Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Dr. Sankar Prasad Mukherjee vs Maulana Abul Kalam Ajad University & Ors on 16 May, 2019
Author: Sahidullah Munshi
Bench: Sahidullah Munshi
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble Justice SAHIDULLAH MUNSHI
W.P. No.11280(W) of 2018
Dr. Sankar Prasad Mukherjee
... Petitioner
- Versus -
Maulana Abul Kalam Ajad University & Ors.
... Respondents
Mr. Srijib Chakraborty, Mr. J.D. Roy ... For the petitioner Mr. Kallol Basu, Mr. Nilanjan Pal ... For the College Authority Mr. Suranjan Das Gupta ... For the University Heard on : 18.01.19, 30.01.19, 08.02.19, 13.03.19 & 08.04.19. Judgment on : May 16, 2019.
Sahidullah Munshi, J.:-
This writ petition along with other two being W.P. No. 5867(W) of 2018 and W.P. No. 5868(W) of 2018 have been assigned before this Court on the request for reference by the Hon'ble Single Bench.
After hearing the learned counsels for the parties extensively this writ petition has come up for final decision to consider whether the orders impugned in this writ petition issued by the respondent no.5 are in gross violation of the authority of the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Service, Leave and Conduct, Rules as also the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Society (HETCS). A prayer has therefore, been made for setting aside and for quashing the show cause notice dated 26th September, 2017, the order of suspension dated 3rd October, 2017 and a decision forming a three-member enquiry committee dated 26th September, 2017 to look into the purported charges levelled in the show cause issued by the respondent no.4 and the report of the purported enquiry committee dated 27th October, 2017 and to allow the petitioner to resume his duties in the post in question.
The termination letter dated 23rd March, 2018 has been issued by Dr. Abhijit Maity, Secretary of HETCS and addressed to the petitioners. The said Abhijit Maity is respondent no.5 herein. The termination letter shows that petitioner's service was no longer required with effect from 23rd March, 2018 and the said termination with one month's advance salary of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) only, in lieu of one month's notice has been deposited in the petitioner's account.
At the beginning, Mr. Bose appearing for the respondent no.5 has raised a question on maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. He submitted that the institution is a private institution and having not been financed by the State it does not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution and the writ proceeding is not maintainable. Mr. Bose has relied on various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Submitted that the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College is a society and no writ petition is maintainable against its decisions. The decisions were relied on by Mr. Basu are as follows:
• Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktarjee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. - Vs. - V.R. Rudani and Ors. reported in (1989)2 SCC 691;
• Pradeep Kumar Biswas - Vs. - Indian Institute of Chemical Biology reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111;
• Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. -Vs. - State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported in AIR 2005 SC 752;
• Official Liquidator -Vs. - Dayanand and Ors. reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1;
• Srikanta Maity -Vs. - The State of West Bengal & Ors. (unreported) W.P. 1407 (W) of 2008;
• Sonia Maheswari -Vs. - State of West Bengal & Ors. (unreported) W.P. 18224 (W) of 2018 decided on 10.01.2019;
• Ramakrishna Mission & Anr. -Vs. - Kago Kunya & Ors. decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2394 of 2019 decided on 28.02.2019 In Andi Mukta Sadguru (supra) paragraph 15 has been relied on by Mr. Basu to argue that a private body is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The decision, however, decides otherwise. In the said decision question arose whether writ petition filed by retrenched teachers of a private aided college (a public trust) affiliated to university, seeking writ of mandamus for compelling the college management to pay them terminal benefits and arrears of salary due, it was held that writ is maintainable. However, the Court held that writ would not be maintainable for specific performance of contractual services or declaration for continuation of service in paragraph 15 of the said decision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held "if the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions of the mandamus.
But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It has to be appreciated that the appellants-trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as government aid. Public money paid as government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. So are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the University takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a private character. It has super-added protection by University decisions creating legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. When there is existence of this relationship mandamus cannot be refused to the aggrieved party." Although, this decision has been relied on by Mr. Basu to show that the writ is not maintainable but the ratio decided in the said decision goes against his proposition. The term 'authority' used for Article 226 in the context must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. This may apply to any other person or body performing public duty. The relevant consideration whether writ will lie or not against a body is the nature of the duty imposed on the body and the function being discharged by it.
In Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) Mr. Basu has relied on paragraph 40 and submitted that writ is not maintainable. Paragraph 40 is set out below:
"40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be - whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article
12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State."
The fact in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) is not identical with the fact involved in the present case. In Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) whether Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is a State within the meaning of Article 12 or not, the Supreme Court held - merely because Prime Minister exercises his function and power as Ex Officio President of the society, it cannot be said that CSIR is a State within the meaning of Article 12. But in the case at hand I have already pointed out that the college is affiliated to the University and governed by statutes and the parameters laid down by the University. Therefore, this decision does not help Mr. Basu.
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) and Official Liquidator (supra) have been cited by Mr. Basu to submit that when a Court differs with the judgment of another Court, what should be the course of action. These two decisions have been relied on by Mr. Basu to show the binding nature of a decision where it has been held that a Bench of Two learned Judges should follow the decision of a Bench of three learned Judges and if a Bench of two learned Judges was inclined not to do so then the proper course for it to adopt would be (i) to refer the matter before it to a Bench of three learned Judges, and
(ii) to set out the reasons why it could not agree the earlier judgment. This decision has been cited by Mr. Basu to show that the referring Judge instead of suggesting for placing the matter before a learned Single Judge, he should have suggested for constituting a larger Bench where the matter could have been decided. He has referred to paragraphs 7 and 11 in the decision of Central Board (supra) and paragraphs 65 and 71 of Official Liquidator (supra).
Srikanta Maity (supra) has been cited by Mr. Basu to argue that writ is not maintainable in the present case where it is held that "persons in their respective capacities in State and AICTE/UGC as members of Governing Body do not lead to an inference that their membership in it would be cumulative facts to say officially the Institution is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under control of Government. Control, if at all to be inferred, is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise but it would not serve to make the Institute a State or other authority for it to be amenable to writ jurisdiction." However, this proposition is not the ultimate proposition which will be borne out from the later part of my decision.
Sonia Maheswari (supra) has been cited by Mr. Basu to argue that a writ is not maintainable in the present case, although, the fact of the case is different from the fact-situation of the present case. In the said decision, the preliminary objection was raised as regards maintainability of the writ petition by a teacher of a private institution run by a managing committee. The school is a self-financed institution and does not receive any aid/grant/support from the Government. In the said school also there was no State control far less, deep and pervasive control over the school. Over such bundle of facts, the Hon'ble Single Bench of this Court sustained the preliminary objection and held that the writ as filed against such institution was not maintainable but the observation was made on consideration of various other judgments including Federal Bank Ltd. - Vs. - Sagar Thomas & Ors., reported in (2003) 10 SCC 733. The ratio in the said judgment supports the case of the petitioner here as it has been held by His Lordship in paragraph 22 that - "from a conjoint reading of the aforesaid decisions and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra), what emerges is that an expansive meaning has to be given to the word 'Authority' as used in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A private body may also be treated as an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution if it discharges function of a public nature, whether under statutory mandate or otherwise. However, would that mean that every action or inaction of such a private body would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court? The answer, in my opinion, must be in the negative. All actions of such a private body do not have public implications. In Srikanta Maity - Vs. - The State of West Bengal (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court, after discussing several decisions of the Apex Court, came to the conclusion that in matters of service conditions between the employees and the employer, where the employer is a private institution, the remedy lies in private law. A writ petition is not maintainable in such cases. The same learned Judge in the case of Santa Kanungo - Vs. - The State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra) came to the conclusion that the petitioner in that case could not seek to enforce her right to the promoted post by application of public law. The learned Judge discussed the Apex Court's decision in Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) and came to the conclusion that what was laid down in the case was that the proposition that a writ petition would not be maintainable merely because the respondent institution is purely an unaided private educational institution, is not a correct legal proposition.
Therefore, the strict adherence of the rule of amenability of writ jurisdiction is not the test whether the institution is in public domain or private domain but it should be the test whether the State has got any control over such institution. In the present case, the institution is controlled by statute through University.
Mr. Basu lastly relied on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramakrishna Mission & Anr. (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Ramakrishna Mission would not constitute an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution. In the said decision, the first respondent joined the Ramakrishna Mission Hospital as a general duty worker. He was regularised with effect from 1st August, 1980 and then he was promoted to the substantive post of nursing aid. He was made permanent on 13th April, 1984. Subsequently, on 31st December, 2005, he was promoted as an office assistant with effect from 1st October, 2005. On 31st January, 2015, the hospital informed the first respondent that he would be retiring from service on 24th March, 2015 in accordance with service rules, consequent upon the completion of 35 years of service. The first respondent filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and challenged the above communication and, ultimately, an order was passed against Ramakrishna Mission, who went up before the Apex Court and raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition stating that Ramakrishna Mission nor its hospital can be said to be 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In that context, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that writ was not maintainable. The decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramakrishna Mission (supra) cannot be made available in the present case where the facts are distinguishable. Even in the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 33 held that contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that there is an exception to this principle where contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision, writ would be maintainable.
Mr Bhattacharya, in support of his submission that writ is maintainable against the college authority, has relied on the following decisions :-
• Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr. - Vs.
- Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr., reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156;
• Delhi Transport Corporation - Vs. - D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & Ors., reported in AIR 1991 SC 101;
• Zee Telefilms Ltd - Vs. - Union of India & Ors., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 649;
• Belly Sankarpur Rajib Gandhi Memorial Ayurvedic College and Hospital - Vs. - State of West Bengal & Ors., an unreported judgment in M.A.T. 239 of 2016.
Relying on Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr.
- Vs. - Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. (supra) Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that if a company is owned by Government and in case of termination of service of its employee, writ is maintainable because the company will be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. He relied on paragraphs 52, 97 and 112 of the decision those are set out hereinbelow:-
"52. In Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others etc., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 79 the Regional Engineering College which was established and administered and managed by a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898, was held to be "the State"
within the meaning of Article 12. In that case the Court said (at page 91):
"It is undoubtedly true that the corporation is a distinct juristic entity with a corporate structure A of its own and it carries on its functions on business principles with a certain amount of autonomy which is necessary as well as useful from the point of view of effective business management, but behind the formal ownership which is cast in the corporate mould, the reality is very much the deeply pervasive presence of the Government. It is really the Government which acts through the instrumentality or agency of the corporation and the juristic veil of corporate personality worn for the purpose of convenience of management and administration cannot be allowed to obliterate the true nature of the reality behind which is the Government. Now it is obvious that if a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional law as the Government itself, though in the eye of the law it would be a distinct and independent legal entity. If the Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional limitations, it must follow a fortiorari that the Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation should equally be subject to the same limitations."(Emphasis supplied.) After referring to various authorities, the court summarized the relevant tests which are to be gathered from the Inter- national Airport Authority of India's case as follows (at pages 96-7 of the Reports) : (SCC p.737, para 9) (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.
(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character.
(3) It may also be a relevant factor......whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected.
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.
(5) If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.
(6) "Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.
97. Rule 9(i) confers upon the Corporation the power to terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice in writing or in lieu thereof to pay him the equivalent of three months' basic pay and dearness allowance. A similar regulation framed by the West Bengal State Electricity Board was described by this Court in West Bengal State Electricity Board and others v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and others (at SCC p. 118, para 4) as :
". . . a naked 'hire and fire' rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer-employee relationship is fast approaching. Its only parallel is to be found in the Henry VIII clause so familiar to administrative lawyers."
As all lawyers may not be familiar with administrative law, we may as well explain that "the Henry VIII clause" is a provision occasionally found in legislation conferring delegated legislative power, giving the delegate the power to amend the delegating Act in order to bring that Act into full operation or otherwise by Order to remove any difficulty, and at times giving power to modify the provisions of other Acts also. The Committee on Ministers' Powers in its report submitted in 1932 (Cmd. 4060) pointed out that such a provision had been nicknamed "the Henry VIII clause" because "that King is regarded popularly as the impersonation of executive autocracy". m e Committee's Report (at page 61) criticised these clauses as a temptation to slipshod work in the preparation of bills and recommended that such provisions should be used only where they were justified before Parliament on compelling grounds. Legislation enacted by Parliament in the United Kingdom after 1932 does not show that this recommendation had any particular effect.
112. In the result, both these appeals fail and are dismissed but the order passed by the Calcutta High Court is modified by substituting for the declaration given by it a declaration that clause (i) of Rule 9 of the "Service, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1979" of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as being opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution to the extent that it confers upon the Corporation the right to terminate the employment of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice in writing or by paying him the equivalent of three months' basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu of such notice."
The ratio of the decision is applicable in the present case. In the said decision, the writ petition involved of question whether a writ is maintainable by a person whose service in the company was terminated on three months' notice on either side or on payment of three months' pay plus D.A. to the employee. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition. The Corporation filed appeals before the Supreme Court. The main questions for determination were (i) whether the appellant-Corporation was an instrumentality of the State so as to be covered by Articles 12 and 36 of the Constitution and (ii) whether an unconscionable term in a contract of employment entered into with the Corporation was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act and violative of Article 14 and as such whether Rule 19(i) which formed a part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees to whom the said Rules applied, was void? The Hon'ble Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court with slight modification and dismissed the Corporation's appeals. While affirming the writ petitioner's contention against the company, the Hon'ble Apex Court came to a conclusion that for the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution, a Court must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State. According to the Hon'ble Apex Court, if the instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government company as defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, it can be presumed to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. In the present case, the termination of the petitioner has occasioned due to arbitrary act of the college authorities which authority is affiliated to University under the control of appropriate statute. Therefore, ratio of the decision supports the petitioners' case and the writ can be held to be maintainable.
Delhi Transport Corporation (supra) is a decision of Constitution Bench where the Hon'ble Apex Court on the anvil of Articles 14, 16, 19(1)(g), 21 and 311 and that of the provisions of Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952, on the issue of confirmation, confirmed employees, it has been held that the Management cannot have unrestricted and unqualified power of terminating the services of the employees. The question involved in the said decision was whether the clauses permitting the employers or the authorities concerned to terminate the employment of the employees by giving reasonable notice or pay in lieu of notice period. In the appeals before the Supreme Court filed by the Corporation dealing with the question whether (i) the appellant-Corporation was an instrumentality of the State so as to be covered by Articles 12 and 36 of the Constitution and (ii) an unconscionable term in a contract of employment entered into with the Corporation was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act and violative of Article 14 and as such whether Rule 9(i) which formed a part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees to whom the said Rules applied, was void, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the company being a Government company within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India has to comply with the rights embodied in Part III of the Constitution and the Directive Principles in Part IV of the Constitution. It was further held that by extending the executive power of the Union and each of the States to the carrying on any trade or business. Ultimately, by majority decision, the appeal was allowed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. This decision also helps the contention raised by Mr. Bhattachayra.
In Zee Telefilms (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court, considering other decisions on the field, held that when a private body exercises its public function even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33 are set out below :-
"30. However, it is true that the Union of India has been exercising certain control over the activities of the Board in regard to organising cricket matches and travel of the Indian team abroad as also granting of permission to allow the foreign teams to come to India. But this control over the activities of the Board cannot be construed as an administrative control. At best this is purely regulatory in nature and the same according to this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case is not a factor indicating a pervasive State control of the Board.
31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket. These activities can be said to be akin to public duties or State functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which is much wider than Article 32.
32. This Court in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. vs. V.R. Rudani & Ors. (1989 2 SCC 691) has held :
"Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to "any person or authority". The term "authority" used in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12 which is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article
32. Article 226 confers powers on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied."
33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226. Therefore, merely because a non- governmental body exercises some public duty that by itself would not suffice to make such body a State for the purpose of Article 12. In the instant case the activities of the Board do not come under the guidelines laid down by this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case, hence there is force in the contention of Mr. Venugopal that this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is not maintainable."
Mr. Bhattacharya has also relied on a decision in Belly Sankarpur (supra) wherein in a similar situation a Division Bench of our Court has held that college affiliated to the University of Calcutta and a college imparting education is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The argument that the termination of the writ petitioner was not a public function as he is an employee of the society cannot be accepted. The ratio of the said decision squarely applies in the present fact- situation of this case. Therefore, there would be no wrong in holding that the writ is well maintainable challenging the arbitrary decision of termination of the petitioner's service by the college authority.
According to Mr. Bhattacharya, in Belly Sankarpur (supra) relying on Jannet Jaypal the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College must be termed within the meaning of 'other authority' of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Mr. Bhattacharya has drawn attention to the first regulation of the university which has been framed in exercise of the power conferred by Sub- section-3 (6)(e)(D) of Section-25 of the West Bengal University of Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the 'said Act'). Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that as per the said regulation the college has been affiliated to the university. As per regulation 8(f) the institution and/or college applying for affiliation, shall have to satisfy the university among others that the governing body of the institution/college is fully capable of financial management, without any liability to the university. The institution/college shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that it is fully capable of meeting its financial liabilities from its own resources. Notwithstanding the above observation, the West Bengal University of Technology would, in no case, bear the responsibility for financial liabilities in relation to the institution/college. According to Mr. Bhattacharya since it is the condition for affiliation it cannot be expected that the government shall render any financial assistance to the college. But ultimate control of the institution is under the West Bengal University of Technology Act, 2000 through the university. All other conditions under Regulation 8 have also been complied with by the college. Therefore, there can be no reason to hold that the college is not controlled by the statute.
Although, I am independently deciding whether or not the writ petition is maintainable in the facts of the present case yet I cannot ignore a fact which has been disclosed in paragraph 25 of the writ petition and in support whereof an order by a Hon'ble Single Bench of this Court has been annexed as Annexure P-
16. A writ petition being WP 27999(w) of 2017 was filed by the respondent no.4 in the present writ petition namely, Professor Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya against Maulana Abul Kalam Azad University and Technology and others which was defended by the then Principal and the college itself. Such writ petition was filed against the college authority inasmuch as the banker with whom the college and the society had been maintaining their account, was not allowing the Principal of the college to operate such bank account. In the said writ petition the Hon'ble Single Bench of this Court directed the University to appoint a Drawing and Disbursing Officer for disbursement of salaries of the teaching and non-teaching staff to meet the day-to-day expenditure. The Hon'ble Single Bench further directed the respondent no.1, University to enquire in the matter by a team and on the basis of the report of enquiry team to give a hearing to the interested parties and thereafter if it were found that an administrator should be appointed for smooth functioning of the said college, they would do the needful. The University would be at liberty to take leave of the Court for appointment of such administrator. On perusal of the said order dated 19th December, 2017 it appears that the writ petitioner Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya although, urged before the Court that the college authority was not entitled to reject his prayer for extension of the probation period and on behalf of the petitioner a prayer was made to stay the operation of the letter dated 23rd September, 2017 which was the letter by which the said Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharay was not allowed to continue as Principal inasmuch as his prayer for confirmation as Principal was disallowed. However, the said prayer was not allowed by this Court. The Court, however, did not grant any order of stay as prayed for. Rather the University was directed to enquire into the matter by an enquiry team. This order has been relied on by the petitioner herein to show that no appeal has been filed against the said order either by the respondent no.4 herein or by the respondent no.3 or the respondent no.5 who is vehemently opposing that the writ petition is not maintainable. This is another limb of argument by Mr. Bhattacharya to submit that the respondents took a volte-face at the present while they themselves sought relief before the writ Court only. Such double stand of the authority should be condemned and deprecated.
In my view, whether or not writ is maintainable, it depends upon the nature of function discharged by the institution in question. If it is found that the institution discharges a public function certainly it comes within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution. In the present case it has been found that the HETCS has been affiliated to the University of Health Science and provisions of the West Bengal University of Technology Act, 2000 passed by the West Bengal Legislature published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary on 20th July, 2000. Undisputedly, the college is affiliated to the University namely, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad University of Technology and the petitioner Shankar Prasad Mukherjee was the emeritus professor of the said college. There is no dispute that the college has been imparting education which is a public function in a larger field. If such institution is seen to have discharged public function at a larger field of the education with responsibility and has been affiliated to the University under the aforesaid Act of 2000, there should not be any reason to hold that the college does not come within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
A supplementary affidavit has been affirmed by Dr. Shankar Prasad Mukherjee on 8th February, 2019 to bring on record certain documents which are directly connected with the instant writ petition. In the said supplementary affidavit the petitioner has disclosed a lease deed dated 7th October, 2004 by virtue of which the Hon'ble Governor of West Bengal was pleased to grant lease of a plot of land measuring 0.342 acre comprised in R.S. plot no. 1550(p), 1502(p), corresponding to L.R. plot nos. 3002, 3003, J.L. no. 18 situated in Mouja Kulihandi, P.S. Chinsurah, Dist. Hooghly in favour of the respondent no.3/college. Such lease was granted in pursuance of an order of Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal vide order no.225- GI(M)/2L/36/01 in terms of the application made by the college authority. Such grant was made only for a paltry sum paid by the college authority. Therefore, the petitioners submitted that while government has provided land to the respondent no.3 to set up the Engineering College it cannot be said that there is no finance for the college by the State. By the supplementary affidavit the petitioner has also relied on a letter dated 14th February, 2006 issued by the Joint Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government of West Bengal addressed to the Director of Technical Education, Government of West Bengal informing that the Hon'ble Governor was pleased to sanction and allowed a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- to five institutions at the rate of Rs.10 lakh each to provide grants-in-aid for development of their infrastructure during financial year 2005-06. It has been further mentioned that the said order was issued with the concurrence of Finance Department vide their U.O. no. (G.r.N) 2945 dated 7th February, 2006, U.O. no. (G.r.B) 940 (SANC)/EH/P/(T)/4C/58/2000/2006/13 dated 13th February, 2006.
The respondents further contended that the college is not a listed Government aided institution in the list of AICTE approved institution in Engineering and Technology 'UG' 'Government-aided' for the State of West Bengal for the academic year 2018-19. The respondents contend that the institution has been listed as unaided private institution. Therefore, it cannot come within the purview of the Article 12 of the Constitution.
From the above disclosure it is absolutely clear that the respondent no.3/college received Government aid from the Government of West Bengal from time to time and thus there is no doubt that the said college comes within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution and the writ petition can be held to be maintainable against any action of such college receiving Government aid. The respondent, however, contended that since there is no regular financing by the State regarding payment of salary of the teachers and staffs the institution cannot be said to a government institution.
Whether or not such an institution can be said to be considered as a State within the meaning of Article 12 depends on many considerations, the prime consideration of which is whether the State Government has any manner of control over the same either financially or otherwise. It is evident from the disclosures made both by the petitioner as also the respondents that the institute comes within the purview of Article 12 at least for the reason that it discharges a 'public function' by imparting education at a larger field and this is sufficient to hold that the State has control over the institution.
Mr. Suranjan Das Gupta appearing for the respondent submitted that there is no dispute that the college is affiliated to his University and the college discharges all functions within the parameters of the said Act of 2000 and regulated by its provision. According to him, the functions discharged by the college are of public nature. The Act defines 'affiliated institutions' which means a college or an institution deemed to be an affiliated college or institutions under the said Act. The word 'teacher' has also been defined by the said Act under Section 2 (24). 'Teacher' means a professor, principal, associate professor, leader, lecturer or such other person holding teaching post or a part-time teaching post appointed or recognized by the university, or appointed by any affiliated institution. The object of the said university has been mentioned in Section 4 of the said Act of 2000 which is set out below:
"4. The objects of the University shall be - the University (1) to organize undergraduate courses of study in engineering and technology, especially in emerging areas;
(2) to organize post-graduate programmes in basic and applied sciences, engineering, and technology and in such other branches of knowledge as the University may deem fit, specially with a view to producing scientists, technologists and managers of high calibre capable of contributing towards development of industries based on modern technology in collaboration with industries as well as national and international research laboratories and academic institutions;
(3) to develop centres of excellence for higher studies and research in basic and applied sciences, engineering, technology and management education; (4) to accord affiliation, and to provide academic support guidance, to institutions in science, engineering, technology and management within the jurisdiction of the University;
(5) to create awareness in key areas of environmental science, conservation of energy and resource, information technology and bio-technology;
(6) to organize distance education programmes aiming at a virtual university;
(7) to organize continuing education programme for up-dating the knowledge and skills of in-service personnel;
(8) to organize and offer consultancy services to industries and other organizations;
(9) to undertake such other activities as may be necessary to fulfil the objects as aforesaid."
From the above objects it is apparent that university has been authorised by the Act to accord affiliation and to provide academic support and guidance. Therefore, although, no provision for financing the college has been made under the statute but the college is controlled under the statutory provision and there should be any reason to hold that the college does not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. Accordingly, I hold that the writ petition is maintainable against the actions of the college authority which indisputably discharges public function with a broader view within the parameters laid down under the West Bengal University of Technology Act, 2000. The provisions of Section 6 are also important to be taken note of. Section 6 of the Act is set out below:
"6. (1) Notwithstanding contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, with effect from such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint in this behalf (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said date);
(a) all colleges and educational institutions imparting education in engineering, technology and management and affiliated to any other university in the State established under any law of the State of West Bengal-
(i) shall be deemed to be affiliated to the University for such period and subject to such terms and conditions, if any, as may be imposed by any university to which such college or institution was affiliated before the said date, until the University issues directions otherwise, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, and
(ii) shall cease to be affiliated to the University to which any such college or institution may have been affiliated before the said date;
(b) any Principal, teacher, or other employee, or any member of the Governing Body, by whatever name called, or any student, of any such affiliated college or institution, holding, by virtue of his being such Principal, teacher, or other employee, or member or student, any office in or under any university or any of the authorities of such university to which such college or institution was affiliated before the said date, shall cease to hold such office and the vacancy so caused shall be deemed to be a casual vacancy for the purposes of the law of the State of West Bengal under which the university was established;
(c) whenever the University issues directions in addition to the requirements stipulated in subclause (i) of clause (a), the affiliated institution shall be bound to comply with such terms and conditions as may be incorporated in the directions of the University within such reasonable time as may be prescribed by the University;
(d) the University shall have power to alter or withdraw the affiliation deemed to have been granted under this section, if the affiliated institution does not comply with the terms and conditions of such affiliation;
(e) for the purpose of deemed affiliation under this sub-section, it shall be competent for the University to satisfy itself in such manner as it may decide, if an affiliated institution was validly affiliated to any university established under any Bengal or West Bengal Act before the said date.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no college or institution providing courses of study or programmes of education, research or training in the field of engineering, technology or management and situated in West Bengal, but not admitted to the privileges of the University, shall be admitted to the privileges of any other university except with the prior approval of the State Government: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall, save as otherwise provided in this Act, apply to -
(a) any constituent college, institution, Faculty or Department of any other university or of any institution for higher education deemed to be a university under section 3 of the University Grants 3 of 1956 Commission Act, 1956, directly managed, controlled and financed by such university or such institution for higher education deemed to be a university under section 3 of that Act, or
(b) any other college or institution affiliated to any other university mainly providing courses of study in subjects other than engineering, technology or management.
Explanation. - For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that the State Government shall decide whether a college or institution mainly provides courses of study in subjects other than engineering, technology or management."
Section 10 of the said Act says that the Governor of the State of West Bengal shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the university. Sub- section (2) says that Chancellor shall exercise such powers as may be conferred upon him by law under the provisions of the Act or as may be, prescribed. The more important provision in this regard is Section 11. Section 11 of the said Act is set out bellow:
"11. (1) The State Government shall have the right to cause an inspection, to be made by such person or persons as it may direct, of the University, its buildings, libraries and equipment, and of any institutions maintained by the University, and also of the examinations, teaching and other work conducted or done by the University, and to cause an inquiry to be made in like manner in respect of any matter connected with the administration and finances of the University.
(2) The State Government shall, in every case, give notice to the University of its intention to cause an inspection or inquiry to be made, and the University shall be entitled to appoint a representative who shall have the right to be Present and to be heard at such inspection or inquiry.
(3) The State Government may address the Vice-Chancellor with reference to the result of such inspection or inquiry, and the Vice-Chancellor shall communicate to the General Council the views of the State Government along with such advice as the State Government may offer on the action to be taken thereon.
(4) The General Council shall communicate through the Vice-Chancellor to the State Government such action, if any, as it proposes to take, or as has been taken, on the result of such inspection and inquiry."
Section 11 says that the State Government shall have control over the university and institutions maintained by the University. University shall have the right to make inquiry in respect of any matter of getting with the administration of finances of the University or the institutions maintained by the University. On a conjoint reading of various provisions made under the said Act it cannot but be held that the University within its control do have requisite checks and balances over the colleges affiliated to the university and even the administration and finances are being controlled by the University within the purview of the said Act of 2000. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the writ is maintainable. Now on merit the writ petition is to be decided whether the order of termination can be sustained or not.
The learned Advocate appearing for the University while submitting that the engineering and technology college is affiliated to the University, he further submits that there are two separate bodies of any college approved by AICTE, namely, (i) Governing body of the college prescribed by AICTE and (ii) Governing body (Managing Committee) of the society, that is, the sponsoring committee, organizing body of the college as per West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. The composition of the governing body of the college has been prescribed by the AICTE in the appendix of approval process wherein the Principal/Director of the college being nominee of the sponsoring college, will act as member secretary. According to him, the requirement of statutory bodies like AICTE/University, the sponsoring/organizing body of the proposed college is required to apply before the respective statutory bodies for approval/affiliation, as the case may be. In the instant case, it is found that the sponsoring society, that is, the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Society applied to AICTE and MAKAUT, West Bengal for approval/affiliation from the respective statutory bodies and, thereafter, the governing body of the college is constituted as per composition prescribed by AICTE.
Mr. Suranjan Das Gupta also relies on a report of enquiry team constituted by the University in compliance with the order of this Hon'ble Court in W.P. No.27999(W) of 2017 in respect of Hooghly Engineering and Technology College (College Code-176). From the said report of enquiry it appears that Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya, Principal, being the member secretary of the governing body of the college, also claimed to be the member secretary of the Managing Committee (Governing Body) of the society (HETCS). During enquiry he was asked to produce papers in support of his claim as member secretary of Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Society (HETCS) but he failed to produce the same. So, the actions taken by Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya, Principal, member secretary of the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Society (HETCS) is arbitrary and unwarranted. The actions taken by Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya as the Principal of the said engineering college and member secretary, governing body of Hooghly Engineering and Technology College are, according to the University, bad-in-law. It was held that -
a) Suspension of Shri Pradyut Dutta, administrative officer, Hooghly, Engineering and Technology College on 22.09.2017, who happened to be a member of the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Society, are bad-in-law.
b) Suspension of Dr. Sankar Prasad Mukherjee, Emeritus Professor, Hooghly Engineering and Technology College, passed on 03.10.2017, is also bad-in-law.
c) Suspension of Mrs. Dipti Bhattacharya, Office Executive (Administration) passed on 11.10.2017 is also bad-in-law.
d) The purported Annual General Meeting of the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Society (HETCS) held on 30th October, 2017, convened by Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya, Principal and secretary of the Hooghly Engineering and Technology College, affixing the stamp of Principal of Hooghly Engineering and Technology College and not convened by the Secretary, HETCS, is bad-in-law.
e) Suspension of submission of annual return on 14.12.2017 to the Registrar of Firms Society and non-trading corporations of West Bengal based on the present Annual General Meeting of the society held on 30th October, 2017 is also bad-in-law.
It has been observed in the said report that in support of actions of three suspensions as mentioned hereinabove, the enquiry team asked Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya, Principal, to produce paper declaring him as the disciplinary authority. Dr. Bhattacharya failed to produce any paper regarding the same. It is also indicated that in the purported disciplinary proceeding in respect of all the three members, Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya acted both as disciplinary authority as well as enquiry committee and, therefore, the report held that such purported order of suspension was impermissible in law and the order of suspensions so passed were bad-in-law.
Record reveals that the petitioner was appointed as an associate professor of Mathematics in Science and Humanities Department of the respondent no.3 college with effect from 11th March, 2014 vide an appointment letter dated 9th March, 2014 (annexure P-3 at page 80 of the writ petition) issued by the then Secretary of Hooghly Engineering and Technology College Society.
Mr. Kallol Basu appeared for the College Authority which includes the respondent no.4 & 5. Respondent no. 4 has filed a separate affidavit-in- opposition affirmed on 8th August, 2018 by Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya. In the said affidavit the respondent no.4 tried to justify that his appointment as Principal of the college was academically stood confirmed on 19th May, 2017 in terms of the appointment letter and service rules of the college. Therefore, no order of the governing body to confirm his service was required. He therefore, claims to be the Principal of the college and he also justifies the order of termination of the petitioners. However, the said respondent no.4 has not been able to justify the stand taken before this Court earlier where he prayed for an order of stay and the same was turned down and wherefrom no appeal has been filed. Rather the order passed by the Learned Single Judge on the writ petition of respondent no.4 has been allowed to be implemented. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the respondent no.5, Dr. Abhijit Maity, affirmed on 9th August, 2018. In the said affidavit it has been contended that in the 13th Annual General Meeting held on 30th October, 2017, the respondent no.5 became the Secretary of the society and in the said meeting a new managing committee of the said society was formed and the same was duly submitted before the Government of West Bengal. It has been asserted that in the said 13th Annual General Meeting held on 30th October, 2017 it was resolved that "recommendation of the governing body, HETCS as regards the disciplinary measures against Dr. S.P. Mukherjee were considered in the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and it was then resolved that the membership of Dr. S.P. Mukherjee be withdrawn from HETCS and G.B of HETCS and his termination of service in HETCS be approved. It was unanimously accepted." The affidavit reiterates that since it was the terms and condition of appointment of the petitioners which was accepted by them no room is left for them to contradict the terms of appointment and the termination since based on the said terms and conditions, challenge made against the said order of termination cannot be sustained.
Mr. Bose, appearing for the respondent no.5, submitted that the appointment letter itself contains the terms and conditions of service which inter alia includes a condition that one months notice is required on either side for resignation or termination from the service of the organisation. Therefore, according to him, since he has accepted those terms and conditions as conditions for his service, he cannot now contradict those terms and condition and challenge the authority of the college in issuing the order of termination. The order of termination has been issued by Dr. Abhijit Maity and in his capacity as Secretary of HETCS. Surprisingly, no one appears for the society.
Stand taken by the respondent nos.4 & 5 cannot at all be supported in view of the fact that a very initiation of the proceeding was without jurisdiction and the notice to show cause was issued by the concerned respondent without proper authority. Therefore, all subsequent actions become nullity. The proceeding as continued by the respondent no.6 also lacks transparency and opposed to administrative fair play which are good grounds for interference in Article 226 of the Constitution. Justice and fair play demand that the impugned order of termination should not be allowed to survive. The order of termination is also devoid of any reasons. This is pure and simple case of hire and fire, which act of the college authority cannot at all be encouraged when indisputably the college is affiliated to the university and it acts within the parameters of the terms of affiliation. If the action by the respondent/college authority is to be supported the purpose for which the founding fathers of the Constitution made provision for Article 21 of the Constitution is bound to be frustrated. The object for which the aforesaid Act of 2000 has been enacted shall also stand extinguished which is not desirable at all. The entire action of the college authority is against the settled principles of administrative law and therefore, cannot be supported.
While accepting the letter of appointment and the provisions of the terms and conditions of the said appointment letter, Mr. Bose submitted, the petitioner in the event of termination of his service, is only entitled to one month's salary for notice for a sum of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) only, being the consolidated pay which has been forwarded to his salary account. Nothing remains for the petitioner to agitate any illegality on the part of the college authority. But at the same time Clause (7) of the said appointment letter says that "appointment is valid subject to your maintenance of good health, mental and physical fitness and for the job." If such a condition is incorporated in the terms and conditions of service then the respondent no.5 cannot certainly argue that the service of the petitioner can be terminated at anytime and under any circumstances without adhering to the requirements of natural justice and the requirements under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is very shocking to note that the respondent no.4 himself is the chairman of the enquiry team and under his leadership recommendation has been made to the governing body to terminate the service of the petitioner. The enquiry report cannot be held to be impartial rather the same is tainted with absolute mala fide and beyond all reasonableness as also fairness apart from the fact that the entire action is against all settled principles of administrative law.
The writ petition further reveals that by a letter dated 8th July, 2015 the respondent no.2, that is, President of the HETCS requested the petitioner to assume charge of the Secretary of the HETCS in view of the resignation submitted by Shri D Singh the then Secretary of the said society. The petitioner accepted such request and agreed to take up the responsibility of the post of secretary of the said society vide a letter dated 20th July, 2015 (annexure P-5 at page 83 of the writ petition). The petitioner even acted as a secretary of the said society in a meeting on 30th August, 2015. The petitioner was re-designated by the managing committee of the HETCS as emeritus professor with effect from 1st June, 2016 as would be evident from annexure P-7 at page 90 of the writ petition. The governing body of the college appointed respondent no.4 as a Principal of the said college on 14th May, 2016 on probation for a period of one year. Such appointment was given by the petitioner as Secretary of HETCS. It is submitted that since the service of the respondent no.4 was not at all satisfactory the authority decided not to confirm the probationary service of the respondent no.4 in the college and he was given breathing time to find out an alternative job. It is the petitioner's case that although, service of the respondent no.4, who was appointed as a Principal of the respondent no.3 college on probation for a period of one year with effect from 18th May, 2016 his service was not confirmed by the governing body of the college/society and the decision was communicated by the hand of the petitioner being the secretary of the HETCS vide letter dated 23rd September, 2017. Despite such communication that service of respondent no.4 as Principal had not been extended and his service was no longer required by the society, the respondent no.4 forcefully represented himself as Principal of the college and issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner on 26th September, 2017 and when confrontation between the petitioner and the respondent no.4 started which had been continued by the respondent no.5 subsequently in his capacity as Secretary. The very authority of the letter dated 26th September, 2017 issued by the said Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya, the then Principal of HETC is the basis for the cause of action in the present writ petition. All subsequent actions and challenge in this writ petition flows from the said show cause notice being Annexure P-11 at page 95 of the writ petition. The petitioner has made a definite case firstly, that the said Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya had no authority to initiate any proceeding against the petitioner for his removal as an emeritus professor of the college inasmuch as on the day when the letter was issued he was not the Principal and secondly, the allegations made against the petitioner are bald, unfounded allegations which could never be proved against him.
So far the first point is concerned, I am satisfied that the very authority of the respondent no.4 Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya to act as a Principal of the college is very much disputed from the evidence produced by the writ petitioners. And the affidavits used by the respondent no.5 it is palpably clear that on the day when the show cause notice was issued the respondent no.4 was without any authority to act as a Principal. Although, show cause notice has been issued lodging various gross allegations against the petitioner but nothing has been shown to substantiate those allegations at least to prima facie hold that he was guilty in any manner. When an allegation is made against the person it is the onus of the person who makes the allegation to prove it that he is guilty of such offences. The show cause notice prima facie does not disclose any offence for which the authority could invite the termination of the service. More surprisingly in furtherance of the said notice of show cause it appears that on 3rd October, 2017 the petitioner was placed on suspension only on the ground that no reply to show cause notice dated 26th September, 2017 could be received till 3rd October, 2017. Leaving 26th September, 2017 and 3rd October, 2017 there is even no clear 7 days notice asking the petitioner to reply to his show cause. This is a gross violation of natural justice, even if it is considered that the respondent has exercised a proper authority which, however, is seriously disputed. Therefore, the notice to show cause and the order of suspension is highly mala fide on the part of the authority that is the so-called Principal of HETC and such action cannot be sustained under any circumstances. After the order of suspension was issued, on 17th October, 2017 the respondent no.4 issued a notice asking the petitioner to appear before the enquiry committee in his office on 18th October, 2017 at 2.00 pm and the petitioner very rightly did not present himself as from the beginning he questioned the authority of respondent no.4 to assume jurisdiction over the purported inquiry.
Record reveals that the enquiry team constituted by Dr. Sumanta Bhattacharyya as the chairman and convenor, Dr. N Tarafdar member and Dr. Abhijit Maity member of the said committee submitted a report on 27th October, 2017 which recommended for taking necessary action by the governing body. A charge-sheet was reportedly issued by the respondent no.4 in his so called capacity of Principal and Secretary, governing body of HETCS giving the petitioner 10 days time to reply to the charges and the termination letter dated 23rd March, 2018 was issued following such charge-sheet because no reply was submitted by the petitioner to the said charges. In my view all actions including the actions taken by the Secretary terminating the petitioner's service are without jurisdiction and all actions taken against the petitioners have vitiated being unauthorised exercise of authority. The entire proceeding being unsustainable, the order of suspension and termination cannot remain alive and those are set aside. The petitioner is entitled to his salaries considering that no proceeding has been initiated against him. Resulting thereby the petitioner is entitled to full salary from the day when he was placed under suspension.
The writ petition, accordingly, succeeds and allowed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be delivered to the learned advocates for the respective parties upon compliance of all usual formalities.
(Sahidullah Munshi, J.)