Bombay High Court
Vasant Permanand Muley vs Aurangabad Municipal Council on 19 March, 2009
Equivalent citations: AIR 2009 (NOC) 1757 (BOM.), 2009 (3) AIR BOM R 158, 2009 (4) AKAR (NOC) 636 (BOM.), 2009 A I H C 2562
Author: P.R. Borkar
Bench: P.R. Borkar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
SECOND APPEAL NO. 37 OF 1987
Vasant Permanand Muley, Advocate ]..Appellant
Occ. Advocate, Bhagya Nagar, (original
Adalat Road, Aurangabad. plaintiff)
VERSUS
1. Aurangabad Municipal Council, ]..Respondents
Aurangabad (through its Chief (original
Officer), now constituted as the defendants)
Municipal Corporation of the City
of Aurangabad (through its
Administrator), Aurangabad - 431001.
2. Administrator, Aurangabad Municipal
Council, Aurangabad. Now the
Municipal Corporation of the City of
Aurangabad, Aurangabad-431001.
3. Chief Officer, Aurangabad,
Municipal Council, Aurangabad, now
the Deputy Commissioner of the
Municipal Corporation of the City
of Aurangabad, Aurangabad-431001.
4. M.D. Baride, Administrator,
Aurangabad Municipal Council,
Aurangabad.
(In his personal capacity)
5. Abdul Karim, Chief Officer, - (DISMISSED)
Aurangabad Municipal Council,
Aurangabad - now retired.
(In his personal capacity)
6. Mohammad Shamim Afandi - (DEAD)
Assistant Chief Officer,
Office of the Municipal's Zonal
Office, Zone No.4, Kranti Chowk,
Aurangabad - Now the Administrative
Officer, Municipal Corporation of
the City of Aurangabad,
Aurangabad-431001.
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(In his personal capacity)
7. K.M. Moinuddin (alias Moin) - (DISMISSED)
Building Inspector, Officer of
Municipal Council's Zonal Office,
Aurangabad-now retired.
(In his personal capacity).
8. V.K. Deshpande, Sanitary Inspector, - (DEAD)
Office of Municipal Council's Zonal
Office, Zone No.4, Kranti Chowk,
Aurangabad.
(In his personal capacity).
Shri V.P. Muley, Advocate - Appellant in person.
Shri Manish Navandar, Advocate for respondent No.3.
ig CORAM
RESERVED ON
:
:
P.R. BORKAR, J.
12.03.2009
PRONOUNCED ON : 19.03.2009
J U D G M E N T :-
. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Jt. Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad, in Regular Civil Suit No.184 of 1977, decided on 29th September, 1983, whereby the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed with compensatory costs of Rs.100/- to each of defendant Nos. 1,3,6 to 8; which judgment and decree is further confirmed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Aurangabad, in Regular Civil Appeal No.1 of 1984 decided on 29th September, 1986.
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2. Brief facts relevant for decision of this
appeal may be stated as below:-
. The plaintiff/appellant filed the suit against
Municipal Council, Aurangabad (as it was then) and its office bearers in official capacity as well as in the individual capacity claiming damages of Rs.8240/-
prior to the suit and at the rate of Rs.10/- per day
till demolition of illegal construction made by one
Govindrao
colony at
Padalkar
Aurangabad
on
and
plot No.81
for
in
issuing
Bhagya Nagar
mandatory
injunction against respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to demolish
or cause to demolish the illegal and unauthorised
construction made on plot Nos.81 and 82 by said
Govindrao Padalkar, as per order passed on 19th May,
1976 and order No.9881 dated 21st July, 1976, issued
by the Chief Officer.
3. The plaintiff is the owner of plot No.82 of
Bhagya Nagar, Aurangabad; whereas Govindrao Padalkar
is owner of adjoining plot No.81. It is stated that
said Govindrao Padalkar has made construction without
leaving marginal open spaces in plot No.81 and has
encroached into the plot of the plaintiff bearing Plot ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 4 ) No.82. Thus, there was unauthorised construction in violation of permission for construction. As a result, notice dated 19.05..1976, produced and proved at Exh.86 was issued to Govindrao Padalkar by respondent No.3 - Chief Officer, stating that he ought to have left side margins while making construction in plot No.81 and has also encroached into plot No.82 as shown in the map annexed to the notice. Said encroachment and illegal construction should be demolished within a period of one month from the notice, otherwise said unauthorised construction encroachment would be removed by the Municipal Council and at the costs of Govindrao Padalkar. The order of demolition No.8991 came to be passed by respondent No.3-Chief Officer on 21st July, 1976. The present plaintiff has filed suit for damages for not implementing said order and also for mandatory injunction for carrying out demolition as per notice Exh.86.
4. Both the Courts have concurrently held that the suit was not tenable as Govindrao Padalkar was not made party to the suit. Both the Courts have also come to the conclusion that the so called unauthorised construction made by Govindrao Padalkar in his plot ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 5 ) No.81 was duly and legally regularised on 11th November, 1971 by the then President.
5. Appellant - Shri Muley who himself is an advocate argued the matter in person. He submitted that the appellant still believes that notice Exh.86 was issued under Section 53 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the M.R.T.P. Act") and as such it has finality and there was no necessity of adding Govindrao Padalkar as party, as he could challenged said notice issued under Section 153 of the not have M.R.T.P. Act. Moreover, he argued that the Trial Court so also the First Appellate Court did not give any opportunity to the plaintiff to add Govindrao Padalkar as party and without giving such opportunity, the suit and the appeal were dismissed. Appellant -
Shri Muley stated that the fact that he is an advocate does not disqualify him from agitating legal points raised in the matter and he was never called upon by any Court to add Govindrao Padalkar as party and dismissal of the suit without giving him such opportunity was wrong.
6. On the other hand Adv. Shri Manish Navandar ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 6 ) appearing for the respondents argued that the appellant is not a layman. He himself is an advocate.
Atleast after getting decision of the Trial Court, the appellant could have made application in the District Court for adding Govindrao Padalkar as party, but instead of that he insisted that Govindrao Padalkar is not necessary party to the pleadings. He further argued that this appeal has been pending from last 21 years and the appellant never made application for adding Govindrao Padalkar as party. Moreover, he been argued that the construction by Govindrao Padalkar has regularised. Issue No.2 to that effect has been decided by the Trial Court and said finding is confirmed by the First Appellate Court. There are no bona fides and this is nothing but protraction of the litigation.
7. At this stage reference may also be made to Second Appeal No.1299 of 2006 pending in this Court.
Said appeal is filed by the legal representatives of Govindrao Padalkar being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.154 of 2000 passed by II Adhoc Additional District Judge, Aurangabad on 27.08.2004, whereby the judgment and decree passed by 4th Jt. Civil Judge, Senior ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 7 ) Division, Aurangabad, in Regular Civil Suit No.738 of 1984 decided on 31.01.2000, was reversed and dismissal of the suit was substituted by decreeing the suit appointing the Town Planning Officer as Commissioner for fixing the boundaries of plot No.81 and 82 situated at Bhagya Nagar, Aurangabad and to demolish illegal and unauthorised construction made by Govindrao Padalkar and to handover vacant possession of the encroached portion to the original plaintiff, who is respondent No.1 before that Court. Plaintiff words present in that suit is also plaintiff in this suit.
plaintiff/appellant had filed In other Regular Civil Suit No.738 of 1984 against which Regular Civil Appeal No.154 of 2000 was decided.
8. Regular Civil Suit No.738 of 1974 was for possession of portion encroached by Govindrao Padalkar (owner of plot No.81) into plot No.82 and also for removal of illegal construction made therein. In the present suit, against which this Second Appeal is pending, same relief is also asked. In addition to that relief, there is prayer for removing unauthorised illegal construction made by Govindrao Padalkar in his plot No.81 in not leaving marginal open spaces as per rules. The copy of plaint in Regular Civil Suit ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 8 ) No.738 of 1974 is made available to this Court by the appellant. I have also called record of Second Appeal No.1299 of 2006 for perusal.
9. Adv. Shri Muley who is present appellant/plaintiff and Adv. Shri Navandar for the respondents have taken me through the entire record.
It does not appear from the record that the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court had passed an order calling upon the plaintiff/appellant to add Govindrao Padalkar or his hears after his death as party to the suit or the appeal and such order is not obeyed by the plaintiff/appellant and therefore the suit or the appeal could not have been dismissed solely on the ground of non-joinder of party.
10. It is no more disputed before me that Govindrao Padalkar is necessary party as held by both the Courts below as the relief claimed is necessarily against the interest of Govindrao Padalkar. It is the construction made by him which is said to be illegal and unauthorised and therefore sought to be demolished.
11. Adv. Shri Navandar vehemently argued that the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 9 ) plaintiff/appellant had sufficient opportunity to add Govindrao Padalkar or his legal representatives as parties to the suit, since the suit was filed in the year 1977. He argued that Shri Muley is not a layman, but an advocate who was well aware of the niceties of law. He further argued that since the alleged unauthorised construction was regularised, there was no more necessity for remanding the matter for adding legal representatives of Govindrao Padalkar as parties. He referred to discussion on issue No.2 by the Trial Court so also the discussion on point by the First Appellate Court.
No.3
12. This appeal came to be admitted by order dated 09.10.1989 by the following order:-
"Heard Shri Gurusahani for the appellant and Shri Navandar for the respondent No.1.
Admit."
. After hearing both sides in my opinion the following substantial questions of law arise in this appeal.
(i) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party namely Govindrao Padalkar and after his death his legal representatives?::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 :::
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(ii) Whether the appellant/original plaintiff
deserves to get opportunity of adding legal
representatives of Govindrao Padalkar as parties to this litigation at this stage?
. My answer to issue No.(i) is in the AFFIRMATIVE and issue No.(ii) in the NEGATIVE.
NEGATIVE
13. Before we proceed, we may refer to the pleadings of the parties regarding alleged regularization. The plaintiff/appellant himself has stated in para 5 of the plaint that after the order by the Chief Officer dated 06.09.1971 in Municipal Office File No.149/17/71 notice of demolition was actually issued and served by the Chief Officer on the owner of plot No.81. The President of the Municipal Council allegedly regularized it on 11.11.1971 by interfering with the Chief Officer's valid order dated 15.08.1971.
The relevant from para 5 is as follows:-
"....... but surprisingly enough, instead of demolishing the said admittedly illegal construction, the President of the Municipal Council allegedly regularised it on 11.11.1971 by interfering with the Chief Officer's valid orders dated 25.08.1971. This so-called regularisation on the part of the President, the plaintiff had pointedly brought to the notice of the Chief Officer and the Administrator of the Municipal Council, was apparently without jurisdiction and was ineffective and null and void in law as the President of the Municipal Council has no voice in respect of grant or refusal for ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 11 ) permission for construction and the same does not lie in his competence."
14. In the written statement filed by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 at Exh.42 in para 4 it was stated that action was initiated by the Chief Officer on the basis of application filed by present plaintiff. However, the action was under Section 189(8) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, which is now titled as "the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965" (hereinafter referred to stated as that "the Maharashtra Act, 1965").
the then Chief Officer was not aware It is further of the fact that the alleged unauthorised construction by Govindrao Padalkar had already been regularised by the then President Shri Abdul Aziz on 11.11.1971. In para 5 it is stated that the papers in this respect were misplaced and inspite of serious search, they were not traced. It is further stated in para 5 & 6 that the unauthorised construction was already regularised.
Issuance of notice by the Chief Officer was in ignorance of the regularisation. Even the plaintiff with ill-intention did not disclose said fact. We further get reference to regularization in para 12 and 15 and it is stated that since unauthorized construction is regularized by the then President, it ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 12 ) cannot be demolished.
15. Shri Muley argued that under the provisions of the Maharashtra Act, 1965, the President was not authorised to regularize unauthorized construction.
He referred to Sections 179 and 189 of the Maharashtra Act, 1965. He also referred to Sections 44 and 152(3) of the M.R.T.P. Act and said that it is the Chief Officer who could have regularized the unauthorised construction. Section 44of the M.R.T.P. Act refers to the Planning requirement of making application Authority for permission by a person who was to the intending to carry out any development on any land.
Section 45 (5) states that whenever such permission or refusal is not communicated within 60 days, it is deemed to have been granted. Learned Advocate Shri Muley argued that under Section 53 whenever any notice is issued, it is final. However, sub-section (3) of Section 53 lays down that if any person aggrieved by notice, may apply for permission under Section 44 for the retention on the land of any buildings, or works, or for the continuance of use of the land to which notice relates. As per Section 5 where permission applied for is granted, notice shall stand withdrawn.
Whenever notice is not complied with, the planning
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authority may prosecute or take further steps for
demolition etc. On the other hand the Trial Court so
also the First Appellate Court have held that the
notice issued at Exh.86 was not under Section 53 of
the M.R.T.P.Act, but it was under Section 189 of the
Maharashtra Act, 1965 and they refer to the subject
mentioned in notice Exh.86, which refers to the
application filed by Govindrao Padalkar under Section
193 of the Maharashtra Act, 1965. Section 193 speaks about completion certificate. Section 189 (2) speaks about sub-section application for permission of construction (4) speaks about grant or refusal of such and permission to construct according to the plan and information furnished and sub-section (8) speaks about the construction in violation of permission granted.
So, it cannot be said that notice Exh.86 was under the Maharashtra Act, 1965 and the two Courts below committed any error.
16. So far as power of President of Municipal Council is concerned, we may refer to Section 58 of the Maharashtra Act, 1965 and Section 58 (1) (d) is as follows:-
"58. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules and bye laws framed ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 14 ) thereunder, the President of a Council shall-
(a) x x x x x
(b) x x x x x
(c) x x x x x
(d) exercise supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of Chief Officer of the Council in matters of executive administration and in matters concerning the accounts and records of the Council; and
(e) x x x x x"
17. So, it would be debatable whether the President has power to set aside the order passed by the Chief Officer and regularize any construction.
One thing is clear that, as has been stated earlier, so far as construction into plaintiff's plot No.82 is concerned, already Second Appeal No.1299 of 2006 is pending. The decree regarding ascertainment of encroached area, demolition of construction from of encroached portion and its possession has been passed by the District Court. So present litigation which is result of subsequent suit also covers and overlaps the relief which is claimed and granted in Regular Civil Suit No.738 of 1974 against which Second Appeal No.1299 of 2006 is pending. The regularization by the President of the Municipal Council must be only in respect of not leaving marginal open spaces in plot No.81 belonging to Govindrao Padalkar and present ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 15 ) litigation can be confined only to that extent.
18. When we are talking about rights of the plaintiff to implead legal representatives of Govindrao Padalkar as parties to this litigation, it must be made very clear that obvious result of such permission to add the legal representatives of Govindrao Padalkar as parties to the appeal would be to allow remand of the matter, because we will have to give opportunity to the legal representatives of Govindrao is Padalkar to contest the original suit which Regular Civil Suit No.184 of 1977. The Municipal Council has come with a case in their written statement filed at Exh.52 on 06.04.1979 that the relevant papers of the file are missing and they are not in a position to get the order of the President regularizing the unauthorised construction by Govindrao Padalkar. Admittedly, Govindrao Padalkar is dead. Record and proceedings of Second Appeal No.1299 of 2006 show that Govindrao Padalkar had expired pending Regular Civil Suit No.738 of 1974 decided on 31.01.2000. No attempt was made by present plaintiff/appellant to add Govindrao Padalkar as party to the present litigation during his lifetime. We have to consider difficulties the legal ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 16 ) representatives of Govindrao Padalkar may face if they are called upon to contest the suit and to prove regularization of unauthorised construction made by the President of the Municipal Council on 11.11.1971.
Their difficulties are compounded by the fact that the Municipal Council does not have relevant file/documents regarding regularization. It is not that the plaintiff/appellant is a layman. He is an advocate. He had full knowledge that he was seeking relief against Govindrao Padalkar right from the day on which No.184 of 1977.
the plaint was filed of Regular Civil He has deliberately chosen not to add Suit Govindrao Padalkar as party and deprived Govindrao Padalkar and his legal representatives early opportunity of contesting this suit. When we are considering prayers for adding parties under Order 1 Rule 10, we have to consider all these aspects.
19. Present appellant who is plaintiff must be deemed to know that the suit suffered from non-joinder of necessary party. In absence of Govindrao Padalkar, no effective decree could be passed, as Govindrao Padalkar during his lifetime and after his death, his legal representatives had/have every right to oppose and resist demolition of so called unauthorized ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 17 ) construction in their own plot No.81.
20. In the case of Jivanlal Damodardas Wani V/s.
Narayan Ukha Sali, AIR 1972 BOMBAY 148, 148 this Court has held that in exercising discretion under Order 1 Rule 10, the Court will not ordinarily add party without plaintiff's concurrence, but in exceptional circumstances can do so when party sought to be added is a necessary party. Thus, consent of the plaintiff to add Govindrao Padalkar as party was necessary and it was plaintiff never was tendered.
resisting In-fact, contention all that along Govindrao the Padalkar was necessary party and he ought to be added as party. He persisted not only in the Trial Court, but in the First Appellate Court, fully knowing legal position, he himself being an advocate. It is now well settled position of law that the plaintiff is dominus litis. He is the best judge of his interest.
21. In Kishan Prasad V/s. Har Narain Singh (1911) ILR 33 ALL 272, 272 the Privi Council has held that under Order 1 Rule 10 of the C.P.C., where necessary parties are not brought within a period of limitation, the suit must be dismissed. Here necessary parties means parties necessary to the constitution of the suit.
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The Lordship considered Section 22 of the Limitation
Act, 1877. In the present case cause of action has
arisen to the plaintiff as back in 1977 and he did not take steps to add Govindrao Padalkar as party to the present suit. The suit is, therefore, bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The suit is time barred against legal representatives of Govindrao Padalkar and in the circumstances the only course is to dismiss the present appeal.
22. Another Court in Fatimabi V/s.
ig case on same point is of
Pirbhai (1897) ILR 21 Bom 580.
our High
In that case the suit was originally filed by one of
the heirs of deceased Khoja Mahomedan. Another heir
subsequently made co-plaintiff beyond time of
limitation. It was held that the suit was barred by
Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1877. when the
second plaintiff was added as party, the suit was
barred against him. In my considered opinion, it
would be unjust to allow the prayer of the
plaintiff/appellant to add legal representatives of
Govindrao Padalkar as party to this suit in the year
2009 when the litigation is pending since 1977 and the plaintiff being himself a lawyer, cannot blame anyone else for not joining Govindrao Padalkar as party ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 19 ) within limitation.
23. One of the salutary object of law of limitation is to prevent the plaintiff from raking up old dispute in respect of which other party would not be in a position to adduce clear cogent evidence. We find number of cases in which it is laid down that whenever inspite of objection by defendants on the ground of non-joinder, the period of limitation was allowed to expire, it would be too late to join such necessary to parties to the suit and the only course dismiss the suit itself. It may be noted that is it is not a case of mis-description of parties, but non-joinder of the parties and after 30 years it would be unjust and improper to allow addition of the legal representatives of Govindrao Padalkar as parties to the present suit.
24. Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (5) of the C.P.C. is as follows:-
"Subject to the provisions of Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1877 (Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963), the proceedings as against a person added as a defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on the service of summons upon him."::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 :::
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25. Obviously, therefore, sub-rule (5) has to be read with Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1877 (old Act). The said section provided that where a new plaintiff or defendant was added or substituted, 'the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party'.
26. Interpreting the said provision, it was held that when a new plaintiff was substituted for the plaintiff on record after the period of limitation, the suit was liable to be dismissed. If it was a case of addition of a new defendant, the suit would be time barred against him.
27. Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (new Act), however, has changed the legal position. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 enacts that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to bona fide mistake, the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant "shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date". The proviso thus mitigates the rigour of law in appropriate cases.
28. Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is as ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 21 ) follows:-
"21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant- (1) Where after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party.
Provided that where the Court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith, it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff."
29. A further question may still arise as to whether the addition of a party after the period of limitation would affect the suit as regards other parties who are already on record. That would depend upon whether the party sought to be added is a necessary or proper party to the suit. If he is a necessary and has not been joined within the period of limitation, the suit will have to be dismissed, the reason being that the suit could be said to be a properly constituted suit only when the necessary party was joined in the suit but, by that time, the suit had already been time barred. But if the party ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 22 ) is only a proper party, as distinguished from a necessary party, the suit as regards the other parties would not be barred since the suit which had already been instituted was legal and proper.
30. I am not satisfied that the mistake, in not joining Govindrao Padalkar or his legal representatives by plaintiff from 1977 till this date, is made in good faith. It is deliberate omission.
There are no bona fides. The discretion given in the
proviso cannot
appellant/plaintiff.
ig be exercised in favour of the
31. In Halsbury's Laws of England, the policy of
the Limitation Act is laid down as follows:-
"The courts have expressed a least three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (i) that long demand claims have been more of cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the stated claim, (iii) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
32. The Supreme Court in Rajender Singh V/s.
Santa Singh, AIR 1973 S.C.2537,
S.C.2537 has observed that the
object of the law of limitation is to prevent
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been
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acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches. This principle is based on the
maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that
is, the interest of the State requires that there
should be end of litigation.
33. Govindrao Padalkar and his legal
representatives have enjoyed fruits of regularization
by the President of the Municipal Council for last 30
years.
this litigation
There was no challenge during that period by making them as party/ies in in this suit. So far as encroachment into plot No.82 belonging to the plaintiff is concerned, he has already availed remedy in filing earlier suit as against which Second Appeal No.1299 of 2006 is pending. When present respondents are coming with a case that there was no violation of Municipal rules and whatever unauthorised construction was there, it was regularized by the President of Municipal Council as back as on 11.11.1971 and notice issued by the Chief Officer was in ignorance of said order of regularization, equity is with Govindrao Padalkar and his legal representatives. As Andrew McGee in Limitation Periods has observed "with the lapse of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:26:03 ::: ( 24 ) time, proof of a claim becomes more difficult, documentary evidence is likely to have been destroyed and memories of witnesses will fade."
34. So taking into consideration all these circumstances, this appeal has no merit. Same deserves to be dismissed. Hence, the Second Appeal is dismissed. The appellant to pay costs of the respondents and bear his own.
ig [P.R. BORKAR, J.]
snk/2009/MAR09/sa37.87
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