Central Administrative Tribunal - Gauhati
Sh. Fanai Pahnuna vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 1 March, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(1)SLJ76(CAT)
JUDGMENT
D.N. Chowdhury, Vice Chairman
1. The legality and validity as to the initiation and continuance of the proposed enquiry against the applicant under the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 is the core issue raised in this application in the following circumstances:
The applicant was recruited to the India Administrative Service (IAS for short) of the Joint Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram and Union Territories (AGMU for short) Cadre under Section 7 of the IAS (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 by competitive Examination in the year 1965. In the year 1990 the applicant was appointed as Chief Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, which post he held till 1993. The applicant was thereafter appointed as Managing Director, DSFDC Ltd., cum Principal Secretary (SC & ST), Government of NCT of Delhi in the year 1994 and he continued to hold the said post till 1998. The applicant was subsequently appointed as full time Member of the Public Grievances Commission, Government of NCT of Delhi and the applicant retired from Government service on 31.1.2001. To this effect the Government issued the Notification No. 14031/6/2000-UTS dated 9.2.2001 and notified the date of superannuation of the applicant as in the afternoon of 31.1.2001. At this stage, by the impugned Notification No. 14033/27/95-UTS dated 30.1.2001 the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs initiated an enquiry against the applicant under Rule 8 of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 for alleged misconduct as mentioned in the statement of articles of charge cited in Annexure-I of the communication dated 30.1.2001. The statement of imputation of misconduct in support of the articles of charge framed, the list of documents substantiating the articles of charge framed as well as the list of witnesses in support of the article of charge accompanied the said Memorandum of charge.
2. The applicant submitted his written statement of defence in March 2001 denying and disputing the charges. The applicant also questioned the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority and also the propriety and legitimacy of the departmental proceeding. By memo dated 1.6.2001 the respondent authority appointed the GDI, Central Vigilance Commission as the Inquiring Authority to enquire into the charges. Hence this application assailing the legitimacy and propriety of the departmental proceeding as well as the continuance of the said proceeding as illegal and ultra vires.
3. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 contested the case and submitted their written statement seriously resisting the application including the maintainability of the same.
4. Before going into the merits of the respective cases it would be appropriate to refer below the statement of the articles of charge framed against the applicant:
"That Shri Fanai Pahnuna, IAS (AGMU:65), while working as Chief Secretary to the State Government of Mizoram and the Chairman of the State Purchase Advisory Board during the period 1990-1992 committed gross misconduct in as much as he in the matter of purchase of a plot of land measuring 22,100 sq.ft. (with a building constructed over it) owned by Smt. Lalparliani, his sister-in-law, located at Upland Road, Laitumkhrah, Shillong for the purpose of setting up Mizoram House approved an arrangement under which:-
(a) The said Smt. Lalparliani was made a payment of Rs. 23.00 lakhs in advance toward the cost of the said property the price for which was fixed at Rs. 58.00 lakhs in an arbitrary manner without its being assessed through the relevant channels;
(b) The deal was finalized and the advance payment made to her despite the fact that the aforesaid property had been notified by the State Government of Meghalaya for acquisition for its own use and the acquisition proceedings had not been formally withdrawn;
(c) The advance payment was made without entering into any formal agreement with her so as to ensure that the money was refunded to the State Government of Mizoram in a time bound manner in case the deal did not materialise; and
(d) The advance payment was made without binding her under a proper agreement to pay the interest on the amount advanced to her in the event of the deal not materialising.
That from the aforesaid acts of commission and omission the charged officer Shri F. Pahnuna, the then Chief Secretary, Government of Mizoram, exhibited lack of integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Public Servant and thereby violated Rule 3(1) of All India Service (Conduct) Rules, 1968,"
The applicant was accordingly charged for the alleged misconduct purportedly implicating lack of integrity and devotion to duty and acting in a manner unbecoming of a public servant. The gravamen of the charge is that the applicant as the Chief Secretary, Government of Mizoram and Chairman of the State Purchase Advisory Board approved an arrangement whereby the land owner was paid an amount of Rs.23 lakhs in advance towards the cost of the said property, the price for which was fixed at Rs. 58.00 lakhs arbitrarily without the same being assessed through the relevant channels. As per the charge the applicant was also made responsible for approval of the arrangement as to finalising the deal and advance payment made to the owner is spite of the fact that the said property was notified by the Government of Meghalaya for acquisition for its own use and that the acquisition was not formally withdrawn. The applicant was also charged for approving the advance payment without entering into formal and biding agreement and without stipulating any interest on the amount advanced to the owner in the even of the deal not materialising.
5. The applicant in his written statement of defence assailed the competence of the Ministry of Home Affairs for initiating departmental proceeding as contrary to the scheme of disciplinary rules. The applicant in his written statement also pointed out that all throughout he acted within the parameters of law and under the authority of the competent authority. He asserted that the proposal for establishment of the Mizoram House in Shillong was made in the year 1989, prior to his appointment as Chief Secretary in the State of Mizoram. He also mentioned a number of steps taken by the authority for purchase of the property at Shillong, which was also reflected in the statement of imputation of misconduct in support of the articles of charge. The earlier proposal for purchasing land at places like Nongrim Hills belonging to one Shri V.L. Sharma, Laitumkhrah belonging to one Mrs Parteii and also other locations were considered. In fact, the applicant in his note suggested that the land at Cleve Colony had a number of advantages. The land was inspected by the officers of Mizoram Government which also inspected by the Chief Minister, the Finance Minister, the applicant, the Finance Commissioner, the Chief Engineer PWD, The Joint Director I & PR and the Liaison Officer, Shillong. The applicant mentioned about his note in the at pages 39, 40 and 41 of the File No. A-600011/16/89-GAD and stated that the entire facts were placed in his note and the same was approved by the then Minister of GAD and the Chief Minister at that relevant time. The applicant also referred to the draft of the D.O. No.A-60011/16/99-GAD dated 12.11.1991 which he put up to the Chief Minister of Mizoram and the same was finally sent by the Chief Minister to the Governor of Meghalaya, wherein the Chief Minister impressed upon the Governor of Meghalaya to personally intervene in the matter and have the land released from the acquisition proceedings so that the Government of Mizoram could acquire the land for the long-felt need of a VIP Guest House at Shillong.
6. Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Sr. Counsel for the applicant assisted by Mr. S.K. Sharma and Mr. Dhrubajyoti Pathak, mainly assailed the proceeding on two grounds. The learned Sr. Counsel, firstly contended that the very initiation of the departmental proceeding initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs is wholly unsustainable in law. Pointing to the provisions of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, more particularly Clause (c) (i), (e) of the Definition Clause contained in Rule 2 of the Rules as well as Rule 7 of the said Rules, the learned Sr. Counsel contended that it is the State Government alone or in the alternative the Joint Cadre Authority of AGMU which was the competent authority to initiate the proceeding and not the Home Ministry. The learned Sr. Counsel in support of his contention also referred to the decision of the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in 0. A.No.967 of 1992 and O. A.No. 1426 of 1992 disposed of on 8.1.1993 and specifically ruled out that the Ministry of Home Affairs was the competent authority to initiate departmental proceeding against AGMU Cadre.
7. Mr. A. Deb Roy, learned Sr. C.G.S.C., on the other hand referred to the Notification No.ll026/2/94-AIS(II) dated 25.4.1995 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, P.G. and Pensions constituting the Joint Cadre Authority for the IAS etc. of Arunachal Pradesh-Goa-Mizoram-Union Territories. Mr. Deb Roy submitted that in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951), read with Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972, the Central Government in consultation with the Governments of States, concerned constituted the Joint Cadre Authority for the respective Services. The learned Sr. C.G.S.C. submitted that for all intents and purposes the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs representing the Union Territories in respect of Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service is constituted as a Joint Cadre Authority of AGMU. Therefore, the Ministry of Home Affairs rightly initiated the proceeding. Section 4 of the All India Service (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972 speaks of the committee consisting of the representatives of each of the Governments of the constituent States of the Joint Cadre Authority. Mr. Deb Roy submitted that the Joint Cadre Authority representing the States of AGMU Cadre of IAS, namely the State Governments of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram and the Ministry of Home Affairs being the State Government in respect of Union Territories had in its meeting held in October 1989 delgated, inter alia, the disciplinary powers in respect of IAS officers of AGMU Cadre to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Mr. Deb Roy further submitted that this was done strictly in conformity with the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In support of his contention, Mr. Deb Roy also referred to the minutes of the meeting of the Joint Cadre Authority (AGMU Cadre) held in October 1989.
8. We have given our anxious consideration in the matter. In the Judgment and Order of the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A.Nos.967/92 and 1426/1994, considering the relevant provisions of law including the allocation of Business Rules framed under Article 77(3) of the Constitution it was held that it was only the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension which was the competent authority as far as allocation of rule was concerned. The power and authority to initiate departmental proceeding is a statutory measure meant to be exercised by the statutory authority on goods and sufficient reason. A mechanism has been introduced creating authority to commence proceeding and impose penalty. It also defined the State Government concerned, wherein the State Government concerned in relation to a Joint Cadre Authority is defined as the Government of all the States for which the Joint Cadre is constituted. As per the Notification dated 25.4.1995 the Joint Cadre Authority for the IAS etc. for Arunachal Pradesh-Goa-Mizoram-Union Territories was constituted. The materials on record did not clearly spell out any delegation of power on the Ministry of Home Affairs. The power of drawing of disciplinary proceeding on good and sufficient reason is an essential power reposed on the Disciplinary Authority, namely the State Government. Whether the essential power can even be delegated as claimed by the respondents is very much controversial. In our considered opinion the authority to initiate disciplinary measure in the settings against the applicant by, the Ministry of Home Affairs is itself doubtful. Our opinion is, however, tentative in nature and we would like to decide the application on merit.
9. The other contention of Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Sr. Counsel for the applicant, is that the respondent authority acted with impropriety and indiscriminately in initiating the departmental proceeding on the applicant. The learned Sr. Counsel submitted that, admittedly, the alleged misconduct was allegedly committed during the period 1990-1992 and the respondents sat over the matter and just on the penultimate day of retirement of the applicant the respondent authority with oblique motive initiated the departmental proceeding. The learned Sr. Counsel submitted that the initiation of departmental proceeding against the applicant on the basis of the materials on record is unjust and unreasonable and therefore, unlawful. In support of his contention, the learned Sr. Counsel for the applicant referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bani Singh v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1308 and also the decision in State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan reported in (1998)4 SCC 154=1998(3) SLJ 162 (SC). Mr. A. Deb Roy, on the other hand, submitted that the respondent authority initiated departmental proceeding lawfully on the basis of materials on record. Mr. Deb Roy submitted that the delay be itself would not vitiate a proceeding in the absence of any illegality. Mr. Deb Roy submitted that the power of initiation of departmental proceeding rested on the respondents and the respondents on consideration of the materials on record initiated the departmental proceeding and the applicant was provided with all the opportunity permissible under the law. Since there were grounds for initiation of departmental proceeding, which were of serious nature, for fitness of things the Disciplinary Authority is required to complete the enquiry, where the applicant will get all the opportunity to vindicate his innocence.
10. There is no dispute on the issue that the power of initiation of disciplinary proceeding is vested upon the State and its instrumentalities. But, all power has its legal limits. Arbitrary exercise of power and unfettered discretion are what the Courts refuse to countenance. Statutory power is to be exercised reasonably and in good faith for proper purposes only on right and lawful consideration. The power can only be used for valid and lawful purpose. Unfettered Governmental discretion is anathema. The alleged misconduct imputed on the applicant dated back to 1990-1992. These matters were known to the authority when the alleged misconduct was committed. The Disciplinary Authority did not act upon it. All governmental actions are to be taken justly, fairly and reasonably. As per the constitutional scheme a delinquent employee also has a right for expeditious of a disciplinary proceeding instead of putting him to undergo mental anxiety and pecuniary losses. Gratuitous interference with the rights of Government servants is also not permissible. The alleged charges are simple in nature without any complexity. No explanation for ii;~ delay came forth accounting the same. The applicant was not in any way responsible for the delay. The ratio of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Bani Singh (supra) and M Radhakishan (supra) are aptly applicable On perusal of the materials on record it appears that the Government of Mizoram took a conscious decision for the Mizoram House in Shillong in the year 1989, long before the applicant came into the picture. The imputation against the applicant was for approving the arrangement mentioned in Annexure-I to the Memorandum dated 30.1.2001, as the Chairman of the State Purchase Advisory Board. The State Purchase Advisory B^oard was the creation of the State Government and decisions were taken for purchase of the very land itself at the level of the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister in his D.O. letter addressed to the Government of Meghalaya requested for personal intervention in the matter and get the land released from the acquisition proceedings so that the Government of Mizoram could acquire the land for their long-felt need of a VIP Guest House in Shillong. The applicant in his written statement made before the authority specifically brought the attention of the authority to the whole gamut of the subject matter disclosing that all those actions were taken bonafide with the full authority of the Government of Mizoram. No materials were furnished before us countering those claims. As a matter of fact the respondents in the written statement did not dispute that all those arrangements were made with the knowledge and approval of the Government of Mizoram. The payment of Rs. 23.00 lakhs in advance was made to the vendor with the knowledge and authority of the persons incharge. The advance in question along with the interest was also recovered by the Government long before the initiation of the proceeding against the applicant. In the background of the tribal society and the tribal ethos, not translating the transaction through a proper instrument cannot by itself be said to be improper in the tribal areas. The Land Acquisition Act of 1884 is not the only mode of acquisition of property. Outright purchase is also a mode for acquisition of property. Transfer of property means conveyance of land of one person to another which includes gifts, sale, exchange lease, mortgage lease etc. or any other permissible mode of transfer. The Meghalaya Transfer And Land Acquisition Act, 1971 was enacted for the protection of the Scheduled Tribes therein. Drawing of an instrument for providing advance was a ministerial act, required to be performed by, the concerned officer when the advance was made. It was not the function of the Chief Secretary-cum-Chairman of the Advisory Board.
11. The statement of imputation of misconduct in support of the articles of charge itself indicated that in the matter of purchase of land all the concerned authorities including the Governments of Mizoram and Meghalaya were participates. The note placed by the Chief Secretary was approved by the Minister, GAD/Chief Minister. In the decision making process the respondents flatered in the interpretation of Meghalaya Transfer of Land Regulat on Act, 1971 (Meghalaya Act I of 1972). As mentioned the act was enacted to regulate transfer of land in Meghalaya for protection of the interest of the Scheduled Tribes therein. Section 3(1) of the Act enjoined that no land in Meghalaya shall be transferred by a tribal to a non-tribal or by a non-tribal to another non-tribal except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. By Act I of 1978 a proviso was introduced by which the Government of Meghalaya, if satisfied, may from time to time, by notification, prohibit such transfer of land within such area or areas as may be specified in the notification and thereupon the competent authority shall not sanction any such transfer of land under the provision of the Act within such area of areas. In pursuance thereto Notification No. RDS 11/76/187 dated 7.6.1978. was made and gazetted in the Extra Ordinary Gazette.dated 8.6.1978. By the notification, amongst others the areas within the East Khasi Hills District except the areas to which the Act aforesaid did not apply were indicated. Needless to state that the Act does not apply to the cantonment and normal areas of Shillong Municipality, i.e. Police Bazar, Jail Road and General Ward (European Ward). Section 11 of the Act carved out an exemption, which also exempted any transfer of land to or in favour of the Government or District Council, The Act specifically did not include other Governments. As per Clause (30) of Section 3 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972, 'Government' or 'the Government' includes the State Government as well as the Central Government. Clause (64) of Section 3 defines State, which means a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and includes a Union Territory. The exemption clause under Section 11 is not to be confined only to the Government of Meghalaya. Mizoram is also a tribal State. The Act also envisaged transaction with previous sanction of the competent authority. Admittedly, as mentioned earlier all those who were basically concerned in such transaction participated. The Government of Meghalaya at all relevant times was taken into confidence by the Government of Mizoram. On the background, the role played by the applicant as the Chief Secretary to the Government of Mizoram and Chairman of the State Purchase Advisory Board, on the materials on record cannot be said to be unlawful. The very nomenclature of the Board as 'Advisory Board' is of advisory character subject to approval by the Government. In the instant case those actions were, admittedly approved at the highest level. As held earlier the discretion reposed on the authority is not an unfettered one. In the exercise of discretion the authority is to act according to rules and act justly, lawfully and fairly. It cannot be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. It must be legal and regular. Those who are charged with discretion must exerci.se the same on reasonable grounds. The authority is duty bound to act lawfully without abusing the discretion. Oppressive and gratuitous interference with the rights of a Government servant is not permissible under the Constitutional set up. The respondent authority while exercising its discretion took into consideration irrelevant and extraneous consideration overlooking the relevant consideration. The date of superannuation of the applicant was 31.1.2001 and the same was known to all concerned including the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The said respondents nowhere explained as to be reasons for the delay initiating the proceeding by assigning any ostensible reason. The Mizo society is a tribal society and tribal ethos and customs dominate the members of the Mizo society. Therefore, transactions with one another in that context was to be taken in the setting of the society.
12. Law and behavioural pattern in the Society also depends on the wider canvas of the community. "In the broadest sense, law is simply any recurring mode of interaction among individuals and groups, together with more or less explicit acknowledgment by these groups and individuals that such pattern of interaction produce reciprocal expectations of conduct that ought to be satisfied", as was observed by the Contemporary Jurist R.M. Unger, in his writing in "Law in Modern Society". "There are two sides to the concept of law as interaction, each corresponds to an aspect of a traditional notion of custom. One element is factual regularity in behaviour. The other dimension is normative", said the author. Custom lacks the attribute of positiveness, it consists of implicit standards of conduct rather than of formulated rules. These standards are mostly tacit, though often highly precise, guidelines for how an individual of certain status and rank ought to act towards one of different or similar rank in a particular situation. They determine, what one should expect from one's kinsman in a variety of circumstances and what in turn may and will demand of her or him.
13. The area in which the alleged acts were said to be committed, the persons and the settings associated is one of the area where the ordinary laws of the land are not made applicable because of the historical necessity. The areas were earlier described as Backward tracts, Excluded areas and specifically administered. Two main codes, viz. the Criminal Procedure Code (except few chapters), the Civil Procedure Code are not made applicable. The application of the General Acts of the law are also barred, e.g. by Notification under Section 2 of Assam Frontier Tract Regulation, 1880 (Act 2 of 1880) the application of the Transfer of Property Act was barred in the erstwhile Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Mokokchung of the State of Nagaland, Mikir Hills tract. The Lushai Hills District (Predecessor of the Mizoram State) was constituted on 1.4.1898 by Notification vide No.920 dated 1.4.1898 under Section 2 of the Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation. All the laws including this Regulation then in force in the tract were repealed at first and then again under Section 3(a) of the Scheduled Districts Act 1874 the same was reapplied to the Lushai Hills District vide Notification No. 921 P dated 1.4.1898.
14. The nature and extent of the law applicable in these areas are pithily reflected in two of the decisions of the Supreme Court. In Guramayum Sakhi Copal Sarma v. K. Onghi Anisija Devi, Civil Appeal No. 659 of 1957, decided by the Supreme Court on 9th February 1961 in connection with the Civil Procedure Code, where the Supreme Court applied the spirit of the code and not the letters of the C.P.C. in the State of Nagaland v. Ran Singh, reported in AIR 1967 SC 212, the Supreme Court was called upon as to the extent of the application of the Cr.P.C., wherein the Constitution Bench extensivley discussed as to the development and growth of law in the area. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the following passages from the said decision :
"........ We must not forget that the Scheduled Districts Act was passed because the backward tracts were never brought within the operation of all the general Acts and Regulations (particularly the Criminal Procedure Code) and were removed from the operation and jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of Judicature......"
"Laws of this kind are made with an eye to simplicity. People in backward tracts cannot be expected to make themselves aware of the technicalities of a complex Code. What is important is that they should be able to present their defence effectively unhampered by the technicalities of complex laws, Throughout the past century the Criminal Procedure Code has been excluded from this area because it would be too difficult for the local people to understand it. Instead the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code has been asked to be applied so that justice may not fail because of some technicality. The argument that this is no law is not correct. Written law is nothing more than a control of discretion. The more there is of law the less there is of discretion, In this area it is considered necessary that discretion should have greater play than technical rules and the provision that the spirit of the Code should apply is a law conceived in the best interest of the people. The discretion of the Presiding Officer is not subjected to rigid control because of the unsatisfactory state of defences which would be offered and which might fail if they did not comply with some technical rule. The removal of technicalities, in our opinion, leads to the advancement of the cause of justice in these backward tracts. On the other hand, the imposition of the Code of Criminal Procedure would retard justice, a' 'ndeed the Governors-General, the Governor and the other hands of local Government have always thought. We think, therefore, that Article 21 does not render the Rules of 1937 ineffective."
15. Discretion necessarily implies good faith in the discharge of the public duty. There is always a perspective in-built in the statutory exercise of power to act justly, fairly and reasonably. All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 clothed on the prescribed authority the disciplinary power of imposing penalties prescribed in Part III of the Rules for good and sufficient reasons. When discretionary power is to invade upon individual rights to be exercised, factors to be determined in deciding what justice and fairness needs on the exercise of power including the nature of interest to be affected, circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanctions. Fair procedure also involves reasonable measure within the reasonable time. Public interest as well as individual interest does not countinance indolence and torpidity. It is not to be used as a vehicle of oppression. Scope of exercise of public power cannot be looked into is isolation from the general principles governing the exercise of power in constitutional democracy. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. A decision based on considerations which have been accorded manifestly inappropriate weight is not a lawful decision. The factors mentioned in the earlier paragraphs though relevant were not taken into consideration. No reasons, not to speak of good reasons, were also ascribed for the incomprehensible delay, lacking ostensible logic for lingering over the matter. On the facts the impugned action of the respondents on the eve of the retirement of the applicant is unduly perverse subjecting the applicant to enormous hardship as well as needlessly burden some infringement of his right. De Smith, Woolf and Jowell in its treatise on "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" (5th Edition) observed that official decision may be held unreasonable when they are unduly oppressive because they subject the complainant to an excessive hardship or an unnecessarily onerous infringement of his rights and interests. The focus of attention in these cases will be principally the impact of the decision upon the affected person. The outcome or end product of the decision making process will thus be assessed......Since the claim is essentially abuse of power, in the sense of excessive use of power.........." (para 13-046; 13-047)
16. From the conspectus it thus emerges that the decision maker in the decision making process has taken into consideration as facts, something which was patently wrong; perversity writ large. It has misunderstood law as well as the fact upon which the decision is based. Admittedly, materials those were taken as a whole did not support the findings of the fact. The respondent authority fell into error in its decision making process by taking irrelevant considerations overlooking relevant considerations that affected the ultimate decision. The unexplained delay in the facts and circumstances of the case also amounted to an abuse of the process.
17. On an overall consideration of all aspects of the matter we are of the opinion that the impugned departmental proceeding initiated by the respondents is unlawful and unjustified. Article 14 strikes on arbitrariness in the State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. Where an act is arbitrary it is also unfair and unequal one therefore, it is contrary to the scheme of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (Reference: E.P. Rayappa v. State of Tamilnadu, reported in AIR 1974 SCC 555 and Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1978 SC 597).
18. For all the reasons the impugned departmental proceeding initiated against the applicant vide Memorandum No. 14033/27/95-UTS dated 30.1.2001 communicated by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Arrairs, New Delhi is set aside and quashed.
19. The application is allowed with costs.