Uttarakhand High Court
Dr. Ramesh Kumar vs State Of Uttarakhand & Ors on 31 July, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
2025:UHC:6761-DB
Judgment Reserved on: 14.07.2025
Judgment Pronounced on:31.07.2025
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
JUSTICESHRI MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI
AND
JUSTICESHRI SUBHASH UPADHYAY
Writ Petition (S/B) No.176 of 2020
Dr. Ramesh Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & Ors. ...Respondents
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Presence:-
Mr. Rajendra Dobhal, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Subhang Dobhal, Advocate for
the petitioner.
Mr. Puran Singh Bisht, Addl. C.S.C. for the State.
Mr. Shobhit Saharia and Mr. Yogesh Pandey, Advocates for respondent nos.2 and 3.
Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for respondent nos.5, 6 and 8.
Mr. R.C. Tamta, Advocate for respondent no.7.
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JUDGMENT:(per Hon'ble Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Tiwari)
1. By means of this writ petition, petitioner has sought the following reliefs:-
"(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 21.01.2016 (Annexure No.8, 9, 10 and 11) and 10.06.2020 (Annexure No.13) passed by the respondents.
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to proceed afresh recruitment on the post of Management Cadre i.e. Manager (Procurement and Inputs) and 1 2025:UHC:6761-DB (Marketing and Sales) after due advertisement and public notice at large."
2. Petitioner who possesses Bachelors Degree in Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry (BVSc & AH), from Narendra Deva University of Agriculture and Technology, Faizabad (U.P.) was appointed on contract as Veterinary Doctor in Nainital Milk Producers Cooperative Union Limited, Lalkuan (Nainital), vide order dated 15.10.2010 and he is still serving as Veterinary Doctor on contract in the said Co-operative Union.
3. As every other Co-operative Society registered under Uttarakhand Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), Milk Co- operative Societies also have a three tier structure, namely, (i) Uttarakhand Co-operative Diary Federation (hereinafter referred to as 'UCDF'), which is an Apex or State Level Co-operative Society, as defined under Section 2(C) of the Act; (ii) District Milk Producers Co- operative Union, which is a Central Society as defined under Section 2(B-2) of the Act and; (iii) the Milk Producers Co-operative Society at the village level which is a Primary Society, as defined under Section 2(B) of the Act. Petitioner is serving on contract in Nainital Milk Producers Co-operative Union Limited, which is a Central Society and he is still waiting for opportunity of regular appointment even after 15 years of service.
22025:UHC:6761-DB
4. An Apex Co-operative Society is a Co- operative Society that operates at the highest level within a specific co-operative structure at the State or National level. Its primary role is to support and facilitate the operations of other co-operative societies, particularly those at the lower levels. Apex societies serve as umbrella organization for other co-operative societies within State, including primary societies and central societies, and co-ordinate the activities of primary and central societies.
5. It transpires that on 10.03.2015, Managing Director, Uttarakhand Co-operative Dairy Federation Limited sent a letter to Executive Director, National Diary Development Board(hereinafter referred to as 'NDDB'), Anand, Gujarat, stating that appointment has to be made against 10 posts of Management Trainee in UCDF by direct recruitment and NDDB was requested to make recruitment against the vacant posts. It was mentioned in the letter that persons appointed as Management Trainee will be initially paid ₹ 30,000/- a month as salary for initial one year and during second year they will be paid ₹ 35,000/- as salary and upon successful completion of training, they will be regularly appointed as Manager in the pay scale of ₹ 15600- 39100 grade pay ₹ 5400/-.
6. NDDB, which was requested by UCDF to make recruitment, recommended 10 candidates for 3 2025:UHC:6761-DB appointment as Management Trainee in different disciplines, vide letter dated 22.12.2015(Annexure-7 to the writ petition). Perusal of said document reveals that a team of officials of NDDB visited National Institute of Agriculture Management (NIAM), Jaipur for recruitment to the position of Management Trainee (Procurement & Inputs) and Management Trainee (Marketing & Sales) and recommended candidates for appointment based on their performance in campus selection. The candidates recommended by NDDB were appointed as Management Trainee by Director, Dairy Development Department and they were ultimately given regular appointment as Manager in UCDF in the Pay Scale of ₹15600-39100 Grade Pay 5400.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though respondent nos.5 to 8 were appointed as Management Trainee on the recommendation of NDDB and they were subsequently given regular appointment as Manager in UCDF as per stipulation made in appointment letter dated 21.01.2016, however, these appointment were made without advertising vacancies in any newspaper or website. He further submits that these vacancies were also not notified to Employment Exchange as per provisions of The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959. He thus submits that appointment given to private respondents without selection is patently illegal and such appointment through backdoor, by a public authority, cannot be permitted to continue. He further 4 2025:UHC:6761-DB submits that as per Article 16, equality of opportunity in matters of public employment is a basic right, therefore, without advertising the vacancies or without giving opportunity to all eligible candidates no one can be appointed in a government department or in an instrumentality of State. Thus he submits that private respondents were appointed as Manager in utter disregard of principles enshrined in Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that UCDF is an apex / State level co-operative society and all district level milk producers co-operative union are its member; Managing Director, UCDF is appointed by State Government from amongst Class-I Officers of State Government, who even after appointment as Managing Director continues to get salary from State Government and not from UCDF; State provides financial aid not only to members of primary co- operative milk societies for purchasing cattles and other equipments for dairy development but also provides funds to the central and apex societies for setting up pasteurization / cooling plants and for infrastructure development. He, therefore, submits that UCDF is State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, thus is bound by provisions of Part-III of the Constitution. He further submits that State Government is having all pervasive administrative and financial control over UCDF and district milk producer co-operative unions, therefore, applying the tests laid down by Hon'ble Apex 5 2025:UHC:6761-DB Court in various judgments, the only inference would be that UCDF is State under Article 12.
9. Learned counsel for petitioner relies upon the law declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Hasia Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors (1981) 1 SCC 722 and submits that the said judgment is on all fours to facts of present case and the tests laid down in that judgment, if applied, will leave no room for doubt that UCDF is covered by definition of State, therefore, it cannot act whimsically in violation of principles enshrined in Part-III of the Constitution.
10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner further submits that State Government in exercise of its power under Section 122 of the Uttarakhand Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 has framed Rules known as The Uttarakhand Co-operative Dairy Federation and Milk Union Centralized Cadre Service Controlling Rules, 2016 which provide for constitution of cadre authority. He points out that Registrar, Milk Co-operative Societies is Chairman of the Cadre Authority and Chairman Uttarakhand Co- operative Dairy Federation is the Vice-Chairman thereof. He submits that officers and members of the cadre authority inter alia are Government officers e.g. Additional Secretary, nominated by Principal Secretary, Dairy Development Department; Joint Director, Dairy Development Department, nominated by Director etc. He submits that Rule 6(i) enables the authority to make 6 2025:UHC:6761-DB regulations relating to recruitment, training and emoluments of employees, with prior approval of State Government. He further submits that Rule 9 provides that appointing authority for Managerial and Non- Managerial posts of federation shall be its Managing Director. Thus, he submits that since State Government has framed statutory Rules under which a cadre authority has to be constituted and the cadre authority has been empowered to make regulations governing mode of recruitment etc, with prior approval of the State, which reveals that UCDF is an authority of the State and Government has all pervasive control over its affairs.
11. Learned Senior Counsel for petitioner submits that having regard to the extent of administrative and financial control exercised by State Government over the affairs of UCDF and also in view of statutory Rules framed by State Government dealing with employees of UCDF and milk union, it can be safely inferred that UCDF is an instrumentality of State. He further submits that every statutory corporation, autonomous body or public sector undertaking which is controlled or funded by the State, is required to follow Constitutional principles and such body/authority cannot act in violation of provisions contained in Part-III of the Constitution. He further submits that UCDF and District Milk Producers Co-operative Union qualify to be State as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution, therefore, their action has to be tested on the anvil of 7 2025:UHC:6761-DB Part-III of the Constitution.
12. He submits that employment under UCDF has all the trappings of public employment, therefore, UCDF is not free to make appointments on the post of Manager without following law of the land. He submits that equality of opportunity in public employment is a basic right which every citizen enjoys and Hon'ble Supreme Court has viewed infraction of this basic right by State authorities very seriously. He submits that appointment to post in a Government controlled body without advertising vacancy is a constitutional sin as it affects right of candidates who are lined up in queue, waiting for employment opportunities and if that opportunity is denied to them and appointments are made through back, then not only such illegal appointments are required to be set aside but the officer who are responsible for such illegal appointments also should be prosecuted.
13. He submits that campus selection made by NDDB is a farce, as there cannot be any selection without notifying the vacancies to all eligible candidates. He submits that team of NDDB officials allegedly visited one particular college at Jaipur (Rajasthan) and hand-picked candidates for appointment as Manager. He submits that a private or multi-national corporation which is absolutely free from Government control can have the liberty of holding campus selection without advertising vacancies, 8 2025:UHC:6761-DB however, UCDF, which is a wing of State Government cannot have that kind of liberty to make appointments in disregard of constitutional principles. He thus submits that appointment of private respondents as Manager is patently illegal, thus liable to be quashed.
14. Learned senior counsel for petitioner has drawn our attention to a document, enclosed as Annexure-3 to the counter affidavit, filed by respondent nos.2 and 3, whereby State Government had granted permission for regular appointment to the persons who were appointed as Management Trainee in UCDF, without advertising vacancies. He has also referred to pleading made in para-22 of the writ petition, where it is stated that UCDF is under control of the State Government and its Managing Director is appointed by the State Government. He has drawn attention to Section 31-A of the Uttarakhand Co-operative Societies Act which provides that for every Apex Society, there shall be a Managing Director who shall be a government servant, not below the rank of a Class-I officer and further that he shall be deemed to be on deputation to the society.
15. Mr. Puran Singh Bisht, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel submits that in view of provision contained in Section 31-A(3)(g) of the Act, the Managing Director of UCDF is competent to make appointments in co-operative societies in accordance with rules and regulations. He further submits that the 9 2025:UHC:6761-DB mode of appointment of employees of UCDF and Milk Union was governed by Uttarakhand Co-operative Dairy Federation and Milk Unions Centralised Service Rules, 2001, under which Managing Director was competent to make appointment with the approval of Registrar. He further submits that in 2016 new Rules were enforced in which approval of State Government is needed before making any appointment.
16. Mr. Shobhit Saharia, learned counsel for UCDF-respondent nos.2 and 3 raised the issue of maintainability of writ petition by contending that UCDF is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of The Constitution of India. He further contended that appointment to the post of Manager in UCDF does not amount to public employment.
17. Elaborating on his first argument, Mr. Shobhit Saharia submits that as per the statutory scheme, namely, Section 31-A(1) of the Act, a Class I Officer of the State Government is sent on deputation as Managing Director and as per sub-section (2) of Section 31-A of the Act, he becomes ex-officio member of Committee of Management of UCDF and he has no power to overrule or override the decision taken by the elected Committee of Management; the salary of all employees of UCDF except Managing Director is paid by UCDF from its own resources and State Government does not provide any funds for the purpose. He has relied upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court 10 2025:UHC:6761-DB in the case of Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. & Others vs. State of Kerala & others reported in 2013 AIR (SCW) 5683. Paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of this judgment are relevant, which are extracted below:-
"8. Writ Appeal No.1688 of 2009 later came up before another Division Bench, the Bench expressed some reservations about the views expressed by the earlier Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1417 of 2009 and vide its order dated 24.3.2011 referred the matter to a Full Bench, to examine the question whether co- operative societies registered under the Societies Act are generally covered under the definition of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative giving a liberal construction of the words "public authority", bearing in mind the "transformation of law" which, according to the Full Bench, is to achieve transparency and accountability with regard to affairs of a public body.
9. We notice, the issue raised in these appeals is of considerable importance and may have impact on similar other Societies registered under the various State enactments across the country.
11. The State Government, it is seen, vide its letter dated 5.5.2006 has informed the Registrar of Co-operative Societies that, as per Section 2(h) of the Act, all institutions formed by laws made by State Legislature is a "public authority" and, therefore, all co-operative institutions coming under the administrative control of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies are also public authorities.
12. We are in these appeals concerned only with the co- operative societies registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, which are not owned, controlled or substantially financed by the State or Central Government or formed, established or constituted by law made by Parliament or State Legislature.
15. We can, therefore, draw a clear distinction between a body which is created by a Statute and a body which, after having come into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of a Statute. Societies, with which we are concerned, 11 2025:UHC:6761-DB fall under the later category that is governed by the Societies Act and are not statutory bodies, but only body corporate within the meaning of Section 9 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act having perpetual succession and common seal and hence have the power to hold property, enter into contract, institute and defend suites and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purpose, for which it was constituted. Section 27 of the Societies Act categorically states that the final authority of a society vests in the general body of its members and every society is managed by the managing committee constituted in terms of the bye-laws as provided under Section 28 of the Societies Act. Final authority so far as such types of Societies are concerned, as Statute says, is the general body and not the Registrar of Cooperative Societies or State Government.
16. This Court in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas and Others (2003) 10 SCC 733, held as follows:
"32. Merely because Reserve Bank of India lays the banking policy in the interest of the banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound economic growth having due regard to the interests of the depositors etc. as provided under Section 5(c)(a) of the Banking Regulation Act does not mean that the private companies carrying on the business or commercial activity of banking, discharge any public function or public duty. These are all regulatory measures applicable to those carrying on commercial activity in banking and these companies are to act according to these provisions failing which certain consequences follow as indicated in the Act itself. As to the provision regarding acquisition of a banking company by the Government, it may be pointed out that any private property can be acquired by the Government in public interest. It is now a judicially accepted norm that private interest has to give way to the public interest. If a private property is acquired in public interest it does not mean that the party whose property is acquired is performing or discharging any function or duty of public character though it would be so for the acquiring authority".
17. Societies are, of course, subject to the control of the statutory authorities like Registrar, Joint Registrar, the 12 2025:UHC:6761-DB Government, etc. but cannot be said that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the society which is deep and all pervasive. Supervisory or general regulation under the statute over the co-operative societies, which are body corporate does not render activities of the body so regulated as subject to such control of the State so as to bring it within the meaning of the "State" or instrumentality of the State. Above principle has been approved by this Court in S.S. Rana v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and another (2006) 11 SCC 634. In that case this Court was dealing with the maintainability of the writ petition against the Kangra Central Co- operative Society Bank Limited, a society registered under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1968. After examining various provisions of the H.P. Co- operative Societies Act this Court held as follows:
"9. It is not in dispute that the Society has not been constituted under an Act. Its functions like any other cooperative society are mainly regulated in terms of the provisions of the Act, except as provided in the bye-laws of the Society. The State has no say in the functions of the Society. Membership, acquisition of shares and all other matters are governed by the bye- laws framed under the Act. The terms and conditions of an officer of the cooperative society, indisputably, are governed by the Rules. Rule 56, to which reference has been made by Mr Vijay Kumar, does not contain any provision in terms whereof any legal right as such is conferred upon an officer of the Society.
10. It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. The State has the power only to nominate one Director. It cannot, thus, be said that the State exercises any functional control over the affairs of the Society in the sense that the majority Directors are nominated by the State. For arriving at the conclusion that the State has a deep and pervasive control over the Society, several other relevant questions are required to be considered, namely, (1) How was the Society created? (2) Whether it enjoys any monopoly character? (3) Do the functions of the Society partake to statutory functions or public functions? and (4) Can it be 13 2025:UHC:6761-DB characterised as public authority?
11. Respondent 2, the Society does not answer any of the aforementioned tests. In the case of a non-
statutory society, the control thereover would mean that the same satisfies the tests laid down by this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi. [See Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Distt. Registrar, Coop.Societies (Urban).]
12. It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like the Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. Such control in terms of the provisions of the Act are meant to ensure proper functioning of the society and the State or statutory authorities would have nothing to do with its day-to-day functions."
18. We have, on facts, found that the Co-operative Societies, with which we are concerned in these appeals, will not fall within the expression "State" or "instrumentalities of the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and hence not subject to all constitutional limitations as enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. We may, however, come across situations where a body or organization though not a State or instrumentality of the State, may still satisfy the definition of public authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Act, an aspect which we may discuss in the later part of this Judgment.
Constitutional provisions and Co-operative autonomy:
19. Rights of the citizens to form co-operative societies voluntarily, is now raised to the level of a fundamental right and State shall endeavour to promote their autonomous functioning. The Parliament, with a view to enhance public faith in the co- operative institutions and to insulate them to avoidable political or bureaucratic interference brought in Constitutional (97th Amendment) Act, 2011, which received the assent of the President on 12.01.2012, notified in the Gazette of India on 13.01.2012 and came into force on 15.02.2012."
18. Judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank 14 2025:UHC:6761-DB Ltd.(supra) is distinguishable on facts as in that case the issue was whether co-operative societies registered under Co-operative Societies Act will automatically come within the purview of expression 'Public Authority', as defined Under Section 2(h) of Right to Information Act 2005. The issue which we are dealing here is entirely different, therefore, the said judgment do not help the case of respondents at all.
19. Mr. Rajendra Dobhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that officer of the State Government after appointment as Managing Director, UCDF is paid salary directly from public exchequer, therefore, the expression 'deputation' used in Section 31-A(1) is a misnomer. He submits that in case of deputation, salary is always paid by the borrowing organization in which a deputationist serves but here State Government is bearing the burden of paying salary to Managing Director. Thus, he submits that this is not a deputation, though by legal fiction, a class I officer of the State, who is appointed as Managing Director, is treated as on deputation, but he remains a State employee and he also receives salary from public exchequer, thus he is accountable to none other except the State Government. This, according to Mr. Dobhal confirms that State is calling the shots, though behind thick veil and UCDF is an instrumentality of State.
20. Mr. Rajendra Dobhal, learned Senior Counsel 15 2025:UHC:6761-DB relies upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Co-Operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey and Ors (1999) 1 SCC 741 for contending that UCDF is instrumentality or authority of the State as mentioned in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In the said judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Section 122 of U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and other statutory provisions for holding that U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited qualifies to be State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Section 122 of the Uttarakhand Co- operative Societies Act is pari materia to Section 122 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, therefore, this Court finds force in the submission made on behalf of petitioner that UCDF is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court.
21. Learned counsel for petitioner also relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M.P. State Co-Op. Dairy Fedn. Ltd. & Anr Vs. Rajnesh Kumar Jamindar & Ors (2009) 15 SCC 221 in which it was held that M.P. State Dairy Federation is covered by definition of State given under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Para 21, 22 and 23 of the said judgment are reproduced below:-
"18. Mr C.N. Sreekumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Federation, in support of the appeals, would contend:
(i) The Special Bench of the High Court committed a serious error in refusing to consider the authoritative pronouncement of this Court in Ajay Hasia [(1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16 2025:UHC:6761-DB 258] as also its earlier decision in Dinesh Kumar Sharma [1993 MPLJ 786] to hold that the Federation is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
(ii) The Federation having been running into huge losses, the conditions precedent for retirement of the employees of the Federation as contained in Regulation 13 of the Regulations having been satisfied, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
19 [Ed.: Para 19 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./53/2009 dated 22-5- 2009.] . Mr Vivek K. Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents and Mr Pragati Neekhra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 17705 of 2008, on the other hand, would urge:
(i) The share capital, functional control and the administrative control being completely in the hands of the Government of the State, the Federation is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
(ii) As the decision of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas [(2002) 5 SCC 111 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 633] governs the field and the criteria laid down therein being satisfied, no exception can be taken to the impugned judgment.
(iii) The Regulations governing the conditions of service being statutory in character and the Federation, having adopted the government circulars and rules for the purpose of implementation of its policy to retire compulsorily a large number of employees, were bound to follow the same.
(iv) The Scrutiny Committee and the Review Committee having not only consisted of the officers of the State but also the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, it was futile to move to the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies for setting aside the impugned circulars issued with regard to compulsory retirement.
(v) Having regard to the Regulations governing payment of back wages, as contained in Regulation 49(2) of the Regulations, the entire back wages should be directed to be paid.
20. An additional contention has been raised in the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 17705 of 2008 that the appellant therein having been suffering from disability within the meaning of the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short "the 1995 Act"), Section 47 thereof would be attracted and, thus, the appellant was entitled to entire back wages.
21. Article 12 of the Constitution of India reads as under:
"12. Definition.--In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' includes the Government 17 2025:UHC:6761-DB and Parliament of India and the Government and the legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India."
The development of law in this regard in view of the decisions rendered by this Court beginning from Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal [AIR 1967 SC 1857 :
(1967) 3 SCR 377] , Ajay Hasia [(1981) 1 SCC 722 :
1981 SCC (L&S) 258] and other decisions including a seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas [(2002) 5 SCC 111 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 633], is to say the least, phenomenal.
22. We may also notice that P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] wherein Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) was held to be "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, was distinguished in Chander Mohan Khanna [(1991) 4 SCC 578 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 109 : (1992) 19 ATC 71 : AIR 1992 SC 76] . However, Chander Mohan Khanna [(1991) 4 SCC 578 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 109 : (1992) 19 ATC 71 :
AIR 1992 SC 76] was overruled in Pradeep Kumar Biswas [(2002) 5 SCC 111 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 633] to the extent it followed the decision in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India [(1975) 1 SCC 485 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 99] .
23. In Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mysore Paper Mills Officers' Assn. [(2002) 2 SCC 167 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 223] Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. was held to be "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India as it was substantially financed and controlled by the Government, managed by the Board of Directors nominated and removable at the instance of the Government and carrying on functions of public interest under its control.
30. In State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 190] the U.P. State Agricultural Produce Market Board has been held to be "State", holding: (SCC p. 681, para 33) "33. The Board is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It was constituted in terms of the provisions of the said Act. As the powers and functions of the Board as also the State in terms of the provisions of the statute having been delineated, they must act strictly in terms thereof. It is a statutory authority. Its powers, duties and functions are governed by the statute. It is responsible for constitution of the market committees for the purpose of overseeing that agriculturists while selling their agricultural produce receive the just price therefor. It not only regulates sale and purchase of the agricultural produce but also controls the markets where such agricultural produces are bought and sold. The Board is entitled to levy market fee and recover the same from the buyers and sellers through market committees.
Indisputably, the market committees and the Board have power to appoint officers and servants. Although the power of the Board in this respect is 18 2025:UHC:6761-DB not circumscribed, that of the market committees is. The market committees can appoint only such number of secretaries and other officers as may be necessary for efficient discharge of its functions. Terms and conditions of such services are to be provided by it. Section 19 of the Act, however, imposes further restriction on the power of the market committee by limiting the annual expenditure made in this regard not exceeding 10% of the total annual receipt of the committee."
31. In S.S. Rana v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [(2006) 11 SCC 634] , Pradeep Kumar Biswas [(2002) 5 SCC 111 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 633] has been followed.
32. We have noticed the history of the Federation. It was a part of the department of the Government. It not only carries on commercial activities, it works for achieving the better economic development of a section of the people. It seeks to achieve the principles laid down in Article 47 of the Constitution of India viz. nutritional value and health. It undertakes training and research work. Guidelines issued by it are binding on the societies. It monitors the functioning of the societies under it. It is an apex body. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the appellant herein would come within the purview of the definition of "State" as contained in Article 12 of the Constitution of India."
22. Learned Senior Counsel for petitioner submits that Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that no one can be appointed in a State department or in an instrumentality of State, without inviting applications or without issuing advertisement. He relies upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and others vs. Chandreshwar Pathak reported in (2014) 13 SCC
232. Relevant extract of said judgment is reproduced below:-
"10. The order of appointment, in the present case, is as follows:
"In the light of the order passed by the Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Bihar, Patna, vide his Letter No. 6/86 F3 Sh. Chandeshwar 19 2025:UHC:6761-DB Pathak, s/o Sh. Devnarayam Pathak of Village Haraji, P.O. Haraji, PS- Dimbara, District- Chhapra was appointed as Constable temporarily from 14.01.1988 afternoon on the condition that his previous character found satisfactory and as and when necessary, his service shall be terminated without assigning any reason or show cause. His pay scale shall be Rs.425-10565 EB-10-605 with the basic pay of Rs.425/-. He has been allotted the CT No.
390."
It is clear from the above order that the appointment has been given only on the asking of the Inspector General of Police. There is nothing to show that any advertisement was issued giving opportunity to all eligible candidates to compete or any selection process was undertaken before appointment of the respondent.
11. In State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC 436, it was observed as under: (SCC PP. 451-52, paras 35-
36) "Appointment / employment without advertisement.
35. At one time this Court had been of the view that calling the names from employment exchange would curb to certain extent the menace of nepotism and corruption in public employment. But, later on, came to the conclusion that some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. Even if the names of candidates are requisitioned from employment exchange, in addition thereto it is mandatory on the part of the employer to invite applications from all eligible candidates from the open market by advertising the vacancies in newspapers having wide circulation or by announcement in radio and television as merely calling the names from the employment exchange does not meet the requirement of the said article of the Constitution.
(Vide: Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Admn., State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, Excise Supdt. v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, Arun Tewari. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh, Binod Kumar 20 2025:UHC:6761-DB Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto, National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh, Telecom District Manager v. Keshab Deb, State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and State of M.P. v. Mohd. Ibrahim).
36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the employment exchange or putting a note on the notice board etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal appointment mandatory compliance with the said constitutional requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment be made by an open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit."
12. No contrary view of this Court has been cited on behalf of the respondent. Moreover, another Division Bench of the same High Court has upheld termination in similar matter as noted earlier against which S.L.P. has been dismissed by this Court as mentioned earlier.
13. Accordingly, it has to be held that in the absence of any advertisement or selection process, the appointment of the respondent is not protected and could be validly terminated. Learned single Judge was justified in dismissing the writ petition while the Division Bench erred in interfering with the same.
14. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the order dated 05.01.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in L.P.A. No. 945 of 2010 and restore the order dated 09.04.2010 passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in C.W.J.C. No.204 of 2004. There shall be no order as to costs."
23. He submits that the 10 persons, who were appointed as Management Trainee in UCDF were taken 21 2025:UHC:6761-DB from one College in Jaipur in State of Rajasthan, namely, National Institute of Agricultural Marketing (NIAM), Jaipur. These appointments were made to the following positions:-
(i) Management Trainee (Procurement &
Inputs) - 5
(ii) Management Trainee (Engineering) - 1
(iii) Management Trainee (Marketing) - 1
(iv) Management Trainee (Quality Control) - 2
(v) Management Trainee (Production) - 1
24. Learned counsel appearing for respondent nos.2 and 3, however disputes this contention and submits that only 6 out of 10 persons were appointed from the aforesaid college in Jaipur. He concedes that 5 persons who were appointed as Management Trainee (Procurement and Inputs) were taken from the aforesaid college and another person who was appointed as Management Trainee (Marketing) was also taken from the same college in Jaipur.
25. Mr. Shobhit Saharia, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos.2 and 3 points out that in the year 2015, a meeting was held between Government of Uttarakhand and representatives of National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) in which it was decided that NDDB will provide assistance for recruitment of employees in UCDF and in view of the decision taken in the said meeting, request was made to NDDB for recruitment to the position of Manager in UCDF. Mr. Shobhit Saharia, however, could not give any 22 2025:UHC:6761-DB satisfactory reply to the question posed by us as to whether State Government or NDDB or any other agency concerned with the recruitment, advertised vacancies in any newspaper, website or any other platform. In fact, he stated, based on instruction, that appointments were made without advertising the vacancies.
26. Mr. Shobhit Saharia submits that since the task of recruitment was assigned to NDDB, therefore, Officers of NDDB visited four different Colleges situated in Jaipur (Rajasthan), Anand (Gujarat), Vallabh Nagar (Gujarat) and National Diary Research Institute, Karnal (Haryana) for holding campus selection based on written examination and interview. He, however, conceded that it was only a campus selection and not a regular selection which is usually done for appointment in Government Corporations.
27. Mr. Siddhartha Sah, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos.5, 6 and 8 and Mr. R.C. Tamta, learned counsel for respondent no.7 contended that as petitioner has not sought relief for himself and he has simply sought quashing of order of appointment issued in favour of private respondents, therefore, the writ petition would not be maintainable.
28. Learned counsel appearing for respondent nos.5 to 8 further submitted that since their clients were appointed as Management Trainee in 2016 and 23 2025:UHC:6761-DB they were thereafter given regular appointment, therefore, disturbing their appointment after nearly 09 years, would be unjust.
29. In reply to the submissions made by learned counsels for respondent nos.5 to 8, Mr. Rajendra Dobhal, learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to paras-11 and 18 of the writ petition, where petitioner has stated that as per the qualification mentioned in the letter dated 10.03.2015, petitioner was fully qualified for appointment as Manager (Procurement and Inputs) in UCDF. He further submits that petitioner has not only sought quashing of the appointment order illegally issued in favour of private respondents but he has also sought a writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents to hold selection for appointment as Manager (Procurement and Inputs) afresh, after advertising the vacancies.
30. Since petitioner is eligible for appointment as Manager (Procurement and Inputs) and he has sought writ of Mandamus to hold selection afresh as per law, therefore, the objection raised by learned counsels appearing for private respondents regarding maintainability of the writ petition is found to be without substance. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner does not have locus standi to maintain this petition.
31. The challenge to locus standi of the petitioner 24 2025:UHC:6761-DB by learned counsel appearing for private respondents is without substance. Appointment of respondent nos.5 to 8 without advertisement has resulted in denial of equality of opportunity to petitioner as despite being eligible, he was prevented from applying for post. Petitioner has sought quashing of appointment orders and also prayed that selection be held de novo. Since prejudice was caused to petitioner by making appointments without advertising vacancies, therefore, he is a person aggrieved, therefore, writ petition cannot be thrown out as not maintainable, as contended by respondents.
32. Even otherwise also in the case of Lakhi Ram Vs. State of Haryana and Ors (1981) 2 SCC 674 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an officer, whose chance of promotion are brought to an end by Government's action expunging remarks from annual confidential report of a co-officer, has a locus standi to maintain a writ petition challenging the expungement, even though made in favour of another person. Para no.1 of the said judgment is reproduced below:-
"1. The only ground on which the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court is that the appellant has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. The appellant filed the writ petition challenging the action of the government expunging the adverse remarks made in the annual confidential report of Respondent 6. The High Court took the view that the appellant was not entitled to complain against the expungement of adverse remarks made in the confidential report of another officer. But this view is, in our opinion, erroneous because the effect of expungement of adverse remarks in the confidential report of Respondent 6 is to prejudice the chances of promotion of the appellant and if the appellant is able to show that the expungement of the remarks was illegal and invalid, the adverse remarks 25 2025:UHC:6761-DB would continue to remain in the confidential report of Respondent 6 and that would improve the chances of promotion of the appellant vis-à-vis Respondent 6. The appellant was, therefore, clearly entitled to show that the government acted beyond the scope of its power in expunging the adverse remarks in the confidential report of Respondent 6 and that the expungement of the adverse remarks should be cancelled. The appellant had, in the circumstances, locus standi to maintain the writ petition and the High Court was in error in rejecting it on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to maintain the writ petition."
33. Similarly in the case of Banglore Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. B.S. Muddappa and Ors reported in (1991) 4 SCC 54 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that violation of rule of law raises a substantial question of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of administration and it furnishes enough cause of action either for an individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under technicalities of locus standi.
34. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition, we find merit in the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner contends that, as per the qualifications specified in the letter dated 10.03.2015, he was fully eligible to be considered for the post of Manager (Procurement and Inputs) in the Uttarakhand Co-operative Dairy Federation Ltd., Haldwani, and that he was deprived of equal opportunity to compete for the said post due to absence of a public advertisement and lack of transparency in the recruitment process undertaken by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. We are of the 26 2025:UHC:6761-DB considered view that the action of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in conducting the recruitment process without issuing a public advertisement or notice, has caused legal injury to the petitioner. Thus, petitioner qualifies to be a person aggrieved and the writ petition filed by him is maintainable. Furthermore, the pleadings made by the petitioner in para-11 and 18 of the writ petition have not been controverted by any of the respondent in their counter affidavit.
35. In the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed reported in (1976) 1 SCC 671, a Four Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question of locus standi held as under:-
"37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved';(ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper.Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more 27 2025:UHC:6761-DB than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.
38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer- circle the. bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outerzone may not be "persons aggrieved.
39. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed ? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law. has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him 28 2025:UHC:6761-DB something, or wrongfully affected his title to something" ? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public ? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority ? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of-the words "person aggrieved" is being considered a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community ? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals ?
36. From the rival submissions made by learned counsel for parties, it is now clear that respondent nos.5 to 8 were appointed initially as Management Trainee in 2016 and thereafter as Manager, however, their appointment in both capacities was made without advertising the vacancies. Thus other eligible candidates had no opportunity to apply for appointment or to participate in the recruitment process.
37. A Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1 came down heavily on backdoor appointments or appointments made in violation of constitutional mandate of equality of opportunity in public employment.
292025:UHC:6761-DB
38. In the case of Suresh Kumar vs. State of Haryana reported in (2003) 10 SCC 276, Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the judgment rendered by Punjab and Haryana High Court, whereby 1600 appointments made in police department, without issuing advertisement were quashed. The High Court had held that entire selection is vitiated because there was no advertisement and due publicity was not given to the vacancies.
39. In the case of Union Public Service Commission vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and Others reported in (2006) 2 SCC 482, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"10. Article 16 which finds place in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The main object of Article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality of opportunity and employment in public offices. The words "employment" or "appointment"
cover not merely the initial appointment but also other attributes of service like promotion and age of superannuation etc. The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee 30 2025:UHC:6761-DB whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution. (See B.S. Minhas vs. Indian Statistical Institute and others AIR 1984 SC 363)."
40. The principles to be adopted in the matter of public employment have been formulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Coop. Bank Ltd. Bhopal vs. Nanuram Yadav and Others, reported in (2007) 8 SCC 264 as under:-
"24. It is clear that in the matter of public appointments, the following principles are to be followed:
(1) The appointments made without following the appropriate procedure under the Rules/Government Circulars and without advertisement or inviting applications from the open market would amount to 31 2025:UHC:6761-DB breach of Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. (2) Regularisation cannot be a mode of appointment. (3) An appointment made in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute and in particular, ignoring the minimum educational qualification and other essential qualification would be wholly illegal.
Such illegality cannot be cured by taking recourse to regularization.
(4) Those who come by back door should go through that door.
(5) No regularization is permissible in exercise of the statutory power conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India if the appointments have been made in contravention of the statutory Rules. (6) The Court should not exercise its jurisdiction on misplaced sympathy.
(7) If the mischief played so widespread and all pervasive, affecting the result, so as to make it difficult to pick out the persons who have been unlawfully benefited or wrongfully deprived of their selection, it will neither be possible nor necessary to issue individual show-cause notice to each selectee.The only way out would be to cancel the whole selection.
(8) When the entire selection is stinking, conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit, individual innocence has no place and the entire selection has to be set aside."
41. In the case of State of Orissa and another vs. Mamata Mohanty reported in 2011 (3) SCC 436, Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that with a view to curb the menace and corruption in public 32 2025:UHC:6761-DB employment, there must a notice published in proper manner, calling for applications, and all those who apply in response thereto, should be considered fairly. Para 36 of the said judgment is reproduced below:-
"36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice Board etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal appointment mandatory compliance of the said Constitutional requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment be made by an open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit."
42. In the case of Renu and others vs. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi and another, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 50, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"16. Another important requirement of public appointment is that of transparency. Therefore, the advertisement must specify the number of posts available for selection and recruitment. The 33 2025:UHC:6761-DB qualifications and other eligibility criteria for such posts should be explicitly provided and the schedule of recruitment process should be published with certainty and clarity. The advertisement should also specify the rules under which the selection is to be made and in absence of the rules, the procedure under which the selection is likely to be undertaken. This is necessary to prevent arbitrariness and to avoid change of criteria of selection after the selection process is commenced, thereby unjustly benefiting someone at the cost of others.
17. Thus, the aforesaid decisions are an authority on prescribing the limitations while making appointment against public posts in terms of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. What has been deprecated by this Court time and again is "backdoor appointments or appointment de hors the rules".
18. In State of U.P. & Ors. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1654, this Court while dealing with the back-door entries in public appointment observed as under: (SCC pp. 217, para
19) "19. ...The method of appointment is indeed not calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will always be appointed or that the appointments made will not be on the considerations other than merit. In the absence of guidelines, the appointment may be made purely on personal or political consideration and be arbitrary. This being so those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination of their appointment 34 2025:UHC:6761-DB is equally arbitrary. Those who come by the back-door have to go by the same door. ....From the inception some engagements and contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them." (Emphasis added)
43. Rule of Law is one of the basic feature of our Constitution. The concept of Rule of Law inter-alia postulates that appointment to a post under State/Central Government or an instrumentality of State has to be made only after inviting applications from all eligible candidates to ensure that equality of opportunity is available to every eligible citizen. In the present case, however, appointments were made by adopting a process, which is not known to law. A private employer may make appointment through campus selection as he is not bound by the Constitutional guarantees, particularly those enshrined in Article 14 and 16. However, UCDF which is an Apex Society, having deep and all pervasive State control cannot be permitted to act in the manner as it did in the present case. From the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it is succinctly clear that respondent nos.5 to 8 were appointed without inviting applications or notifying vacancies, therefore, their appointments cannot but be castigated as backdoor appointments, thus illegal.
44. In the case of Ajay Hasia Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors (1981) 1 SCC 722 Hon'ble 35 2025:UHC:6761-DB Supreme Court in paragraph no.7 held that as under:-
"7..... Now it is obvious that if a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional law as the Government itself, though in the eye of the law it would be a distinct and independent legal entity. If the Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional limitations, it must follow a fortiorari that the Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation should equally be subject to the same limitations. If such a corporation were to be free from the basic obligation to obey the fundamental rights, it would lead to considerable erosion of the efficiency of the fundamental rights, for in that event the Government would be enabled to override the fundamental rights by adopting the stratagem of carrying out its functions through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation, while retaining control over it. The fundamental rights would then be reduced to little more than an idle dream or a promise of unreality. It must be remembered that the Fundamental rights are constitutional guarantees given to the people of India and are not merely paper hopes or fleeting promises and so long as they find a place in the Constitution, they should not be allowed to be emasculated in their application by a narrow and constricted judicial interpretation. The courts should be anxious to enlarge the scope and width of the fundamental rights by bringing within their sweep every authority which is an instrumentality or agency of the Government or through the corporate personality of which the Government is acting, so as to subject the Government in all its myriad activities, whether through natural persons or through corporate entities, to the basic obligation of the fundamental rights. The constitutional philosophy of a democratic socialist republic requires the Government to undertake a multitude of socio-economic operations and the Government, having regard to the practical advantages of functioning through the legal device of a corporation, embarks on myriad commercial and economic activities by resorting to the instrumentality or agency of a corporation, but this contrivance of carrying on such activities through a corporation cannot exonerate the Government from implicit obedience to the Fundamental rights. To use the corporate methodology is not to liberate the Government from its basic obligation to respect the Fundamental rights and not to override them. The mantle of a corporation may be adopted in order to free the Government from the inevitable constraints of red tapism and slow motion but by doing so, the Government cannot be allowed to play truant with the basic human rights. Otherwise it would be the easiest thing for the Government to assign to a plurality of corporations almost every State business such as post and telegraph, TV and radio, rail road and telephones -- in short every economic activity -- and thereby cheat the people of India out of the fundamental rights guaranteed 36 2025:UHC:6761-DB to them. That would be a mockery of the Constitution and nothing short of treachery and breach of faith with the people of India, because, though apparently the corporation will be carrying out these functions, it will in truth and reality be the Government which will be controlling the corporation and carrying out these functions through the instrumentality or agency of the corporation. We cannot by a process of judicial construction allow the Fundamental rights to be rendered futile and meaningless and thereby wipe out Chapter III from the Constitution. That would be contrary to the constitutional faith of the post-Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621] era. It is the fundamental rights which along with the directive principles constitute the life force of the Constitution and they must be quickened into effective action by meaningful and purposive interpretation. If a corporation is found to be a mere agency or surrogate of the Government, "in fact owned by the Government, in truth controlled by the Government and in effect an incarnation of the Government", the court, must not allow the enforcement of fundamental rights to be frustrated by taking the view that it is not the Government and therefore not subject to the constitutional limitations. We are clearly of the view that where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be held to be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 and hence subject to the same basic obligation to obey the Fundamental rights as the Government."
45. Having regard to the statutory provisions, particularly, Section 2(B-2), Section 31-A(1), Section 119, Section 120 and Section 122 of The Uttarakhand Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed under Section 122 of the Act whereunder cadre authority was constituted for governing mode of appointment and conditions of service of employees of UCDF and Milk Co-operative Unions and also in view of other attending facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that UCDF comes within the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution. This view of ours is fortified by judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Co-Op. Dairy Fedn. Ltd. & Anr 37 2025:UHC:6761-DB Vs. Rajnesh Kumar Jamindar & Ors (2009) 15 SCC 221 and U.P. State Co-Operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey and Ors (1999) 1 SCC 741.
46. It is not in dispute that while appointing private respondents as Management Trainee, other eligible candidates were not informed about availability of vacancies. Law is well settled that State or instrumentality of State has to make appointments in conformity with all constitutional principles and one of the basic principle is that no one should be appointed on a post without advertising the vacancy. Appointment without advertisement will be termed as backdoor appointment which shall be void-ab-initio.
47. Since respondent nos.5 to 8 were appointed as Management Trainee by Director Dairy Development without advertising the vacancies and they were thereafter given regular appointment on Class-II post of Manager, while petitioner and other eligible candidates were denied the right to be considered for appointment, therefore, the grievance raised by petitioner against appointment of private respondents is well founded. The campus selection alleged to have been made by NDDB is an eyewash and farce, which cannot protect the appointment given to respondent nos.5 to 8.
48. As discussed above, out of 10 appointments, 6 were made from one particular college and students 38 2025:UHC:6761-DB studying elsewhere were not made aware that such campus selection is being held. Other eligible persons, who completed their studies long back were also deprived of the opportunity to participate in the selection for want of advertisement.
49. In view of legal position and facts of the case as discussed above, the appointment of respondent nos.5 to 8 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and appointment given to respondent nos.5 to 8 as Management Trainee, without inviting applications from other candidates, are quashed and set aside. For the same reason, their subsequent appointment as Manager are also quashed and set aside. The Competent Authority shall be at liberty to make fresh appointment to the post of Management Trainee/ Manager, but only after issuing advertisement in widely circulated newspapers and after holding selection as per norms.
(Subhash Upadhyay, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) 31.07.2025 Sukhbant SUKHBANT Digitally signed by SUKHBANT SINGH DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=71978f9c61bfde0ba69967c787b1764ea7bc7d d129a8a6380d49b1885e628615, postalCode=263001, SINGH st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=2D8B71B8D8E345F6B7F95B1DD4FB4BE BD2B7D72C42261361AED33172F152148D, cn=SUKHBANT SINGH Date: 2025.08.01 11:29:54 +05'30' 39