Kerala High Court
M/S.Panchamy Pack (P) Ltd vs The Travancore Devaswom Board on 11 April, 2025
Author: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
Bench: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
2025:KER:31374
Arb.Appeal 48/2015
1
"C.R.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE EASWARAN S.
FRIDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 21ST CHAITHRA, 1947
ARB.A NO. 48 OF 2015
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 17.07.2015 IN OP(ARB)
NO.34 OF 2012 OF I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:
M/S.PANCHAMY PACK (P) LTD.
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, RAVIKUMAR S.,(*)
GROUND FLOOR, THOUCH STONE MANOR, VANCHIYOOR,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
*Replaced
MR.RAVIKUMAR S (LATE) IS REPLACED BY MR.NIDHEESH
VETTUTHARAYIL ANIL AS THE DIRECTOR REPRESENTING
M/S.PANCHAMY PACK (P) LTD., AS PER ORDER DATED
11.04.2025 IN I.A.NO.1/2024 IN ARB.A.48/2015.
BY ADVS.
K.JAJU BABU (SR.)
M.U.VIJAYALAKSHMI
BRIJESH MOHAN
2025:KER:31374
Arb.Appeal 48/2015
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RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
THE TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, NANTHANCODE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001.
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.JAYAKUMAR (SR.)
SMT.A.SREEKALA, SC, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD
SRI.S.RAJMOHAN, SC, TDB
THIS ARBITRATION APPEALS HAVING BEEN FINALLY ON
09.04.2025, THE COURT ON 11.04.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:31374
Arb.Appeal 48/2015
3
"C.R."
DR. A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR, J. & EASWARAN S., J.
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Arb. Appeal No. 48 of 2015
-----------------------------------
Dated this the 11th day of April,2025
JUDGMENT
Easwaran S., J.
The appeal is preferred by the appellant aggrieved by the order of the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram in OP(Arbitration) No.34/2012 dated 17.7.2015.
2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:
The appellant is a small-scale industrial unit registered under the Industries Department of Government of Kerala. The respondent Devaswom Board (hereinafter referred to as Board) is registered under the provisions of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950. An agreement dated 13.4.1999 was executed between the appellant and the respondent for filling and distribution of "Aravana Prasadam" in Sabarimala, which was to be operated from 1999 till 2007. The agreement was for the supply of 50 lakhs of cans, and the appellant claims to have delivered more than 430 lakhs of cans, generating an amount of Rs.178 Crores to the respondent Board. Various disputes stemmed out of the operation of the agreement with the appellant alleging that the respondent Board did not fulfil its obligation under the contract. Aggrieved by the action of the Board, the appellant raised a dispute relating to the delay in payment before the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, invoking Section 18(1) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter called as 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 4 "MSMED Act, 2006"). The respondent Board raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the claim before the Facilitation Council. The preliminary objection was overruled by the Council in its order dated 18.6.2009. The said order was challenged by the respondent in WP(C) No.22286/2009, which was dismissed by this Court without prejudice to the right of the Board to challenge the said decision under any statutory scheme. The Facilitation Council could not resolve the dispute between the parties through conciliation and therefore referred the matter for arbitration under sub-
Section (3) of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. The appellant claimed a sum of Rs.8,08,35,636.97. On the other hand, the respondent-Board claimed a sum of Rs.1,53,01,367/- due to them from the appellant. The respondent also raised a plea that there were deductions done by the Board under various orders of the civil courts and the Debt Recovery Tribunal and on another basis. In the arbitration proceedings, though the Council directed the Board to produce documents to justify the deduction relating to the disputed payments, it is contended that the Board failed to produce such evidence and, therefore, the Council finally passed an award stating that a sum of Rs.6,66,42,549/- is due to the appellant.
3. Challenging the award of the Facilitation Council (Arbitral Tribunal), the Board approached the Additional District Court, Thiruvananthapuram in OP(Arbitration) No.34/2012. It was basically contended in the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "Arbitration Act", for short) before the District Court that the award was liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) thereof. The finding of the Facilitation Council on the merits of the case was also 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 5 questioned before the District Court. During the pendency of the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Board filed IA No.142/2014 seeking to produce additional documents, which was accepted by the District Court on 15.7.2015 and on 17.7.2015 the District Court set aside the award passed by the Facilitation Council finding that there was no basis for the Council to have arrived at the amount due to the appellant herein and accordingly set aside the award leaving open the parties to initiate fresh proceedings, if so desired under the Act. Hence, the appellant is before us in the present appeal.
4. Heard Sri.Jaju Babu, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Smt.M.U.Vijayalakshmi, appearing on behalf of the appellant and Sri.K.Jayakumar, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri.Ajith, appearing on behalf of the respondent- Board.
Submissions of the appellant
5. The learned Senior Counsel primarily contended that the order of the District Court in allowing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is vitiated by material irregularity. The District Court erred egregiously in allowing the application solely based on the additional materials produced by the Board in IA No.142/2014. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the District Court could not have entertained the application while deciding the case under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It is further contended that the finding of the District Court that the Facilitation Council does not have the authority to arbitrate on the dispute and it can only consider the claim for interest on account of delayed payment under Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is against the statutory scheme of the said Act. Referring to sub-
2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 6 Section (3) of Section 18, the learned Senior Counsel contended that the Facilitation Council has got power to arbitrate on the dispute between the parties once the conciliation fails. Therefore, the finding to the contrary by the District Court cannot be sustained. It is also further pointed out that the preliminary objection raised by the Board that the Facilitation Council does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the appellant was rejected by the District Court, and against the said finding, the Board has not preferred any appeal. It is further contended that the District Court erred in going into the merits of the case while allowing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.
Submissions on behalf of the Travancore Devaswom Board.
6. Sri.K.Jayakumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Board, in extenso, argued on the entitlement of the Board to raise the question of maintainability of the application under Section 18 of the Act 27 of 2006 (MSMED Act). The learned Senior Counsel by placing reliance on the provisions of Order-XLI Rule-22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 asserted before this Court that insofar as the proceedings under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is concerned, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 being applicable, the respondent-Board is entitled to question the findings of the District Court on the question of jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council in an appeal preferred by the claimant. In support of his contention, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam and Others [(1999) 7 SCC 435].
7. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the jurisdiction 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 7 of the Facilitation Council is barred since the appellant is not a registered unit under the MSMED Act, 2006 and thus it is not a supplier as defined under Section 2(n) thereof. Only if the appellant has got a registration under Section 8 of the MSMED Act, 2006, then only an application under Section 17 read with Section 18 thereof is maintainable before the Facilitation Council and thus the Facilitation Council lacked inherent jurisdiction to arbitrate on the dispute. Consequently, it is contended that the award passed by the Facilitation Council is void inasmuch as it lacks inherent jurisdiction to consider the claim. In support of his contention, relied on decisions of the Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc Vs Burn Standard Co Ltd and others [(2006) 11 SCC 181] & T.N.Electricity Board Vs Bridge Tunnel Constructions and others [(1997)4SCC 121].
8. Alternatively, it is contended that the Facilitation Council had basically rendered its finding based on a mere statement of claim not supported by any evidence. It is the specific case of the learned Senior Counsel that, like in any civil litigation, even in a claim under Section 18, it was incumbent upon the appellant to have established its entitlement for the amount as claimed in the application. It is only when the claimant establishes its claim with evidence, then the burden shifts to the respondent-Board to disprove the claim. It is further contended that the Board had agreed only to provide limited facilities to the appellant and that all facilities provided to them are not covered by the agreement and thus the award passed without considering the express stipulation in the agreement cannot be sustained. It is also pointed out that the agreement entered into between the parties provide for deduction of cost by the Board especially since the 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 8 agreement required the appellant to provide the cans with flip lid and since there was failure on the part of the appellant to provide the same, the Board was entitled to deduct the cost. It is further contended that the entire claim was premature inasmuch as the appellant did not invoke the resolution mechanism under clause 25 of the contract. Still further the Facilitation Council failed to notice that there were restraint orders on the Board from disbursing the admitted amounts. It is contended that the appellant's claim is not for delayed payment and therefore, the Council has no jurisdiction. Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel requested this Court to look into the merits of the claim of the appellant in order to find out whether the decision of the District Court calls for any interference or not. Alternatively, it is further contended that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is limited. To substantiate the aforesaid contentions, the learned Senior Counsel placed before us a detailed note of argument.
9. We have considered the rival contentions raised across the bar. Evaluation of the submissions
(a) Whether Devaswom Board was entitled to produce additional evidence in a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
10. We shall first deal with the question as to whether the respondent Board was entitled to adduce further evidence before the District Court in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. According to us, this issue assumes significance since the District Court relied on the additional evidence to set aside the award of the Facilitation Council (Arbitral Tribunal). The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Board heavily relied on the provisions of Rule 11 of the Kerala Arbitration and 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 9 Conciliation (Court) Rules, 1997 framed by the High Court of Kerala under Section 82 of the Arbitration Act, to contend that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are mutatis mutandis made applicable to the proceedings under the Act, and therefore, the provisions of Order-XLI Rule-27 CPC will apply to the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. No doubt, Order-XLI Rule-27 CPC, enables the parties for production of additional evidence to the appellate court. But, the question before us would be whether in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, Can the District Court, entertain an application under Order-XLI Rule-27 CPC? When we look into the scheme of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we find that recourse to a court against the arbitral award can only be made by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3). Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 34 are restrictive in its character and that an application to set aside the award will lie only on limited grounds. When we peruse the grounds of the petition under Section 34, it becomes obvious that the respondent Board had raised grounds to set aside the award on grounds enumerated under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act. The scheme of Section 34 being complete code by itself and summary in nature and further that the power of the District Court to interfere with the arbitral award being limited, we see no reason to hold that the person seeking to set aside the award is entitled to produce additional evidence which will enable him to sustain his claim under Section 34. Accepting the argument of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Board would certainly defeat the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the purpose for which Section 34 has been enacted. Though the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 10 not per se exclude the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but that by itself will not enable the respondent Board to contend that it can introduce additional evidence before the District Court in its application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
11. In Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi [(2018) 9 SCC 49], the Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and held that an application for setting aside the arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator unless exceptional circumstances are made out.
12. Even if we are to assume that under exceptional circumstances the respondent Board was entitled to produce additional documents, we are unable to persuade ourselves to approve the said recourse, especially since the affidavit accompanying the application for production of documents does not make out any exceptional circumstances. Still further, we find that the Original Petition under Section 34 was preferred in the year 2012 and after a lapse of nearly two years the application was filed. This clearly shows that it is an afterthought on the side of the respondent Board. Still further, the manner in which the District Court had taken up the application for production of additional documents and finally pronounced upon the said documents is also unacceptable. The application for acceptance of the additional documents was allowed on 15.7.2015 and after two days, i.e. on 17.7.2015, the District Court pronounced final orders on the application and set aside the award by relying on the documents produced by the Board. Though the learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 11 application was allowed on cost, we are of the view that, that by itself will not enable the District Court to rely on the additional materials. When we closely scrutinise the records, we find that the additional documents, which are voluminous in nature, were for the first time introduced before the District Court. We find that inasmuch as the Board did not have a case that it was prevented from producing the additional documents before the Facilitation Council, the District Court erred egregiously in relying on the additional documents produced by the board. Pertinently, the application to set aside the award was not lodged under Section 34(2)(b)(v) of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the respondent having not made out an exceptional circumstances for entertaining the application for production of documents, the District Court erred in relying on the additional documents while considering an application under Section 34. Accordingly, we answer the point against the respondent.
b) Jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council to entertain an application under Section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006.
13. We need to delve upon this issue in extenso, especially since the learned Senior Counsel Sri.K.Jayakumar, appearing for the Board, vehemently raised an objection as regards the jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council, notwithstanding the fact that the District Court had rejected the said contention. Initially, when this contention was raised by the learned Senior Counsel, we had expressed a doubt as to whether the Board is entitled to raise this issue before us in an appeal preferred by the claimant. In answer to our query, the learned Senior Counsel for the Board placed extensive reliance on the provisions of Order-XLI Rule-22 CPC and the decision of the Supreme Court in 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 12 Ravinder Kumar Sharma (supra) to point out that the Board is entitled to raise its objection.
14. In Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal [(2019) 8 SCC 112], the Supreme Court held that since the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is a self-contained Act, the provisions of the CPC will apply only insofar as the same are not inconsistent with the spirit and provisions of the Arbitration Act. It is in this context, that we expressed our doubt regarding the entitlement of the respondent to raise the question of jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council in the light of the fact that the District Court had rejected the contention of the Board and found that the Facilitation Council has got a power to decide the dispute. Though Order-XLI Rule-22 CPC would normally entitle a respondent in an appeal to raise a question regarding the propriety of a finding of the court below against him, we find that under the scheme of Order-XLI Rule-22 CPC, the respondent cannot support a decree on a ground, which would not have been available to him if he were an appellant. Therefore, even if we are to assume that the Board is aggrieved by the finding of the District Court that the Facilitation Council has the jurisdiction to decide the dispute, since the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was allowed by the District Court, no appeal would lie at the instance of the board against the said finding. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel, Sri.Jaju Babu, appearing for the appellant that the District Court while setting aside the award granted liberty to the appellant to raise a fresh dispute under the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 and had the appellant taken recourse to such action, the findings of the District Court would certainly operate against the Board. Therefore, prima facie we 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 13 are of the view that it would be highly unjust to allow the Board to raise the question regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council in an appeal preferred by the claimant aggrieved by the setting aside of the award of the Facilitation Council by the District Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
15. Be that as it may, without finally pronouncing our views on this issue, in order to do complete justice to the parties, we decided to examine this issue a little deeper. Since we have decided to examine the question of jurisdiction, the doubt expressed by us as above becomes mere academic.
16. The essence of the argument of the Learned Senior Counsel is that since the appellant is not a supplier it cannot invoke the provisions of Section 18. It is the further case that even assuming so, the facilitation council could not have taken up the case for arbitration since it does not have the power to do so. We will consider these contentions separately. To answer the first point raised by the Learned Senior Counsel, we feel it is expedient to refer to a few of the provisions of the MSMED Act 2006.
Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, 2006 reads as under:
"(n) "supplier" means a micro or small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8, and includes,-
(i) the National Small Industries Development Corporation, being a company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
(ii) the Small Industries Development Corporation of a State or a Union territory, by whatever name called, being a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
(iii) any company, co-operative society, trust or a body, by 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 14 whatever name called, registered or constituted under any law for the time being in force and engaged in selling goods produced by micro or small enterprises and rendering services which are provided by such enterprises;"
The word "supplier" is thus defined as an enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to in sub-Section (1) of Section 8 and includes a company rendering service. Turning to Section 8, we find that a memorandum of micro small and medium enterprises shall be filed with such authority as may be specified by the State Government under sub-Section (4) or the Central Government under sub-Section (3). We deem it appropriate to extract Section 8 in its entirety.
"8)Memorandum of micro, small and medium enterprises,- (1) Any person who intends to establish,--
(a) a micro or small enterprise, may, at his discretion; or
(b) a medium enterprise engaged in providing or rendering of services may, at his discretion; or
(c) a medium enterprise engaged in the manufacture or production of goods pertaining to any industry specified in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951), shall file the memorandum of micro, small or, as the case may be, of medium enterprise with such authority as may be specified by the State Government under sub-section (4) or the Central Government under sub-
section (3):
Provided that any person who, before the commencement of this Act, established--
(a) a small scale industry and obtained a registration certificate, may, at his discretion; and 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 15
(b) an industry engaged in the manufacture or production of goods pertaining to any industry specified in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951), having investment in plant and machinery of more than one crore rupees but not exceeding ten crore rupees and, in pursuance of the notification of the Government of India in the erstwhile Ministry of Industry (Department of Industrial Development) number S.O. 477(E), dated the 25th July, 1991 filed an Industrial Entrepreneur's Memorandum, shall within one hundred and eighty days from the commencement of this Act, file the memorandum, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) The form of the memorandum, the procedure of its filing and other matters incidental thereto shall be such as may be notified by the Central Government after obtaining the recommendations of the Advisory Committee in this behalf.
(3) The authority with which the memorandum shall be filed by a medium enterprise shall be such as may be specified, by notification, by the Central Government.
(4) The State Government shall, by notification, specify the authority with which a micro or small enterprise may file the memorandum.
(5) The authorities specified under sub-sections (3) and (4) shall follow, for the purposes of this section, the procedure notified by the Central Government under sub-section (2)."
When we read Section 8 closely, we find that the conditions specified under sub-Section (1) are clarified by clause (a) to proviso, which says that a small scale industry which has obtained a registration certificate, may, at his discretion file a memorandum in accordance 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 16 with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, we find that the requirement to file a memorandum by small scale industry which has obtained a registration certificate is only discretionary. However, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Board, however, contended that the proviso will operate to both clauses under (a) and (b) and clause (a) cannot be read in isolation to clause (b). We are afraid that the said contention is completely misplaced. Normally, the proviso creates an exception to the main provision and may have life on its own. It is intended to carve out a distinction from the main provision. However, in this case, we feel that it may not be expedient to read clause (a) and (b) of the proviso together. If we read it conjointly, it will go against the legislative intention. If the legislature wanted all such small scale industries, registered under the respective State Government to compulsorily take out registration under the MSMED Act 2006, it need not have inserted clause (a) to proviso to Section 8(1). If we accept the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the Board, then it would render clause (a) of the proviso, redundant and meaningless. When we read clause (a) and (b) more closely, we find that the legislature was conscious of the fact that a small-scale industry which had obtained registration prior to the coming into force of the Act, is not compulsorily required to be registered under the provisions of the Act. Otherwise, the legislature would not have used the word "discretion" in clause (a) of the proviso to Section 8(1), whereas under clause (b) of the said proviso, we see that the words used are "shall within one hundred and eighty days from the commencement of this Act". Therefore, we hold that clauses (a) and (b) of proviso to Section 8(1) has to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. To hold otherwise would be doing violence to the provisions of the Act 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 17 and against its constitutional mandate.
17. Yet another reason as to why, we are persuaded to hold against the respondent Board is that, Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 opens with a non obstante clause and provides that any party to the dispute may with regard to any amount due under Section 17, make a reference to the council. Section 18(2) mandates that on receipt of reference, the council should undertake a mandatory conciliation. When the conciliation fails, the council gets the power to arbitrate on the dispute. Sub-Sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 18 are extracted for reference.
"18. Reference to Micro and small Enterprises Facilitation Council.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to the dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.
(2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing, alternate dispute resolution service by making a reference to such institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of section 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996(26 of 1996) shall apply to such dispute as fi the conciliation was initiated under Part II of that Act.
(3) Where the conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 18 providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the disputes as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section(1) of section 7 of that Act." On a careful reading of the above provisions , we find that to start with, Section 18 does not use the word "supplier", instead it employs the phrase "any party to a dispute, may". Therefore prima facie, it gives an impression that for initiation of a reference under Section 18 of the MSMED Act 2006, it is not the requirement of law that one should be a supplier who has filed a memorandum under Section 8(1). Moreover Section 18 starts with a non obstante clause. Therefore, the argument of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Board, has its own inherent infirmities and we are unable to agree with the said contention. Still further, when we go back to the definition of "supplier", we find that it is not confined to a micro or a small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to under Section 8(1), and also includes Companies and other entities engaged in selling goods and rendering services, produced and provided by an enterprise. It is worthwhile to mention that Section 2(h) defines the word "micro enterprise" to mean that an enterprise classified as such under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) or sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 7. The existence of a micro, small and medium enterprise as could be seen from the definition clause of Act 27 of 2006 (MSMED Act) would lead to an irresistible conclusion that their existence is, notwithstanding the promulgation of the MSMED Act, 2006. No doubt, Section 8 requires a memorandum 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 19 to be filed, but we must note that the mandatory requirement of filing of a memorandum arises, only if a person is desirous of establishing a micro, small and medium enterprise, after the promulgation of the Act 27 of 2006 or which is covered under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 8(1). The cumulative reading of the definition clauses, Sections 7 and 8,along with Section 18(1) and (3) would compel us to conclude that an application by a micro or a small enterprise to the Facilitation Council under Section 18 cannot be rejected on the ground that the said enterprise has not obtained registration under Section 8. Still further Section 18 starts by saying "any party to a dispute". Even if we are to assume that any party to the dispute must be a supplier, since a supplier includes a service provider also and the definition being an inclusive definition, it is not the requirement of law that for maintaining an application under Section 18, filing of a memorandum under Section 8 is mandatory. Therefore, we hold that the Facilitation Council did have the jurisdiction to entertain the application preferred by the appellant.
18. We also find that the question of jurisdiction as now being raised before us, was not raised before the Facilitation Council at the first instance. Though the Board initially raised a preliminary objection on the jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council, it was solely on the ground that the appellant is not a registered small scale industrial unit. We find that the Facilitation Council had passed an interim order on the maintainability, of the application filed by the Devaswom Board. Challenging the said order, the Board approached this Court in WP(C) No.22286/2009. While sustaining the order, a Division Bench of this Court, reserved the right of the Board, including statutory if any, to challenge the interim order of the Facilitation Council ruling on the maintainability in 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 20 favour of the appellant. We are surprised to note that, the Board did not pursue the matter thereafter and participated in the proceedings of the Facilitation Council. Thus, the Board having not pursued their remedy pursuant to the judgment dated 25.2.2010 in WP(C) No.22286/2009, the Board is estopped from raising the said contention once the final award has been passed by the Facilitation Council (Arbitral Tribunal). In the scheme under sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act 27 of 2006, we find that once the Facilitation Council finds that the conciliation proceedings have failed, then it is open to the Council either to undertake a recourse to arbitration by itself or refer the parties to a third party for arbitration. Here, in this case, the facilitation council took upon itself, the task of arbitrating the dispute. Once the Facilitation Council decided to arbitrate on the dispute by itself, then the proceedings get out of the purview of the Act 27 of 2006 (MSMED Act) and then is governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Coming to the provisions of Arbitration Act, we note that Section 16 enables the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. Although a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction is to be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence, the party is not precluded from raising such a plea, merely because that he has appointed or participated in the appointment of the arbitrator. We find that inasmuch as the Board having failed to raise this issue before the facilitation council, and participated itself before the Facilitation Council in the arbitration proceedings, is certainly precluded from raising the question of competence at a later point of time.
19. In this context, we find that the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz also 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 21 referred to as competence-competence or competence de la recognised would apply. The aforesaid doctrine implies that an Arbitral Tribunal is empowered and is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction including determination of all jurisdictional issues and the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement and further the said doctrine is intended to minimise the judicial intervention, so that the arbitral process is not thrown out at its threshold when preliminary objections are raised. When we consider the contention of the respondent-Board in the touchstone of the principles governing the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, we find that the Board had the opportunity to raise this objection before the Facilitation Council, which acted as an arbitral tribunal, but did not raise to the extent which has now been raised before us and voluntarily participated in the arbitration proceedings by consent and later decided to agitate the issue of competence of the Facilitation Council to arbitrate on this issue.
20. We further note that, going by the scheme of the Arbitration Act, there is statutory inhibition on a person seeking to set aside the award from raising the issue of the competence of the tribunal at the stage of consideration of a Section 34 petition. In Gas Authority of India Ltd and Another VS Keti Construction (I) Ltd and others [2007 (5) SCC 38] the Supreme Court held that if a party after receipt of notice of the arbitral tribunal, does not raise the lack of jurisdiction before the Tribunal, it cannot raise the question later in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
21. In the present case, we have already found that the decision of the Facilitation Council ruling on its own jurisdiction having become final, the Board later 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 22 to get over the impasse, decided to rephrase its objection by referring to the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 for the first time in its application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. This is impermissible under law. To make matter worse we note that, the Board did not even thought fit to prefer the application under Section 34(2)(a)(v) by showing good reasons. Such inconsistent stand cannot be approved by this Court. Suffice to say, even if we are to assume as an extreme proposition of law, that the Board was entitled to raise this issue because it goes into the root of the jurisdiction, since we have found that the objection does not merit consideration, we hold that the objection is completely unfounded.
c) Jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council to Arbitrate
22. The second limb of argument raised by the Learned Senior Counsel for the board is on the Jurisdiction of the facilitation Council to arbitrate on the dispute. Normally, on our finding on point (b) as above, should close out this issue, we felt, it is necessary to consider this issue in detail especially since the District Court held that the Facilitation Council does not have the authority to arbitrate once the conciliation has failed, since it has jurisdiction only to consider the claim for interest on the delayed payment. Before us the Learned Senior Counsel for the board vehemently supported the finding by taking us through the various provisions of the MSMED Act 2006. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the facilitation council cannot arbitrate on the entire dispute between the parties and must confine itself to the claim for interest for the delayed payment. In order words according to the Learned Senior Counsel for the board, the Jurisdiction of the facilitation council is limited.
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23. To appreciate this contention, we need to read sub-section (1) and sub- Section (3) of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 closely. When we read sub-Section (3), we find that the Council is empowered either to take up itself the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Before the stage as envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 18 is reached, the Council is entitled to take up for conciliation of the issue raised in an application under sub-Section (1) of Section
18. Once the conciliation fails, then the entire dispute opens for arbitration under sub- Section (3) of Section 18. It must be noted that the provision of Section 24 of the MSMED Act provides that the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, thereby meaning that Section 18 has an overriding effect.
24. The question as to whether the Facilitation Council is entitled to arbitrate on the issue /any dispute between the parties is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in Silpi Industries etc. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [2021 (4) KLT 242 (SC)] held that Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 also makes it clear that the provisions of 1996 Act are made applicable as if there is an agreement between the parties under sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the 1996 Act. Though the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the question as to whether a party is entitled to raise a counter claim in an arbitration proceeding under sub-Section (3) of Section 18, we find that the observations made by the Supreme Court regarding the scope of Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act is very much applicable to the facts of the present case.
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25. In Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd (Unit 2) and Another [(2023) 6 SCC 401], the Supreme Court once again was called upon to consider this issue and held that the Facilitation council which had initiated the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act 2006 would be entitled to act as an Arbitrator. It was further held that the Facilitation Council is empowered to rule on its own Jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Paragraph Nos.45 and 52 are extracted hereunder:
"45. There cannot be any disagreement to the proposition of law laid down in various decisions of this Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for the buyers that the Court has to read the agreement as it is and cannot rewrite or create a new one, and that the parties to an arbitration agreement have an autonomy to decide not only on the procedural law to be followed but also on the substantive law, however, it is equally settled legal position that no agreement entered into between the parties could be given primacy over the statutory provisions. When the Special Act i.e. MSMED Act, 2006 has been created for ensuring timely and smooth payment to the suppliers who are the micro and small enterprises, and to provide a legal framework for resolving the dispute with regard to the recovery of dues between the parties under the Act, also providing an overriding effect to the said law over any other law for the time being in force, any interpretation in derogation thereof would frustrate the very object of the Act.
xxx xxx xxx
52. The upshot of the above is that:
(52.1) Chapter V of the MSMED Act, 2006 would override the
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provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
(52.2) No party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be precluded from making a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, though an independent arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
(52.3) The Facilitation Council, which had initiated the Conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be entitled to act as an arbitrator despite the bar contained in Section 80 of the Arbitration Act.
(52.4) The proceedings before the Facilitation Council/institute/centre acting as an arbitrator/arbitral tribunal under Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006 would be governed by the Arbitration Act, 1996.
(52.5) The Facilitation Council/institute/centre acting as an arbitral tribunal by virtue of Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be competent to rule on its own jurisdiction as also the other issues in view of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. (52.6) A party who was not the 'supplier' as per the definition contained in Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, 2006 on the date of entering into contract cannot seek any benefit as the "supplier" under the MSMED Act, 2006. If any registration is obtained subsequently the same would have an effect prospectively and would apply to the supply of goods and rendering services subsequent to the registration."
26. Paragraphs 52.2 to 52.5 as extracted above would clearly dispel any doubt as regards the entitlement of the facilitation council to take up the dispute for Arbitration.
2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 26 Therefore, we have no other alternative to reject the contention of the board that the facilitation council lacks jurisdiction to entertain the arbitration proceedings.
27. Before we move further, we need to address an incidental issue which has since, cropped up in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (supra). One of the incidental issues answered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision is that a party, who is not a supplier, as per Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, 2006 on the date of entering into the contract cannot seek the benefit under the MSMED Act, 2006. We find that the finding of the Supreme Court on this issue will not preclude the appellant from claiming the benefit of the Act, since the contract was entered in the year 1999, before coming into force of the MSMED Act, 2006, and, for the precise reason given by us that clause (a) of the proviso to Section 8(1) would operate in favour of the appellant thereby granting discretion to him to file a memorandum under Section 8, we are of the view that the embargo under Section 8 will apply only to those units seeking to establish themselves after coming into force of the MSMED Act, 2006 and those who fall within clause (b) of the proviso to Section 8(1).
28. When we examine the findings of the District Court, which led to the setting aside of the award, we find that the District Court had adopted an interpretation, which would defeat the very purpose of the statute. It is beyond doubt, that the MSMED Act, 2006 is a beneficial legislation and any interpretation which would defeat the purpose of the Act is to be avoided. When we read the scheme of Section 18, we are unable to agree with the findings of the District Court that the Facilitation Council did not have the 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 27 jurisdiction to arbitrate on the dispute between the parties and that the arbitration even if undertaken should confine to the claim of interest for delayed payments alone. Such restrictive and narrow interpretation is completely unwarranted and, therefore, we hold that the under Sub Section (3) to Section 18, the facilitation council has the jurisdiction to arbitrate on the entire dispute and not confined to the interest on the delayed payment to the party concerned. Accordingly, we answer this point against the respondent board. Scope of Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act
29. Having ruled on the Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, to arbitrate on the dispute under Sub Section (3) to Section 18 of the MSMED Act 2006, we move on to the much debated issue before us. The learned Senior Counsel Sri K Jayakumar, with vehemence argued before us that it is imperative for this Court to investigate the merits of the claim by the appellant, since, according to him, the claim is highly inflated and unsustainable. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the award is against the fundamental policy of India and thus the District Court rightly exercised its power under Section 34 and hence the same should not be interfered by this Court under Section 37.
30. To delve deep into this issue, we need to address the scope of Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. One of the grounds open for the party to challenge the award of the arbitral tribunal is a violation of the fundamental policy of India. It is now settled law that if an award is challenged on the ground of violation of public policy of India, the person should show that the Arbitral Tribunal has violated the "fundamental juristic principles" and thus violated the "fundamental policy of India".
2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 28 These juristic principles can be broadly delineated as i) duty to adopt a judicial approach,
ii) compliance with principles of natural justice, particularly application of mind to the attendant facts and circumstances, iii) the decision is no perverse or so irrational that no reasonable man would have arrived at the same ie: Wednesbury principles would be applicable {See ONGC Vs Western Geco International Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 263}.
31. Keeping in mind these broad principles, when we proceed further, we find, the argument of the learned Senior Counsel untenable because of the restrictive covenant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The power under Section 34 being restrictive in nature, while considering the application, the court is not expected to go into the reasoning given by the arbitral tribunal and set aside the award merely because another view is possible. In an appeal against the order setting aside the award under Section 34, the jurisdiction of the appellate court can be exercised, if the court while setting aside the award has travelled beyond its jurisdiction. See Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. and Another v. Sanman Rice Mill and Ors. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632]. Therefore, if we were to accept the argument of the learned Senior Counsel and enter into a roving enquiry on the merits of the claim, we would be transgressing the limits of the jurisdiction imposed on courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, which is impermissible under law.
32. However, since the district court has set aside the award and the claimant is in appeal, we need to examine the case, to the limited extent of seeing as to whether the 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 29 order of the District Court is within the limited contours of the power available under Section 34. Against the above backdrop, when we analyse the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Board, we find that it is not a case where the Arbitral Tribunal had pronounced the award based on no evidence. Unlike an ordinary civil litigation, when a party approaches the Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006, the issue before the Arbitral Tribunal would be whether the party is entitled for the amount due under a contract. A perusal of the award shows that the Facilitation Council had given sufficient opportunity to the Board to sustain its action and prove, that it was legally permissible to deduct amounts under various heads. A further reading of the award shows that the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the deductions were made without any logical or rational reasons. According to us, this finding could not have been reappreciated in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. When we delve deep into the further findings rendered by the Tribunal, it becomes clear to us that the Arbitral Tribunal had basically undertaken an exercise wherein the legality of the deduction claimed by the Board was decided. Suffice to say, the Board could not impeach before us the specific finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that despite opportunity granted to them, there were compelling reasons as to why they were unable to produce evidence to disprove the claim of the applicant. Perhaps, realising the lacuna, the Board produced the additional evidence at the fag end of the consideration of the application under Section 34. According to us, the said recourse is completely impermissible under law and contrary to the scheme of the provisions under Section 34 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 30 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, it becomes imperative for us to interfere with the order of the District Court.
33. However, before finally reaching the conclusion as above, we need to address a core issue raised before us by the Board, that the award is against the public policy of India. In order to examine the issue as to whether the findings of the arbitral tribunal offends any of the juristic principles laid down by the Supreme Court in ONGC (supra), we may have to refer to some of the findings rendered by the Facilitation Council to the limited extent of examining it to see whether it is against the "fundamental policy of India".
34. The challenge by the Board against the award is centred on the following points. i) The Facilitation Council did not conduct the conciliation proceedings before undertaking the arbitration, ii) the finding of the arbitral tribunal on the entitlement of the appellant was without basis in as much as the appellant failed to prove its case, iii) the award of the tribunal is beyond the scope of the contract since only limited facility has been provided by the Board to the appellant, iv) the tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the Board is entitled to deduct the cost of flip lids if the same is not provided, v) the tribunal failed to notice the pendency of garnishee proceedings, vi) the Board was bound to withhold certain amounts based on the report of the Ombudsman and that the High Court had directed the Board to take up the follow up action.
35. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the points raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the Board, our observations are as follows:
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i) The contention of the Board that the Facilitation Council did not conduct conciliation proceedings before taking up with the arbitration cannot be countenanced in the light of the specific findings in the award that parties were given opportunity to settle the issues amicably, but the same failed. Nothing has been brought on record before us, to disprove the specific finding of the tribunal that parties were afforded an opportunity to settle the dispute amicably however the same did not materialise.
ii) As regards the argument, that the appellant failed to prove its case before the tribunal, we find the parties went ahead with arbitration based on Annexure-
A2 statement before the tribunal produced by the Board itself. The core issue agitated before the arbitral tribunal was whether the Board was entitled to deduct various amounts from the amount due to the appellant. Therefore, it presupposes that the Board owes amount to the appellant, but did not want to pay, since it claimed entitlement to deduct the amounts under different heads. If that be so, we are afraid that the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the Board that the appellant should have proved its case before the arbitral tribunal cannot be countenanced.
iii) As regards the entitlement of the Board to withhold the amounts under the head potential recoveries, the tribunal on a deeper analysis found that the Board admitted an amount of Rs 1,53,01,367/- being the amount outstanding to the appellant but it was subject to other charges. However, it could not 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 32 justify under what grounds the deductions were to be made. Although it is the specific case of the Board, before the Facilitation Council as well as before us, that it was incumbent upon them to withhold the amount, in view of audit objection and the direction of this court in DBAR No.3 of 2009 to take follow up action, we note that the Board could not produce evidence to show that the proceedings culminated in any order from the court to recover the said amounts. Therefore, we cannot find fault with the Facilitation Council in reaching the conclusion that the Board failed to produce orders of the court, which enabled them to withhold the amounts. Even assuming for a moment, the Facilitation Council had reached an erroneous decision, the district court could not have come to a different conclusion.
iv) Moreover, we find from the findings of the Facilitation Council that, there were a lot of discrepancies in the various statements produced by the Board before the tribunal. With these materials when the parties went ahead with arbitration, we find that there was considerable amount of unison on the points to be arbitrated. Thus, the Board cannot be heard to contend that it was obliged to provide only limited facilities under the Contract.
v) As far as deduction towards the non-supply of cans without flip lids, on a cursory glance of the terms of the contract, we do not find any clause enabling the Board to deduct the amount towards the same. Still further, we find that the said point is not seen raised in the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the District Court.
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vi) As regards the assertion before us, that there were restraint orders under the garnishee proceedings, the appellant had demonstrated before the District Court which recorded its finding that the civil suit which formed the basis of the garnishee proceedings was dismissed. What happened to the amount deposited by the Board is not forthcoming and the learned Senior Counsel was not able to clearly dispel our doubts on this issue.
36. Our observations as above need to be tested against the well-founded principles laid down by the Supreme Court, on the course to be followed while considering an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act against an order allowing an application under Section 34. In OPG Power Generation Private Limited Vs Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt Ltd. and Another [2025 (2) SCC 417], the Supreme Court broadly laid down the criteria for interference with the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. After analysing a plethora of precedents on the point, the Supreme Court held that a mere wrong application of law or misappreciation of evidence by itself is not a ground to set aside the award. Delving deep into the issue, the Supreme Court held that if the reading of the award shows the reasoning which is discernible/ intelligible, the jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be invoked to set aside the award.
37. On a cumulative consideration of the facts and law presented before us, we are of the considered view that the award of the tribunal cannot be said to be based on no evidence at all. In fact, we must note that the tribunal did not allow 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 34 the entire claim of the appellant, rather, it had relegated the appellant to its civil remedy as regards the disputed claim and proceeded to arbitrate on issues which could be resolved by it. In fact, we note that Supreme Court in McDermott (supra) relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the Board, made it clear that while exercising the power under Section 34, the court is only to see whether there is patent illegality which goes to the Jurisdiction of the case, that the breach of fundamental policy of India is such that no reasonable man will arrive at the conclusion as reached by the Arbitral Tribunal. Thus, on facts, we find that in the nature of the pleadings before the District Court, the District Court, could not have reappreciated the evidence and ruled on the sustainability of the findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal. As things stand today, the scheme of the Arbitration Act does not permit the District Court, while considering an application under Section 34, to examine the merit of the claim and substitute its views and pass a different award other than what has been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. (See Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co Vs Union of India & Ors [(2023) 15 SCC 472].
38. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the District Court clearly transgressed its jurisdiction in allowing the application under Section 34. We are thus left with no other alternative but to interfere with the order. As a necessary corollary, the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal (Facilitation Council) has to be restored, leaving the parties to work out their remedies.
39. Before parting with the case, we need to take note of the order passed by this Court on 8.4.2016 in I.A No.4070/2015 wherein the request of the 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 35 Board to withdraw the amount deposited by them was allowed, making it clear that if the appellant succeeds in the appeal the Devaswom Board shall make available the entire amount as ordered by this court. However, we find that the deposit was made by the Board in pursuance to the mandate contained under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 and the appellant cannot have any lien over the same. Still further, the award of the arbitral tribunal is to be executed as if it is a decree of the civil court as provided under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Hence, the parties are left to take recourse, in accordance with law.
As an upshot of our findings above, we are of the considered view that the appellant is entitled to succeed. Therefore, the Arbitration Appeal is allowed setting aside the order dated 17.7.2015 in OP(Arbitration) No.34/2012 and the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal (Facilitation Council) is restored. Costs made easy.
Sd/-
DR.A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR, JUDGE Sd/-
EASWARAN S., JUDGE jg 2025:KER:31374 Arb.Appeal 48/2015 36 APPENDIX OF ARB.A 48/2015 APPELLANT'S ANNEXURES ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT FILED BY THE APPELLANT CLAIMING RS. 8,08,35,636.97 ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT FILED BY THE RESPONDENT ADMITTING RS. 1,53,01,367/- AS DUE TO THE APPELLANT ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT FILED BY THE APPELLANT SHOWING THE ILLEGAL DEDUCTIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT FILED BY THE APPELLANT REGARDING ILLEGAL INTEREST DEDUCTIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT ANNEXURE A5 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT FILED BY THE APPELLANT SHOWING THE UNLAWFUL DEDUCTIONS IN RESPECT OF EXTRA WORKS ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT FILED BY THE APPELLANT SHOWING THE OTHER UNLAWFUL DEDUCTIONS NOT COVERED BY ANNEXURES A4 AND A5.
ANNEXURE A7 TRUE COPY OF THE AGREEMENT DT. 13.04.1999
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIES
ANNEXURE A8 TRUE COPY OF THE AWARD SIGNED ON
24.03.2011
ANNEXURE A9 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DT.
25.07.2015 FILED BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT
ANNEXURE A10 TRUE COPY OF THE RESOLUTION HELD ON
19.2.2024 AUTHORIZING THE APPLICANT
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HEREIN TO REPRESENT THE PETITIONER
COMPANY
RESPONDENT'S ANNEXURES
ANNEXURE R1(a) TRUE COPY OF CERTIFICATE DATED 20.01.2014 ISSUED BY DENA BANK TO THE RESPONDENT ANNEXURE R1(b) TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 18.12.2015 ISSUED BY THE COMPANY LAW CONSULTANT TO THE RESPONDENT ANNEXURE R1(c) TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 20.01.2016 ISSUED BY THE COMPANY LAW CONSULTANT TO THE RESPONDENT ANNEXURE R1(d) TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 25.02.2010 OF THIS COURT IN WP(C)No.22286/2009 ANNEXURE R1(e) TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 22.03.2012 OF THE DISTRICT COURT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM IN IA NO.2655/2011 IN ARB. OP NO.34/2012.