Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Syed Mohammad Yahya Quadri (Died) Per ... vs The District Collector And Anr. on 15 April, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(3)ALT793, 1997 A I H C 1485, (1996) 3 ANDHLD 781, (1996) 2 LS 255, (1996) 3 ANDH LT 793
JUDGMENT B.K. Somasekhara, J.
1. The matter was heard once and an order was passed on 1-4-1994 setting aside the findings given on issues 1 and 2 by the trial Court and the matter was remitted back for giving fresh findings on issues 1 and 2 by giving sufficient opportunity to both the sides to lead additional evidence on the said issues and the appeal was kept pending till then. Now that the learned trial Judge has submitted his findings on the said issues again, as directed by this Court, in his report dated 22-11-1995, the matter is being heard again to dispose of the appeal on merits.
2. This is a plaintiff's appeal. His suit O.S.No. 79 of 1978 was dismissed by the learned Sub-Judge, Nalgonda by his judgment and decree dated 24-3-1982. The respondents in the appeal were the defendants in the suit.
3. The plaintiff filed the suit for return of the plaint schedule property by delivering vacant possession of the same by defendant No. 1, who is the District, Collector, Nalgonda District, Nalgonda. The suit property is described in the' plaint schedule as an agricultural land tearing S.No. 33 in Nalgonda Revenue Village. The plaintiff was the owner of the suit property. It was acquired by the Government for the purpose of construction of a maternity ward through Section 4 notification dated 26-3-1953 and Section 6 notification dated 5-11-1053 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act Compensation was awarded to the plaintiff by the Land Acquisition Officer at the rate of 0-50 paise per square yard on 14-9-1957, On a reference Under Section 14 of the Hyderabad, Land Acquisition Act, the District Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 2-00 per square yard, in O.P.No: 41 of 1958. The defendants challenged the title of the plaintiff. The learned District Judge held that the plaintiff is the owner of the land and entitled to. the enhanced compensation. Accordingly, the compensation was enhanced. The amount of compensation so awarded has been kept in deposit in the Court and the plaintiff has not drawn it so far. In the meanwhile, it appears that the Director of Medical and Health Services addressed a letter No. 299569 dated 16-6-1970 to the Secretary to the Government that the acquuired land was no longer required for the construction of maternity ward, since it was already constructed in the premises of Head Quarters' Hospital, Nalgonda. Therefore, he suggested that the acquired land may be returned to the owner. The plaintiff made a petition to the Government on 22-8-1974 expressing his willingness to take back the land without any claim for damages or compensation. The Government in its Memo No. 449, dated 13-10-1974 directed the District Collector, Nalgonda to submit withdrawal' proposals in respect of the land acquired. It appears that the Collector proposed to the Government for retaining the Government land for use for any suitable purpose. The plaintiff submitted a petition to the Government on 5-2-1975 stating that the acquired land was liable to be redelivered to him Under Section 54-A of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act since it was no longer required for the purpose for which it was acquired. On 22-2-1975, the Government replied to the plaintiff that they have already issued a memorandum No. 443, dated 11-2-1975 rejecting the requisition of the plaintiff and that they saw no reason to reconsider the said order. Therefore, the plaintiff filed Writ Petition No. 573 of 1975 before this Court seeking a direction to the Government and the District Collector to act as per the provisions of Section 54-A of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. The Government op posed the petition. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on 15-4-1977 on the ground that the matter involves the question as to whether the land was agricultural land or a Gaothan land and that being a question of fact it could not be decided in the writ proceedings. Therefore, with such observations the writ petition was disposed of leaving open the choice to the plaintiff to institute necessary proceedings before an appropriate Court for establishing the nature of the land acquired. The question whether the land has to be redelivered to the plaintiff Under Section 54-A of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act was also kept open.
4. In the plaint it was alleged that the suit land is a part of the agricultural land and it was never a 'Gaothan' nor was treated as such by any competent authority. It was recorded in the revenue records as an agricultural land. It was never removed from the patta. It was further contended that the concerned authority, for whom the land was acquired, having expressed that the land acquired was no longer required for the purpose for which it was acquired, was bound to redeliver the land to the plaintiff Under Section 54-A of the Act. The plaintiff pleaded that he was always willing and ready to give up the claim to the amount of compensation in deposit. In the meanwhile, the Government started constructions on the land acquired and therefore the plaintiff contended that the Government is bound to remove those constructions and redeliver the same to him under the circumstances by virtue of Section 54-A of the Act.
5. The defendants contended that when the land was acquired for the purpose of maternity ward under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act the Government was entitled to use it for any other public benefit or purpose, for which it was acquired. Since the enhanced compensation was also deposited by the Government, which the plaintiff was entitled to withdraw, no more question was to be decided in regard to the land. They further pleaded that the Director of Medical and Health Services, Hyderabad in letter No. 299569 dated 16-6-1970 requested the Government to issue instructions to the Collector to negotiate with the land owner to withdraw the claim of enhanced compensation and to dispose of the acquired land as the said land was no longer required by the department. The Government also directed the District Collector in its letter dated 30-1-1974 to negotiate with the plaintiff for withdrawal of their petition. It appears that the District Collector while requesting for sanction of the enhanced compensation, informed the Government that the land acquired was not agricultural or pastural land at the time of acquisition and that the acquired land had to be disposed of as per Rule 28 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Rules. It was contended that there were already houses around the acquired land and therefore It was no longer an agricultural land. It was further contended that the provisions of Section 54-A of the Act did not apply to the facts of the case. The Government did not express at any stage that the land was no longer required for the public benefit or purpose. It was contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to get back the land either Under Section 54-A of the Act or for any other reason. It was further contended that the Government has every right to use the said land for any other public purpose. Therefore, it proposed to use it for the Social Welfare Department for the purpose of construction of Scheduled Caste girls hostels which was not inconsistent with the public purpose for which the land was acquired. It was pleaded by the defendants that the construction of the buildings was also completed and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to get the relief in the suit. The plaintiff issued a notice prior to the suit and since the concerned record was not available at that time, no reply was given. The defendants also denied that the plaintiff is the sole successor of the original owner of the suit land and therefore the suit is not maintainable. The cause of action in the suit was also denied. It was contended that the suit was barred by limitation and the valuation of the suit was not correct and Court fee paid was also not correct.
6. The parties went to trial on the following issues;
"(1) Whether the suit land is an agricultural land and whether the same is liable to be redelivered to the plaintiff in view of the provisions of Section 54-A of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act?
(2) Whether the suit land is a village site (Gaothan land)?
(3) Whether the defendants can retain the possession of the land for public purpose other than the one for which it has been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act?
(4) Whether the Court fee paid is sufficient?
(5) To what relief?"
The plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and three other witnesses as per P.Ws.2 to 4 and got marked three documents as per Exs. A-1 to A-3. Four witnesses were examined for the defendant as per D. Ws.1 to 4 and one document was marked as per Ex.D-1.
7. After hearing both the sides and on the basis of the material before him, the learned Sub-Judge held issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and issue No. 2 against the defendants, issue No. 3 against the plaintiff and issue No. 4 in his favour and ultimately held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief and consequently dismissed the suit. When the matter was remitted back to the learned Sub-Judge for submitting his findings afresh on issues 1 and 2, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and five other witnesses as per P.Ws.2 to 6 respectively and on behalf of the defendants D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined. The plaintiff produced Exs. A-1 to A-3 during such an enquiry and the defendants got Ex.B-1 marked. The learned Sub-Judge after affording opportunity to both the sides and after hearing both the sides held issue No. 1 against the plaintiff and issue No. 2 against the defendants.
8. Mr. Baig, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant has contended that when once there was a finding on issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and when the defendant did not produce any material to hold to the contrary regarding issue No. 1, the learned Sub-Judge was not right in taking a view afresh in regard to issue No. 1 by reassessment of the materials and when the factual situations based on evidence were not altered. He has contended that even now with all the materials before the Court, the suit land should be held as an agricultural or pastural land and by operating Section 54-A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Act, the defendants are bound to restore the suit land to the plaintiff as the purpose for which it was acquired was not fulfilled. He has also contended that in any view of the matter, the finding of the learned Sub-Judge either before or thereafter that the plaintiff is not entitled to get back the possession of the land Under Section 54-A of the Act is not justified. He has maintained that the suit is not barred by limitation in view of the fact that he was pursuing the remedy through out after the defendants took a decision to reject the representation of the plaintiff to redeliver the possession of the suit land under the said provision and when the plaintiff was pursuing his remedy before the Court in writ proceedings it is not proper to say that the suit is barred by limitation.
9. Mrs. Swarna Reddy, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, has contended that when once the learned Sub-Judge has recorded a clear finding that the suit land is neither an agricultural nor a pastural land based on the material on record, the plaintiff being the appellant cannot assail it just because the finding is against him. She has also contended that by judging the matter in any manner the suit is barred by limitation as it was not filed within three years from the date when the cause of action accrued. She has further contended that when once the suit land was acquired for public benefit, the Government was entitled to use it for any public benefit and as long as it was not inconsistent with the purpose for which it was acquired.
10. It is further contended that Section 54-A of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act should be read along with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and should be harmoniously construed along with the said provisions so as to bring out the real meaning and intention of the legislation incorporating Section 54-A in the Land Revenue Act. Mr. V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned Government Pleader, took over the arguments, adds further to the argument of Mrs. Swarna Reddy mat when once the land is vested in the Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act which is equivalent to the relevant provisions under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, it is for the Government or the beneficiary of the land acquisition to decide whether it is required for the public purpose regarding which the property was acquired and as long as the property needed for any public benefit or purpose within the meaning of Section 3 (f) of the Land Acquisition Act, unless it is established that it is no longer required for such a public benefit or purpose within Section 3 (f), Section 54 does not come into play. The learned Government Pleader also relied upon the decision in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, in support of his contention that the property when once it is vested in the Government by virtue of the Land Acquisition Act, the right of the Government to deal with the property in any manner thereafter cannot be taken as preventive and in that light of the matter Section 54-A has to be interpreted.
11. The learned Sub-Judge recorded a finding that the suit land is an agricultural land. When the matter was remitted back for dealing with the same issue again after giving opportunity to both the sides, in his findings recorded on 22-11-1995 it was held that the suit land is not an agricultural land and that it is not a 'Gouthan'. Significantly enough the plaintiff repeated his evidence after the remand although the evidence was recorded again and the defendants did not produce any fresh material except examining certain witnesses who also repeated the same thing in addition to Exs. A-1 to A-3 and B-1 which did not improve the case. On hearing both the sides this Court feels that in spite of the remand to give better opportunity to both the sides, there is no improvement in the matter. The facts and circumstances in the case in regard to the nature of the suit land whether it is an agricultural land or whether it is a 'Gouthan', etc., has not altered. Therefore, we are again confronted with the same question about the nature of the land. With the matters already on record at all stages, this Court is thus constrained to re-examine the question both on facts and on law.
12. The following points arise for consideration in this appeal:
(1) (a) Whether the finding of the learned Sub-Judge (after remitting back the matter) that the suit land is not an agricultural or pastural land is correct and justified?
(b) If not, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the patta of the suit land to be given to him by virtue of Section 54-A of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F?
(2) Whether the Government is entitled to make use of the suit land for any purpose other than the purpose for which the suit land was acquired as long as it is for public benefit or public purpose?
(3) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
(4) (a) Whether the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-Judge deserves to be set aside?
(b) If so, to what extent?
13. Admittedly, the suit land was an agricultural land at the time of acquisition. It bears a survey number, has an assessment as agricultural land and was actually acquired as an agricultural land. Exhibit B1, which is the pahani for the year 1952-53, on the other hand, confirms that the suit land was an agricultural land till that year bearing Survey No. 33 with clear expression of its area as Acs.3-19 guntas, assessed at Rs. 3.19 p. bearing the khata number. Obviously the classification of the land as on the date of the acquisition was agricultural land having all the characteristics of an agricultural land as above. The defendants did not take any pains to demonstrate that such a classification of the land has transformed into one of non-agricultural land either by procedural method or by change of utility. Even the written statement of the defendants does not state that the suit land was converted into non-agricultural land at any stage much less that it was put to non-agricultural purpose. It is true that the suit land was acquired for the construction of a maternity ward to mean that it was to be used for non-agricultural purpose. But the evidence bears testimony that the land was not used as such but there was a categoric statement by the Land Acquisition Officer that (he land was not required for the purpose for which it was acquired but due to subsequent persuasions by revenue authorities it was used for constructing the hostel buildings for the use of the girls belonging to the scheduled caste (by Social Welfare Department). The witnesses, namely, D.Ws-1 to 4, who are supposed to be the officers of the defendants, have not come out with a specific expression that either the land lost its classification with character as an agricultural land or that it was unfit to be used for agricultural purpose. The learned Assistant Government Pleader contended that the entries in the revenue records and in Ex.P-1 in column 17 mention the suit land as 'abadi' to mean that it is a house-site or a plot and it is also evident from the evidence that there are houses existing on the suit property thereby meaning that the suit land as agricultural land has lost its characteristics to lose its classification. It is true that there is such an entry as 'abadi' in column 17 of Ex.P-1. It is conceded by both sides that the meaning of the word 'abadi' is normally understood as a land used for residential purpose to construct houses, et cetera. The real question is whether that transforms me nature of the land or classification of the land.
14. The Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act 1317 F (Act No. 8 of 1317 F) regulates the procedure relating to the land revenue primarily. While regulating the assessment and collection of land revenue there are certain provisions in the Act which envisage the basis of such levy and collection of land revenue. Section 48 of the Act makes it obligatory that all lands whether applied for agricultural or any other purpose is liable for land revenue. Section 50 of the Act contemplates that the land revenue shall be assessed according to the various modes of use, namely, (a) agricultural use; (b) in addition to agricultural use any other use from which profit or advantage is derived. This provision also contemplates the remission of land revenue in particular situations. Under Chapter VII of the Act there will be settlement including the survey, et cetera, to identify a land by assigning survey number, et cetera, for purposes of assessment. It is on such basis land revenue will be levied and collected under the provision stated above. Section 100 of the Act contemplates that no land revenue shall be levied in certain cases on lands within village site. A land which is styled or called as 'abadi' unless brought within Section 100 of the Act, it cannot be understood as a non-agricultural land. Section 62 empowers the Collector to take action Under Section 57 of the Act against a pattadar or shikmidar who has without permission appropriated agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes. That will be tantamount to unlawful occupation or use of the land with title warranting the action Under Section 57 of the Act. Therefore, the law imposes that an agricultural land cannot be used for non-agricultural purposes unless it is converted into non-agricultural land by remitting assessment, et cetera. It may not be impertinent to visualise that In i country like India agricultural hand has a source for the sustenance of the subjects the agriculture being the main avocation of not only the majority of the people of India that forms almost 75 to 80% of the total population. The continuance of agricultural land as a source of social survival appears to be the real theory behind such stringent regulations not to permit the misuser or non-user of the agricultural land, the purpose for which it is preserved unless converted into non-agricultural land in accordance with law. Therefore, as rightly contented by Mr. Baig, the learned advocate, unless the defendants establish that the suit land was converted into non-agricultural land in accordance with law it must be presumed to have continued to have the same character as that of agricultural land.
15. It is true that the plaintiff is not able to produce sufficient and satisfactory evidence to prove mat the suit land is a pasturage. Except saying that the grass grows spontaneously on the land for purposes of the grazing of the village cattle, there is no material produced to show that it has been reserved for such purpose, namely as a 'Gouthan'. There is not even a slight indication from any documentary evidence in the case that the suit land is either reserved as 'Gouthan' or pasturage or used for such a purpose. If some grass grows now and then and the cattle is grazed sporadically that itself may not be sufficient to classify the land as a pasturage. Although the expression 'pasturage' is not defined in the Act, it is to be understood as a land reserved for grazing the village or community cattle. Both the dictionary meaning and the lexicon meaning bring home such an intent In the absence of proof to mat direction, it is not possible to accept that the suit land is a pasturage. To that extent the finding of the learned Sub-Judge after remand deserves to be accepted.
16. Apart from the factual and the legal meaning of the 'agricultural land' as above when once a land is classified as an agricultural land with the presumption that it continues to he as such, we are still to examine whether when once an agricultural land is used as such and is capable of being used as such whether it would continue to have such a texture and utility. That opens up the jurisprudential approach of the matter. The learned Government Pleader has tried to postulate that an agricultural land at one time need not continue as such and it may transform for various reasons to lose its identity. Before examining such a contention on facts it must be said to the discredit of the defendants that no evidence is produced in this regard. Mr. Baig, the learned advocate for the appellant-plaintiff, has depended upon the definition of 'agriculture' in Section 2 Sub-clause (sic. Sub-section) (1) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (Act No. XXI of 1950) (for short ' APTL Act') to demonstrate that the suit land having been once used for agricultural purposes should be treated as an agricultural land unless it is etablished that it is incapable of being used for such a purpose. The provision in the definition reads:
"2 (1) (a): "Agriculture" with its' grammatical variations and cognate expressions includes:-
(i) horticulture;
(ii) the raising of crops, grass or garden produce;
(iii) dairy farming;
(iv) poultry farming and stock breedings; and
(v) grazing does not include the cutting of wood only;"
'Agricultural land' is defined in Sub-clause (sic. Sub-section) (c) of the provision:
"Agricultural land means land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or reserved for growing forests and includes-
(i) fallow d,
(ii) the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to agricultural land, and
(iii) the sites of dwelling houses occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers or artisans and land appurtenant to such dwelling houses;"
In the very expression of the definition of 'agricultural land' it need not always be used for that purpose to continue its identity but it will not lose its identity as long as it is capable of being used for agricultural purpose. When once a land is proved to be an agricultural land its incapability of being used as such should be a proof and the contrary is a non-proof. The defendants have not established either factually, legally or scientifically that the soil content of the suit land is not capable of being put to use for agricultural purpose as above. That takes us to the real legal meaning of 'agriculture' and 'agricultural land' as has been settled both by Courts and by jurists. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, the Supreme Court dealt with the question about the classification and the meaning of 'agriculture' and 'agricultural land'. It is held therein that:
"The term 'agriculture' in various dictionaries has been used both in the narrow sense of the cultivation of the field and the wider sense of comprising all activities in relation to the land including horticulture, forestry, breeding and rearing of livestock, dairying, butter and cheese making, husbandry, et cetera."
"Whether the narrower or the wider sense of the term "agriculture" should be adopted in a particular case depends not only upon the provisions of the various statutes in which the same occurs but also upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The definition of the term in one statute does not afford a guide to the construction of the same term in another statute and the sense in which the term has been understood in the several statutes does not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which the term should be understood generally."
The meaning that a land which is capable of being used for agricultural purpose is also incorporated in the said precedent.
17. Our own High Court in Smt. Meenakshamma v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, 1967 (1) An.W.R. 327 = AIR l997 A.P. 189 had an occasion to deal with the question. While following B. K. Sahas Roy's case and Mega Raj v. Alia Rakhi, 1947 P.C. 72 the meaning of 'agriculture' was accepted to be "performing operations like tilling of the land, sowing of seeds, etc" "It follows, therefore, that "agricultural land" is land which relates to or is connected with the aforesaid basic operations of agriculture."(Para 8) Furthermore, notwithstanding the operations of agriculture as above 'agricultural land' has been explained in the words of the Division Bench of this Court as hereunder:
"The general character of land, if it is to be considered independently of its connection with agriculture, would give little content to the adjective "agricultural" in the expression "agricultural land". If the capacity for being used for agriculture is a criterion, as observed by Bhagwati, J., in Rasikhal Chiman Lal v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (AIR 1965 Gujarat 259) even build ing sites lying idle would be agricultural lands "since it would always be possible to say of them that they are capable of being used for agricultural purpose.
Our High Court, in this Division Bench, has approved the dictum of the High Court of Mysore in Krishna Rao v. Third Wealth Tax Officer, AIR 1963 Mysore 111 which is as follows:
That the present characteristics and not the potentialities of a land are the proper criterion. If a land is originally used for purposes of agriculture or for purposes subservient to or allied to agriculture, it would be agricultural land. If it is not so used, it would not be agricultural land. The question how a land is ordinarily used would be one of fact depending on the evidence in each case. If, for instance, an agricultural land as we have interpreted above is left fallow in a particular year owing to adverse seasonal conditions or to some other special reason, it would not cease to be agricultural land."
Therefore, the clear expressions in the decisions supra should bring a land within the meaning of agricultural land as long as it is capable of being used for agricultural purpose unless the user has stopped for justifiable reasons. That is also consistent with the definition of 'agricultural land' Under Section 2 Sub-clause (1) (c) of the APTL Act.
18. When we are thinking of the distinction between agricultural land and non-agricultural land it may open up the scope to know the Agricultural Jurisprudence and the Agricultural Economics. The initial distinction to be drawn is between the agricultural land and non-agricultural land. This has nothing to do with urban property and rural property because within the rural property there exists both agricultural and non-agricultural properties. For instance the villagers select a place suitable for dwelling and maintenance of cattle for the purpose of proper supervision and cultivation of lands nearby or at a reasonable distance. This would be popularly called 'Grama Thana' (residential part of the village or the village proper). The revenue law or local laws was like the. village panchayat should determine mis. The area in the village excluding grama thana, roads, et cetera, could be normally styled as lands or agricultural lands. Therefore, the rest would be non-agricultural. In a country like India there could be a safe presumption that every bit of land is agricultural, unless qualified to be contra and this is the job of law-makers. The purpose or utility to which a land is ear-marked should scientifically determine its nature. In other words, from the commonsense point of view a land used for agricultural purpose should be called agricultural land and to follow the converse theory regarding non-agricultural land. The primary sense in which the term 'agriculture' is used is 'ager' a field' and if the term is understood only in that sense agriculture would be restricted only to cultivation of land in the strict sense of the term meaning thereby tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar operations on the land including the subsequent operations. Admittedly, as on the date of the acquisition of the suit land it was an agricultural land. The defendants have not come out with a case that it was never used as an agricultural land or that it is incapable of being used as an agricultural land. The continuation of the same assessment to the suit land as an agricultural land means mat it was recognised to be a land which was capable of being used for agricultural purposes. The subsequent event, merely by constructing the buildings for the purpose of the Government as above, could not be taken to have changed the character of the suit land as non-agricultural land. Therefore, this Court both on facts and law, is convinced mat the suit land was an agricultural land as on the date of the acquisition by the defendants and continued to be as such in law on acquisition and that it is not proved to be a land which is incapable of being used for agricultural purposes and, therefore, it is an agricultural land.
19. Mr. Baig, the learned advocate for the appellant, has contended that when once the suit land is found to be an agricultural land the plaintiff was entitled to get the patta transferred to his name by virtue of Section 54-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-F (for short 'the Act'), particularly when the defendants made a clear expression mat it was not required for the purpose for which it was acquired. The learned Government Pleader has contended that Section 54-A being a part of the Act in question has nothing to do with the provisions of me Hyderabad Land Acquisition Actor the Central Land Acquisition Act. According to him, this provision is intended in the context of the levy and collection of the land revenue and also the disposal of agricultural land within the intendment of the provision of the Act. In this regard,he has drawn the attention of this Court to the Preamble of the Act which is meant for regulating the matter relating to the land revenue and nothing more man that. He has also contended that even assuming mat Section 54-A of the Act can be understood to regulate the transfer of the patta to the owner regarding the land acquired for a public benefit, the facts and circumstances of this case do not attract the said provision. To appreciate the rival contentions in mis regard it may be useful to repeat the very provision:
"54-A PROCEDURE IN RESPECT OF LAND ACQUIRED FOR PURPOSE OF PUBLIC BENEFIT AND NO MORE REQUIRED:- When agricultural or pasturage land acquired for public benefit is no longer required, the patta there of shall be made In the name of the person or his successor from whom, such land was acquired, provided he consents to refund the compensation originally paid to him. If such person or his successor does not take the land, it may be given on patta Under Section 54." (special stress added) A simple and the grammatical analysis of this provision has the following ingredients: (1) An agricultural land or pasturage is a land acquired for public benefit is no longer required; (2) The pattadar from whom the land was acquired consents to refund the compensation originally paid to him; (3) The land so acquired shall be made in the name of the person or to his successor from whom such land was acquired if ingredients (1) and (2) as above are satisfied; (4) If such a person or successor does not take the land as above it may be given on patta Under Section 54 of the Act (which regulates the procedure for acquiring unoccupied land). Mr. Baig, the learned advocate, interprets this provision to mean that the moment the land was acquired for public benefit is no longer required for the very purpose for which it is acquired the patta of the land shall be mandatorily transferred to the person from whom such land was acquired. According to him, the expression 'no longer required' is meant to end with the non-availability of the purpose for which it is acquired and for no other purpose. The learned Government Pleader contends to the contrary. According to him, as long as the land is used for the public benefit or purpose and need not be the very purpose for which it was acquired, the provision is not attracted.
20. It is true that the contention of the learned Government Pleader in regard to the right of the Government or the authority acquiring the land to deal with the land in any manner conducive and the requirement of the acquiring authority is not restricted in law in view of the vesting of the land with such an authority or the Government. Because, according to him, the moment the possession of the land is delivered to such an authority or the Government the land and the title in the land vest in such an authority or the Government and, therefore, there cannot be any restriction to deal with the land in its own manner. In this regard, Mr. Murthy, learned Government Pleader, has depended upon Gulam Mustafa's case (1 supra). It is true that this is a direct decision propounded on the submission presented by the learned Government Pleader. The Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the implication of Section 5, Sub-clause (sic. Sub-section) (3), of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act 1309-F which is similar to Section 6, Sub-clause (sic. Sub-section) (3), of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. In that case, the land was acquired for the public purpose, namely, for holding a village market. The municipality which acquired the land sold away the excess land. It was contended that such a measure by the beneficiary of the acquisition is illegal and opposed to Section 5, Sub-clause (sic. Sub-section) (3), of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Article This contention was answered by the Supreme Court as hereunder:
"At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long after the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 5 (3) declaration." (Para 5 of the ruling) The law declared as above is direct on the question, namely, whether the land acquired for a public purpose Under Section 5, Sub-clause (Sub-section) 3, of the Act can be dealt with by the authority or the Government for any other public purpose by whom it is acquired including the alienation of the land so acquired. But the question is whether such a rule of law discharged by the Supreme Court as above has any bearing on the real question involved in this case, namely, whether by virtue of Section 54-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act 1317-F the defendants are mandatorily bound to transfer the patta in the name of the plaintiff. Patently the implications of Section 54-A of the Act was never the subject-matter of the pronouncement in Gukm Mustafa's case (1 supra) nor any interpretation of the rule is discharged in that regard. It has only laid down the general principle as above and not with reference to Section 54-A of the Act That is yet to be decided. No citation or authorship is cited by either side in regard to the interpretation of Section 54-A of the Act. Therefore, we are to still examine the effect of Section 54-A of the Act as is required in the facts and circumstances of this case.
21. Before adverting to the facts and circumstances of mis case to be governed or otherwise by Section 54-A of the Act, we are to ruminate over the fundamentals about such a provision occurring in one Act to be read in the context of the similar subject dealt with by another similar or corresponding Act. At the moment we are having three enactments relating to the acquisition of the property by the Government either for itself or for any beneficiary, namely, (1) The Land Acquisition Act 1894, (2) The Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act 1309 F, and (3) Section 54-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-F. The Land Acquisition Act 1894 is the law of the land in relation to the acquisition needed for public purpose and for companies and for determining the amount of compensation, el cetera (Preamble of the Act). The Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act 1309 F relates for a similar purpose in relation to the acquisition of the lands and payment of compensation within the erstwhile State of Hyderabad, The Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act 1317-F. is the local or the State Law relating to the land revenue in the State of Andhra Pradesh extended to Telangana area or operating on Telangana area. There cannot be any doubt that the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is the general law of land acquisition and the other two Acts are the special laws confined to a particular State and the particular area of the State. The settled law in regard to the general law and the special law prevailing over each other and when there are two special laws of the same State or the area prevailing over each other may be recorded in brief. That special law prevails over general law warrants no legal scanning as the universal doctrine Generalia Specialibus non-derogant is too well consolidated. The Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act and the Land Acquisition Act are the parametrical statutes. The former overrides the latter as a substituted law. So, both are telescoped into one law the former as a projectile. So the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act cannot be but general law of land acquisition in Hyderabad Province or State. The Hyderabad Land Revenue Act containing provisions relating to land acquisition or the allied topics should necessarily be a special law and to that extent prevails over the Land Acquisition Act. In such a situation, no question of harmonious construction of the provisions of the two enactments arises. There is no escape mat Section 54- A of the Land Revenue Act unquestionably should prevail over the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act and the Central Land Acquisition Act. Notwithstanding the necessity not arising for harmonious construction of the provisions in these three enactments, it is simple that when a particular provision in a special law dealing with the very topic or subject of the land acquisition of the local law the law appears to be that the said provision should be read along with the provisions of the similar statute. In other words, Section 54- A of the Land Revenue Act should be read as part and parcel of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act 1309-F. Now, if we can understand the real implication of law when once a land is acquired for a public purpose it vests with the authority or the Government for whose benefit it is acquired, such authority or the Government can deal with the matter in its own way in accordance with law. But such a right is subject to Section 54-A of the Land Revenue Act. To put it in a simple manner when a land so acquired is an agricultural land or a pasturage acquired for the public benefit, when once such a land acquired for the public benefit is no longer required the patta thereof shall be made in the name of the person from whom such land was acquired. All the rights of the acquiring authority is thus subject to the implications of Section 54-A of the Act. The law-makers have visualised that if an agricultural land or pasturage is acquired for a public benefit and mat purpose of the acquisition is frustrated or not fulfilled there is no gainsaying by the authority acquiring the land that it should be kept idle without allowing its utility for such purpose and thus mandates that it should go back to the person from whom it was acquired so that the utility cannot be lost. However, as rightly contended by the learned Government Pleader, such a contingency will occur only if the ingredients of Section 54-A of the Act are fulfilled. In the present case if the plaintiff establishes that the defendants did no longer require the suit land for the public benefit for which it was acquired, it is open to him to get back the patta of the suit land transferred to his name. Then a serious question comes as to what is the meaning of 'public benefit' and the expression 'no longer required' used in the provision. Mr. Murthy, the learned Government Pleader, has made the best efforts to demonstrate that as long as the utility of the land for the public benefit is adopted by the defendants as in the present case, namely, for the construction of the hostels by the Social Welfare Department, the requirement of the land for the public benefit continues and the expression 'no longer required' used in the provision has no special meaning in such circumstances because the moment it was proposed by the Collector that the said land could be used for constructing the hostels by the Social Welfare Department it is ordered by the Government. Mr. Baig, the learned advocate for the appellant, has a different approach of the matter altogether. According to him, the expression 'no longer required' has a bearing on the time at which the real purpose for which it was acquired has ceased to exist.
22. In the nature of the rival contentions as above this Court has the task to interpret Section 54-A of the Act to bring out the true intention of the lawmakers. The expression 'public benefit' used in the provision is synonym to 'public purpose' Under Sections 3(f), 4 & 6of L.A. Act as has been rightly conceded by both the learned advocates. Perhaps the expression 'benefit is wider and comprehensive than the word 'purpose'. Therefore, the expression 'public benefit' in the provision should be understood within the meaning of 'public purpose' Under Section 3, Sub-clause (f), of the Central Land Acquisition Act 1894 regarding which there appears to be no equivalent definition in the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act. Section 3 of that Act only concerns with the notification to be issued for acquisition of the land for Government purpose and the public benefit: Under the circumstances there may not be any impediment to make use of me definition of 'public purpose' Under Section 3 (f) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. In this case, the suit land was acquired for constructing a maternity ward which is obviously for public purpose and that was also conclusively established. The change of the purpose for constructing hostels for girls by the Social Welfare Department it can be understood mat it was apart of the social welfare measure. Technically speaking, the purpose to construct any building for girls by Social Welfare Department may not be brought within any of the provisions of the 'public purpose' Under Section 3, Sub-clause (f), of the Land Acquisition Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, this definition of 'public purpose' is inclusive definition and, therefore, cannot be taken as an exhaustive one. The learned Government Pleader has supported himself with the pronouncement of the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab, which deals with the question of the parametres of the definition of 'public purpose' Under Section 3 (f) of the Act as contended by him. The majority of the Beneh has held that the definition of 'public purpose' Under Section 3 (f) of the Land Acquisition Act being an inclusive one is not compendious and, therefore, is not useful in ascertaining the ambit of that expression. On the other hand, it was held that:
"Broadly speaking the expression 'public purpose' would, however, include a purpose in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned." (Paragraph 24) It was hastened to add:
"Public purpose is bound to vary with the times and the prevailing conditions in a given locality and, therefore, it would not be a practical proposition even to attempt a comprehensive definition of it. It is because of this mat the Legislature has left it to the Government to say what is a public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for a public purpose." (Paragraph 31) The law is also declared that it is for the Government to conclude as conclusive evidence about the nature of the public purpose involved, however, after objections Under Section 5-A before making a declaration Under Section 6-A of the Act. When the Government thought of constructing the building for girls in the Social Welfare Department it cannot be termed as the purpose private one and it should be obviously for public purpose. Constitutionally, the social welfare activities are part of the Directive Principles of State Policy - Article 46 of the Constitution, as rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader. The social welfare method is the part of Social Justice enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution. It cannot be doubted that a social welfare measure should be obviously a public purpose. When the defendants as the organs of the Government and the beneficiary of the acquisition of the suit land thought of constructing the building for the hostels of the girls as a part of social welfare measure it should be brought within the meaning of 'public benefit' or 'public purpose' because it was in the general interest of the community, namely, the sections deserving the social welfare measure and at any rate not of a particular interest of the society or individuals. To that extent, the act of the defendants in changing the 'public benefit' one from Constructing a maternity ward to that of constructing the building for the girls' hostel as a social welfare measure should be brought within the meaning of 'public benefit'. But that is not the end of the matter. We are still to know the real meaning of the expression 'no longer required for the public benefit' in Section 54-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act (hereinafter should be styled as 'the Act')
23. The expression 'no longer required' in Section 54-A of the Act has a simple meaning. It must be a requirement for a reasonable period for which the purpose of acquisition exists. Otherwise, the use of the expression 'no longer required' was not necessary in the provision. When the law-makers drafted and brought into force the provision they were mindful of the legal implications that when a land (agricultural and pasturage) is acquired for a particular public benefit it was to be fulfilled within a reasonable period depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case or else to mandatorily transfer the patta to the owner or the person from whom the land was acquired. In that context, the meaning of 'no longer' should be nothing more than no longer than the very purpose for which the land was acquired. The very purpose Or the benefit for which the land was acquired should be nothing but the very notification issued Under Section 3 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act equivalent to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the general Land Acquisition Act. Otherwise, the use of the expression 'no longer required' becomes otiose or redundant or absurd. If any other meaning is permitted for such an expression it would tantamount to the requirement in art infinity or without any bounded time. The simple question is whether 'no longer required' can be left to the unfettered discretion of the Government to decide about it whenever they wanted it. That may not be the true implication of the provision. ReadingSection54-A of the Act in a simple grammatical manner would yield to the only meaning that when once the public benefit for which the land was acquired ceases after a reasonable time there is no gainsaying for the Government or the authority acquiring the land to retain the land but to transfer the patta to the person from whom it was acquired. Putting upon any other interpretation or meaning to such an expression would be negate of the real intendment of the Legislature. In the present case, the moment the defendants felt that the suit land was not required for constructing the maternity ward, it was at that stage they were to think whether the time-bound programme for such acquisition was reasonable or not. The expression of the Land Acquisition Officer that it was no longer required was a real and true evidence of things to show that the land was not actually required to construct the maternity ward and, in fact, such a purpose was not fulfilled. In the context, 'no longer required' in the present set of facts and circumstances only means that when once the defendants decided that the suit land was not required for constructing the maternity ward mat completed the purpose of Section 54-A of the Act that it was really no longer required for the real benefit for which it was acquired, namely, for construction of the maternity ward. At that moment only the defendants were bound to transfer the patta to the plaintiff. If the construction put up by the learned Government Pleader upon Section 54-A of the Act is accepted this Court feels that it is better that Section 54-A is either repealed or given up as a part of the Act in question. Therefore, the plaintiff has established in this case that he was entitled to get the patta transferred to his name on the defendants no longer requiring the suit land for the public benefit, namely the construction of the maternity ward.
24. The learned trial Judge, without due consideration of these legal implications arising out of the factual situation, wrongly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the decree as prayed for. This Court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as claimed in the suit.
25. Although the plea of bar of limitation was taken in the trial Court it has been answered in the negative and justifiably too. The suit is filed within the period of limitation as the period within which the proceedings were being pursued in this Court in writ proceedings are to be excluded by virtue of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and in this situation it would be within the period of three years from the date of acquisition of the cause of action by virtue of the residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it must be held that the suit is not barred by limitation.
26. Then comes the question as to what should, happen to the change of events. Admittedly, the defendants have constructed the hostels' buildings to run the two girls' hostels wherein obviously investing sufficient public money. Mr. Baig, the learned advocate for the plaintiff, is not able to say as to what is to be done in view of the changed circumstances. It is true that as held by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, the relief cannot be always moulded under Order 7 Rule 7 of CPC merely by taking note of subsequent events except to grant the relief as per the right of the parties existing on the date of the suit. But here is a case wherein by the time the suit was filed the constructions put up by the defendants on the suit land had already been completed. It cannot be held to be totally illegal as the measure was for the public benefit and not for a private purpose. It is in that situation this Court becomes the Court of Equity to adjust the rights of the parties. It is well known that the Courts of Law in India are Courts of Equity ultimately because it is on the pedestal of DHARMA or Equity the whole system of Justice is expected to be dispensed with herein. Although Equity follows Law in view of the universal maxim 'Acqustus Sequitur legem' the Law can never be inconsistent with Justice. Moreover, such a situation is sought to be met with by the rule of equity enshrined in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Murthy, the learned Government Pleader, submits that technically speaking Section51 of the Transfer of Property Act may not be applicable to the present situation as the defendants had rightly acquired the suit land for a public purpose and had become the absolute owner after it had vested in it and acquired the land for a public benefit or the purpose in the circumstances stated above and, therefore, the rule may not be operated in stricto sensu. Mr. Baig, the learned advocate, submits that even assuming that the provision may not be applicable in its technical expression, the principle therein has to be borrowed and applied to the situation to meet the ends of justice. This Court had an occasion to deal with a similar question in R.B. Bharata Charyulu v. R.B. Alivelu Manga Thayaru, 1996 (1) An.W.R. 456-1996 (1) ALD 922 recently where it was found that the wife was the owner of the site and the husband was the owner of the building, lite implications of Section 51 were applied to render the true justice between the parties. In substance, it has been held therein that the rule of equity has been codified Under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act and it is not exhaustive or absolute. The ratio decidendi flowing therefrom have been pithily edited by the learned author of the journal in the following words:
"'Rule of equity' has been the part of this provision. Whether the 'rule of equity' is borrowed from English Law or not, it has been codified Under Section 51 of the Act. It is subject to the stipulations in the very provision. It is true that as the expression goes under the provision, it is intended for the benefit of the transferee of immovable property when he makes any improvement on the property believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled thereto. It does not spell out as to what should happen to the other party to the document or any other party who is going to be affected by the operation of such a 'rule of equity'. Therefore, it appears that the 'rule of equity' codified Under Section 51 of the Act, to meet such a situation, is not exhaustive or absolute."
"'Rule of equity' is a part of natural justice. In other words, it is only a part of portion of natural justice, a portion of which may be codified now and then by human beings. It is a myth to think that the entire 'rule of equity' can be codified. It is said to be humane when human beings apply for human beings, in human way and divine when they traverse beyond the subjective core and act within the objective mind and heart of a 'Sthithapragna' within the meaning of Chapter II of the SONG CELESTIAL - BHAGAVAD GITA OF LORD SRI KRISHNA. In mis context, it may be necessary to point out that the 'rule of equity' whether in England or India or elsewhere in the universe may not be different in the sense that it is going to be applied for human beings in a particular situation depending upon the facts and circumstances. It cannot be a technical rule. However, it is subject to certain restrictions as per the settled principles. Under the circumstances, this Court may not be wrong in saying that the 'rule of equity' or 'doctrine of equity' is not exhaustively codified Under Section51 of the Act and this Courtis entitled to apply such a principle to the facts and circumstances of this case also to meet the ends of justice. There is one more illustration to support such an inference. There may be many instances where mere may be improvements by certain persons although the property belongs to others. The illustrations may be plenty, but the very common illustrations are by mortgagee, intermeddlers, lessees, agents, et cetera. Under Section 108 (B) of the Transfer of Property Act, as rightly propounded by the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent, the rule mat any improvement forms part of the soil has been enshrined. Therein, the implication is mat if during the continuance of the lease any accession is made to the property, such accession shall be deemed to be comprised in the lease itself to go to the benefit of the lessor. However, by operating the 'rule of equity' in such a situation, the law has allowed option to the tenant or the lessee to remove the superstructure before the delivery of possession and not thereafter. That is made amply clear in Section 108 (h) of the Act. In other words, the 'rule of equity' has been codified in the form of statute here and there to meet the ends of justice. If we logically think mat the whole 'rule of equity' applies to only such a situation as has been codified either Under Section 51 or Section 108 of the Act, perhaps, the results may be disastrous and may lead to injustice. Thus the expression 'transferee' Under Section 51 of the T.P. Act need not be confined to an alienee in the strict technical sense, but it should be understood to be any person acting under same colour of title and possession or bona fide belief and who improves it with such a bona fide belief. The law settled in such a situation is that such a person improving the property on eviction be compensated in two ways, either (1) by being paid the value of the improvements, or (2) by buying out the better title at a valuation of the property irrespective of the improvements. It is settled that the option as to the mode of compensation is that of the evictor, who can either pay the value of the improvement and take the land or sell the land instead of evicting him." (Para 22) "The defendant knowing fully well that the site belongs to his wife, however, with bona fide belief under the circumstances stated above risked to put up the construction. The plaintiff allowed the defendant to put the construction, perhaps with the hope that ultimately she may get the benefit of it in view of her status as the wife of the defendant. In other words, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can be deprived of their right to their respective properties, namely, the site and the building." (Para 23) "If we borrow the 'rule of equity' from Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act which is already extracted above, it is clear that the amount to be paid or secured in respect of such improvement shall be the estimated value thereof at the time of the eviction. In other words, in case if the plaintiff has to be put into possession of the site by passing a decree, it must be given the first option to have the building thereon, by paying the amount or the estimated value for that, prevailing at the time of eviction and not at the time of improvement. If she fails to avail the same, then equity will move towards the defendant wherein he will have to pay the estimated value of the site prevailing at the time of eviction and not at the time of acquisition.
27. Thus presuming that the plaintiff may perhaps be entitled to get the possession of the suit land (upon which the building exists now) by virtue of the transfer of patta in his favour Under Section 54-A of the Land Revenue Act, the consequences may amount to eviction of the defendants from the suit land or the suit property. The defendants have not only put up the constructions on the suit land which amounts to improvement but also they are running the hostels for girls belonging to the scheduled castes. In such a situation, merely asking the defendants to hand over the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff by demolishing the structure would be not only against justice but would also be in a way unconstitutional as the whole purpose is to forbear the Directive Principles of State Policy in the interests of the persons belonging to the scheduled castes. Therefore, it is proper that either the plaintiff should get the compensation to the suit land on a particular date fictionally deeming to be the date of eviction (or) the defendants should be given an option to retain the suit land, though the plaintiff can be given option to purchase the construction of the building on the suit land if the defendants fail to exercise their option by paying the appropriate compensation on a particular date. Only then the true sense of justice can be brought home.
28. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Sub Judge are set aside. But the suit shall stand decreed as follows: The plaintiff shall be entitled to get the patta of the suit land transferred to his name technically, but instead of that, the plaintiff shall be entitled to get the compensation in regard to the suit lands from the defendants which shall be the market value of the same as on to-day deeming it to be a fictional date of eviction. The market value shall be ascertained by appointment of a Commissioner by the Executing Court. The initial cost of commission shall be met by the plaintiff in such a situation to be reimbursed by the defendants ultimately. In this regard, the option to have the benefit or the relief shall be for the defendants to be exercised within three months from to-day by filing a written option into the trial Court. If the defendants fail to exercise such an option within the stipulated period, the plaintiff would be entitled to exercise the option by filing a written option within two months thereafter into the trial Court to purchase the building or the construction existing on the suit land regarding which the market value shall be ascertained as on to-day by appointment of a Commissioner in the same manner as above. The defendants shall also pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout. This right of the plaintiff as above shall be subject to his not pressing to get the compensation already awarded and to refund any compensation if he is already paid or to be adjusted out of the total compensation to be paid to him ultimately. The defendants are entitled to have the first option as a whole.