Karnataka High Court
Naganna (Deceased) By L.Rs And Others vs State Of Karnataka And Others on 29 May, 1998
Equivalent citations: ILR1998KAR3503, 1998(5)KARLJ658
Author: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
Bench: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
ORDER
1. Since the facts involved in all these petitions and also the contentions raised, are fairly similar and identical, they are heard together and disposed of by this common order.
2. A few facts, which may have a bearing for the disposal of these petitions, may be set out as hereunder:
(a) In Writ Petition No. 6271 of 1997, the petitioners claim to be the joint owners in possession of land measuring 9 acres comprised in Survey No. 66/B situated at Raichur Town, Raichur Taluk and District.
(b) In Writ Petition No. 10976 of 1997, the petitioner claims to be the owner of the land measuring 11 acres, 30 guntas and 26 gun-tas in Survey Nos. 72/1, 75 and 77 respectively. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 10977 of 1997 are the owners of the land measuring 1 acre 16 guntas, 36 guntas, 1 acre 22 guntas and 1 acre, 35 guntas in Survey Nos. 72/2, 74, 76 and 78 respectively. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 10978 of 1997, are the owners of land measuring 2 acres 2 guntas in Survey No.
79. The petition in Writ Petition No. 10979 of 1997, is the owner of land measuring 4 acres in Survey No. 66/C. All these lands are situated at Raichur City.
(c) It appears that the second respondent in each of these peti- tions, i.e., the Urban Development Authority, Raichur (hereinafter referred to as "the Development Authority"), had formulated a development scheme for formation of house sites; and thereafter a notification dated 28th of January, 1991 came to be issued in exercise of the power conferred on the Development Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Authorities Act"). The petitioners/their predecessors-in-title had filed objections for formation of scheme on the lands in question. After consideration of the objections filed by them, the objections were overruled and the Development Authority, in all, proposed to acquire about 48.5 acres of land including the lands of the petitioners. The Development Authority, after considering the objections filed, submitted a scheme as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Authorities Act, to the first respondent- State Government and the State Government, after consideration of the proposal submitted by the Development Authority, sanctioned the scheme by means of its order dated 30th of September, 1991. Subsequently, by means of Gazette Notification dated 30th of January, 1992, a declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act came to be made notifying that the lands belonging to the petitioners and others were required for public purpose. A copy or the said notification has been produced as Annexure-D in Writ Petition No. 6271 of 1997 and Annexure-E in Writ Petition Nos. 10976 to 10979 of 1997. Thereafter, Awards in respect of the lands in question came to be passed on 10th of March, 1997.
3. In these petitions, the petitioners have sought for the quashing of both the notifications issued under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Authorities Act as well as the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Authorities Act on the ground that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed since the Award was not passed within a period of two years from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act as required under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Acquisition Act".
4. Sri P.G. Mogali, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, made two submissions. Firstly, he submitted that since the Awards were not passed within two years from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act, the entire acquisition proceedings stood lapsed. Elaborating this submission, the learned Counsel pointed out that Section 36 of the Act makes the Acquisition Act applicable in respect of the acquisition of the land under the Authorities Act otherwise than by agreement. Therefore, he would submit that in view of Section 36 of the Authorities Act, the provisions contained in Section 11A of the Acquisition Act are applicable and, therefore, there is a statutory obligation on the authorities to pass an Award within two years from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act. He submitted that Section 11A came to be incorporated into the Acquisition Act by means of Act No. 68 of 1984, which came into force with effect from 24th of September, 1984, and the Authorities Act came into force with effect from 16th of November, 1987. Therefore, he would submit that since the Authorities Act being a subsequent Act, which has not specifically excluded the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act, in view of the provisions contained in Section 36 of the Authorities Act, the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act are applicable insofar as the acquisition of the lands in question are concerned. Secondly, he submitted that the material on record would show that the scheme has not been implemented within five years from the date of the framing of the scheme as required under Section 27 of the Authorities Act and, therefore, it must be held that the scheme also stood lapsed. In this connection, he also pointed out that though an attempt was made to show that possession of the lands in question was taken on 10-4-1997, as a matter of fact, the possession of the lands in question was not taken from the petitioners. In support of this plea, he points out that undisputedly neither the petitioners nor any person interested in the lands were served with any individual notice as provided under Section 9 of the Acquisition Act; and, therefore, the claim made by the respondents that possession of the lands in question was taken, was totally false and baseless. He also submitted that since the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19 was made as far back as on 28th of January, 1991, it was not permissible for the Authorities to take possession of the lands in question as, by then, i.e., on 10-4-1997, five years' time provided under Section 27 of the Authorities Act had lapsed. Sri Mogali, in support of his first submission, drew my attention to the decision of this Court in the case of C.B.C.I. Society for Medical Education and Another v Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Development Authority and Others wherein this Court, while considering the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Bangalore Development Authority Act") had held that Section 11A of the Act applies to the acquisition under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. He also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mariyappa and Others v State of Karnataka and Others, wherein the Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (here- inafter referred to as "the House Sites Act"), has taken the view that the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act applies in respect of the acquisition of lands made under the provisions of the House Sites Act. Further relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore v H. Narayanaiah, Sri Mogali submitted that unless the provisions of the Authorities Act specifically excludes the Acquisition Act, Section 11A of the Acquisition Act is applicable. He also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Majeed Sahib and Another v District Collector and Others and drew my attention to paragraph 6 of the said judgment wherein the Supreme Court has held that by virtue of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act, the entire acquisition proceedings stood lapsed.
5. Sri A.S. Mahesh, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State, and Sri V.T. Raya Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the Development Authority, tried to sustain the impugned notifications and the acquisition proceedings. Further, while strongly countering the first submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, they submitted that the Authorities Act being a self-contained Code, which fully provides for the procedure prescribed for acquisition of the land, the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act cannot be made applicable in respect of the acquisition made under the Authorities Act. In support of their plea, they relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited, Bangalore and Others v State of Karnataka and Others, and also another decision of this Court in the case of Hanumanthappa M. v State of Karnataka and Others, wherein this Court, while considering the applicability of the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act in respect of the acquisition made under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, has taken the view that the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act will not apply to the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. They submitted that it is only in the matter of payment of compensation, the provisions contained in the Acquisition Act are made applicable and the provisions contained in Section 11A of the Acquisition Act are not applicable. Insofar as the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is concerned, Sri Raya Reddy submitted that the Development Authority has taken a loan of Rs. 26 lakhs from Thungabhadra Grameena Bank, Raichur and it has made the land fit for distribution of sites after taking possession of the land; and, therefore, it must be held that the scheme has been substantially implemented. He submits that if the scheme is substantially implemented, the scheme will not lapse. In support of his contention, he relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of A Krishnamurthy (deceased) by L.Rs v Bangalore Development Authority. Further, Sri Reddy also drew my attention to Paragraph-7 of the Statement of Objections in support of his plea that the scheme has been substantially implemented. Sri Mahesh and Sri Raya Reddy also submitted that these petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches on the part of petitioners in approaching this Court. It is their further submission that at any event of the matter, if this Court -were to take the view that the award having not been passed within the period prescribed under Section 11A of the Acquisition Act and on that account, the acquisition proceedings is vitiated, having regard to the fact that the land in question has been acquired for the public purpose, to wit, distribution of house sites to the members of the general public, it would be in the interest of justice, instead of quashing the acquisition proceedings, to direct the second respondent-authority to pay higher compensation based on the market value to be fixed by this Court, instead of compensation payable to the petitioners on the basis of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Authorities Act. In support of this submission, they relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Majeed Saheb, supra. Sri Mahesh and Sri Raya Reddy submitted that the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of C.B.C.L Society supra, is no longer a good law as the principle laid down in the said decision, has been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of the Bangalore Development Authority and Another v C.B.C.L Society for Medical Education and Others . They drew my attention to paragraph 11 of the said judgment.
6. In view of the arguments put forward by the learned Counsel for the parties, the questions that would emerge for my consideration, are the following:
(1) Whether the acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands in question stands lapsed as contended by the petitioners as the awards were not passed within two years from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act?
(2) Whether the scheme also stood lapsed as contended by the petitioners as the scheme had not been substantially implemented in terms of Section 27 of the Authorities Act?
(3) Whether the petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court?
(4) If it is held that either the acquisition proceedings, or the scheme stood lapsed, whether the relief that can be granted to the petitioners is only payment of higher compensation or quashing of the entire acquisition proceedings?
7. Before adverting to the questions that would arise for consideration in this petition, it is useful to briefly refer to Sections 19, 27 and 36 of the Authorities Act and Section 11A of the Acquisition Act, which may have a bearing to decide the questions that have arisen for consideration in this petition.
(a) Section 19 of the Authorities Act reads as under:
"19. Upon sanction, declaration to be published giving particulars of land to be acquired.--(1) Upon sanction of the scheme, the Government shall publish in the official Gazette declaration stating the fact of such sanction and that the land proposed to he acquired by the authority for the purpose of the scheme is required for a public purpose.
(2) The declaration shall state the limits within which the land proposed to be acquired is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and the place where a plan of the land may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and the authority shall, upon the publication of the said declaration, proceed to execute the scheme.
(4) If at any time it appears to the authority that an improvement can be made in any part of the scheme, the authority may alter the scheme for the said purpose and shall subject to the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) forthwith proceed to execute the scheme as altered.
(5) If the estimated cost of executing the scheme as altered exceeds by a greater sum than five per cent of the estimated cost of executing the scheme as sanctioned, the authority shall not, without the previous sanction of the Government, proceed to execute the scheme, as altered.
(6) If the scheme as altered involves the acquisition otherwise than by agreement, of any land other than the land specified in the schedule referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 18, the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 and of sub-
section (1) of this section shall apply to the part of the scheme as altered in the same manner as if such altered part were the scheme.
(7) The authority shall not denotify or reconvey any land included in the scheme without the specific orders of the Government.
(8) The authority shall not allot any land to any individual, organisation or authority, the civic amenity area ear-marked in the scheme without the orders of the Government".
(b) Section 27 of the Authorities Act reads as under:
"27. Authority to execute the scheme within five years.-- Where within a period of five years from the date of publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19, the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative".
(c) Section 36 of the Authorities Act reads as hereunder:
"36. Provisions applicable to the acquisition of land otherwise than by agreement.--(1) The acquisition of land under this Act otherwise than by agreement within or without the urban area shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable of the Land Acquisition. Act, 1894.
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the authority shall be deemed to be the local authority concerned.
(3) After the land vests in the Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon payment of the cost of the acquisition, and upon the authority agreeing to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of the acquisition, transfer the land to the authority, and the land shall thereupon vest in the authority".
(d) Section 11A of the Acquisition Act reads as hereunder:
"11-A, Period within which an award shall be made.--The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement".
Re: Question (1):
8. Insofar as the first question is concerned, I am of the view that the said question requires to be held in favour of the petitioners.
9. Undisputedly, the Authorities Act came into force with effect from 16th of November, 1987. Section 11A came to be incorporated into the Acquisition Act, as noticed by me earlier, with effect from 24th of September, 1984. Therefore, when the Authorities Act came into force, the provisions of the Acquisition Act contained Section 11A. Sub-
section (1) of Section 36 of the Authorities Act extracted above, provides that acquisition of the land under the Authorities Act otherwise than by agreement, shall be regulated by the provisions as far as they are applicable by the Acquisition Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act, in my view, is similar to the declaration to be made under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Acquisition Act. The provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act is similar to the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. There is no provision made in the Authorities Act providing for passing of the Award, taking possession of land and the procedure provided for determination of compensation. On the other hand, sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Authorities Act indicates that the vesting of the land acquired is with the State Government under Section 16 of the Acquisition Act. Therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned Government Advocate and also Sri Raya Reddy that the Authorities Act is a self-contained Code which fully provides for the procedure for acquisition of the land and, therefore, the provisions of the Acquisition Act cannot be made applicable. Since there is no provision made in the Authorities Act providing for passing of the award, taking possession of land, vesting of the land and determination of the quantum of compensation to be paid, etc., in view of sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Act, I am of the view that the provisions contained in Sections 9, 11, 11A, 16, etc., of the Acquisition Act are applicable in respect of the acquisition made under the Authorities Act. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, since the Authorities Act being a subsequent Act, if the intention of the legislature was to exclude Section 11A of the Acquisition Act, it would have been specifically stated so in the Authorities Act. When it is not specifically excluded and when Section 36(1) of the Authorities Act specifically provides that acquisition of the land under the Authorities Act otherwise than by agreement within or without the urban area shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as the Land Acquisition Act is concerned, it is not possible to take the view that the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act cannot be made applicable. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H. Narayanaiah, supra, referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, in my view, fully supports his contention. It is useful to refer to paragraph 22 of the said decision which reads as hereunder:
"There was some argument on the meaning of the words "so far as they are applicable", used in Section 27 of the Bangalore Act. These words cannot be changed into "insofar as they are specifically mentioned" with regard to the procedure in the Acquisition Act. On the other hand, the obvious intention, in using these words, was to exclude only those provisions of the Acquisition Act which become inapplicable because of any special procedure prescribed by the Bangalore Act (e.g. Section 16) corresponding with that found in the Acquisition Act (e.g. Section 4(1)). These words bring in or make applicable, so far as this is reasonably possible, general provisions such as Section 23(1) of the Acquisition Act. They cannot be reasonably construed to exclude the application of any general provisions of the they are specifically mentioned". They amount to laying down the principle that what is not either expressly, or, by a necessary implication, excluded must be applied".
(emphasis supplied) Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that Section 11A of the Acquisition Act applies in respect of the acquisition made under the provisions of the Authorities Act.
10. Now, the next question that would arise for consideration is whether the award was made within two years from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act. Admittedly, the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act was made on 30th of January, 1992. The award was admittedly passed on 10th of March, 1997. Therefore, the award passed is admittedly beyond two years from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act.
11. Section 11A of the Acquisition Act mandates the Land Acquisition Officer to make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the declaration and further provides that if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land would lapse. It is relevant to point out that Section 11A of the Acquisition Act not only casts an obligation on the Land Acquisition Officer to make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the declaration, but also provides for the consequences, if such declaration is not made. As observed by me earlier, the consequences of not making an award is that the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land would lapse. Therefore, in my view, the provisions contained in Section 11A of the Acquisition Act are mandatory in nature. The consequences of not passing the award within the time prescribed is that statutorily acquisition proceedings stand lapsed. Therefore, since there is no dispute and there cannot be any dispute that the award was not passed within a period of two years from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, I am of the view that the entire acquisition proceedings stood lapsed. In my view, I am also supported by the declaration of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Majeed Sahib, supra, wherein at paragraph 8 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"Section 11A was brought on statute by Amendment Act 68 of 1984. It was notorious that the State, after publication of declaration under Section 6 went on delaying for years, to pass the awards putting obstruction to the owner of the land for enjoyment; resultantly, loss and undue disadvantage ensued to the owner of the land. To mitigate such hardship, the Parliament introduced Section 11A and directed the Land Acquisition Officer to make the award within two years from the date of publication of last of the steps under Section 6(2) publishing the declaration under Section 6. As a consequence, the Land Acquisition Officer is statuto- rily under an obligation, at the pain of invalidation of the acquisition itself, to make the award within two years unless it falls within one of the provisos or the explanation added thereto. In this case, neither the proviso nor the Explanation stands attracted to the facts. Consequently, since the Land Acquisition Officer did not make the award within two years from the date of the declaration, viz., June 17, 1988, the entire acquisition shall stand lapsed".
(emphasis supplied)
12. In the light of the discussion made above, I am of the view that the entire acquisition proceedings statutorily stood lapsed for the default in not passing the award within the time prescribed.
13. However, it is necessary to refer to the submission of the learned Government Advocate and Sri Raya Reddy based on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of C.B.C.I. Society, supra. In my view, the said decision has no application insofar as the provisions of the Authorities Act is concerned. As noticed by me earlier, the Authorities Act came into force subsequent to the incorporation of Section 11A into the Acquisition Act. Insofar as the BDA Act is concerned, it is a 1976 enactment and Section 11A admittedly came to be incorporated subsequent to the said enactment. In that background, this Court took the view that in the absence of corresponding amendment to the BDA Act, the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act cannot be made applicable. Therefore, since the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bangalore Development Authority, supra, can be distinguished insofar as the application of the provisions of Section 11A of the Acquisition Act, to the Authorities Act is concerned, I find it unnecessary to consider the submission of Sri Mogali that in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mariyappa, supra, the decision of this Court in the case of Bangalore Development Authority, supra, does not lay down the correct law and the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of C.B.C.I. Society, supra, is the correct law.
Re: Question (2):
14. Admittedly, the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act was made on 12th of March, 1992 and the Award was made on 10th of March, 1997. Even according to the Development Authority, which is seriously disputed by the petitioners, the possession of the land in question was taken only on 10th of April, 1997. Therefore, the award was passed just a few days before the expiry of five years' period mentioned in Section 27 of the Act. Thus, possession of the land, even according to the Development Authority, was taken after the expiry of five years' period from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act. Section 27 of the Act mandates the Development Authority to execute the scheme substantially within a period of five years from the date of publication of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act. The said provision further provides that if the Development Authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme stands lapsed and the provisions of Section 36 of the Authorities Act shall become inopera- tive. Therefore, from the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Act, it is clear that passing of the award, taking of possession, substantial implementation of the scheme prepared in respect of which a declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 17 was made, must be implemented within a period of five years from the date of declaration made under sub- section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. On the undisputed facts, it is not possible to accept the contention of Sri Reddy that the scheme in its entirety or even a portion of it, has been substantially implemented. If the scheme was not substantially implemented before five years from the date of declaration made under Section 19(1) of the Act, the scheme stands lapsed. Therefore, it is not permissible for the respondents to take possession of the land after the scheme stood lapsed. The possession, if any, taken by the authority or attempt made to take possession after the lapse of the scheme would be without the authority of law. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Act, the scheme also stands lapsed. Therefore, my answer to Question No. (2) is also in favour of the petitioners.
Re: Question (3):
15. The petitioners have filed this petition in the month of April 1997 i.e., immediately after passing of the award. Till the award was passed, the petitioners were entitled to take shelter under Section 11A of the Acquisition Act and protect their rights and possession in respect of the lands in question on the ground that the entire acquisition proceedings had lapsed. While considering the first question, I have taken the view that on account of non-passing of the award within the statutory time prescribed, the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed.
The petitioners have filed the writ petition within two weeks from the date of passing of the award when their rights were threatened to be interfered with in view of the award passed and when an attempt was made to dispossess them from the lands in dispute. When the acquisition proceedings statutorily stood lapsed, it was not necessary for the petitioners to approach this Court. It is only, as noticed by me earlier, when their rights relating to the lands in question, were sought to be affected, they have approached this Court. Therefore, I am of the view that there is no delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in filing the writ petitions. Consequently, Question No. (3) is also held in favour of the petitioners.
Re: Question (4):
16. Now, the only question which remains to be considered, is that even if the acquisition proceedings, stood lapsed, since the lands in question are required for public purpose, whether this Court should declare that the acquisition proceedings had not lapsed and instead the respondents have to be directed to pay only higher compensation as contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents. Even on this question, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents. The Supreme Court, in the case of Abdul Majeed Sahib, supra, at paragraph 6 of the judgment, has clearly observed that since the Land Acquisition Officer did not make the award within two years from the date of the declaration, the entire acquisition stood lapsed.
Therefore, the effect of failure to pass the award within two years from the date of declaration is that by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 11A of the Act, the entire acquisition proceedings statutorily stands lapsed. Under those circumstances, in my view, it is not permissible for this Court to revive the acquisition proceedings which has stood lapsed on the ground that the land in question is acquired for public purpose. If that is done, it will frustrate the very mandate contained in Section 11A of the Act and the object behind the said provision. The approval of total inaction on the part of the Authorities of the State to comply with the statutory requirement on the ground of public purpose, should not dilute the rule of law, which every one in the country is wedded to. Further, as observed by me earlier, no progress of any sort has been made to develop the land in question. I have also earlier held that possession of the land in question, as a matter of fact, was not taken though it is asserted by the respondents that possession was taken. Under these circumstances, even on facts, I am of the view that this is not a case where the Court should save the acquisition proceedings, which has lapsed by awarding higher compensation to the petitioners as contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents." The decision of Division Bench relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents, in my view, stands on a different set of facts and has no bearing to the facts of the present case.
17. In the light of the discussion made above, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to succeed in these petitions.
18. Accordingly, the impugned notification dated 28th of January, 1991 issued by the Urban Development Authority, Raichur, and also the notification dated 30th of January, 1992 issued by the State Government insofar as the lands of the petitioners are concerned, are hereby quashed. The acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands belonging to the petitioners, are held to have lapsed. However, it is made clear that the acquisition of the lands belonging to others, which are not challenged before this Court, remains undisturbed.
19. In terms stated above, these petitions are allowed and disposed of.
20. Sri A.S. Mahesh, learned Government Advocate, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within four weeks from today.