Allahabad High Court
Badri Prasad And Others vs Addl. Commissioner And Others on 21 August, 2019
Author: Yashwant Varma
Bench: Yashwant Varma
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 6 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 30831 of 1993 Petitioner :- Badri Prasad And Others Respondent :- Addl. Commissioner And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- J.K.Tewari,Faujdar Rai,R.K.Ojha,S.D.Kautilya,S.P.Dwivedi,Shailendra Kumar Singh Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,Dhanesh Chandra Dubey,A.Pandey,Anil Kumar Mishra,Pradeep Kumar,Y.Pandey Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.
Heard Sri Faujdar Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri P.N. Saxena, learned Senior Counsel along with Dhanesh Chandra Dubey for the private respondents as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.
This petition impugns an order dated 30 June 1993 pursuant to which the Additional Commissioner has rejected the substitution application made by the petitioners and has held that the proceedings initiated by them challenging the leases granted in favour of the private respondents stood abated. It becomes pertinent to note that the petitioners in paragraph -3 of the writ petition have given particulars of leases that are stated to have been made in their favour. In that paragraph, it is asserted that the petitioners were granted leases in 1375 Fasli [corresponding to the English calendar year 1967) in accordance with the provisions of Section 26A of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"]. Although, it is asserted that the petitioners were in possession, none of the leases that were stated to have been made in their favour have been brought on the record. It is further alleged that the original landholder in collusion with the respondents 4 to 69 obtained orders from the Collector, Mirzapur pursuant to which leases came to be executed in favour of the private respondents here. It was the grant of these leases that the petitioners challenged before the Additional Commissioner.
The application for cancellation is stated to have been made sometime in 1973. The record further reflects that it was sent for necessary comments of the Collector being obtained in 1980 pursuant to which an enquiry report was submitted in 1985. These proceedings which were instituted in 1973 languished before the Additional Commissioner for more than a decade thereafter. In 1992, the petitioners moved an application for substitution in those proceedings. In that application details were given of the death of various applicants and it was prayed that their legal heirs be substituted and permitted to prosecute the proceedings. It is that application for substitution which has been rejected in terms of the order impugned. The Additional Commissioner has proceeded to reject the substitution application firstly on the ground that no details of the date of death of the original applicants was mentioned. It has further taken into consideration the fact that no legally tenable explanation was proffered for the inordinate and evident delay in moving the said application.
Before this Court, Sri Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that the principles of substitution and abatement would not apply to proceedings under the Act. According to learned counsel, there are no specific provisions made in the Act on the basis of which the principles underlying Order XXII C.P.C. may be applied. He submits that the mere failure on the part of the applicants to mention the date of death of the original applicants was not a circumstance which warranted rejection of the application itself. Sri Rai has drawn the attention of the Court to Sections 37, 38 and 42 of the Act to submit that the provisions of C.P.C. are attracted only to enquiries or hearing of objections under the Act or to appeals that may be preferred thereunder. According to the learned counsel, the provisions of Section 37 and 38 cannot be said to apply to proceedings which may be initiated under Section 27(4) of the Act. Section 27(4) of the Act, it becomes pertinent to note, deals with the power of the Commissioner to enquire into any settlement that may be made of surplus land and if satisfied that it was irregular to cancel the same.
The Court firstly notes that the petitioners admittedly claim the protection of Section 26A. That provision is in the following terms:
"26-A. Settlement of land let out for interim period before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969.--The surplus land let out to any person for an interim period under sub-section (2) of Section 26, as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969, shall at the end of such period, be resumed by the Collector and thereafter, settled in accordance with the provisions of Section 27:
Provided that where such person is a person who would, if the surplus land so let out were excluded from consideration and if he was resident of the circle, he would have fallen under any of the clauses (b) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 198 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, then so much of such land, as together with the area, if any, otherwise held by him aggregate to not more than 1.26 hectares (3.125 acres), shall, at the desire of that person, either before or at the end of such period, be settled by the Collector with that very person."
Before this Court, it is candidly admitted that the petitioners were granted leases under Section 26(2). Sub-section (2) of Section 26, as it stood originally, envisaged the grant of temporary leases for a period of five years. That provision was deleted by U.P. Act No. IV of 1969. Section 26-A, which came to be inserted in the statute in terms of U.P. Act No. XXXV of 1970 provides that land held by any person for an interim period under sub-section (2) of Section 26 shall at the end of that period be resumed by the Collector and thereafter settled in accordance with the provisions made in Section 27. The Proviso to Section 26A then takes care of the rights of persons which stood eclipsed consequent to the deletion of Section 26 (2) by providing that such a person may also apply for allotment and establish that he falls within the preferential categories enumerated in clauses (d) to (e) of Section 198 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. On the own case as set up by the petitioner therefore it is manifest that their leases came to an end upon the expiry of five years when computed from 1967. The private respondents are stated to have been granted leases after the lease of the petitioners came to an end. In the Counter Affidavit, it is stated that the leases granted in favour of the petitioners expired in 1380 Fasli and it was only thereafter that the surplus land was settled in their favour in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Act.
From the above narration of facts, it is evident that the rights which inhered in the petitioner came to an end on the expiry of five years from the grant of the original and temporary settlement made in their favour under Section 26(2). Consequent to deletion of that provision and the provisions made in Section 26A, the lease was, upon termination, liable to be resumed and thereafter settled afresh in accordance with Section 27. No right consequently inhered in the petitioner to occupy the land after the expiry of five years from the grant. The challenge to the leases granted in favour of the private respondents rested on the foundation of a continued interest of the petitioners in the land in question. However, as noted above, the temporary settlement made in their favour under Section 26 (2) neither survived nor was it preserved in terms of the provisions of Section 26A. Viewed in that light it is apparent that the proceedings in which the substitution application was filed was neither maintainable nor did it in one sense survive.
The proceedings which were initiated by the petitioners and are stated to be referable to Section 27(4), were also clearly untenable. It is not the case of the petitioner that they had applied for the grant of fresh leases after the expiry of five years. It is also not their case that they had participated in any settlement process initiated thereafter and were wrongly denied the benefits of Section 26A. The petitioners do not assert that they were party to the settlement proceedings in which leases ultimately came to be granted in favour of the private respondents. Viewed in that context, this Court finds no right, indefeasible or other, which entitled the petitioners to invoke the provisions of Section 27(4). If the above facts are borne in mind, it is evident that the issue of substitution which has been dealt with in the impugned order pales into insignificance. It would have only entailed the continuance of proceedings which were otherwise untenable in law.
While the matter could have rested here, since elaborate submissions in respect of applicability of the principles of abatement were addressed by Sri Rai, the Court in all fairness only deems it apposite to observe as follows.
The provisions made in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act in unequivocal terms confer the powers and privileges of the Civil Court on officers and authorities holding an enquiry or hearing objections under the Act. The proceedings envisaged under Section 27(4) clearly entail an enquiry and a hearing on objections that may be preferred. In fact, it was the petitioners themselves who had preferred objections to the settlement made in favour of the respondents. Section 37 further mandates that the officers and authorities holding such an enquiry would follow the procedure laid out in the C.P.C. for trial and disposal of suits. Viewed in that backdrop, the submission of Sri Rai that the provisions and principles of abatement would not apply does not merit acceptance. The reliance placed by Sri Rai on the judgment rendered by a learned Judge in Bansi Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others1 is clearly misplaced. Suffice it to note that the said decision was rendered in the backdrop of the provisions made in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. Sri Rai, learned counsel in all fairness concedes that no provision pari materia to Sections 37 and 38 stands engrafted in the 1953 statute.
Accordingly and for all the reasons aforestated, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition, which shall in consequence, stand dismissed.
Order Date :- 21.8.2019 Arun K. Singh (Yashwant Varma, J.)