Patna High Court
Krishna Kant Pandey And Ajit Kumar Roy vs Suniti Bala Sarkar on 21 August, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1989(37)BLJR563
JUDGMENT S. Shamsul Hasan, J.
1. All these Civil Revision applications are being disposed of by this joint adjudication because the issues involved are similar yet they have been subjected to divergent interpretation by the two trial courts resulting in piquant interpretational contradictions which have to be resolved by a common appraisal and decision.
2. The three suits which gave rise to the present applications were all for eviction of the tenants-defendants by bringing into operation the provisions of Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') applying the doctrine of reasonable personal necessity from a single premises, portions of which were occupied by them separately, the plaintiff being the same. In Civil Revision Nos. 2105 and 2106 of 1986, the tenants-defendants are the petitioners and in Civil Revision No. 1207 of 1986, plaintiff is the petitioner who is opposite party in the former two applications.
3. In Title Eviction Suit Nos. 50/25 and 49/24 of 1984/1986 giving rise to Civil Revision Nos. 2105 and 2106 of 1986, the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement of the premises in suit for the use of her son for the partnership business with her son-in-law was accepted but in Title Eviction Suit No. 48 of 1984 giving rise to Civil Revision No. 1207 of 1986, this plea of the plain tiff has been negatived. The premises in question is a house having four storeys bearing Holding No. 3 New Holding No. 379/307-A Circle No. 23 Ward No. 16 situated in the city centre of Patna on the road known as Govind Mitra Road. The petitioners defendants in Civil Revision Nos. 2105 and 2106 of 1986 were the tenants in different portions of the first and second floors of the building. The opposite party defendant in Civil Revision No. 1207 of 1986 was a tenant in a portion of the groundftoor of the same building. The rest part of the building, i.e., the 3rd floor and 4th floor and a portion on the ground floor were in occupation of the landlord-plaintiff, her son and her son-in-law. In all the suits, the eviction of the tenants was sought on the ground that the portions of the building occupied by the tenants were required for transferring from Varanasi and expanding the business of a printing press to be run by a partnership firm consisting of the plaintiff's son and son-in-law. It is stated that this is a family partnership firm and is registered as "Hind Art Cottage" and for this purpose, the entire first floor including the portion occupied by the tenants in former civil revision applications and the portion occupied in the groundfloor by the tenant in the latter civil revision application were required.
4. I would first like in my own way to deal with the scope of the expression "reasonably and in good faith" occurring in Section 11(1)(e) of the Act. The meaning of the word "reasonable" as it appears in Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (Edited by A.M. Macdonald OBE BA (Oxon) is "endowed with reason : rational : acting according to reason: agreeable to reason : just : not excessive : moderate". The words "in good faith" in the same dictionary mean "with sincerity". In other words, these two expressions can only mean that the requirements must be a genuine one and not for motives other than that for which the eviction is sought and it must be such a need that would appear plausible by any reasonable consideration. Elucidating this, if the ground on which the eviction is sought is ridiculous or contrary to law or for the purpose which is prohibited in law or morality or civic values and all this with an intention of unjustified aggrandisement and unfair harassment of the tenant, then it would not come within the description. The scope of the expression "reasonable requirement", which spreads over a wide spectrum is highlighted by the four meanings of the word "reasonable" viz. rational, just, not excessive, and moderate. The reasonableness of the plea will have to be decided on the basis of these expressions. In the plea of reasonable requirement, if these aspects appear to be patent or are latent, the claim would be entirely justified. Once it is established that the requirement conies within the definition of reasonableness, the term "in good faith will naturally become manifest because sincerity of purpose is achieved if the landlord is just and cannot be described as being unduly excessive and is moderate, thus within the bounds of rational behaviour. On these will depend the sincerity of the landlord. If the requirement is of the landlord or other person for whose benefit the building in question is held by the landlord, a wide range of situations can be brought within the ambit of reasonableness and similarly, a very wide range can be excluded from it. While it is entirely reasonable for a person who requires his building for extending his business by setting up a new business in order to augment his resources, it may not be reasonable to evict a tenant merely on the ground of commercial escalation of rent.
5. I would divide 'the reasonable requirement of the landlord in good faith' into two heads-(i) purely personal and (ii) commercial. 1 would again divide commercial reasonable requirement into two heads-(i) for the benefit of the landlord and others who come within the definition- due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances, and (ii) for purely commercial benefit without any real requirement. In the first category will come such cases in which the landlord requires the premises for himself or for those coming within the ambit of the description "for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord" as envisaged under Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act which, in conjunction with the persons described as "landlord" in Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act apart from the individuals covered by first explanations to Section 11 (1)(c) of the Act, includes son, daughter, brother, or a member of the joint family or a dependant, for setting up as business, or vocation or for residential purposes extending the occupancy. It would be a purely personal requirement which would be entirely reasonable and, if proved, at the trial, also in good faith. In the category of commercial-cum-personal requirement, there may be instances in which a landlord may be faced with a necessity to find ways to increase of augment the income and thus seek an eviction merely for inducting a tenant who may pay much higher rent prevailing at the time in preference to old tenant who is paying a very meagre sum as rent particularly when it is much below the market rent or by giving an opportunity to the existing tenant to revise the tarrif and increase the rent to the market value either by negotiation or by resorting to a proceeding for fixation of fair rent by an appropriate authority. For example, if a man retires from service or the head of the family dies and he has a house or a part of the house, the sudden fall in income would necessarily instill in him, in the case of the former, and the heirs of the deceased, in the case of the latter, the desire to augment it and increase it by earning more income from the premises he or they owns. This cannot be said to be unreasonable. In contradistinction to a situation in which if a man has no such need and is in no economic need or problem then this mere commercial aggrandisement will not endow the plea with any reasonableness. The former classification can be styled as eco-personal and the other eco-commercial. Thus even seeking eviction to enhance rental value of the house can, under certain circumstances, be reasonable and under another utterly unreasonable. I repeat the eviction of the occupant to get more rent because of sudden depletion of the landlord's income by any causes-legal or otherwise-beyond his control, would be entirely reasonable and I would call it necessity of economics but if there is no such situation, there is no depletion or loss of income but the landlord wants to evict the tenant just to add to his already swelling wealth, then that would be purely a commerial personal necessity which would be utterly unreasonable. The expression "the building is reasonably and in good faith required" in Clause (c) of Section 11 (1) of the Act is, however, circumscribed by the words "occupation of" and my conclusion regarding the situation styled by me as 'eco-personal' will remain inconclusive unless the true import of these expressions are found. The word 'occupation', it cannot be disputed, has numerous meanings and wide connotations as also unlimited uses. Some of the meanings and interpretations are : an employment, business, the exercising of any business or office, trade or calling, profession, craft, habitual employment, etc. Within the ambit of Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act, applying a restricted meaning it is commonly believed that it means the actual physical occupation of the landlord or of such other persons for whose benefit the building is held either for the purpose of residence or trade or vocation. The matter that has to be examined is whether if the need, as, what I have described, is eco-personal or necessity of economics, then it would come within the meaning of the expression ''occupation of". In other words, where seeking the enhancement or rent otherwise by judicial process instead of enhancement by seeking eviction of a tenant to get an increased rent occasioned by the necessities mentioned above, it would come within the description of the word "occupation of". If the expression "occupation of" is interpreted to be restricted in its meaning and import, I feel that will be doing a violence to the expression itself and as well as to the intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly, the enactment is beneficial for a tenant and protective for a landlord. Thus, a restricted meaning would deny the landlord the protection he is being given and would also defeat his right to make a living out of the structure constructed by him or his ancestors. Endowing this expression a wider meaning and connotation would be more appropriate in the context of Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that if a person seeks eviction on the grounds described by him as eco-personal, it will be deemed to come within the ambit of the expression "occupation of". I get sustenance for my view that the word has a wide connotation is, from numerous decisions by courts outside India as cited in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of words and phrases (Fourth Edition) by John S. James some of which are quoted below :-
(2) The term 'occupation' has not so far as I can find any technical meaning. It ordinarily means that which engages the time and attention" "(per Ewing J.A. Nor., Trusts Co, v. Eckert (1942) 2 WWR 382.
X X X X (5) Australia : I construe 'occupation' and occupied [in Reg. 63 of the National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations]-----as having a broader meaning than exclusive or uninterrupted user, and as including those who have a contractual privilege of intermittent use of the premises. Occupation and possession have not necessarily the same significance (per Mayo J., Returned Sailors, etc. League of Australia v. Abbott (1946) SASR 270.
X X X X (6) "Occupation" even "Actual occupation" does not, necessarily, mean RESIDENCE (R. v. West Riding Justices, 2 QB 505), although "99 persons in 100 would so understand it" (Per Patteson J., ibid).
No decision was pointed out to me by either party which would restrict the meaning of the words "occupation of". This considering the family set up in our society, it cannot be disputed that the requirement of a son within the aforesaid norms will come within the definition of Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act.
6. It is undoubted that the B.B.C. Act is a piece of legislation that offers protection to a tenant from avaricious landlords perfidies but it also offers by the enactment of Section 11 of the Act, protection to the landlord against the peridy of recalcitrant tenants assuming an attitude of unfair intransigence to enjoy the pleasure of somebody else's investment by non-observance or misobservance of the contract agreed between the landlord and the tenant. It also protects the landlord by statutory termination of tenancy under certain circumstances thus facilitating eviction. The two rights have to be strictly enforced in their various ambits and particularly in the event of a plea of reasonable requirement being raised the balance of convenience will be comparatively judged and weighed on the anvil of the situation set out by me above. The words of each of the clauses must be strictly construed and the two rights strictly enforced in their various spheres under appropriate circumstances. It cannot be forgotten that while ateanant needs to be protected from landlords, covetous of gain, it is equally necessary that a landlord whose valuable property is involved, is not deprieved of its benefits.
7. Whether the requirement is reasonable and in good faith to be decided on the anvil of what I have said above. It is true that it may cause sufferings and harassment to the tenant, yet if a landlords wants economic benefit within the situation spelt out by me above for himself and his family, no tenant should be allowed to obstruct the right by the abuse of the process of the Court and prolonged litigations The spirit of this observation is proved by the incorporation of Section 14 of the Act which has simplified the procedure for eviction of a tenant on this ground. This brings me to consider whether the personal necessity of the plaintiff landlord is a reasonable one and the premises is required in good faith.
8. Setting out the cases of the two petitioners-defendants in the first two suit (T. E. S. 50/25 and 49/24 of 1986), they have taken a plea that the personal necessity of the landlord can be satisfied by bringing into his use the second and the 3rd floor and the defendant in the latter suit has pleaded that the portion of the groundfloor already in occupation of the plaintiff is sufficient for his personal necessity. Neither of the two courts below, in the aforesaid suits, had given any finding on the question of the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff being satisfied by evicting the tenants from a part of the premises. A finding in the former two suits was called for from the Courts below and it is to the effect that if a portion occupied by one tenans i.e. verandah and a room occupied by another is vacated, the reasonable and substantial need of the plaintiff would be fully satisfied. The finding in the latter suit is that the partial eviction of the tenants would not satisfy the reasonable and substantial requirement of the plaintiff.
9. After stating the matters broadly, I now take up the cases separately in order to appraise the correctness or otherwise of the findings and the ultimate result in these applications.
10. Now coming to Civil Revision Nos. 2105 and 2106 of 1986, the petitioners tenants of these two applications reside in two portions of the first floor and second floor of the building in question. It is not disputed that in the ground floor first floor and the third floor, the business of the son of the plaintiff in the name and style of M/s, Hind Art Cottage and M/s. Hind Offset is being run. The former firm is a partnership firm consisting of the son-in-law of the plaintiff Jagdish Chandra Deb, and the plaintiff s son Bireshwar Sarkar and that firm is paying rent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff requires the building for the expansion of the business of her son and his brother-in-law. The need has been accentuated by the fact that the son of the plaintiff, who was running a Press which was stated to be a family business in rented house in Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh, has been evicted from there ultimately by an order of the Supreme Court of India. Further, the son and son-in-law have also taken loan on interest from a Bank and are paying interest, thus, facing heavy financial commitment which could only be recompensed by the speedy commencement of the business for which the loan has been sought. This requirement, I have no hesitation in holding, is entirely within the first category and is also eco-personal in contradistinction to eco-commercial tested on the anvil of what I have said above. To enable a son or son-in-law to set a business in a premises is entirely justified personal necessity, absolutely reasonable and without doubt, in good faith, particularly, on the facts of this case. The eviction of the tenants is not sought to extract higher rent from anybody. It is sought to augment the personal income of the family by providing useful vocation to its members. Justifiability of this requirement cannot be doubted.
11. The objections taken by the defendants petitioners like the suit being not maintainable because it has been filed by the son of the plaintiff and not by the plaintiff herself appear to be all entirely technical and do not attack the core, i.e., absence of reasonableness and in good faith. The trial court has rightly decided this point. The plaintiff is the owner and occupier of the building. Her son Bireshwar Sarkar has acted in pursuance of the power granted to him by Power-of-Attorney. The plaintiff has come to Court as a witness and has supported the plaint. The Power of Attorney has been exhibited. In this situation, it cannot be held that the suit is not maintainable. It was further contended in this Court that the partnership firm M/s. Hind Art Cottage is situated in the groundfloor and is paying rent to the plaintiff. The fact that the partnership firm situated in the groundfloor is paying rent would render unjustifiable the plea of personal requirement as a part of the groundfloor stands let out to another tenant, i.e., the partnership firm. Two aspects emerge from this situation. Firstly, whether the right of the landlord to evict a particular tenant is defeated because other portions of the building or other premises are occupied by the tenants other than one who is sought to be evicted and secondly whether a partnership firm paying rent but belonging to the plaintiff-landlord's family will be treated as a tenant in the manner that one would treat a stranger tenant.
12. The first situation has now been settled by numerous decisions and does not require any elaboration. A landlord is entirely free to exercise his discretion and is always entitled to choose a particular premises for eviction which he feels would satisfy his reasonable requirement. He cannot be guided by the objection of his tenant otherwise. If a landlord has numerous tenants in one building or has several tenanted buildings, unless he has a right to choose, he can never get an order of eviction unless he seeks the eviction of all the tenants. This interpretation cannot be countenanced as valid. The landlord knows his reasonable require merits depending on his necessity and he alone can decide where and how his object can be achieved. In all events, the reasonableness of requirement with regard to the premises of choice will have to be decided. The Court has to decide whether the plea of the landlord is reasonable and is in good faith in relation to the premises in question de hors the fact of there being other tenants. Thus, in this case, the plea of eviction of the plaintiff landlord of a particular tenant cannot defeat her right to seek eviction of that particular tenant. This situation is also patent from Explanation IT of Section 11 (l)(c) of the Act. This brings to the second question-whether the partnership business consisting of the son and the son-in-law, naturally, representing the daughter of the family, while paying rent, will he treated as a tenant in ordinary sense of the term "tenant" as defined in the Act. Section 2 (h) of the Act defines "tenant" as below :-
"Tenant" means any person by whom, or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes.-
(i) a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour; and
(ii) a person who occupies a building as an employee of the landlord of such building either on payment of rent or otherwise.
(iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and condition specified, respectively, in Explanations I and II to this clause, such of the aforesaid persons-
(a) spouse;
(b) son or unmarried daughter, or where there are both, both of them;
(c) parents;
(d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of predeceased son, as had been ordinarily residing in the premises with such person ,as a member or members of his family up to the date of his death, but does not include any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made.
(Explanations have been left out) From this definition it may be plausible to hold that a partnership firm even if it is comprised of the members of the family can be treated to be a tenant. In fact, even a member of the family including the son can be treated to be a tenant but that will depend on the domestic relationship between the landlord and the members of the family and the working arrangement achieved as a result thereof. Ipso facto, a tenancy similar to that of a stranger will not be presumed. It may purely be a working arrangement for an undisclosed purpose. The creation of the partnership firm and payment of rent will not deprive the landlord the benefit of Section 11(1)(c) of the Act if the tenancy is not so in the strict sense of the definition but is merely an administrative arrangement. Such a member or members of the family, who are running a business in the premises and want to expand or start a business by seeking eviction, can run their business by setting it up in any legal form that they may desire. They can set up a company, a firm-proprietorship or partnership or a society or association. That will only be for the purpose of the institutional set up of the business. It will not affect the benefit accruing to the landlord vis-avis another tenant in the expression of his desire to seek eviction for the former, that is, the business of the members of the family though in the form of an association or corporate body or firm. This will depend from case to case and the only thing that will have to be weighed is whether the business when it assumes the character of a juristic entity-largely or broadly-comprising of such persons who come within the definition of those for whose benefit the property is held by the landlord. Even though, such a juristic entity is paying rent to the landlord, it will not create a relationship that would defeat the right of the landlord who seeks eviction of the ground of reasonable personal necessity for the benefit of the personal of that entity. The Court will have to examine whether the interest in the juristic entity of a person is fractional, infinitesimal, or entirely or largely. The ultimate discovery of the real character of the business vis-a-vis the right to the beneficiary of the eviction will depend on the aforesaid ascertainment. If the interest is fractional or infinitesimal, then the juristic entity will not be entitled to the benefit of an eviction proceeding otherwise there is no reason why it should not be endowed to the right to obtain eviction for its benefit. I am of the view that members of a family coming within the scope of the words" for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord." [as envisaged under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act], even if they are the party of the juristic entity will be entitled to get the benefit of the personal necessity of the landlord vis-a-vis their inter-se relationship. In this case, it is not shown that the interest of the son and the son-in-law was fractional or infinitesimal. Indeed, it was entirely their business and the partnership was created only as a working arrangement and would not be separated from the shadow of the plaintiff-mother merely because rent was being paid.
13. It is not stated that either Bireshwar Sarkar or Jagdish Chandra Deb, son and son-in-law of the plaintiff-landlord, respectively, are paying rent individually to the plaintiff. The rent is being paid by the partnership firm comprising of the son and the son-in-law This would not in any way deprive the son and the daughter through her husband to be treated as persons for whose benefit the building is held by the plaintiff landlord because merely by evolving a relationship of the landlord and tenant, the natural relationship invoking the definition will not disappear and each situation has to be judged on its own peculiarities.
14. Two other points were raised and negatived by the trial court correctly. Firstly, that heavy machines required for the Press cannot be carried to the first floor of the building and the plaintiff's son for whose benefit the business is being run, is holding a business in Varanasi and lastly the southern portion of the first floor is tenanted by a Bank employee. The first objection can hardly be an objection to affect the plea of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord. I cannot accept this proposition of fact and law affecting personal necessity, that heavy machines cannot be installed in the first floor of the house. The second point also is equally untenable because as I have stated above, the business of the son of the plaintiff has been disrupted by a decree of the Supreme Court for the house in which the business was being run and the same has been shifted to Patna.
15. In regard to the last point, it has come in evidence that the tenant in the southern portion of the building has already been evicted. It is not disputed that in the second and third floor the family itself resides, a part of it being occupied for the family business and by the son-in-law and the daughter. They naturally cannot be expected to shift from their living quarters. I, therefore, feel that the grounds raised by the defendants to defeat the claim that the plaintiff requires the entire first floor for the reasonable necessity and that too in good faith have not been fully established.
16. I now take the point of partial eviction decided in favour of the petitioners by a finding given by the trial court that the reasonable and substantial requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied by the partial eviction of the two tenants. I had called for a report from the trial court in this regard and the same has been received to the effect that if the verandah occupied by one tenant and a room occupied by the other is vacated, the reasonable and substantial need of the plaintiff would be satisfied. The learned trial court, has, however, failed to consider how machineries for setting up a Press can be installed in the verandah and in one room of the building in question. It has also failed to consider the problem of igress and engress and the convenience of running the business with residential portion surrounding it. I have examined the findings of the court below and I find that the plaintiff requires the premises in question in good faith and reasonably and if the requirement of setting up of business of Printing Press is accepted as a valid requirement, which I have no doubt it is, then it is ridiculous to suggest that it can be established in the verandah and a room only. I am fully satisfied that the finding of the trial court of eviction of the tenants from a part of the premises to satisfy the substantial and reasonable requirement of the plaintiff is entirely untenable. Hence, these two civil revision applications have to be dismissed with costs.
17. Coming to Civil Revision No. 1207 of 1986, I have already set out the stand of the plaintiff and the defendants in the suit. Basically, personal necessity is the same, that is, expansion of the business of the son and the son-in-law, on the son being uprooted from his business from Varanasi. The defendants, however, challenged this and asserted that the premises in their possession is not required for any reasonable or bona fide purpose. The plaintiff's claim has been negatived on three grounds viz. (i) non-examination of the plaintiff herself, (ii) the business of the son and the son-in-law being a partnership business and that partnership firm paying rent to the plaintiff, it cannot come within the definition of a person for whose benefit the building is held by the plaintiff-landlord and the eviction cannot be sought for on this ground and in fact the eviction is being sought for the benefit of a tenant and (iii) the son and the son-in-law are not dependant on the plaintiff-mother.
18. Coming to the first point, I may reiterate that I have already held above that the need of the plaintiff is entirely valid, reasonable and in good faith. Reasons have already been set out above and their validity for the claim in regard to the part of the premises involved in this suit need not be reiterated here. There is no manner of doubt that the law as laid down in the case of Ramji Jankiji and Anr. v. Mauni Baba Kale Kambalwala Jai Siyaram Dasji and Ors. is unassailable but I fail to understand what adverse inference can be drawn due to the non-examination of the plaintiff when all she was required to do was to state whether she needed the premises for herself, son and son-in-law for the purposes stated in the plaint.
19. Numerous witnesses have deposed to this effect and it was not one of those cases in which merely on the non-examination of the plaintiff, the entire story will stand falsified. The claim for bona fide and reasonable requirement of a suit premises under the B.B.C. Act is entirely dissimilar to the claim which depends entirely on the evidence of the persons asserting the claim like title to land or right to some property- movable or immovable. I am, therefore, entirely in disagreement with the learned trial court that it was entitled to draw adverse inference in regard to the claim of the plaintiff that the suit premises was required for personal necessity, reasonably and in good faith.
20. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The reason for her non-examination was her failing health. The learned court below has virtually held that the fact that she is in poor state of health has not been established. The only adverse inference that could be possible but would be entirely unjustified is that she is not in poor state of health. This, however, cannot be decided by a hair splitting appraisal of evidence as has been done in this case by the trial court. Had the plaintiff been in good health, there was absolutely no reason why she should have failed to appear as a witness when she has already appeared in the other two cases. Merely because the doctor's evidence was incomplete and lacking in details, it cannot be said that she is not in poor state of health, There were other materials also on the record for this purpose. The Court is required to find whether the requirement is reasonable and in good faith. That could not be avoided on these feeble and untenable grounds.
21. The next ground is equally specious. I have already held and would like to repeat that the member of the family cannot be denied the benefit of the claim of personal necessity of the suit premises merely because the business he is running or is about to be established is in a corporate form or in any other legal form. Here, the business is of the family, the son-in-law, representing the daughter and the son. If the firm, that is set up pays rent, it does not mean that it became a tenant in the strict sense of the words and would not come within the class of persons for whose benefit the building is held by the plaintiff landlord as I have held above. It is established on the fact that the business was entirely that of the family and the liability was only of the partners jointly and severally. Therefore, they cannot be put at par with other juristic entities where interest is fractional of infinitesimal.
22. The last point is also devoid of any merit that the son and the son-in-law are not dependant on the plaintiff. One does not have to be dependant on the landlord to come within the meaning of the persons for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord'. The word 'dependant' has not been used in the Act. A member of the family would be entirely independant yet he could be entitled to the use of the property of the holder in view of the proximity of the relationship. If the personal necessity of the person can only be extended to dependant children and not to others, then it will negate the very purpose of the section. Dependance on the landlord entitles a person to the benefit of an eviction. It does not, however, follow that lack of dependance would result in deprivation of that right.
23. On my calling for it, the Court has stated that the personal necessity of the petitioner-plaintiff cannot be substantially and reasonably satisfied by the partial eviction of the tenants. This finding, I have no manner of doubt, is entirely correct and I see no reason to differ with it.
24. I, therefore, feel that the personal necessity of the landlord in regard to the groundfloor is entirely justified. The trial court significantly does not say categorically and specifically that the personal necessity of the plaintiff is not reasonable and the claim is not in good faith. It has merely dismissed the claim on untenable grounds of dubious merit. On examining the evidence in these cases, I find that the groundfloor and also the first and second floor of the building in dispute are reasonably required for the personal use of the members of the plaintiff's family and, that is, by the plaintiff for setting up a business of printing press. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the personal necessity of the plaintiff landlord is entirely reasonable and in good faith.
25. In the result, Civil Revision Nos. 2105 and 2106 of 1986 are dismissed with costs and Civil Revision No. 1207 of 1986 is allowed with costs. The trial court will now proceed to execute the decree giving rise to Civil Revision Nos. 2105 and 2106 of 1986 and, in Civil Revision No. 1207 of 1986, the trial court will proceed with the eviction of the petitioners tenants from the portions occupied by them on the building in suit, as mentioned in the plaint, in accordance with law, in all cases, forthwith.