-Section(1)."
10. By Act 24 of 2010, Section 2A was renumbered as sub-Section(1) and by same Act i.e., Act 24 of 2010 sub-Section (2) and (3) came to be inserted after Section 2A(1) of the I.D. Act. The said amendment Act came into effect on and from 15th September, 2010. In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary Act 24 of 2010 is to be held operative prospectively.
11. The effect of amendment is that any workman who has been discharged, dismissed, 16 retrenched or terminated as specified in sub-section (1) of Section 2A may make an application directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of his individual dispute after the expiry of 45 days from the date he has made an application to the conciliation officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute. Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A lays down the time limit for making such application to Labour Court or Tribunal. It provides that such application to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute shall be made before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal and retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub- Section(1).
12. A bare reading of above provision would indicate that a dispute covered under sub-Section(1) can be agitated or questioned by a workman by making 17 an application directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of such dispute and such application should be filed before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service. In other words, the right conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years of the date of dismissal, discharge etc. Sub-Section (3) of Section 2A would operate independently. The right available to the workman under Section 2A is not withstanding anything contained in Section 10 of the ID Act.
13. Thus, question which would arise for consideration in the instant case is; Whether dispute raised beyond three years from the date of discharge, dismissal or retrenchment can be entertained by the Labour Court or Tribunal by condoning the delay if any in raising the dispute or filing a claim petition or in 18 other words, if an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed, would it be maintainable and such delay can be condoned?
14. Prior to incorporation of Section 2A a workman had to necessarily depend upon the trade unions to espouse his cause for seeking reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the I.D.Act. The incorporation of Section 2A enabled the workman to approach the Labour Court or Tribunal directly and prevented the mischief of unreasonable delay occasioning on account of reference not being referred to by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act.
15. Section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act introduced by Karnataka Amendment Act 5 of 1988 enables an individual workman to challenge a termination order by directly applying to the Labour Court within six months 19 from the date of communication of such order of termination.
16. The period of limitation for filing a petition before the Labour Court is six months from the date of communication of such order. A Division Bench of this Court has held in KSRTC Vs KHALEEL AHMED AND ANR reported in ILR 2002 (3) Kar 3827 that the period of six months prescribed under Section 10(4A) cannot be extended. It has been held by the Division Bench as under:
"23. It seems quite clear to us that the State Legislature has incorporated sub- Section (4A) in Section 10 of the Act to provide a more expeditious remedy to the workman enabling him to redress his grievances without undergoing the ordeal of approaching any Labour Union and without approaching the State Government for referring his case to the Labour Court. Therefore, the remedy provided under sub-Section (4- A) is a remedy alternative to what is provided under sub-Section (1) of 20 Section 10 of the Act. But the right created under the State Amendment is coupled with a condition that individual workman has to prefer application before the Labour Court within the time frame of six months fixed by the legislature. It is a statutory condition precedent for exercise of the right and availment of remedy under sub-Section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act. Therefore, it has to be held that if an application is filed beyond the period of 6 months as prescribed under the above sub-Section, then it will be incumbent on the part of the Labour Court not to entertain such an application since the condition does not only bars the special remedy but it also strikes at the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain such an application. Such an interpretation is in consonance with the general rule of interpretation of statute. Such construction will not also in any way prejudice the right of a workman to get his dispute resolved by a reference under sub-Section 10(1) of the Act provided the dispute sought to be raised do not become stale because of his inaction as held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Balbir Singh Vs Punjab Roadways, Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Vs Prahlad Singh and 21 Telecom District Manager Vs A.A.Angali".
(emphasis supplied)
17. In EXECUTIVE ENGINEER AND OTHERS VS LOKESH REDDY AND OTHERS reported in 2003 (3) LLJ 662 the point which came up for consideration was whether the period of limitation provided under Section 10(4A) of the Act is directory or mandatory and it came to be held that it was mandatory. It has been held as under:
"40. In view of the discussion made so far, we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the learned single judge in the present matters in holding the period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act as directory and not mandatory and affirm the view taken in the case of Khaleel Ahmed (supra), which has already clarified the said position of law holding the period of limitation in Section 10(4-A) as mandatory.
So, the view taken by the Labour Court and affirmed by the learned single judge in the matters relating to period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act, being contrary to the Division Bench 22 decision of this Court in the Case of Khaleel Ahmed (Supra) cannot be sustained and consequently, the impugned awards in allowing the applications filed after about six years (and not within six months) under Section 10(4-A) of the Act should have been set aside by the learned single judge. Since that was not done by the learned single judge in the impugned order, our interference is required".
18. As to whether the plea of limitation though not raised, is required to be considered by the Labour Court or not while adjudicating a claim petition filed under Section 10(4A), came up for consideration before the Division Bench in SMT.RUKMINIBAI AND OTHERS VS THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, NEKRTC, BIDAR DIVISION, BY ITS CHIEF LAW OFFICER reported in ILR 2013 Kar 1024 and held that Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1963, is peremptory in nature and imposing a duty on the Court to dismiss the applications which are barred by limitation even if the 23 plea of limitation is not raised. It has been held as under:
"9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is peremptory in nature. It imposes a duty on the Court to dismiss the applications, which are barred by limitation even if the plea of limitation is not raised. If the claim petition is barred by time, the Court or an adjudicating authority has no power or authority to entertain such an application and decide it on merits. As stated, even in the absence of such a plea by the respondent or opponent, the Court or the authority must dismiss such an application if it is satisfied that the same is barred by limitation."
19. Keeping the above principles in mind, a reading of Section 2A(3) would lead to an irresistible conclusion that time stipulated for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the case may be, has to be necessarily "before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination 24 of service as specified in sub-Section (1)." Time limit for making an application to the Labour Court stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A does not appear to have a bearing to the provisions of sub- Section (2) of Section 2A. In any event right conferred under Section 2A would lapse immediately preceding the date of expiry of three years from the date of dismissal, discharge etc.,. In other words, the limitation of three years prescribed under sub-Section (3) of Section 2A being mandatory, same cannot be condoned by taking recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which has no application to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
20. It is well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed within a specified time, the same would primarily be mandatory. It has been held 25 in the case of NAZIRUDDIN VS SITARAM AGARWAL reported in AIR 2003 SCW 908 to the following effect:
"The Courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract the words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of legislature must be gathered from the language used.
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21. Thus, in the background of the dicta of the Apex Court in NAZIRUDDIN's case referred to supra, when Section 2A is perused, it would indicate that if the legislature really intended that the period of limitation provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A was to be construed as directory, then it would not have prescribed the limitation of three years and it would have used the words "at any time" instead of using the words "before the expiry of three years". Though the words `at any time' is found in Section 10(1), same is conspicuously absent in sub-Section(3) of Section 2A which would clearly depict the intention of the legislature namely, it had deliberately imposed limitation period under sub-Section (3) of Section 2A and as such legislature did not employ the words `at any time' in the said provision as found in Section 10(1) and in its place, it has specifically incorporated 27 the words `before the expiry of three years'. Hence, to interpret the period of limitation found in sub-Section (3) of Section 2A as directory and not mandatory would amount to adding something which is not provided in the provision by the legislature or it would amount to doing violence to the provision, if such interpretation is sought to be made.
22. In the background of aforestated discussion, when the facts of hand are examined, it would clearly indicate that on the services of the employee - respondent being terminated by the Management by letter of termination dated 11.02.2009, a reference was sought under Section 10(1)(c) (d) of the I.D. Act by the respondent by submitting a representation to Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bangalore on 06.09.2012. The appropriate Government made a reference by order 28 dated 03.06.2013 - Annexure-N and pursuant to the same, proceedings was commenced before the Labour Court, Bengaluru in Reference No.16/2013. After appearance of the respondent - employee before the Labour Court and before filing of the claim petition, a memo came to be filed on 07.11.2013 (part of Annexure-M) seeking withdrawal of the reference and permission to file a fresh application under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act. The said memo was partially accepted by the Labour Court as could be seen from the order dated 07.11.2013 (part of Annexure-M) passed on the said memo. It reads as under:
"First Party present and filed
memo stating that the present
reference is not maintainable and he intent's to file fresh application under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act.
29Heard the respondent counsel.
Perused the memo filed by the first party -workman for the reasons mentioned in memo the reference is hereby dismissed and case is closed."
23. Though it can be gain said by the workman that the reasons assigned in the memo has been accepted and thereby liberty has been granted to the workman to reagitate his claim by filing a claim petition under Section 2A(2) of the I.D.Act and as such the claim petition filed beyond the prescribed period is to be condoned, requires to be considered with utmost circumspection. In order to address this issue, it would be appropriate to note the chronological date of events which had unfolded in the instant case. 30 It can be summarized as under:
DATE PARTICULARS 08.06.2007 Date of appointment of workman 05.07.2007 Date of joining 11.02.2009 Termination letter (according to workman) 06.09.2012 Application filed before Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Bengaluru.
03.06.2013 Date of reference under Section 10(1)(c)
(d) of the I.D. Act by the appropriate Government.
21.06.2013 Reference registered by the Presiding Officer, III Additional Labour Court, Bengaluru in reference No.16/2013.
22.07.2013 Notice issued to the workman by Labour Court.
07.11.2013 Memo filed seeking dismissal of the reference to facilitate filing of a fresh application under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act by the workman and order passed by the Labour Court on the same date.
13.02.2014 Claim petition under Section 2A(2) filed before the Labour Court with an application for condonation of delay of 730 days.
17.03.2015 Interlocutory application for condonation of delay allowed by Labour Court.
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24. As could be seen from the above referred chronological events, the respondent - employee claims to have been issued with an appointment letter on 08.06.2007 and contends that he joined duty with effect from 05.07.2007 and was being paid salary till January, 2009. It is also contended by the respondent - employee that termination of his services without issuing charge sheet or conducting enquiry is arbitrary, illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice and as such, the termination letter dated 11.02.2009 is bad in law.
25. It is not in dispute that the respondent - employee being aggrieved by this action of the petitioner
- Management, filed an application before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bengaluru on 06.09.2012 and after considering the counter of the Management, appropriate Government made reference to the Labour 32 Court by order dated 03.06.2013. The said reference came to be registered by the Labour Court, Bengaluru in reference No.16/2013 and notices came to be issued to the parties and pursuant to the notices being issued, both the parties appeared before the Labour Court. However, before claim petition could be filed, as already noticed herein above, the first party - workman i.e., respondent - employee withdrew the reference and filed a claim petition under Section 2A(2) of I.D.Act on 13.02.2014. An application for condonation of delay in filing the claim petition was also filed. In the affidavit supporting the application for condonation of delay, it has been contended that on account of certain proceedings pending before various forum, he could not file the claim petition under Section 2A(2) of the I.D.Act. Hence, delay of 730 days in filing the claim petition was sought for being condoned.
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26. In view of the fact that sub-section (3) of Section 2A having been held as mandatory and the said provision clearly indicating that in case of dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination, an application referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 2A to be made before the expiry of three years, i.e., on or before 10.02.2012 and same having not been made, respondent - employee cannot be heard to contend that delay is to be condoned. At the cost of repetition, it is to be held that on the expiry of three years period from the date of discharge, dismissal etc., the right to invoke Section 2A would stand extinguished.
27. In view of the aforestated discussion, this Court is of the considered view that Point Nos. (i) & (ii) has to be answered in the negative namely, Labour Court cannot entertain a claim petition filed under 34 Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act after three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination and Labour Court was not justified in condoning the delay of 730 days in filing the claim petition.
28. In view of the fact that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 not being applicable or attracted to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, question of invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to save the claim of the respondent - employee for the period spent before the wrong forum i.e., before the appropriate Government from the date of filing of application before Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Bangalore on 06.09.2012 to the date of withdrawal of the reference before Labour Court on 07.11.2013 also does not arise. Even otherwise, there is no explanation forthcoming for the delay in not raising the dispute from 11.02.2009 to 35 06.09.2012 i.e., from date of termination till the date of filing of application before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Bengaluru.
29. Thus, viewed from any angle, the impugned order dated 17.03.2015 condoning the delay in filing the claim petition by allowing the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be sustained.
Hence, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
1) Writ petition is hereby allowed.
2) Order dated 17.03.2015 passed by Presiding Officer, III Addl.Labour Court, Bengaluru in I.D.No.6/2014 - Annexure-A is hereby quashed.36
3) I.A.No.I - Annexure-P filed under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 CPC is hereby rejected.
4) Consequently, I.D.No.6/2014 - Annexure-O filed under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is hereby dismissed.
5) Rule made absolute.
6) Costs made easy.
Sd/-
JUDGE SBN/sp