State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Smt. Kaushalya Devi vs Kewal Krishan Kapil & Ors. on 30 December, 2009
H H.P. STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, SHIMLA. Appeal No. 188/2008. Reserved at Hamirpur on 26.11.2009. Date of Decision 30.12.2009. In the matter of: Smt. Kaushalya Devi W/o Sh. Hakam Chand R/o VPO Jhaniari, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, HP. Appellant. Versus 1. Kewal Krishan Kapil son of Shri Brij Lal Kapil, Kapil Niwas near Govt. Primary School, Hamirpur, HP; 2. Shri Rajesh Kumar, RMP, R/o VPO Jhaniari, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, HP; 3. Registrar Ayurveda Medicines and Homeopathy, Shimla, HP; 4. State of HP through Secretary Ayurveda, Shimla. Respondents. Honble Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Goel (Retd.), President. Honble Mrs. Saroj Sharma, Member. Honble Mr. Chander Shekher Sharma, Member. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the Appellant.: Mr. Peeyush Verma, Advocate, alongwith appellant who has been identified as such by Mr. Verma. For the Respondent No.1: Mr. S.C. Chauhan, Advocate with respondent No.1 who has been identified as such by Mr. Chauhan. For the Respondent No.2 Mr. R.N. Bhardwaj, Advocate with respondent No.2 who has been identified as such by Mr. Bhardwaj. For the Respondents 3 & 4 Mr. D.S. Parmar, ADA with Mr. Jagat Ram, Jr. Assistant, from the O/o District Ayurvedic Officer, Hamirpur. O R D E R
Per Mr. Chander Shekher Sharma, Member.
This appeal is directed against the order of District Forum Hamirpur, in Consumer Complaint No. 38/2006, dated 12.6.2008 whereby the complaint was dismissed by holding that the appellant failed to establish a case of medical negligence against the respondents.
2. Facts of the case as they emerge from the complaint file are, that the appellant while doing domestic work, (tethering of buffalo) suffered thumb injury on her right hand at about 5:00 PM on 6.1.2005 and in order to take medical treatment at Zonal Hospital, Hamirpur she was looking for conveyance on roadside, when respondent No.1 who is a Ayurvedic Doctor, stopped his scooter and introduced himself as a Medical Officer and persuaded her to accompany him to the nearby clinic of respondent No.2 at Jhaniari Bazar proposing that she should take first aid to stop the bleeding and thereafter go to Surgeon at Zonal Hospital, Hamirpur. As such she accompanied by some ladies of the nearby locality including Smt. Sharda Devi of village Jhaniari, came with respondent No.1 to the clinic of appellant No.2. Here the appellant No.1 gave two injections to her and asked her to look the other side. Thereafter within a second he chopped off her right thumb from middle without her consent and without any medical necessity. And on being asked by the appellant as to why her thumb has been chopped off, she was quipped Boboo Tijjo Kutee Dua Biah Karna Hai, (Sister, you dont have to marry for the second time.)
3. Further averments in the complaint are, that the act of chopping off her right thumb was an act of medical incompetence, and lack of medical knowledge, which led to medical complications secondary infection (Bacterial) of thumb. Thus due to use of non sterilized instruments/material, the complications were severe. Therefore the appellant remained under treatment in Zonal Hospital, Hamirpur under the supervision of Dr. Vipin Sharma, Orthopedic Surgeon for a considerable period. Thus she remained under constant mental strain and pain and was not able to follow the ordinary pursuits of life and needed assistance in her day to day work. Her further case set out in the complaint was tht due to the acts of negligence of respondent No.1 with the active help of respondent No.2 she lost her vital part of her body, i.e. the right hand thumb, resulting in its being disfigured, as well as loss of its utility. Respondent No.1 charged Rs. 100/- as his fees from the appellants husband at his residence and also directed him to pay Rs. 166/- to respondent No.2. There were other cases of medical negligence on the part of respondent No.1, was also set up as a plea for allowing the complaint.
4. In this background, in the complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 compensation to the tune of Rs. 3 lacs have been claimed by the appellant.
5. When put to notice respondents have contested and resisted the complaint. Respondent No.1 pleaded that there was no medical negligence on his part and he is a qualified doctor working in government dispensary/hospital since 1979, having experience of 27 years in the field of medical treatment and in such cases it is the foremost duty of a doctor to treat a patient when injured person is brought for medical treatment. As such he had instantaneously given her medical aid and he had made best efforts to redeem the patient. Further versions of respondent No.1 is that while he was at Jhanyari, he was stopped by the local persons including the husband of the appellant. He saw the appellant who came to him with a wound in the hand due to the loss of tip of thumb and requested for immediate medical treatment. He thus prescribed injection TT and pain killers to her and applied dressing on the wound which is an accepted treatment in the medical science, as such there is no deficiency of service on his part.
6. Plea of respondent No.2 was that he had no complicity directly or indirectly with the treatment of the appellant given to her by respondent No.1. Regarding alleged injury on her thumb/hand, she voluntarily came to his clinic alongwith respondent No.1, where first medical aid was given to her by respondent No.1. He had only allowed respondent No.1 to use medicine and dressing material etc. on the basis of humanitarian grounds especially on the request of the appellant. And he has only received payment of actual cost of medicines and dressing material used at his clinic, thus the complaint was not maintainable against him.
7. Respondent No.3 also contested and resisted the complaint and the plea was that appellant is not entitled for payment of any compensation.
8. Respondent No.4 also resisted the complaint. Its stand was that the appellant is not consumer, under section 2 (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4 were offering free service to the public for safety of their health. It was further pleaded that the respondent No.1 had given proper treatment to the appellant being AMO of the locality as he was approached by the appellant and her husband with wound in the hand due to loss of tip of thumb and had requested him for immediate treatment. Thus according to this respondent best medical treatment was given to her by respondent No.1, who had exercised reasonable competent degree of skill.
9. Rejoinder to the reply(s) was filed by the appellant wherein she has reiterated the stand taken in the complaint. Sur rejoinder was also filed by the respondent No.1 who had reiterated his stand taken in his reply to the complaint.
10. Appellant in support of her case has filed her own affidavit and affidavits of Smt. Sharda Devi, S/Sh. Amar Singh, Hakam Chand, Ram Lal, and documents Annexures C-1 to C-14. Respondent No. 1 in support of his version of the case filed his own affidavit and notification dated 26.9.1980 Annexure OP1/A, letter dated 19.5.2000 issued by Central Council of Indian Medicine OP1/B, Degree of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery OP1/C and prescription slips.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case file minutely. Mr. Verma learned counsel for the appellant argued that this is a case of gross medical negligence on the part of the respondent No.1 who had chopped off the right thumb of his client without her consent in the clinic of respondent No.2, where no sterilized surgical instrument was available. Respondent No. 1 had also charged fee of Rs. 100/- from the appellant and pleaded that the finding of the District Forum below is not legally sustainable in the eyes of law, as it had not rightly appreciated the evidence on record, despite there being sufficient, cogent and convincing evidence on record to prove the case of medical negligence against the respondent No.1.
12. Mr. Verma also argued that respondent No.1 has submitted that evidence of his client and her witnesses has remained unrebutted as well as unchallenged, as none of the witnesses were cross-examined. He also referred to a number of decisions of the Apex Court/National Commission in support of this appeal for allowing it. These are in the case of Poonam Verma Vs. Ashwin Patel & Ors., II (1996) CPJ 1 (SC), Dr. Shivkumar Gautam Vs. Alima B. & Ors., 2006 (3) CPR 290 (NC), P.N. Thakur (Prof) & Anr. Vs. Hans Charitable Hospital & Ors., III (2007) CPJ 340 (NC) and Sher Singh (Dr.) Vs. Billu Khan, IV (2007) CPJ 295 (NC). Mr. Verma has also urged by referring to case law that action taken without consent of the patient tantamounts to medical negligence.
He also referred to a decision of Dr. A.K. Mittal Vs. Raj Kumar, 2009, CTJ 606 (CP) (NCDRC) and case of Malay Kumar Ganguly Vs. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and others, 2009 CTJ 1064 (Supreme Court ) (CP), in the case of Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences Vs. Prasanth S. Dhananka and others, 2009 CT 712 (Supreme Court) (CP) and Samira Kohli Vs. Prabha Manchanda & Anr., AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1385.
13. Mr. S.C. Chauhan learned counsel for the respondent No.1 argued that there is no iota of evidence on record to prove medical negligence in the present case as no expert opinion in support of the case had been brought on record by the appellant. He supported the order of the District Forum below and prayed for upholding it. In support of his contentions he referred to various decisions of the Apex Court/National Commission viz. Birji & Anr. Vs. Dr. Neeru Tiwari & Anr., II (2009) CPJ 42 NC, in the case of B.N. Goel Vs. Dr. M.K. Goel & Ors., II (2009) CPJ 131 NC, in the case of Shibshree Bnerjee Vs. Pearless Hospital & B.K. Roy Research Centre & Ors., III (2009) CPJ 88 NC and in the case of Ins. Malhotra Vs. Dr. A. Kriplani & Ors., II (2009) .CPJ 18 SC.
14. Mr. D.S. Parmar, learned ADA for respondents 3 and 4 argued that there is no evidence worth name on record to prove any negligence muchless medical negligence on the part of his clients and he supported the order of the District Forum below.
15. Mr. R.N. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for respondent No.2 argued that that this is a case of no medical negligence against his client, since he had only sold the medicines and no part was taken by him in the present case in the procedure undertaken by respondent No.1 on the thumb of the appellant.
16. Written arguments on behalf of the appellant and respondent No.1 were also filed. Written argument on behalf of the appellant are pages 90 to 94 and arguments on behalf of the respondent No.1 at pages 85 to 89.
17. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and also after having gone through the record of the case, we are of the view that the order of the District Forum below is not sustainable both on facts as well as in law. Reason being that the District Forum below had not properly appreciated the evidence on record, and thus wrongly concluded that there was no medical negligence on the part of respondent No.1 in the present case. On the basis of the material on record we are of the view that there is sufficient, cogent and reliable evidence on record to connect the respondent No.1 with medical negligence in the present case which will be discussed in detail hereinafter under separate heads.
18. In the present case first of all we would like to state the law and general principles relating to medical negligence.
The broad principles under which medical negligence as a tort have to be evaluated, have been laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Jacob Mathew Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., 2005 CTJ 1085 (SC) (CP) wherein the Bench finally concluded its opinion as follows:
We sum up our conclusions as under:
(1) Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as given in Law of Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G.P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three; duty, breach and resulting damage.
(2) Negligence in the context of the medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment with a difference. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in particular a doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional.
So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure which the accused followed. When it comes to the failure of taking precautions, what has to be seen is whether those precautions were taken which the ordinary experience of men has found to be sufficient; a failure to use special or extraordinary precautions which might have prevented the particular happening cannot be the standard for judging the alleged negligence. So also, the standard of care, while assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time of the incident, and not at the date of trial. Similarly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that particular time (that is, the time of the incident) at which it is suggested it should have been used.
(3) A professional may be held liable for negligence on one of the two findings:
either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. It is not possible for every professional to possess the highest level of expertise or skills in that branch which he practices.
A highly skilled professional may be possessed of better qualities, but that cannot be made the basis or the yardstick for judging the performance of the professional proceeded against on indictment of negligence.
(4) The test for determining medical negligence as laid down in Bolam case (1957) 2 All ER 118 (QBD) holds good in its applicability in India.
19. In this case the Apex Court had adopted the test laid down in Bolam Vs. Freirn Hospital Management Committee, (1957) 2 All ER 118 (QBD) in which it has been observed as under:-
Where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill..It is well-established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.
20. The Honble Supreme Court of India observed that this judgment had been followed repeatedly not only in India but in other jurisdictions as well, and that it was the statement of law as commonly understood today. In paragraphs 24 and 32 of Jacob Mathews case it has been observed thus:
24. The classical statement of law in Bolams case has been widely accepted as decisive of the standard of care required both of professional men generally and medical practitioners in particular. It has been invariable cited with approval before the courts in India and applied as a touchstone to test the pleas of medical negligence.
In tort, it is enough for the defendant to show that the standard of care and the skill attained was that of the ordinary competent medical practitioner exercising an ordinary degree of professional skill. The fact that a defendant charged with negligence acted in accord with the general and approved practice is enough to clear him of the charge. Two things are pertinent to be noted. Firstly, the standard of care, when assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time (of the incident), and not at the date of trial. Secondly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that point of time on which it is suggested as should have been used.
32. At least three weighty considerations can be pointed out which any forum trying the issue of medical negligence in any jurisdiction must keep in mind. These are: (i) that legal and disciplinary procedures should be properly founded on firm, moral and scientific grounds;
(ii) that patients will be better served if the real causes of harm are properly identified and appropriately acted upon; and (iii) that many incidents involve a contribution from more than one person, and the tendency is to blame the last identifiable element in the chain of causation, the person holding the smoking gun.
21. In Halsburys law of England the degree of skill and care required by a medical practitioner is stated as follows:-
The practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge, and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither the very highest nor a very low degree of care and competence, judged in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, is what the law requires, and a person is not liable in negligence because someone else go greater skill and knowledge would have prescribed different treatment or operated in a different way; nor is he guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art, even though a body of adverse opinion also existed among medical men.
Deviation from normal practice is not necessarily evidence of negligence. To establish liability on that basis it must be shown, (1) that there is a usual and normal practice; (2) that the defendant has not adopted it; and (3) that the course in fact adopted is one no professional man of ordinary skill would have taken had he been acting with ordinary care.
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Now we will discuss/evaluate the evidence which has come on record under different heads for proving the fact of medical negligence on the part of respondent No.1 in the present case taken into consideration the aforesaid legal position in this matter.
(1) Amputation/chopping off middle part of thumb of Smt. Kaushlya Devi in the clinic of respondent No.1 at Jhanyari where no infrastructure/surgical instruments were available:-
This fact had been amply proved on record from the averments made in the complaint as well as from the affidavit of Smt. Kaushlya Devi. In this behalf paras 2 and 3 of the complaint and affidavit of Sharda Devi, that respondent No.1 chopped off/amputated the middle part of the right thumb of the appellant in the clinic of respondent No. 2 at Jhanyari which was a place where no distilled surgical instruments/hygienic conditions were existing of which judicial note can be taken. It clearly speaks of the fact that reasonable degree of skill had not even been used by the respondent No.1 while treating the appellant and his conduct fell below that of standards of reasonably competent practitioner in his field. There is further corroboration about cutting/amputation of inured part of thumb and medical negligence on the part of respondent No.2 from the press note Annexure C-4, its copy endorsed to District Ayurvedic Officer Hamirpur as Annexure C-5. We will go to the extent that even if respondent No.1 undertook the treatment of the appellant at her/her husbands request, it was his duty as a professional to have ensured that there were properly sterilized instruments etc. to have undertaken the premises of respondent No.2.
(2) Amputation/chopping off right middle part without consent of the appellant :-
In the present case this fact has been proved from the affidavits of the appellant and Smt. Sharda Devi, that the respondent No.1 had chopped off the middle part of right thumb of the appellant without her consent. Consent before undertaking surgical or therapeutic procedure is essential as per judgment of Apex Court given in the case of Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences Vs. Prasanth S. Dhananka and others, 2009 CTJ 712 (Supreme Court) (CP) This is what was held by the Apex Court in this decision while observing that consent in the context of a doctor-patient relationship means, the grant of permission by the patient for an act to be carried out by the doctor, such as a diagnostic, surgical or therapeutic procedure which is a must before any surgical act is done by the doctor in the case. To similar effect is the decision of the Apex Court in Samira Kohli Vs. Prabha Manchanda & Anr., AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1385. Thus the act of the doctor clearly establishes medical negligence on his part.
(3) Appellant suffering of mental pain, agony and taking of treatment in civil hospital, Hamirpur as a result of negligent act of cutting/chopping the middle part of right thump of appellant.
There is ample as well as acceptable evidence on record in the shape of uncontroverted/uncontested evidence, affidavit of the appellant and her husband Sh. Hakam Chand, from which it is clearly made out that the appellant had to take treatment for the amputation of middle part of her right thumb at Civil Hospital, Hamirpur for a considerable period, w.e.f. 7.1.2005 to 23.3.2005 which fact is evident from the various prescription slips attached with the complaint file, there are at pages 53 to 56. Due to infection developed in the thumb of the appellant as a consequence of the aforesaid medical negligent acts of respondent No.1. She had also to incur expenses for her treatment. This fact is also evident from the cash memos. These are from pages 58 to 72 and the detailed statement of expenditure Annexure C-11 attached with the complaint which comes to Rs. 12,915/-.
(4) Charging of fee of Rs. 100/- unauthorizedly by the respondent No.1 :-
In the present case this fact had been amply proved on record from the affidavit of Sh. Hakam Chand and Smt. Kaushlya Devi, that on 6.1.2005 respondent No.2 visited their house and demanded fee of Fs. 100/- despite the fact that payment was resisted on the ground that since he had chopped off the part of thumb, but despite objections, respondent No.1 had taken Rs. 100/-, and only thereafter he left the house. This act of respondent No.1 is against the government instructions since the doctors are getting NPA and they cannot charge any fee from the patient.
23. In the present case medical negligence on the part of respondent No.1 had been clearly proved on record by cogent and convincing evidence by the appellant which is ignored by the District Forum below while dismissing the complaint. Even report of District Ayurvedic Officer, Hamirpur had not been placed on record. In a case involving medical negligence, initial burden as per above discussion is discharged by the appellant by making out a case of medical negligence on the part of the hospital or the doctors concerned, the onus then shifts on to the hospital or to the doctors to satisfy the court that there was no lack of care or diligence. This is settled by the Apex Court in case of Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences Vs. Prasanth S. Dhananka and others (supra), which is lacking in the present case.
24. Mr. Peeyush Verma learned counsel for the appellant argued that in the present case there is no rebuttal evidence or any cross-examination of any witnesses who have deposed about negligence on the part of respondent No.1, and this case of medical negligence was fully proved on record as such initial burden had been discharged by his client in case of medical negligence was established. As a result of it the burden shifted on the doctor to satisfy this Commission that there was no lack of reasonable degree of care expected of professional like respondent No.1 in this case.
25. From further examination of the record of this case, we are of the view that there is no cogent, convincing and reliable evidence produced by respondent No.1 which rebuts the evidence of appellant. No reliance can be placed upon the affidavit of Amar Singh, since he had not deposed that he was inside the clinic of respondent No.2 when appellant was taken inside the clinic by respondent No.1 and name of Ram Lal does not figure in the version submitted by respondent No.2 in response to the complaint. As such no reliance can be placed on the affidavit of Ram Lal, Annexure OP1/E. Even the appellant and other material witnesses in the present case have not been cross-examined by the respondent No.1 who had clearly deposed of the facts of gross negligence on the part of the respondent No.1. Hence the submissions of Mr. Verma are well founded qua legal proposition laid down by the Apex Court/National Commission in various decisions which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant.
26. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has also cited various decisions of Apex Court which have been mentioned hereinabove. The main thrust of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 was, that since no expert evidence has been produced in the present case which was necessary to prove the medical negligence, and in the absence whereof the impugned order deserves to be upheld and he prayed for accordingly. No doubt this is the settled legal position that expert evidence is required to prove negligence on the part of medical practitioner, but this is a case of such a nature, wherein there is clear statement of Smt. Kaushlya Devi and Smt. Sharda Devi that the middle part of the thumb was chopped off by the respondent No.1 without her consent, and having uttered to the appellant when she asked him why her thumb has been chopped of Boboo Tijjo Kutee Dua Biah Karna Hai. Even in the prescription slip which is at page 53 of the complaint file where appellant had taken treatment it had clearly mentioned AUK AMPUTATED THUMB (R).
27. Mr. Verma placed reliance upon various decisions of the Apex Court/National Commission that any doctor having practiced allopathy without being qualified in that system was guilty negligence per-se is not disputed, but in the present case this fact is clear from the notification of the Health and Family Welfare Department, dated 26.9.1980 that in modern medicines these can also be used by the Ayurvedic practitioners. This notification under the Drugs and Cosmetic Act, Annexure OP1/A and notification dated 19.5.2004 also corroborates the same. Even from Annexure OP1/F which is the degree for GAMS of respondent No.1, it is clear that the doctor was having medicine and surgery as subjects in his course which he had qualified. As such in view of this evidence on record it cannot be held that the respondent No.1 could not have prescribed allopathic medicines and could do surgery. However, as already held evidence above referred proves medical negligence on the part of respondent No. 1.
28. The judgment of Sessions Judge, Hamirpur passed in Sessions Trial No.2 of 1998 in case State Vs. Kusum Lata & Anr., Annexure C-1 wherein respondent No.1 was also charged for offences under Sections 314, 109/34 IPC is a judgment of acquittal, hence no benefit can be derived from that judgment. Even affidavit of Sh. Pyar Chand Puri to whom wrong treatment was given by respondent No.1 cannot be taken into consideration for coming to the conclusion that there was medical negligence on the part of this respondent. So no benefit can be derived by the appellant from this document, as discussed above.
29. As per learned counsel for the respondent No.2 that there is no iota of evidence on record of medical negligence against respondent No.2 since he had only sold the medicines and no active part was taken by him in the present case. We accept this submission.
30. In the present case respondent No.4-State cannot be held by vicariously liable for the acts of the doctor, i.e. respondent No.1 because he charged Rs. 100/- from the appellant as fee to which he was not legally entitled being a doctor serving in government dispensary. As such he is personally liable in the present case for his acts of medical negligence resulting in the appellant suffering mental torture injury and she was deprived of her middle part of thumb.
31. No other point was urged.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and legal position explained hereinabove, and the fact that the conduct of respondent No.1 who is doctor of long standing, his conduct fell below that of the standard expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field. As such we set aside the order passed by District Forum, Hamirpur in Consumer Complaint No. 38/2006, dated 12.6.2008 and respondent No.1 is held liable to make payment of compensation to the appellant for causing mental harassment, torture, besides incurring of medical and other expenses which is quantified at Rs. 25,000/-. On this sum appellant is held entitled to interest @ 9% per annum from the date of complaint, i.e. 21.3.2006 till payment. Respondent No.1 is also held liable pay Rs. 15,000/- for causing permanent disability to the appellant on account of medical negligence on the part of respondent No.2, which has been certified by the competent authority vide Annexure C-15, to the extent of 15% permanent disability on the right thumb of the appellant as she had become in capacitated in doing the work due to cutting of middle part of her right thump as per evidence on record. Appellant is also held entitled to costs of Rs. 10,000/-. Ordered accordingly. As a result this appeal is allowed only against respondent No.1 and dismissed qua respondents 2 to 4.
Learned counsel for the appellant has undertaken to collect copy of this order from the Court Secretary free of cost as per rules, and office is directed to send copy of this order to the respondents in the liker manner as per rules free of costs.
Shimla, December 30, 2009. ( Justice Arun Kumar Goel ) (Retd.) President.
(Saroj Sharma) Member.
( Chander Shekher Sharma ) /Karan/ Member.