Jharkhand High Court
Pranami Estates Pvt. Ltd vs The State Of Jharkhand on 20 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:24567
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No.22 of 2022
Pranami Estates Pvt. Ltd., a Company having its previous address of office
at 23 A, A.C. Market, Second Floor, G.E.L. Church Complex, Main Road,
District-Ranchi and also having its office at 4th Floor, Crosswind Court
Road, District-Ranchi, represented by one of its Directors, Bijay Kumar
Agrawal, son of Late Daulat Ram Agrawal, Age-58 years, Resident of -
Shivganj, Harmu Road, P.O. and P.S.-Harmu, Ranchi, District-Ranchi,
Jharkhand . At present having an address of offices at 201, Second Floor,
HP chambers opposite Dr. Mansaria, Crosswind Court Road, District-
Ranchi, Jharkhand ............... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, having its office at
Kutchery Chowk, P.O-GPO, P.S-Sadar, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi having its office at Collecteriat
building at Kutchery Chowk, P.O-GPO, P.S-Sadar, District- Ranchi,
Jharkhand
4. The Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation (S.A.R.), Ranchi having
its office at Collecteriat building at Kutchery Chowk, P.O-GPO, P.S-Sadar,
District- Ranchi, Jharkhand
5. (a) Rajesh Oraon
(b) Ajay Oraon
All sons of Jeetu Oraon R/o village-Simalia, P.O.-Bihata Toli, P.S-Ratu,
District-Ranchi
6. (a) Jatru charwa
(b) Chandar Oraon
(c) Chatu Oraon
All sons of Sukra Oraon R/o village-Simalia, P.O.-Bihata Toli, P.S-Ratu,
District-Ranchi
7. (a) Kunwar Oraon
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(b) Nitu Oraon
(c) Ravi Oraon
All S/o Late Kolha Oraon, R/o-Village Simalia, P.S.- Bihatha Toli, P.S.-
Ratu, Dist.-Ranchi (Jharkhand)
8. Mangra Oraon, son of Late Jatru Oraon
All (5 to 8 above)-Residents of Village-Simalia, Bhitha Toli, P.S.-Ratu,
District-Ranchi, Jharkhand ............ Opposite Parties
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Vimal Kirti Singh, Advocate Mr. Ujjal Choudhary, Advocate Mr. Raunak Sahay, Advocate Mr. Srikant Sahay, Advocate Mr. Vineet Kumar, Advocate For the Opp. Parties : Mr. D.K. Prasad, Advocate Mrs. Sunita Kumari, AC to Sr.SC-II
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C.A.V on 06.08.2025 Pronounced on 20/08/2025 Prayer: 1. The present review petition has been filed seeking
review/modification of the order dated 16.12.2021 passed in W.P(C) No.3768 of 2013 by this Court whereby and whereunder the writ petition was dismissed declining to interfere with the order impugned dated 14.12.2011 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in S.A.R. Appeal No.07 of 2010.
Factual Matrix:
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition as also referred in the order sought to be reviewed needs to refer herein which reads as under:2
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(i) That one Jatru Oraon, son of recorded Raiyat Bodho Oraon alias Bocho Oraon, voluntarily surrendered 4.94 acres of land including the land under the present proceeding of Khata No. 102 under Khewat No.2, situated at Village Simalia, P.S. Ranchi, Thana No. 139, District Ranchi to the then landlord Kumar Brijendra Nath Shahdeo, son of late Thakur Mahendra Nath Shahdeo by virtue of a Registered Deed of Surrender being Deed No. 5684 dated 23.09.1954 and put the said landlord in possession since the said date of surrender and the land so surrendered became Bakast land of the then landlord. Thereafter, the said landlord settled 45.86 acres of land including the aforesaid land to one Shaildhari Lal (since deceased) by virtue of a registered perpetual lease deed being Deed No. 6739 dated 20.12.1954 and put the said Settlee in possession since the date of Settlement who got his name mutated in the Serista of the State of Bihar through the Circle Office, Kanke vide Mutation Case No. 400R27 of 1956-57 and has regularly paid rent to the State thereafter and the said Settlee, Shaildhari Lal constructed other structures including building and boundary wall over the land in question.
(ii) That the said Settlee, Shaildhari Lal remained in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the land so long alive and after his death, his widow, Nilika Lal and his son, Sanjeev Tandon Lal inherited the property by succession and got their names mutated in the Serista of the State of Jharkhand through the Circle Office, Kanke Anchal, Ranchi vide Mutation Case No. 1925R27 of 2005-06. Out of the said property thus inherited, the said Nilika Lal 3 2025:JHHC:24567 and Sanjeev Tandon Lal sold 0.85 acres of land of R.S. Plot No. 1911 of Khata No. 139 under Khewat No. 2 to the petitioner company by virtue of a Registered Deed of Sale dated 07.09.2006 being Deed No. 13192 for a valuable consideration and put the petitioner company in possession of the same and the petitioner company is in possession of the same since the date of purchase and has constructed boundary wall and other substantial structures on the land.
(iii) That in the year 2007, the respondent nos. 5 to 8 herein filed a case being S.A.R. Case No. 317 of 2007-08 against the vendors of the petitioner company namely, Nilika Lal and Sanjeev Tandon Lal, widow and son respectively of the said Settlee, Shaildhari Lal claiming restoration of 0.94 Acres of land of R.S. Plot No. 1911 of Khata No. 102, situated at village Simalia, P.S. Ranchi (now Ratu), District-Ranchi. In the said proceeding, an ex-parte order was initially passed on 29.08.2008 by the Ld. Special Officer, Scheduled Areas Regulation, Ranchi against the opposite parties therein i.e., Nilika Lal and Sanjeev Tandon Lal, the vendors of the petitioner company for non-appearance in the aforesaid matter even after being served with notice to file their reply/objection.
(iv) That after learning about the said ex-parte order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 317 of 2007-08, the petitioner company filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleadment as an Opposite Party in the aforesaid proceeding being a necessary party and also for recall of the order of delivery of possession. The said application filed under Order 1 4 2025:JHHC:24567 Rule 10(2) by the petitioner company was allowed and the Petitioner company was directed to be impleaded as an opposite party in the said S.A.R. Case No. 317 of 2007-08 whereupon the Petitioner company produced all relevant documents in support of its claim and accordingly, the Ld. Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi, after careful perusal and due consideration of the same, dismissed the case for restoration of land of the opposite parties i.e.. Respondent nos. 5 to 8 herein vide its order dated 09.02.2010 holding that their claim was not legal and valid and was also barred by limitation.
(v) That being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Ld. Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi, the Opposite parties (Respondent nos. 5 to 8) preferred an appeal being SAR Appeal No. 07/2010 before the Ld. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi who, vide his order dated 14.12.2011, allowed the said Appeal with a direction for restoration of land in favor of the Appellants i.e., Respondent nos. 5 to 8 herein without considering the provisions of law or the materials on record.
(vi) That against the aforesaid order dated 14.12.2011 passed by the Ld. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in S.A.R. Appeal No. 07/2010, the Petitioner herein preferred a Revision being S.A.R. Revision No. 186 of 2011 under Section 217 of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act which was rejected vide order dated 25.05.2013 without considering the fact that the case of Opposite parties (Respondent nos. 5 to 8 herein) was hopelessly barred by limitation as well as adverse possession since the transfer of the land in favor of the said Settlee, 5 2025:JHHC:24567 Shaildhari Lal, took place way back in the year 1954. The restoration application preferred by the respondent nos. 5 to 8 u/s 71A of the CNT Act ought to have been filed within a reasonable period of the initial transfer and certainly not in 2007 i.e., over 54 years of the said initial transfer and is thus barred by the principles of limitation and is not permissible in law.
(vii) That the Ld. Deputy Commissioner and the Ld. Commissioner, both have grossly erred in allowing the restoration application and proceeding under Section 71-A of the CNT Act without considering the fact that the said restoration application, which was filed in the year 2007 i.e., about 54 years after the Chhapparbandi settlement was made in favour of the said Settlee, Shaildhari Lal, was thoroughly barred by limitation and this issue stands settled by a plethora of decisions of the Hon'ble Courts. Therefore, besides the proceedings under Section 71A of CNT Act being not applicable in the instant case, the same is also hopelessly barred by limitation and adverse possession.
3. Being aggrieved, the instant petition has been preferred for reviewing the order dated 16.12.2021 passed in W.P(C) No.3768 of 2013 by this Court.
4. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petition being W.P(C) No.3768 of 2013 has been preferred challenging the order dated 14.12.2011 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in S.A.R. Appeal No.07 of 2010 whereby and whereunder the order dated 09.02.2010 passed by the Special officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi has been set aside as also the order dated 25.05.2013 passed in S.A.R. Revision No.186 6 2025:JHHC:24567 of 2011 which has confirmed the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner.
5. The ground has been taken that the land in question had come in possession of the writ petitioner on 07.09.2006 which is on the basis of the purchase of the land from the erstwhile owner, namely, Nilika Lal and Sanjeev Tandon Lal.
6. The private respondents have preferred an application for restoration of the land being S.A.R Case No.317 of 2007-08 against Nilika Lal wife of Shaildhari Lal and Sanjeev Tandon Lal son of Shaildhari Lal. The said application was decided on 29.08.2008 by passing ex-parte order as was claimed by the writ petitioner since the notice has not been served upon them.
7. The said Nilika Lal and Sanjeev Tandon Lal had transferred the land in favour of the present petitioner. The review petitioner after going about the fact that the order was passed on 29.08.2008 and, hence, filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. for being impleaded as opposite party in the aforesaid proceeding as also prayed for recall of the writ of delivery of possession.
8. The ground has been taken that the writ petitioner has purchased the land in question from Nilika Lal and Sanjeev Tandon Lal and, as such, they are having the interest over the landed property. Hence, being a necessary party was to be heard.
9. The matter was heard by the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi and order was passed on 09.02.2010 by dismissing the case of the respondent nos. 5 to 8 for restoration of land in question as being not legal and valid and also barred by limitation. 7
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10. The respondent nos.5 to 8 being aggrieved with the order passed by the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi have preferred an appeal being S.A.R. Appeal No. 07 of 2010 as also the revision being S.A.R Revision No.186 of 2011, but both the applications have been dismissed.
11. The present review petitioner being aggrieved by the revisional order dated 25.05.2013 has filed the writ petition being W.P(C) No.3768 of 2013.
12. This Court has called upon the private respondents as also the State respondents who have appeared and contested the case by taking the plea that there is no error in the impugned order dated 14.12.2011 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in S.A.R. Appeal No.07 of 2010.
13. The learned Writ Court after considering the factual aspect, settled position of law and submission made on behalf of the parties had dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 16.12.2021 by refusing to interfere with the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner dated 14.12.2011 and 25.05.2013 in SAR Appeal No. 07 of 2010 and in SAR Revision No. 186 of 2011 respectively.
14. The instant review petition, thereafter, has been filed on behalf of the present review petitioner.
Submission on behalf of the review/writ petitioner:
15. The learned counsel appearing for the review petitioner has taken the following ground.:
(i) The review petitioner since is the subsequent purchaser having purchased the land in question from Nilika Lal and Sanjeev Tandon Lal against whom the restoration order was 8 2025:JHHC:24567 passed and, as such, the review petitioner was not required to purchase the land after getting permission from the Deputy Commissioner as mandated under section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (in short, C.N.T Act).
16. The Learned counsel for the review petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the order dated 16.12.2021 passed in W.P.(C) 3768 of 2013 is fit to be reviewed.
Submission on behalf of the Opposite Parties/State:
17. The learned counsel appearing for the private respondent/ Opposite Parties as well the learned counsel appearing for the State have submitted that the ground upon which the present review has been filed is not fit to be entertained reason being that if the Raiyti land which is recorded in the name of the tribal can only be transferred with permission of the Deputy Commissioner as required under section 46 of the C.N.T Act.
18. It has been contended that even in the case of surrender of land as required under section 72 of the C.N.T. Act such permission is required.
19. It has been contended that the legal issues have already been dealt with by this Court while deciding the issue on merit, as would be evident from the relevant paragraphs, particularly, paragraph nos.14 to 21 of the order dated 16.12.2021 passed in W.P(C) No.3768 of 2013 which are being quoted hereunder as:
"14. This Court, therefore, deems it fit and proper to deal with these two grounds.
So far as the first ground is concerned that admittedly the reference has been made by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation about 9 2025:JHHC:24567 application under Section 71-A being barred by limitation but the question is that how the original authority has given such finding. It is the admitted case of the writ petitioner that the order passed by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation is an ex-parte order. The question herein is that the issue which will be raised by the competent authority is required to be dealt with but not on the basis of personal knowledge of the concerned authority or the Court of Law. The matter would have been different if the writ petitioner would had appeared before the original authority and raised the point of limitation by showing the documents and leading the evidence on that ground but since the proceeding itself was an ex-parte, therefore, there was no occasion of consideration of documents which was in favour of the writ petitioner on the issue.
15. Therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, on reference of ground of rejection, an application filed under Section 71- A being time barred cannot be said to be a just finding of the original authority.
16. This Court, further deems it fit and proper to refer the question of limitation being an issue of mixed question of law and fact. A specific pleading to that effect is required to be made before the concerned authority but no such application has been brought on record by the writ petitioner raising the issue of limitation however, submission has been made that there is no question of any objection since the order has been passed ex-parte even such argument will be accepted then also it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner to raise this objection before the appellate authority but as would appear from the order passed by the appellate authority no such plea has been made, save and except, the ground that the settlement cannot construe to be transferred.
17. Therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, the issue of limitation which has been raised by the writ petitioner cannot be said to be a valid ground for its consideration at this stage.
18. So far as the second ground is concerned that the nature of land since has been changed from Raiyat to Chhaparbandi, therefore, provision of C.N.T. Act will not be applicable.
It is not in dispute that the land, if Chhaparbandi in nature, the provision of C.N.T. Act will not be applicable rather the provision of Transfer of Property Act will be applicable. But merely by taking the point that the nature of land has been changed from Raiyati to Chhaparbandi, is not sufficient rather the specific plea to that effect is required to be taken on the basis of the relevant documents for its consideration before the competent authority but as would appear from 10 2025:JHHC:24567 the order passed by the original authority as also the appellate or revisional authority, no such document has ever been produced on behalf of the petitioner, save and except, the plea that the writ petitioner is not in possession of the land since the year, 1954. Therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, the aforesaid ground of change of nature of land to that of Chhaparbandi, is not fit to be acceptable.
Admittedly, the authorities have also considered the question of surrender which was done by one of the shareholders of the Raiyat, namely, Jatru Oraon while the other partners have not come even though the land was settled in favour of one Bocho Oraon by the exlandlord and as such, the surrender is illegal in absence of permission of Deputy Commissioner as required under Section 72 of the Act, 1908.
19. This Court, therefore, is of the view that no valid reason has been shown for issuance of writ of certiorari by this Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
20. It requires to refer herein the principle of issuance of writ of certiorari as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477, wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:-
7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of 11 2025:JHHC:24567 fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168. Reference in this regard also may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, it has been held at Paragraph-21, which is being referred hereinbelow :-
".......as to the character and scope of the writ of 'certiorari' and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in 'Parry and Co. v. Commercial Employees' Association, Madras,' AIR 1952 SC 179 (L):-'Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.' AIR 1952 SC 192 (M); 'Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi,' AIR 1952 SC 319 (N), and quite recently in AIR 1954 SC 440(C). On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) 'Certiorari' will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will 12 2025:JHHC:24567 not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in "certiorari"......."
In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. Vrs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under:
"12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra).........
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice."
Thus, it is evident that the scope of issuance of writ of certiorari is very limited and it can only be issued in case of order passed having jurisdictional error or suffers from patent illegality on the face of it but no such ground has been made out.
21. Therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, it is not a fit case where interference can be shown in the impugned order.
22. Accordingly, the instant writ petition fails and is, dismissed."
20. On the aforesaid grounds it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that once the legal issues have already been considered by this 13 2025:JHHC:24567 Court, the same cannot be a ground for review, rather at best the same can be a ground to challenge by referring an appeal before higher Forum and, as such, the instant review petition may be dismissed. Analysis:
21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the grounds upon which the order dated 16.12.2021 passed in W.P(C) No.3768 of 2013 has been sought to be reviewed.
22. This Court before exercising the power of review which have been preferred solely on the ground that after the land in question having been purchased no permission under section 46 of the C.N.T. Act is required. This Court is of the view that scope of review and the power of the Court to be exercised while reviewing the order passed by this Court needs to be referred herein first.
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case "Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors." [AIR 1954 SC 526], particularly, at paragraph-32 has observed as under:
"32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason."14
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24. Likewise, in the case of "Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India" (1980) Supp. SCC 562, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the Court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed:
'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ..... The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."
25. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati" (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under:
"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;15
2025:JHHC:24567 Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason"
has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:--
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(viii) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."
26. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power of review is to be exercised if there is any error occurred on the face of the order or the factual aspect could not have been brought to the notice of this Court in spite of the due diligence having been taken in the matter of making available the factual aspect of the relevant documents.
27. The position of law is well settled, as would appear from the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the review of the judgment can only be made if the new fact has come which could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of the due diligence, as has 16 2025:JHHC:24567 been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra).
28. It is evident that while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognised and established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed. For example, the power may be exercised on the discovery of some new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking review despite due exercise of diligence when the order was made.
29. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review.
30. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
31. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 17 2025:JHHC:24567 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'.
32. Further, the law is well settled that a review petition, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise", as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi" (1997) 8 SCC 715, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under:
"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise"."
33. Similarly, in "S. Murali Sundaram Versus Jothibai Kannan and Others" 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
15. While considering the aforesaid issue two decisions of this Court on Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC are required to be referred to? In the case of Perry Kansagra (supra) this Court has observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC, the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order. It is observed that a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is further observed that review is not appeal in disguise. It is observed that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not 18 2025:JHHC:24567 to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed that it is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a judgment by which thecontroversy has been finally decided. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of review powers and principles relating to exercise of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had summed upon as under:
"(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit."
34. In the recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr., reported in (2024) 2 SCC 362, the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7 which reads as under:-
"16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review. 16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected".
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
19
2025:JHHC:24567 16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long- drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.--"
35. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law we are now proceeding with the merit of the instant petition.
36. The question herein which has been raised by making a ground for review that the review petitioner is purchaser of the property and, as such, the permission as required under section 46 of the C.N.T. Act is not required to be obtained.
37. Further, by virtue of the possession of the land in question the land will be said to be owned by the review petitioner on the principle of adverse position.
38. The aforesaid issue has already been dealt with by referring the provision of section 46 and 72 of the C.N.T. Act as would be evident from paragraph nos.11 and 12 of the order sought to be reviewed, for ready reference the same is being quoted hereunder as:
"11. Before answering the issue, this Court deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Section 46(1)(a)(b) and Section 46(3) which reads hereunder as:-
"46. Restrictions on transfer of their right by raiyat.-(1) No transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof,-
(a) by mortgage or lease for any period expressed or implied which exceeds or might in any possible event exceed five years, or
(b) by sale, gift or any other contract or agreement, shall be valid to any extent.
(3) No transfer of contravention of sub-section(1), shall be registered or shall be in any way recognized as valid by any Court, however in exercise, of civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction.20
2025:JHHC:24567 (3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Deputy Commissioner shall be a necessary party in all suits of a civil nature relating to any holding or portion thereof in which one of the parties to the suits is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and the other party is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes."
12. Section 72 also requires to be referred which reads hereunder as:-
"72. Surrender of land by Raiyat-
(1) A Raiyat not bound by a lease or other agreement for a fixed period may, at the end of any agricultural year surrender his holding [with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing]. (2) But, notwithstanding the surrender, the Raiyat shall be liable to indemnify the landlord against any loss of the rent of the holding for the agricultural year next following the date of the surrender, unless he gives to his landlord, at least four months before he surrenders, notice of his intention to surrender.
(3) The Raiyat may, if he thinks fit, cause the notice to be served through the Court of the Deputy Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the holding or any portion of it is situate. (4) When a Raiyat has surrendered his holding, the landlord may enter on the holding and either let it to another tenant or to take it into cultivation himself. (5) Nothing in this Section shall affect any arrangement by which a Raiyat and his landlord may arrange for a surrender of the whole or a part of the holding [with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing]."
It is, thus, evident from the provision of Section 46 that the transfer of land of the occupancy raiyat to be a valid transfer only in a case where the Deputy Commissioner grants such permission, while Section 72, it is in a case of surrender but before vesting it upon the landlord, the permission of Deputy Commissioner is also required as would be evident from Section 72 of the Act, therefore, either under Section 46 or Section 72, the permission of Deputy Commissioner is necessary."
39. The question of non-requirement of permission under section 46 of the Act 1908, by the subsequent purchaser of the land has been made a ground for review, but this Court is of the view that the same cannot be a ground for review, rather once the order has been passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Revisional Authority under the appellate and revisional power holding therein that the land is fit to be restored in favour 21 2025:JHHC:24567 of the private respondents on the ground of having no permission as required under section 46 of the CNT Act, 1908 which itself suggests that any land if has been transferred in favour of the first transferee and from the first transferee to second transferee as the case of the writ petitioner is, then also the provision under section 46 of the C.N.T. Act will be applicable seeking permission even being the second transferee and if the land which has been transferred in favor of the first party without any permission as required under section 46 of the CNT Act, 1908 if the land is tribal land, then the requirement to have the revision under section 46 will also be there in a case of transfer of the land in favour of second party.
40. Further, the land which has been transferred in favour of first party if without permission of the Deputy Commissioner as required under section 46 of the CNT Act, then the illegality which has been crept up at the initial stage, i.e., the stage of transfer of land in favour of first party will be continued and the same will also affect the land if transferred in favour of the second party in absence of permission as required under section 46 of the CNT Act that exactly in the present case.
41. This Court has dealt with the aforesaid issue of requirement of permission under section 46 of the CNT Act.
42. This Court has also considered the implication of section 72 of the CNT Act wherein the case pertains to the surrender by the Raiyati in favour of the land.
43. Section 72 no doubt provides a provision of surrender of the land but before vesting it upon the landlord the permission of the Deputy Commissioner is required as a mandatory condition and if that is not available, then certainly the restoration application in pursuance to the 22 2025:JHHC:24567 provision under section 71A CNT Act is to be filed as has been held by the Hon'ble Patna Court in the case of "Bhagwan Das v. Koka Pahan"
reported in 1980 0 BLJ 611.
44. The aforesaid aspect of the matter has fully been considered as would be evident from the paragraph nos.8, 9 and 10 of the order sought to be reviewed herein, for ready reference the same are being quoted hereunder as:
8. But Mr. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner subsequent to his argument has placed the order of Division Bench of Patna High Court passed in the case of Bhagwandas Vrs. Koka Pahan, reported in 1980 0 BLJ 611, wherein, proposition has been laid down at paragraph nos.4 and 5, which reads hereunder as:-
"4. From the plain reading of Sec.71-A of the Act it will appear that the Deputy Commissioner has been empowered to restore land belonging to a member of Schedule Tribes if the transfer of his land has taken place in contravention of Sec.46 or any other provision of the Act or by any fraudulent method. The important word in this section is the word transfer. In the absence of anything to the contrary "transfer" as envisaged in the section must mean transfer as understood in the Transfer of Property Act. "Surrender" is not a transfer under the Transfer of Property Act rather it is a right given to a raiyat under the tenancy law to terminate the settlement whol3e or part and return either the whole holding or any part of it to the land lord. My considered opinion is that surrender being a right arising out the tenancy law without anything else it cannot be treated as a transfer and therefore Sec.71-A is not attracted in a case of surrender.
5. Mr. Sahai Sinha next contended that in this case surrender and settlement were part of the same transaction therefore Sec.46 of the Act was attracted and a proceeding under Sec.71-A of the Act was maintainable. There is no dispute about the legal position that if it is proved that the surrender of raiyat land of a member of the Schedule Tribe was brought about in order to take settlement of the same and in other words surrender and settlement are proved to be one transaction or both are parts of the same transaction. Sec.46 of the Act will be attracted consequently the proceeding under Sec.71-A of the Act will be maintainable. There is no evidence in this case that the surrender was brought about by the petitioner to obtain settlement of the land from the 23 2025:JHHC:24567 ex-landlord whether surrender and settlement were parts of the same transaction must be proved by the evidence and in the absence of any such evidence it cannot be presumed to be so. In the absence of any evidence on record, the finding of Respondent Nos.2 to 4 that the surrender and settlement were parts of the same transaction must be held to be perverse."
9. But learned Senior Counsel, in all fairness has produced the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Full Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Smt. Bina Rani Ghosh Vrs. Commissioner, South Chota Nagpur Division and other, reported in AIR 1985 Patna 352, wherein, the view which was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagwandas Vrs. Koka Pahan (supra) has not been held to be a good Law and accordingly, it has been laid down that the surrender and the settlement will form one single transaction and the provision of Section 71-A equally applied in a case of surrender of land under the provision of Section 72 so as also under Section 46 as would appear from paragraphs 24 and 25 of the judgment which reads hereunder as:-
"24. If we analyse Section 71A we will notice that the Deputy Commissioner has been given power to restore raiyati land of a member of the Scheduled Tribes, if a transfer has taken place : - (i) in contravention of Section 46;
(ii) in contravention of any other provisions of the Act;
(iii) by any fraudulent method including decree obtained in suit by fraud and collusion.
Decree of a Court by which the title of person is declared is not 'transfer' as generally understood; but by Clause (iii) it has also been included as a mode of transfer, albeit if the decree was obtained by fraud and collusion. There is no difficulty in understanding Clause (i) because what is transfer within the meaning of Section 46 has been enumerated in that Section. Clause (ii) speaks about transfer in contravention of any other provisions of the Act. In other words, besides Section 46, there are sections, transactions under which may amount to transfer. It is well settled that each word of a section must be given effect and so the words in Clause (ii) must have full play. Section 72 mandates that a raiyat whose lease is not for a fixed period, may surrender his holding or part thereof with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing. Any surrender made in contravention of Section 72 must be held to be bad in law. By surrender, right to hold land is given up by a raiyat in favour of another, who becomes entitled to hold the same. In effect, by surrender the raiyat looses his title in the land. The Legislature, therefore, provided that surrender may be made only with 24 2025:JHHC:24567 previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing. It must, therefore, be held that provisions referred to in Clause (ii) is Section 72. Surrender of right by a raiyat in his land must be held to be transfer within the meaning of Section 71A and statute provides that if it was made in contravention of Section 72, the surrender may be annuled."
25. In the proceeding under Section 71A, it was also held that there was clear nexus between the surrender and the settlement and they formed one single transaction. Mr. Sinha strenuously argued that this finding was perverse as it was not supported by evidence. Apart from what have been stated by the learned Chief Justice, even assuming that there was no evidence on the basis of which that finding can be sustained, in view of the fact that as the surrender was made without the previous sanction in writing of the Deputy Commissioner, there had been contravention of Section 72; consequently, it must be held that land so surrendered could have been restored under Section 71A of the Act."
10. Learned Senior Counsel after putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Full Bench of the Patna High Court has submitted that now questions which is to be looked into by this Court is as to whether the transfer which has been said to be illegal in absence of permission of the Deputy Commissioner, can be held to be a valid finding in view of the fact that the nature of land has become Chhaparbandi as also the issue of limitation."
45. It is evident from the said paragraphs referred hereinabove that the consideration has been made on the basis of the arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner lead by Mr. Manjul Prasad, the learned senior counsel.
46. The issue of limitation has also been taken into consideration as would be evident from the paragraph no.14 thereof.
47. The additional ground has been taken that by virtue of the adverse possession, the title is fit to be declared in favour of the review petitioner, however, this point has not been raised on behalf of the review petitioner before this Court.
48. Since this Court is exercising the power of review wherein it is not available for review petitioner to take a new ground which was already 25 2025:JHHC:24567 available at the time of adjudication/consideration of the issue at the original stage.
49. Such consideration cannot be given in view of the applicability of principle of constructive res judicata.
50. This Court after having discussed the aforesaid facts and considering the scope of review as referred in the judgment rendered hereinabove, is of the view that it is not a case where any error apparent on the fact of the order is available, hence, the present review petition is fit to be dismissed and, accordingly, dismissed.
51. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Sudhir Dated: 20/08/2025 Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR 26