Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation ... vs Ali Jafaar And Ors. on 30 April, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(3)ALD463, 2004(3)ALT371
Author: B. Sudershan Reddy
Bench: B. Sudershan Reddy
JUDGMENT B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 1-9-2003 passed in the Writ Petition No. 6329 of 2003.
Briefly stated the facts are as follows:
2. One late Smt. Sakina Bai Hazi Abdulla was the true and absolute owner of the land admeasuring 1225 Sq.yds. situated in Municipal No. 10-3-5, Mehdipatnam Cross Roads, Hyderabad (for short "the said land"). The respondents/writ petitioners claim to be her legal heirs.
3. The said land was leased to the predecessor of the appellant M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., namely M/s. Esso Standard Inc. by the original owner on 1-2-1970. The lease agreement was effective from 1-4-1970 for a period of ten years (first five years rental @ Rs. 400/- per month and the next five years rental @ Rs. 450/- per month). That there was a renewal option in the said lease agreement for a further period of ten years. The renewal option was accordingly exercised by the lessee vide letter dated 20-11-1979. The lease period was accordingly extended and the land owner executed another lease deed dated 22-4-1980 in favour of the appellant Corporation extending the lease for another period of ten years commencing from 1-4-1980. The lease period was expired by 31-3-1990. The owner Smt. Sakina Bai Hazi Abdulla died in the year 1987.
4. The Corporation admittedly has not paid rentals as per the lease agreement after the death of the original owner. The Corporation had not vacated the premises even after the expiry of the lease period. The Chief Regional Manager of the Corporation in purported exercise of powers under Sections 5 and 7(3) of the E.S.S.O. (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1974, has sent an intimation dated 13-3-1990 to the writ petitioners exercising the statutory right of renewal of lease for a further period of ten years commencing from 1-4-1980 on the same terms and conditions on which the Corporation held the lease. It is unnecessary to refer in detail, the correspondence between the appellants and the writ petitioners. The fact remains that even the said extended lease period was also expired by 31-3-2000. The gravamen of the complaint in the instant writ petition relates to the refusal on the part of the appellants herein to vacate the land even after the expiry of the lease period.
5. The appellants in their counter-affidavit filed in the writ petition stated that the Corporation vide its letters dated 17-9-1987, 13-3-1990, 7-10-1996 and 1-3-2000, advised the persons claiming to be the legal heirs of the original owner to provide details of their claims so as to enable the Corporation to pay the rentals for the leased site. They did not come forth with the required documentation and proof. However, rentals were sent by the Corporation up to October, 1987, and rental cheques were returned from June, 1987, onwards. It is also the case of the appellant Corporation that the land occupied by the retail outlet premises was declared as surplus land under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, by the Special Officer and Competent Authority vide his proceedings dated 14-6-1980 and the appeal preferred by the legal heirs against the order of the competent authority was dismissed by the appellate authority by order dated 18-2-1995. The legal heirs therefore cannot claim absolute rights over the property, as it is open to the Government to acquire the same for public purpose.
6. In the reply affidavit filed by the General Power of Attorney Holder of the writ petitioners, the details as to how the writ petitioners claim to be the legalheirs of the deceased original owner are stated.
7. The simple case of the writ petitioners is that the Corporation even after the expiry of the extended lease period on 31-3-2000, did not deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the writ petitioners and continue to illegally squat on the property. Being the legal representatives of the original owner, they are entitled to seek eviction of the Corporation from the premises in question. The petitioners accordingly prayed for issuance of writ of mandamus in the following manner:
"....... the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass an order or orders more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondent Coiporation in occupying and to be in possession of the premises (Land) bearing Municipal No. 10-3-5, Mehdipatnam Cross-Road, Hyderabad, belong (Sic) to the writ petitioners as unconstitutional, arbitrary, illegal and without any authority of law and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 300(A) of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the respondent to handover the premises to the petitioners and pass such - other order or orders as the Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper".
8. The learned Single Judge having overruled the objections as to the maintainability of the writ petition allowed the writ petition and accordingly directed the appellants herein "to deliver vacant possession of the land to the petitioners within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order".
Submissions:
9. The learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation Sri P.V. Sanjay Kumar, submitted that the writ petition filed by the respondents/writ petitioners is totally misconceived and not maintainable in law.
That a number of disputed questions of facts including the question as to whether the respondents/writ petitioners are the legal heirs of the original owner, arise for consideration and such disputed facts can never be satisfactorily resolved in a summary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The dispute between the parties lies purely in the realm of private law and therefore the public law remedies that are available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are not available to resolve the dispute between the parties in this case. The learned Standing Counsel further contended that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot grant eviction decrees. Mere fact that the Corporation is an instrument of the State itself is of no consequence since the dispute between the parties arise out of an alleged breach of contractual terms.
10. Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, learned Additional Advocate-General, submitted that there are no disputed questions of fact that are required to be resolved in this proceedings. The dispute sought to be created by the appellants by their own conduct is totally untenable and unsustainable. In the absence of any rival claims, the Corporation cannot dispute the title of the writ petitioners on the strength of their being the legal heirs of the deceased original owner. The learned Judge properly exercised the discretion and accordingly interfered in exercise of Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which does not require any interference in the appeal preferred by the Corporation. The stand taken by the Corporation is so absurd which cannot stand any scrutiny of this Court. That after the expiry of the lease on 31-3-2000, the Corporation continues to be in possession of the land without any justification. The appellants being trespassers are not entitled to any indulgence of this Court.
11. We have given our earnest consideration to the submissions made during the course of hearing of this writ petition.
About the maintainability of the writ petition:
12. The only question that falls for consideration is whether the writ petition filed by the respondents/writ petitioners is maintainable ?
13. The appellant Corporation is admittedly an instrumentality of the State. Its actions and inactions may be susceptible to judicial review by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But the question is whether a writ of mandamus lies directing the Corporation to vacate the premises in question and handover the same to the writ petitioners ?
14. We will proceed on the assumption that the appellant Corporation is squatting on the land even after the expiry of the extended period of lease without any justification and consider whether any relief could be granted to the writ petitioners.
Distinction between public law and private law:
15. That a writ of mandamus lies, in the normal means of enforcing the public duties by public authorities. The writ of mandamus lies when a public authority fails to do its duty entrusted to it by law. The remedy covers the field of Governmental powers and duties.
16. Professor Wade in his well-known treatise; Administrative Law stated the principle:
"........ A distinction which needs to be clarified is that between public duties enforceable by mandamus, which are usually statutory, and duties arising merely from contract. Contractual duties are enforceable as matters of private law by the ordinary contractual remedies, such as damages, injunction, specific performance and declaration. They are not enforceable by mandamus, which in the first place is confined to public duties and secondly is not granted where there are other adequate remedies."
17. That a writ of mandamus issued against a person who has a legal duty to perform but has failed and/or neglected to do so, such a legal duty may emanate from either in discharge of a public duty or by operation of law. It is trite that this Court will not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain a writ petition wherein public law element is not involved.
18. In L.I.C. of India v. Escorts Ltd., , O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., said:
"The action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the Court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances."
19. In State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust and Ors., , it is said:
"If the matter is governed by a contract/ agreement between the parties, the writ petition is not maintainable since it is a public law remedy and is not available for any private law field, e.g., where the matter is governed by a non-statutory contract."
20. In our considered opinion, for a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the impugned action or inaction, as the case may be, on the part of any instrumentality of the State or other authorities need to fall in the realm of public law Act, be it a legislative Act, an executive Act of the State or its instrumentalities imbued with public law element. That a writ of mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it as a sufficient legal interest. In cases where a person or authority cannot be characterised as a State within the meaning of Article 12, even so a writ of mandamus may lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty, which an applicant is entitled to enforce against such person or authority. What is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon the person or the authority, and the Court will enforce such statutory public duty.
21. In G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute and Anr., , it is observed that a writ under Article 226 can lie against a "person" if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty. Although it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity.
22. In VST Industries Ltd. v. VST Industries Workers' Union and Anr., 2001 (1) ALD 70 (SC) = (2001) 1 SCC 298, the Supreme Court said that the words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are therefore, not be confined only to statutory authorities or instrumentalities of State but would cover any other person or body performing public duty. "The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on that body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party; no matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied"
23. The Supreme Court approvingly referred to the propositions summarised as to when the activities of the private bodies are subject to the standards of public law in De Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th edition.
(1) The test of whether a body is performing a public function, and is hence amenable to judicial review, may not depend upon the source of its power or whether the body is ostensibly a "public" or "private" body.
(2) The principles of judicial review prima facie govern the activities of bodies performing public functions.
(3) However, not all decisions taken by bodies in the course of their public functions are the subject-matter of judicial review. In the following two situations judicial review will not normally be appropriate even though the body may be performing a public function:
(a) Where some other branch of the law more appropriately governs the dispute between the parties. In such a case, that branch of the law and its remedies should and normally will be applied; and
(b) Where there is a contract between the litigants. In such a case the express or implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern the transaction, or other relationship between the parties, rather than the general law. Thus, where a special method of resolving disputes (such as arbitration or resolution by private or domestic Tribunals) has been agreed upon by the parties (expressly or by necessary implication), that regime, and not judicial review, will normally govern the dispute."
24. It is clearly established, that whenever the authority or the person performs a public function or discharges a public duty, the remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are available. Public duty can never be equated to that of an obligation to any person or identifiable group of persons. Public duty is owed to the public in general and not specifically to any person or group of individuals. That is the precise character of public law duty in contra distinction to private law, which is normally founded upon a contract or tort etc., as the case may be.
25. In Union of India v. S.B. Vohra and Ors., , it is held:
"The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. For a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the authority need to fall in the realm of public law - be it a legislative Act of the State, an executive Act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or authority imbued with public law element. The question is required to be determined in each case having the aforementioned principle in mind. However, it may not be possible to generalize the nature of the action which would come either under public law remedy or private law field nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list of such actions."
26. The appellant Corporation is a wholly owned Government Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1952, established for the purpose of doing business in petroleum and petroleum products. The business in petroleum and its products will not involve discharge of any public law functions or duties. The said land acquired on lease from the original owner itself was for the purpose of establishing its retail outlet. The lease of the land by the original owner enabled the Corporation to undertake its normal commercial activity of sale in petroleum and petroleum products.
27. We find it difficult to discern as to what public duties or public law functions, are discharged by the Corporation in the process of its business of sale in petroleum and petroleum products. In such view of the matter, we hold that the dispute raised by the writ petitioners lies in the realm of private law and not public law.
28. However, Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, learned Additional Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the respondents/writ petitioners placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dolly Das, , and contended that similar relief as the one granted by the learned Single Judge in the instant case, has been granted by the Supreme Court in that case against Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (supra). The learned Additional Advocate-General contended that the facts pleaded are of such a nature they do not involve any complicated questions of fact needing elaborate investigation. That according to the learned Additional Advocate-General, there are no disputed questions of facts requiring any resolution as such and therefore there are no impediments to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
29. That since whole of the case of the respondents/writ petitioners rests upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dolly Das (supra), we may briefly notice the facts in that case.
30. Dolly Das who filed the writ petition in the Orissa High Court was the lessee in respect of the disputed plot and was in possession of the leasehold property on the basis of the lease deed dated 10-8-1964 executed by the Government of Orissa. The land had been leased out for industrial and commercial purposes mainly for automobile shop room and service station. The original lessee was M/s. Kalinga Automobiles, M/s. Caltex (India) Ltd., entered into a lease agreement with the writ petitioner and became the sublessee in respect of the disputed premises by virtue of the lease deed dated 1-10-1969 for a period of ten years renewable and determinable as provided in the lease deed. M/s. Caltex (India) Limited was taken over by the Government of India and was amalgamated with the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, by an order made on 9-5-1978 under the provisions of the Caltex (Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex (India) Limited) Act, 1977. The Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, by order dated 23-5-1979 exercised the option of renewal of lease for a further term of ten years from the expiration of present tenure of the lease. Thereafter on 13-9-1989 the Corporation wrote to the writ petitioner that in terms of Sections 5 and 7(3) of the Act, they exercised their right to renew the lease for a further period of twenty years commencing from 1-10-1989, on the same terms and conditions on which the lease deed dated 1-9-1970 held the lease immediately before 1977. On 23-3-1993 the writ petitioner filed petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the said notice of renewal dated 13-9-1989. Before the High Court the writ petitioner contended as under:
"(i) That no deed has been executed renewing the lease on its expiry on 30-9-1979 and, therefore, the appellant could not exercise any further option of renewal and the notice of renewal, to which we have adverted to earlier, dated 13-9-1989 sent by the respondent is without jurisdiction and the appellant is a trespasser;
(ii) that even if the appellant had a statutory right of renewal the same could be availed of only once and there could be no further renewal subsequent to 1989;
(iii) that in terms of the enactment the right of renewal has to be exercised when desired by the Central Government and the Central Government having not desired in the present case it is not open to the appellant to exercise that right;
(iv) that in view of enormous escalation of prices of land in the city of Bhubaneswar it is an arbitrary and inequitable act on the part of the appellant to occupy the premises at a meagre rent of Rs. 1,900/-per month; and
(v) that the respondent's offer to be appointed as an agent under the Corporation should have been acceded to and not to appoint illegally another agent,"
31. The Corporation inter alia contended before the High Court that even in the absence of a deed, the right of renewal could be exercised in accordance with the original terms containing the lease deed and therefore it had a right to ask for a further renewal of twenty years and the notice of renewal cannot be stated to be illegal or arbitrary.
32. The High Court held that the Corporation having replaced M/s. Caltex (India) Ltd., in the terms of the Act while the original lease was subsisting and after the expiry of the lease, no fresh deed having been executed between the parties, Clause 3(g) of the lease deed was not acted upon and, therefore, the appellant cannot enforce a second renewal after the renewed term of ten years which expired in 1989. Ultimately the High Court issued direction quashing the impugned letter of the Corporation on the ground that it does not have the power to exercise option for any further renewal after expiry of renewal period in 1989; the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited should deliver the vacant possession of the premises in question to the writ petitioner.
33. The Supreme Court while adverting to the contention that the remedy is not appropriate in the case observed:
"That the facts pleaded are of such a nature which do not involve any complicated questions of fact needing elaborate consideration of the same, the High Court could also exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such matters. There can be no hard and fast rule in such matters. When the High Court has chosen to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution we cannot say that the discretion exercised in entertaining the petition is wrong."
34. The judgment of the High Court was accordingly upheld with some modifications.
35. In our considered opinion, the decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (supra), in no manner helps the case of the writ petitioners. The Supreme Court having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
"The lease had been granted with effect from 1-10-1969 in favour of M/s. Caltex (India) Ltd. and on the coming into force of the Act on 23-4-1977 the appellant had stepped into its shoes and from that day onwards the appellant has been in possession of the same till now. The crucial question whether the option for renewal either in terms of the lease deed or in terms of the Act had been availed of or not is the controversy between the parties now. Litigation between the parties has been going on from 1993 onwards. On the expiry of the term the deed provides for renewal for two terms of 10 years each on the same terms and conditions except for enhancement of rent and execution of fresh deed modifying the clause relating to renewal. The appellant gave notice of renewal in terms of the provisions of (i) the deed in the letter dated 23-5-1979, and (ii) the Act in the letter dated 13-9-1989. Now it is not necessary to examine the effect of renewal for the earlier period as even on the appellant's own showing it is invoking the statute in the latter notice and not the terms of the deed. If that is so, the appellant could seek for renewal only in terms of Section 7 of the Act which enabled it to renew the deed for a period of one term as originally granted. A covenant for renewal is not treated as a part of the terms prescribing the period of lease but only entities a lessee to obtain a fresh lease. Renewal of lease could only be for one term and no more, but nevertheless it could be contended that the covenant for renewal was also part of the lease and, therefore, stood incorporated in the renewed lease arising under the Act. However, in the peculiar facts of this case, we think that it is not necessary to enter upon the merits of the controversy regarding the effect of Clause 3(g) of the lease deed or the rights available under the Act for renewal of the lease period. We are of the opinion that the ends of justice in this case will be met if we modify the order of the High Court in the following terms:
(1) The appellant does not have power to claim exercise of option for any renewal of the lease beyond 30-9-1999;
(2) The appellant seeks for and is granted time to handover vacant possession of the premises in question to the respondent on or before 31-3-2000, however, subject to filing of the usual undertaking in this Court within a period of four weeks from today;
(3) Rent payable is as per the terms of the lease deed, that is, Rs. 1,920/- per month which shall be paid till the date of handing over the vacant possession;
(4) If any arrears of rent, as stated above, have not been paid, the same shall be paid within a period of three months from today; and (5) The order made by the High Court to the extent it is inconsistent with our order shall stand set aside."
36. That a fair reading of the judgment disclose that in the peculiar facts of the case on hand, the Supreme Court perhaps exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in order to do complete justice between the parties modified the order of the High Court as noticed supra.
37. Be it as it may, the question that had fallen for consideration before the Orissa High Court was whether the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited had a statutory right of renewal and whether the notice of renewal dated 13-9-1989 was valid in law. The option of renewal exercised under the statute was the subject-matter in issue. The dispute raised therein was purely in the realm of public law.
38. In the instant case, there is no exercise of such option invoking any statutory provision is involved seeking further renewal of the lease by the appellant Corporation. The extended lease period also came to an end by 31st March, 2000, and the Corporation continues to be in possession of the land in whatever capacity about which we do not propose to express our opinion. No proceeding of the Corporation in exercise of its power under any statute is impugned in this writ petition. Therefore the decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (supra) is in no manner supports the contention of the learned Additional Advocate-General.
Disputed questions of facts and the discretion of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
39. We have already noticed the relevant facts and the nature of the dispute . between the parties in this case. The Corporation had gone to the extent of raising dispute regarding the writ petitioners being the legal heirs of the original owner. They have also raised the dispute that the writ petitioners are no more the owners of the said land as the same has been declared as surplus land under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. No doubt, the writ petitioners vehemently denied the said issue. In our considered opinion, the summary proceedings, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are ill suited to resolve such disputed questions of facts as the one involved in the present case.
40. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Anr., , the Supreme Court said:
"The High Court may, in exercise of its judicial discretion decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. If the petitioner makes a claim which is frivolous, vexatious, or prima facie unjust, or may not appropriately be tried in a petition invoking extraordinary jurisdiction, the Court may decline to entertain the petition. But a party claiming to be aggrieved by the action of a public body or authority on the plea that the action is unlawful, highhanded, arbitrary or unjust is entitled to a hearing of its petition on the merits."
41. That such observations were made apparently on the basis that the petition filed by the writ petitioner therein did not raise any complicated questions of facts for determination and the claim could not be characterised as frivolous, vexatious or unjust. It was a case where the decision of the municipality enforcing the provisions of Maharashtra Municipality Act, 40 of 1965 relating to the levy, assessment, collection, recovery of octroi, was questioned. The relief prayed for was to restrain the municipality from levying octroi fees. Obviously no disputed questions of facts had arisen. The dispute was clearly in the realm of public law.
42. Similarly the observations made by the Supreme Court in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Ors., , are to the same effect that "the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because, in considering the petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may all to be determined. The, High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. But when the petitioner raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account, the High Court may decline to try a petition." It is further observed that "if on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, that ft should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, the Supreme Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court."
43. We fail to appreciate as to how the judgments render any assistance whatsoever to the case set up by the writ petitioners. The question is not of jurisdiction but one of exercise of discretion in the given facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to go into even disputed questions of facts can never be disputed. The Court in each case has to decide itself as to whether the facts pleaded are of such nature, which can be gone into by the Court in summary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
44. In ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited, (2004) 14 ILD 395 (SC), it is observed:
"When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified"
45. It is true that there is no absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed questions of facts, the parties should be relegated to a civil suit.
46. We are required to bear in mind that the plenary right of the High Court to issue writs in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of alternative and effective remedies available unless the impugned action of the State or its instrumentality is so arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the guaranteed constitutional rights or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court may consider it necessary to exercise its jurisdiction.
47. Suffice it to hold that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, normally cannot entertain writ petitions where the dispute raised lies in the realm of private law field for the reason that enquiry into such dispute may involve adjudication of disputed questions of facts for which purposes the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are ill suited.
48. The Court cannot grant relief in the nature of an eviction decree.
We accordingly decline to entertain the writ petition for both the reasons namely;
(a) Dispute raised by the writ petitioners lies in the realm of private law;
(b) Disputed questions of facts raised cannot be satisfactorily tried in this summary proceedings.
49. On the facts and in the circumstances, we find it difficult to grant any relief to the writ petitioners in this writ petition. We accordingly hold that the writ petition is not maintainable and the writ petitioners are required to avail such remedies as may be available to them in law, in which event, the matter may have to be considered on its own merits uninfluenced by dismissal of the writ petition.
50. We make it clear, we have not expressed any opinion on any one of the controversial issues and the observations, if any, made in this order are confined only for the disposal of the writ petition and shall have no bearing on the merits of the claim.
51. In case the respondents/writ petitioners intend to file any civil suit seeking appropriate relief as against the appellant, the same may have to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months from the date of filing of the suit. The facts and circumstances warrant expeditious disposal of the suit, if any, to be filed by the respondents/writ petitioners.
52. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ appeal is allowed. The judgment under appeal is accordingly set aside.
53. In the result, the writ petition shall stand dismissed. Each party shall bear their own costs.