Karnataka High Court
Mr Raghavendra R A vs State Of Karnataka on 12 November, 2025
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WP No. 15159 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO.15159 OF 2025 (LA-KIADB)
BETWEEN:
MR. RAGHAVENDRA R.A.
S/O LATE P. RANGAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.45,
MARUTHI NILAYA, 6TH MAIN ROAD,
KAMAKSHIPALYA, NEW BADAVANE,
MEENAKSHINAGAR,
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU-560079.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI SANJAY B.K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
Digitally signed by DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRIES,
MAHALAKSHMI B M VIKASA SOUDHA,
Location: HIGH DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
COURT OF BENGALURU-560001.
KARNATAKA
(REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY)
2. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD (KIADB),
NO.49, 4TH & 5TH FLOOR,
EAST WING, KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BENGALURU-560001.
(REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER)
3. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER (LAO),
KIADB, OFFICE OF THE KIADB,
KHANIJA BHAVAN (5TH FLOOR),
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WP No. 15159 of 2025
HC-KAR
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BENGALURU-560001.
4. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT,
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT,
BENGALURU-560009.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI HARISHA A.S., AGA FOR R-1 & R-4;
SRI P.V. CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 & R-3;
SRI GIREESHA KODGI, ADVOCATE FOR R-5 TO R-9)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE
FINAL NOTIFICATION NO.CI 112 SPQ 2024 DATED 30.12.2024
ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 (COMMERCE & INDUSTRIES DEPT.,
GOK) UNDER SECTION 28(1) OF THE KIAD ACT INSOFAR AS IT
PERTAINS TO THE PETITIONER'S LAND BEARING SY.NO.208/1 (OLD
SY.208), MEASURING 2 ACRES 19 GUNTAS, OF HULIKUNTE VILLAGE,
DODDABALLAPURA TALUK ANNEXURE-K AND ETC.
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDER, THIS DAY, ORDER
WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner has approached this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
"a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the Final Notification No.CI 112 SPQ 2024 dated 30.12.2024 issued by Respondent No.1 (Commerce & Industries Dept., GoK) under Section 28(1) of the -3- NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR KIAD Act insofar as it pertains to the Petitioner's land bearing Sy. No.208/1 (Old Sy.208), measuring 2 Acres 19 Guntas, of Hulikunte Village, Doddaballapura Taluk [ANNEXURE-K];
b) Declare that the acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act initiated vide the aforesaid Preliminary Notification have lapsed and are null and void with respect to Sy.No.208/1 (2A-19G), the Petitioner being the lawful owner thereof by virtue of Sale Deed dated 15.05.2019 (Annexure- C), and consequently direct the Respondents to treat the Petitioner's title and possession over Sy.208/1 as free from any acquisition or claim by the State or KIADB;
c) Issue a writ of mandamus directing Respondent Nos.2 to 4 to forthwith drop all proceedings to dispossess the Petitioner from the lands in his possession, including the land in Sy. No.207, Hulikunte Village, and to consider and adjudicate the Petitioner's objections dated 19.05.2025 (Annexure-P) in accordance with law and principles of natural justice, before taking any further steps pursuant to the Final Notification dated 30.12.2024 or the acquisition of 26 Guntas in Sy.207;-4-
NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR
d) Direct Respondent No.2-KIADB and its LAO (Respondent No.3) that, in the event of finalising any award or disbursing any compensation for the acquired 26 Guntas in Sy. No.207, they shall not release the entire compensation to any private party without apportionment or securing the Petitioner's claim, and shall instead deposit the disputed portion of compensation in a court of competent jurisdiction under Section 29(2) of the KIAD Act read with Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or otherwise secure the same, pending resolution of the Petitioner's rights by a civil court or amicable settlement;
e) Grant an interim order of injunction and stay, restraining the Respondents, their officers, subordinates or any persons acting through them from interfering with the Petitioner's peaceful possession and enjoyment of lands in Sy. Nos.207 and 208/1, Hulikunte Village, including by way of taking possession, demolishing structures/crops, or initiating civil or police action to dispossess, and further restraining the Respondents from disbursing or distributing any compensation amount in respect of Sy. No.207 to the exclusion of the Petitioner, pending disposal of this writ petition; -5-
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f) Award costs of this petition and proceedings to the Petitioner, given the oppressive and arbitrary actions of the Respondents necessitating this litigation; and
g) Pass such other writ, order, or direction as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity, including but not limited to directing an inquiry into the conduct of Respondent officials in mishandling the acquisition process, or directing the Respondents to compensate the Petitioner for the losses suffered due to violation of his constitutional rights."
Brief facts:
2. The petitioner claims rights over land bearing Survey No.207 (2 acres 10 guntas), and 208/1 (2 acres 19 guntas) of Hulikunte Village, Doddaballapura Taluk, Doddabelavangala Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, under a registered sale agreement dated 24.10.2016 from Smt. T.G. Shanthamma and her family in respect of Survey No.207, followed by a supplementary agreement dated 01.03.2019 enhancing the consideration from -6- NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR `60,00,000/- to `70,00,000/-, claims absolute ownership over Survey No.208/1 under a registered sale deed dated 15.05.2019. Usha H.R. daughter of Shanthamma filed O.S. No.355/2020 seeking for partition and injunction. An ex parte interim order was granted on 23.10.2020 and by judgment and decree dated 13.09.2022, suit was decreed only in respect of Sy. No.207, excluding Survey No.208/1.
3. During the pendency of the civil proceedings, the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) issued a preliminary notification dated 22.07.2021 acquiring both survey numbers, subsequently issued final notification dated 30.12.2024 acquiring only 26 guntas in Sy. No.207, while dropping Survey No.208/1 from acquisition.
Statement of objections by respondent Nos.2 and 3:
4. The writ petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner is only an agreement holder, not the registered owner or khatedar, hence, he has no locus standi to -7- NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR challenge the acquisition. The reliefs sought to quash the acquisition, to declare that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed, and to direct payment of compensation are not germane to the petitioner's status. The petitioner has not impleaded his vendor, namely Smt. T.G. Shanthamma and her children, even though allegations are made against them and the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It is stated that the preliminary notification under Section 28 (1) of the KIAD Act was duly issued and public notice published in Vijaya Karnataka on 31.07.2021, inviting objections. Notice under Section 28 (2) of the KIAD Act was served on the recorded Khathedars, and after due enquiry, order under Section 28 (3) was passed on 09.12.2022. The final notification under Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act dated 30.12.2024 was properly issued, and the land vested in State under Section 28 (5) of the KIAD Act. It is submitted that there is no procedural illegality or violation of Articles 300 or 300A of the Constitution. It is stated that the petitioner -8- NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR was never delivered possession under the agreement of sale dated 24.10.2016, as its recitals themselves negate such delivery. The vendors continue to be the khatedars and their names alone appear in the RTC, notifications were issued based on those records. Further, the Trial Court decree in O.S. No.355/2020 has already recognized the vendor's ownership over Survey No.207 and the petitioner may pursue his remedy in R.A. No.10014/2025.
It is stated that the acquisition proceedings is valid, lawful and complete and no interference is called. Statement of objections by respondents No.5 to 9:
5. The respondents are the impleading applicants who came on record by the order of this Court dated 16.10.2015. It is contended that the petitioner, who was the family friend of the respondents and acquainted with them through business connections, and during 2016, demonetization period, he requested to use his medical firm's bank account for certain financial adjustments and 'to regularize those transactions, he allegedly persuaded -9- NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR the family to execute nominal sale agreements in his name and his brother's name, without any consideration, merely to show legitimate business dealings for income tax purposes'. It is submitted that the agreement dated 24.10.2016, pertaining to Survey No.207 and Survey No.208, were executed without any sale consideration, and solely to help the petitioner in overcoming alleged income tax issues. It is stated that the petitioner obtained the signature by misrepresentation and persuasion, claiming that the documents were required only for tax purposes. It is further submitted that the petitioner and his firm transferred funds to the respondents' accounts and immediately instructed them to return the same via RTGS or cash. The detailed banking records show that every amount received was returned on the same day or soon thereafter, proving that no genuine sale consideration was ever paid. The sale deed dated 15.05.2019 was executed under duress, showing a consideration of `33,00,000/- through cheques, which had
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR already returned to the petitioner's account. The cancellation of the earlier agreement dated 06.12.2016 was registered on the same day, allegedly without their knowledge or concern.
6. It is stated that O.S. No.355/2020 was filed by the respondent's daughter Usha, which resulted in a partial decree granting a 1/5th share in Survey No.207. O.S. No.413/2024 was filed seeking cancellation of the sale deed dated 15.05.2019 in respect of Survey No.208, asserting that the said sale deed is void and vitiated by, fraud, coercion and want of consideration. It is stated that the respondents' names continue to be recorded as the khatedars for Survey No.207 as per the RTC for the year 2024-2025. It is contended that they are suffering from cancer and are dependent on the compensation to meet the medical and financial needs. The several writ petitions in W.P. Nos.10062/2022, 25331/2022, 4897/2023 and 6301/2024, have been filed, wherein this Court directed
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR the KIADB to disburse the compensation within specified period.
7. It is contended that the petitioner is neither the lawful owner nor in possession of the property, but at best an agreement holder, with documents having been obtained through fraud, coercion and illegality, and therefore, the compensation ought to be disbursed only to the recorded khatedas-respondent Nos.5 to 9 as per the earlier orders of this Court.
8. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned AGA for respondent Nos.1 and 4, learned counsel for the KIADB-respondent Nos.2 and 3 and learned counsel for respondent Nos.5 to 9.
Contention of the petitioner:
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he is an agreement holder in possession of Survey No.207 under 2016 Agreement protected by Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ('TP Act' for short) and an
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR absolute purchaser of Survey No.208/1 under a registered sale deed dated 15.05.2019. The vendors have divested their interest and are therefore estopped from claiming compensation. It is further submitted that the petitioner was not issued notice under Section 28 (2) of the KIAD Act, despite being an 'interested person'. Further, the acquisition proceedings, according to the petitioner, suffer from inordinate delay and several procedure lapses, rendering them vitiated. It is contended that the KIADB acted in collusion with the vendors to deprive him of the compensation. The omission to notify and hear the petitioner amounts to deprivation of property without authority of law and violates Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution of India. The Decree in O.S. No.355/2020 is under challenge in R.A. No.10014/2025 and hence, the vendors cannot rely upon it as final. It is submitted that any compensation payable in respect of Survey No.207 must be deposited before the Court pending adjudication of the issue of ownership.
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10. The petitioner's counsel relied upon the following decisions:
i. Sukhbir Vs. Ajit Singh1 (Sukhbir) ii. Smt. Narasamma and another Vs. The Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board and others2 (Smt. Narasamma) iii. Sadashivaiah and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others3 (Sadashivaiah) iv. Ghanshyam Vs. Yogendra Rathi4 (Ghanshyam) Contention of respondent Nos.2 and 3-KIADB:
11. Learned counsel submits that the petition is not maintainable and the petitioner being an agreement holder has no locus standi to challenge the acquisition. All the statutory procedures under Sections 28 (1) to 28 (5) of the KIADB were duly complied with; public notice was issued, objections of the kathedars were heard and final 1 Civil Appeal No.1653/2021 2 2003 KAR LJ 6 299 3 W.P. Nos.7540/2001 & con. Matters D.D. 26.08.2003 4 Civil Appeal Nos.7527-7528/12 D.D. 02.06.2023
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR notification was lawfully issued. It is contended that respondent Nos.5 to 9 continue to be the recorded kathedars in the revenue records and notices were rightly served upon them. In support of his contention, reliance is placed upon the decisions in the case of Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar5 (Dr. G.H. Grant), J.M. Sohanlal and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore6 (J.M. Sohanlal).
Contention of respondent Nos.5 to 9:
12. In support of the statement of objections, learned counsel contends that the agreement and the sale deed are fraudulent, void and unenforceable in law and that the petitioner is not in lawful possession. The respondent Nos.5 to 9 are recorded khatedars and there are directions to the KIADB to disburse compensation to them. Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the writ petition and release of compensation in favour of 5 AIR 1966 SC 237 6 AIR 1996 KAR 171
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR respondent Nos.5 to 9. In support of his contentions, the reliance is placed on the following decisions:
i. Yallamma Vs. Shekharappareddy7 (Yallamma) ii. Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) through Director Vs. State of Haryana and another8 (Suraj Lamp & Industries Private Limited) iii. Rajamma Vs. Smt. Munigiddamma and others9 (Rajamma) iv. Sabbir (dead) Through Lrs. Vs. Anjuman (since deceased) through Lrs10 (Sabbir) v. Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Suresh Chand and another11 (Ramesh Chand) vi. Munishamappa Vs. M. Rama Reddy and others12 (Munishamappa) 7 (2006) Supreme (Kar) 280 8 AIR 2012 SC 206 9 (2001) 4 KCCR 2525 10 2023 SCC Online SC 1292 11 2025 Live Law (SC) 862 12 (2024) 13 SCC 132
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR vii. Gregory Patrao and others Vs. Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited and others13 (Gregory Patrao) viii. Mahnoor Fatima Imran and others Vs. M/s Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., & Ors14 (Mahnoor Fatima Imran)
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the questions that arise for consideration are:
"i. Whether the petitioner, being an agreement holder, can challenge the acquisition proceedings or claim compensation?
ii. Whether the parties may seek a reference for adjudication under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LA Act' for short) and seek deposit of the compensation amount before the competent Court?"
14. This Court has carefully considered the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
13
2022 Live Law (SC) 602 14 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679
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15. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Smt. Narasamma's case stated supra to contend that the core issue for consideration is, 'whether an agreement holder, who could not obtain conveyance of land on account of its compulsory acquisition, is nevertheless entitled to claim compensation or a share thereof in lieu of the acquired property, and to have such claim adjudicated, even though he holds no title.' It is submitted that the said decision squarely applies to the present case and that the petitioner's right to seek compensation arises in lieu of the performance of the contract. It is contended that it is well settled that when a purchaser's contract to acquire immovable property becomes impossible of performance without no fault on his part, as in the case of compulsory acquisition by the State, the law protects the buyer's interest by awarding compensation equivalent to the value of the property.
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16. Reference is made to Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ('SR Act, 1963' for short) which empowers the Court to award compensation (damages) in substitute of specific performance where the contract cannot be carried out. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh15 (Jagdish Singh), wherein it was held that where a contract, without fault of the plaintiff becomes impossible of performance, the Court may grant compensation in lieu of the specific performance under Section 21 of SR Act, 1963. It is therefore urged that an agreement holder is not remediless and may recover from the acquiring authority the value of the property determined in the acquisition proceedings, as such value represents the property itself.
17. He further relies on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sukabir (supra), wherein the land was acquired during the pendency of a suit for specific performance, and the Apex Court upheld the High Court's 15 (1992) 1 SCC 647
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR decree awarding the entire compensation amount to the agreement holder. The Court had observed that a purchaser under an agreement steps into the shoes of the original owner and is entitled to receive the compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the LA Act' for short), together with statutory benefits, after deducting any expenses incurred by the owner. That the principle emerging from Sukabir, read with Jagadish Singh, clearly enunciates that equity treats the compensation as representing the property itself for the purposes of enforcing the contractual rights of a bonafide agreement holder, who was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract but was prevented due to acquisition.
18. Applying the above principles, learned counsel submits that the petitioner has paid `68.50 lakhs out of the total consideration of `70 lakhs and was ready and willing to pay the balance of `1,50,000/-. The acquisition intervened without any breach on the part of the
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner has an equitable right to claim acquisition compensation in respect of the acquired 26 guntas of land in Sy. No.207. It is contended that denying such compensation to the petitioner would result in unjust enrichment of the original vendors, who would receive both the petitioner's consideration and the State compensation. The principle of equity, as recognized in the aforesaid decision, mandates that the agreement holder is entitled to compensation when the Courts have become incapable of granting specific performance due to compulsory acquisitions, since the land itself has vested absolutely in the State Government and no specific performance can now be sought.
19. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has placed decisions stated supra to contend that the petitioner, being only an agreement holder without registered conveyance, cannot claim ownership, possession or compensation under the KIAD Act or any acquisition law. This Court, in Yallamma's case, has held
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR that an agreement of sale, even if registered, does not by itself convey title nor create any interest or charge in the immovable property. The title passes only upon execution and registration of a sale deed as required under Section 54 of the TP Act and Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Hence, a mere agreement holder cannot be treated as 'an owner, or khatedar' in acquisition proceedings, and his remedy, if any, lies only against the vendor personally.
20. The Apex Court, in Suraj Lamp & Industries case held that the transactions based on a General Power of Attorney (GPA), Agreement to sale, Will or affidavit transaction do not confirm ownership, nor create any interest in the immovable property and held at paragraph Nos.15 and 16 as under:
"Advantages of registration
15. In the earlier order dated 15-5-2009 [(2009) 7 SCC 363 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 126] , the objects and benefits of registration were explained and we extract them for ready reference: (SCC p. 367, paras 15-18)
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR "15. The Registration Act, 1908 was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration.
16. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future 'any right, title or interest' whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs 100 and upwards to or in immovable property.
17. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed.
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18. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person(s) presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified."
Registration of documents makes the process of verification and certification of title easier and simpler. It reduces disputes and litigations to a large extent.
Scope of an agreement of sale
16. Section 54 of the TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam [(1977) 3 SCC 247] observed: (SCC pp. 254-55, paras 32-33 & 37) "32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. (See Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [AIR 1967 SC 744 :
(1967) 1 SCR 293] .) The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein.
33. In India, the word 'transfer' is defined with reference to the word 'convey'. ... The word 'conveys' in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership.
* * *
37. ... that only on execution of conveyance, ownership passes from one party to another...."
21. In Rajamma's case, this Court held at paragraph No.10 as under:
"10. In view of the above, we are of the view that even if it be assumed that any equitable interest has been created in favour of the appellant, but as the document has not been registered, no equitable interest could and did pass on in favour of the appellant under that deed for want of registration. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, no right did pass on to the or in favour of the appellant with respect to the property, whether it is subject matter of agreement to sell or subject matter of Power of Attorney. No doubt, right to manage might have been there. But it cannot be said that thereunder
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR the appellant became entitled to claim compensation in the land acquisition proceedings from the Government with respect to the land acquired and it is not such that a person who alleges to have paid entire sale consideration has no remedy. The law is very clear on this aspect of the matter and the remedy of the appellant is to file a suit for compensation as the decree for specific performance of contract of sale cannot be granted as the property had already been acquired by the Government. The contract might have become impossible of performance, but it could not be said that it is because of the fault of the appellant, instead it could be said that it became impossible of performance because of the change of position by and on account of acquisition of the plot by the Government in the land acquisition proceedings. In such cases, Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act read with other provision will come to the rescue of the appellant. This question has been considered in greater detail by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1604, where Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after examination of the case law, have been pleased to lay it down as under:
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR When the Plaintiff by his option has made specific performance impossible, Section 21 does not entitle him to seek damages. This position is common to both Section 2 of Lord Cairn's Act, 1858 and Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But in Indian Law that contract, for no fault of the Plaintiff, becomes impossible of performance. Section 21 enables award of compensation in lieu and substitution of specific performance."
22. The Apex Court, in the case of Ramesh Chand, held at paragraph Nos.18 to 22 as under:
"General Power of Attorney
18. A power of attorney is a creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him. It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. A General Power of Attorney does not ipso facto constitute an instrument of transfer of an immovable property even where some clauses are introduced in it, holding it to be irrevocable or authorizing the attorney holder to effect sale of the immovable property on behalf of the grantor. It would not ipso
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR facto change the character of the document transforming it into a conveyance deed.
19. A power of attorney is not a sale. A sale involves transfer of all the rights in the property in favour of the transferee but a power of attorney simply authorises the grantee to do certain acts with respect to the property including if the grantor permits to do certain acts with respect to the property including an authority to sell the property.
20. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Basant Nahata, it was held that:
"13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience.
xxxx
52. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers of Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The donee in exercise of his power under such power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the donee."
21. Further, the position of a power of attorney with respect to conferment of title was explained by this Court in the case of Suraj Lamp (supra), thus:
"20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR authorises the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see Section 1-A and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee."
22. Having discussed the position of law, it is essential to peruse the recitals of the General Power of Attorney, which is on record and pressed into service by plaintiff. The said GPA merely authorises the grantee to manage the affairs of the suit property, which includes the power to let out the property on rent, and create a mortgage of the same, etc. However, it is silent on the aspect of conveyance. Be that as it may. The recitals of the power of attorney would indicate the intent of the grantor is to limit the powers of the grantee to only manage the suit property, and not to create any interest in his favour, which is in consonance with the settled position of law as discussed above that a power of attorney is an agency by which the agent derives the authority or the right to enter into transactions on behalf of the principal. Even if we accept the validity of the Power of Attorney in
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR favour of the plaintiff, still it does not confer a valid title on him with respect to the suit property."
23. In Munishamappa's case, the Apex Court again held that even long possession pursuant to an agreement of sale does not confer ownership, only lawful transfer by registered sale deed confers title and Courts cannot decree specific performance, if the contract was not lawfully enforceable or executed in accordance with the statutory provisions. Agreement of sale is not a conveyance, it does not transfer ownership rights or confer any title.
24. The Apex Court in the case of Mahnoor Fatima Imran, held that unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title or entitle the claimant to protection from dispossession and held at paragraph Nos.17 and 25 as under:
"17. It is in this context that we must examine the document of 19.03.1982, an agreement which is said to have been validated in the year 2006. We
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR immediately notice that the very contention of the writ petitioners is only that they have obtained proper conveyances by registered sale deeds from Bhavana society, whose claim is under the agreement of 1982, which has not till date been registered and hence cannot be recognized as a valid mode or instrument of transfer of immovable property, going by the above decision.
25. We make it clear that we have not said anything about the possession of 99.07 acres which will have to be agitated in appropriate proceedings. As far as the writ petition praying for a direction not to dispossess, we find that the writ petitioners to have not established a valid title. We prima facie find the title to be suspect, which would disentitle them from claiming a rightful possession, which also has not been proved."
25. From the decisions stated supra, the ownership in land can arise only by virtue of a registered sale deed, agreements, GPAs, Wills, or affidavits do not confer title. An agreement holder, whose title is not established through a registered conveyance, has no statutory right to seek compensation in acquisition proceedings under the
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR KIAD Act or LA Act. Section 53A of the TP Act gives only a defensive right and does not enable a person to assert ownership or seek compensation. The petitioner's remedy, if any, is a civil and a personal against his vendors for recovery of money.
26. In the case of Dr. G.H. Grant, the Apex Court held that the power of the Collector under Section 30 is distinct and from that under Section 18, and may be exercised even after an award under Section 11 has been made. The Apex Court observed that the award under Section 11 is not a source of right to the compensation, instead, the right occurs when the land is vested in the acquiring authority after possession under Section 16 and the statutory process is complete. The Apex Court made a distinction between Section 18 and Section 13 and reaffirmed the separate nature of two provisions.
27. This Court, in Narasamma's case, observed that although the petitioner, being agreement holder, did
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR not possess a registered title and therefore could not invoke Section 18 of the LA Act, which pertains to disputes regarding entitlement to compensation, he was nevertheless entitled to seek a reference under Sections 30 and 31. The Court held that, since the agreement to purchase had been rendered impossible of performance due to the acquisition, the petitioner's remedy lies under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Thus, an agreement holder is not left remediless. The Co-ordinate Bench recognized that, while agreement holders are not legal owners, they are still "persons interested" under the LA Act, and that their contractual rights, having been extinguished by compulsory acquisition, entitle them to claim compensation in lieu of performance under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act.
28. In the present case, the agreement holders were undisputedly involved only with a direction to make reference and not with the substantial challenge of ownership. The Apex Court in the cases of Suraj Lamp &
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR Industries, Ramesh Chand and Mahnoor Fatima Imran have clarified that agreement holders do not acquire any proprietary interest and acquisition proceedings and acquisition compensation is favoured only the persons with registered title. Hence, the equitable extension adopted in Narasamma's case has been substantially diluted by the subsequent judgment. While Narasamma's case recognized equitable entitlement of genuine agreement holders to have claims referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition, applies only when, i. The agreement is bonafide supported by consideration;
ii. Possession is established, or readiness to perform is proved, and no serious allegation of fraud nor any subsisting competing title dispute is pending.
29. It is not in dispute that the petitioner rests his claim under a registered agreement of sale dated 24.10.2016 supplemented by the supplementary agreement dated 01.03.2019, said to relate to Survey
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR No.207, measuring 2 acres 10 guntas. During the course of the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a suit for specific performance has been instituted by the petitioner seeking execution of the sale deed in respect of the agreement of sale dated 24.10.2016. However, the said suit appears to have been filed only during the pendency of the present writ petition and after the acquisition notifications were issued under the KIAD Act. It is therefore apparent that the petitioner had not, at any point prior to the acquisition, taken steps to enforce his alleged contractual rights. The subsequent filing of the specific performance suit cannot retrospectively validate or revive an expired or unenforceable contract, nor can it establish a pre-existing interest in the land as on the date of its acquisition. The determination whether the petitioner has any subsisting contractual right or entitlement to compensation will necessarily depend upon the outcome of the proceedings before the Civil Court. Until such right is adjudicated and
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR established, the petitioner cannot be treated as an 'interested person' within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the LA Act, so as to claim or intercept the compensation payable to the recorded owners.
30. However, this Court does not consider whether the suit of the plaintiff seeking specific performance, if filed now, would be barred by limitation. The cause of action to seek performance arose much earlier and the petitioner allowed the statutory period to lapse without taking steps. Hence, the petitioner's contention that the acquisition intervened and frustrated the contract is actually untenable and legally unsustainable. The mere existence of a suit for specific performance, after the expiry of its time for completion, cannot confer upon the petitioner any subsisting right in the acquired land or in the compensation paid above thereof.
31. The interested person has been defined under Section 3 (b) of the LA Act, which reads thus:
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR "3. Definitions:
xxx
(b) the expression "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land."
32. The term is inclusive, not exhaustive. It covers any person who claims an interest in the compensation payable for acquired land, regardless of whether such person holds legal title. What matters is the claim of interest in the amount of compensation, not necessarily ownership of the land itself. The Courts have consistently interpreted the expression 'person interested' literally to ensure that anyone whose legal or equitable rights are affected by the acquisition can be heard.
33. The Apex Court in the case of G.H. Grant held that a 'person interested includes anyone who claims to be entitled to compensation whether as a owner, mortgagee, lessee or any other person having interest in the land or
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR its compensation'. The right to receive compensation may devolve by operation of law. Agreement holder, whose contract of sale has not culminated in a registered conveyance, whose title or possession has not been judicially recognized, cannot automatically be treated as 'a person interested', in the acquired property. The mere existence of an unperformed or disputed agreement does not confer a proprietary or compensatory right in the land or its value. Recognition under Section 30 arises only when the claimant demonstrates an existing legal or equitable entitlement capable of judicial determination. Unless the agreement is proven to be valid, substituted and supported by consideration, the holder cannot maintain a claim for compensation, as his right has not yet established in law. Accordingly, the points framed for consideration are answered and this Court pass the following:
ORDER i. The writ petition is hereby dismissed.
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NC: 2025:KHC:46245 WP No. 15159 of 2025 HC-KAR ii. The petitioner is at liberty to pursue his remedy against respondent Nos.3 to 9-vendors, if so advised, in accordance with law.
Pending I.As. if any do not survive for consideration.
Sd/-
_____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA MBM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 19