Calcutta High Court
Prem Nath Diesels Pvt. Ltd. vs Aloka Dam on 14 May, 1998
Equivalent citations: AIR 1999 CALCUTTA 1, (1999) 1 CAL HN 252 (1999) 1 CAL WN 106, (1999) 1 CAL WN 106
JUDGMENT N.K. Mitra, J.
1. The plaintiff/respondent filed Title Suit No. 43 of 1989 in the 2nd Court of the learned Assistant District Judge at Alipore against the defendant/appellants for eviction from the suit premises alleging inter alia, in the plaint that the plaintiff inducted the defendant company as monthly tenant in respect of the ground floor fiat of premises No. 43, Jhowtola Road, at present renamed as Fazlul Haque Sarani, Calcutta-19, of which the plaintiff was the owner, at a monthly rental of Rs. 5,000/- payable according to the English Calendar, for a period of 3 years from 1st of July, 1980 to 30th June, 1983 as per the tenancy agreement dated 21st June, 1980. Subsequently, after the expiration of the said period of tenancy, at the request of the defendant company, the plaintiff allowed the tenancy to continue for another period of 3 years commencing from 1st July, 1983 till 30th June, 1986 in terms of the renewal clause in the said agreement dated 21st June, 1980 with an enhancement of rent from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 5,500/- per month payable according to the English Calendar. Prior to the expiry of the said renewed period, the plaintiff by a letter dated 30th April, 1986 requested the defendant company to vacate the suit premises immediately after the expiry of the renewed period. The defendant company, however, without vacating the suit premises sent rent for the month of May, 1986 by account payee demand draft, which was duly refused by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also informed the defendant company that as there was security deposit of Rs. 15,000/- lying with the plaintiff, the same would be adjusted against the rent for the months of May and June, 1986 and the balance Rs. 4,000/ - was to be refunded thereafter. The defendant company, however, through its solicitors and Advocates M/s. Khaitan and Company wrote a letter on 12th June, 1986 to the plaintiff inter alia, claiming therein that the defendant company was a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in terms of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The defendant company, subsequently, requested the plaintiff to allow induction of a sub-tenant nanicly M/s. Bharat Power Corporation (P) Ltd. in place and stead of the defendant company in the suit premises but the said request was flatly refused by the plaintiff by her letter dated 30th September, 1986. Subsequently, however, in the month of January, 1987, the defendant company expressed its intention to vacate the suit premises by the end of March, 1987 and the plaintiff relying on the said assurance and promise, wrote a letter to the defendant company dated 6th March, 1987 and intimated the defendant company that her men and/or agent would be present to accept delivery of possession on 1st of April, 1987, in reply to which, the defendant company intimated the plaintiff that the defendant company was looking for alternative arrangement, and if it was successful in getting alternative accommodation, it would vacate the suit premises. The defendant company, however, did not vacate the suit premises by 31st March, 1987. Subsequently however, according to the plaintiff, the defendant company inducted M/s. Bharat Power Corporation (P) Ltd. as a sub-tenant in the suit premises without the consent of the plaintiff. By her letter dated 30th March, 1987, the plaintiff duly intimated the defendant company that by its acts and conducts it had violated the undertaking to vacate the suit premises. Immediately on receipt of the same, the defendant company with a mala fide motive purported to send a demand draft for the sum of Rs. 22,000/- alleging to be the rent for the months of October, 1986 to March, 1987. The plaintiff, however, returned the same to the defendant company by her covering letter dated 17-4-87.
2. The plaintiff further alleged, that on the persuation of the said M/s. Khaitan & Company with the father of the plaintiff, the matter was ultimately settled and on the assurance and express written undertaking given by the defendant company that it would vacate the suit premises immediately after the expiry of 30th June, 1989, and the plaintiff by an agreement dated 1st June, 1987 allowed the defendant company to continue its tenancy for a further specific period of 3 (three) years commencing from 1st July, 1986 till 30th June, 1989 subject to the payment of monthly rent of Rs. 6,000/- including service charges and Rs. 900/- per month as consolidated charges of occupier's share of Municipal, rates and taxes. The defendant company through; its Solicitors and Advocates' letter dated 26th May, 1987 admitted the default on its part in payment of rent from the month of July, 1986 till May, 1987 at the said rate per month, and after calculating and adjusting the amount deposit lying with the plaintiff, the defendant company agreed, and in fact paid a sum of Rs. 1,02,473/- by an account payee cheque drawn on the Punjab National Bank, Janpath Road, New Delhi, in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant company also cleared its obligation towards the payment of occupier's share of corporation rates and taxed for the suit premises. The plaintiff further alleged that by the agreement dated 1st July, 1987 the defenant company expressly, unambiguously and unequivocally agreed in writing to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises on the expiry of the last date of June, 1989, which is clearly a writing made subsequent to the creation of the said tenancy.
3. The plaintiff also alleged that as the defendant company had failed and neglected to vacate the suit premises and deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff with the expiry of 30th June. 1987 in total violation of the written undertaking dated 1st July, 1986 as referred to above, the defendant company was liable to be evicted under Clauses (j) and (k) of Sub-section (1) Section 13 of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and as the defendant company agreed to vacate the suit premises in writing dated 1st July, 1987, no notice in terms of Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the said Act was required to be served upon the defendant company, though the plaintiff had sent a letter dated 26th April, 1989 calling upon the defendant company to vacate the suit premises on the expiry of June, 1989.
4. The plaintiff alleged further that the defendant company in utter violation of the provisions of law as well as the said agreement dated 1st July, 1987 installed various machineries in the garage, and wrongfully, converted the same into a workshop or machine shop thereby causing damage and/or deterioration to the suit premises, and as such, it was guilty of acts of waste and negligence, resulting in material deterioration to the condition of the suit premises, and thus, also was liable to be evicted on the said ground. The other grounds for eviction from the suit premises by the defendant company as alleged in the plaini were inter alia, that the defendant company had violated the provisions of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and the plaintiff also reasonably required the suit premises for her own use and occupation and for the occupation of her family.
5. The defendant company contested the suit by filing written statement denying and disputing the material allegations made in the plaint. In paragraph 5 of the written statement, the defendant company categorically stated that fresh tenancy with effect from 1st July, 1986 was created by me agreement dated 1st July, 1987 and as it was a monthly tenant, it was protected against the eviction under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. It also denied that the agreement dated 1st July, 1987 was an agreement made subsequent to the creation of the tenancy as alleged in the plaint. It, however, stated that the tenancy was created with effect from 1st July, 1986 under the aforesaid agreement dated 1st July, 1987. The defendant company also alleged that the enhancement of rent was Rs. 5,500/- to 6,000/- per month was not an enhancement of the existing rent, but a new tenancy was created under the agreement dated 1st July, 1987 with effect from 1st July, 1986 under fresh terms. The defendant company also denied and disputed the legality and/or enforce-ability of the purported undertaking to vacate the premises by 30th June, 1989 as contained in the said agreement creating the tenancy dated 1st July, 1986. The defendant company also denied that it had inducted any sub-tenant, and/or was using any part of the premises for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was let out, or that it was guilty of violation of the provisions of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act or, that it was defaulter in payment of rent. It also denied that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises and that it was liable to be evicted as per the provisions of Clauses (j) and (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 as alleged by the plaintiff in the plaint.
6. An attempt was made subsequently by the defendant company to amend the written statement which, however, was rejected by the trial Court by its order dated 2nd May, 1991. The application under Section 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 filed by the defendant company on 7th August, 1989 in the suit, was also rejected by the learned trial Judge by his order dated 20th March, 1990. The defendant company also filed title suit No. 259 of 1989 in the Court of the learned 2nd Munsif at Alipore against the plaintiff for the self-same tenancy inter alia, for a declaration that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the ground floor flat in premises No. 43, Fazlul Haque Sarani, and also for permanent injunction. It has also filed an application under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 151 of the Code, in the ejectment suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant company for stay of the said ejectment suit till the decision of the title suit which was, however, rejected by the learned trial Judge by his order No. 32 dated 20th March. 1991.
7. Nine issues were framed in the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent including the additional issues, which are set out below :--
"1. Is the suit maintainable?
2. Is that defendant liable to vacate the suit premises as per letter of the plaintiff?
3. Does the plaintiff reasonably and suitably require the suit premises for her personal use and also for the use of her family members?
4. Did the defendant sublet the suit premises as alleged?
5. Has the plaintiff no reasonable and suitable accommodation?
6. In the plaintiff entitled to get a decree as prayed for?
7. To what other relief or reliefs if any, is the plaintiff entitled? Additional Issues :
8. Is the defendant liable to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of Clauses J. and K of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of W.B.P.T. Act as alleged?
9. Has the plaintiff any legal obligation to send notice to quit under Section 13(6)of the W.B.P.T. Act to defendant?"
8. In the suit the plaintiff herself examined as P.W. 1 and also one Sri Ramesh Choudhury an Advocate, working in the Solicitors' Firm standing in the name of M/s. Khaitan and Company, as P.W. 2, while Sri Rajendranath, the Managing Director of the defendant Company, was the sole witness deposed on behalf of the defendant company as D.W. 1.
9. The learned Second Assistant District Judge, Alipore by his judgment and decree dated 31st August, 1991 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that Clause (v) of the agreement dated 1st July, 1987 entered into by and between the parties to the suit being Exhibit No. 1, spoke of the statutory period for vacating the tenanted premises by the defendant company to the plaintiff and therefore, it came within the ambit of Section 13(1)(j) and (k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 as it was clear from the evidence of D.W. 1, that Exhibit No. 1 stood acted upon by the parties concerned. The learned Judge also held that Exhibit No. 1 was created subsequent to the creation of the tenancy and during the continuance of the tenancy of the defendant company under the plaintiff.
10. So far as the plaintiff's letter dated 25th April, 1989 written to the defendant company asking it to vacate by the end of June, 1989 was concerned, which was Exhibit No. 3, the learned Judge came to a conclusion that it was not a notice to quit at all under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the said letter did not, in any way, invalidate the agreed Clause (v) contained in page 9 of the agreement. The learned Judge further observed that taking into consideration the entire matter in controversy, and by taking into consideration the materials on record, he safely arrived at a conclusion that the suit as filed by the plaintiff was maintainable in law and the agreement -- Exhibit No. 1, having a legal, binding and effective force upon the parties to the suit, the defendant company was under legal obligation to vacate the suit premises in accordance with Clause (v) of the said agreement and the plaintiff had no legal obligation to serve any notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and as such, the plaintiff's claim for eviction of the defendant company from the suit premises on the basis of Section 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was of fully sustainable in law arid the plaintiff was thus entitled to a decree as prayed for. So far as the Issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were concerned, the learned judge, however, decided the said issues against the plaintiff. The other issues namely, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9 were, however, decided in favour of the plaintiff, by the learned Judge. The said judgment and decree are the subject matters of challenge in the premises, first appeal.
11. The only question involved in this appeal is, whether the agreement in writting dated 1st July, 1987 (Exhibit No. 1) executed by and between the parties to the appeal, whereby, the defendant/appellant agreed to vacate the suit premises on the expiry of the last day of June. 1989, can be treated to be a ground for the defendant/appellant's eviction from the suit premises under Section 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 as the tenant having agreed in writing to the landlord, subsequent to the creation of the tenancy, to vacate the suit premises on the expiry of 30th June, 1989, had failed to do so.
12. In the said agreement (Exhibit No. 1) under the heading The Parties Hereof Further Expressly Agree and Declare as Follows, it had been categorically stated inter alia, in Clause (i) that the said agreement dated 1st July, 1987 would be valid and binding between the parties for a period of three years from 1st July, 1986, while in Clause (v), a declaration was given by the defendant/tenant to the effect that on expiration of the said agreement, the tenant would forthwith vacate the tenanted premises without any objection on any ground whatsoever.
13. Mr. Chatterjee, a Senior Advocate of this Hon'ble Court, appearing for the appellant contended inter alia, that as per Section 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the tenant's agreement to vacate and quit the suit premises, must be subsequent to the creation of the tenancy, and in the present case, the disputed agreement, though was dated 1st July, 1987. which contained the above Clause (v), since the agreement was created with a retrospective effect from 1st July, 1986 the agreement was created simultaneously with the creation of the fresh tenancy and both of them were effective from the same date and hence, Clause (v) could not be said to be an agreement in writing made by the defendant company subsequent to the creation of the tenancy. The agreement, according to Mr. Chatterjee, therefore, was merely a recording of matters settled earlier and in support of his contention referred to a decision of P.B. Mukherjee, J. in the case of M.M. Goswami v. J, Choudhury, (1965) 69 Cal WN 568. Mr. Chatterjee also referred to the decisions in the case of Lalita Pattrea v. Ramani Kanta Das, (1985) 89 Cal WN 587; Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd. v. K.D. Banerjee, .
14. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that since the disputed agreement (Exhibit No. 1) was a lease for more than one year, it was compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, and that not having been done, was inadmissible in evidence and its clauses could not be considered even for collateral purposes also. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee referred the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chand v. Govardhan Das, .
15. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, contended inter alia, that the appellant was admittedly a monthly tenant under the respondent since the inception of the tenancy with effect from 1st July, 1980, inasmuch as, the original agreement for tenancy dated 21st June, 1989 was an agreement for three years only from 1st July, 1980 to 30th June, 1983 and as such, it would come within the purview of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and in such view of the matter, whatever agreement or agreements was or were entered into subsequently between the parties, was or were all subsequent to the creation of the tenancy and during the subsistence of such tenancy.
16. Mr. Mukherjee also contended that the monthly tenancy of the appellant continued till 30th June, 1989 and according to Mr. Mukherjee, the Clause (v) of the alleged agreement dated 1st June, 1987 must be taken to be a writing of the tenant executed subsequent to the creation of his tenancy and during the subsistence of such tenancy. According to Mr. Mukherjee, Clause (v) of the said agreement would, therefore, squarely bring the case with Section 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 1956.
17. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that since the agreement dated 1st June, 1987 was not a registered one, no fresh tenancy was created by virtue of the same and the old tenancy continued, when the agreement was entered into, and even if the said agreement being Exhibit No. 1 was an unregistered one, the same could he used for colateral purposes by the parties to the said agreement and Clause (v) of such agreement, therefore would clearly show that the appellant had agreed in, writing after the commencement of the tenancy and during the subsistence of the tenancy, that it would vacate the premises on expiration of the period, mentioned in the said agreement, that is, on the expiry of 30th June, 1989 forthwith, without any objection. Mr. Mukherjee also referred to the evidence of D.W. 1, who in cross-examination clearly admitted, that Exhibit No. 1 was a company agreement and the company namely, the appellant, would respect the agreement being Exhibit No. 1. According to Mr. Mukherjee further, the Rent Control Legislation is no longer a beneficial legislation for the tenant only, but it is also a beneficial legislation for the landlord as well. In support of his contentions. Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decisions in the case of Cumming v. Danson, (1992) 2 All ER 653; Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises v. Syeda Vajhinunissa, : Yudhisther v. Ashok Kumar, ; and Nikhil Dev v. Sankarlal Chandra (1981) 85 Cal WN 494.
18. Moreover, Mr. Chatterjee contended that Clause like Clause (k) or (j) of Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 deprives a tenant from the statutory protection and it must be, therefore, strictly construed against the landlord in favour of the tenant as was observed by P.B. Mukherjee, J. in the above decision; of this Hon'ble Court in the case of M.M. Goswami v. J. Choudhury (1965) 69 Cal WN 568.
19. Considering the rival contentions of the respective Counsels, we find there is much substance in the contentions of Mr. Mukherjee. Section 13(1)(k)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 runs as follows :--
"13(1)(k). Where subsequent to the creation of the tenancy the tenant having agreed in writing with the landlord to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlord has failed to do so."
20. The said clause is one of the grounds, on which a tenant can be evicted under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. From the wordings of the said Clause 13(1)(k), it is quite clear, that two things are conditions precedent for invoking the said clause i.e., (i) the tenant having agreed in writing to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlord has failed to do so and (ii) such agreement in writing by the tenant must be subsequent to the creation of the tenancy. The said Clause (k) of Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, therefore, gives certain protections to the tenant against eviction, inasmuch as, unless there is an agreement in writing subsequent to the creation of tenancy and/or unless there is a written undertaking given by the tenant subsequent to the creation of tenancy to vacate the premises at a particular time or date, the landlord cannot avail of the provisions of Section 13(1)(k). as has been held by the Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. V. K.D. Banerjee, . In Nikhil Dev v. Sankarlal Chandra, (1981) 85 Cal WN 494 it has, however, been held that when, subsequent to the creation of a tenancy, the tenant has agreed in writing with the landlord to deliver vacant possession of the premises by a certain date and has failed to do so, the landlord can file a suit for eviction under Clause (k) of Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and service of notice under Section 13(6) of the said Act is not necessary before filing such suit. Even a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, is also not required to be served on the tenant before filing the suit on that ground as has been held by this Hon'ble Court in ILR (1967) 1 Calcutta 438. Moreover, this Hon'ble Court also in the case of G.B. Roy v. R.C. Das, 82 Cal WN 617 : (AIR 1982 Calcutta 235), has held further that an agreement of this nature as contemplated by Section 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, though it is to be in writing by the tenant, is not required to be signed by the landlord, if there is any overt act indicating the acceptance thereof.
21. From the facts of the present case it would clearly appear that the defendant/appellant became a monthly tenant under the plaintiff/respondent in respect of the suit premises on and from 1st July, 1980 and the tenancy was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and since then the tenancy was continuing, no matter whether any subsequent agreement of lease was created in the year 1986, inasmuch as. even if any such lease was created in the year 1986 by the alleged document (Exhibit No. 1) for three years only such lease would also come within the purview o the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 by virtue of Section 3 of the said Act which says in clear terms that the said Act would apply to all leases for less than 15 years. Undoubtedly. Exhibit No. 1 was an unregistered document, but it matters little whether the disputed document (Exhibit No. 1) was registered or unregistered, as such document would not change the nature and character of the appellants' disputed tenancy under the respondent nor would it create a new or fresh tenancy of the appellants under the respondent.
22. Under Section 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 it is stated that leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent shall be registered. Section 49 of the said Act says that no document required by Section 17 (or by any provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882) to be registered shall (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered. Priviso to the said Section 49, however, says inter alia that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the said Act, or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.
23. As it has already been held hereinbefore that Exhibit No. 1 did not create any fresh or new lease in favour of the appellant, in our view, the said Exhibit was not required to be registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 it was not a lease deed at all and hence, the said Exhibit No. 1 is admissible in evidence for collateral purposes and according to us, Mr. Mukherjee rightly contended that Exhibit No. 1 can be used in evidence as an agreement entered into in writing by the appellant with the respondent after the commencement of its tenancy and during the pendency of its tenancy it would vacate the suit premises after expiry of the period as stipulated in the said agreement i.e. after 30th June, 1989.
24. Mr. Chatterjee laid special stress upon the observation made by the Apex Court of the Country in that when a lease required to be registered as per the provisions of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 has not been registered, it is inadmissible in evidence and terms of such lease also cannot be used even for collateral purposes. However, as it has already been discussed and held therein before that Exhibit No. 1 was not a lease creating a new or fresh tenancy in favour of the appellant, it was not required to be registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 and as such, according to us, the decision of the Supreme Court in being quite distinguishable on facts would be of no help to the appellants.
25. The Supreme Court in the case of Nagarmal Tekriwal v. State of Bihar, 1971 Cri LJ (N) 14 also held inter alia, discussing the scope of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 with regard to a prosecution under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act that the question arose whether accused was an agriculturist. Witnesses deposing on oath stated that the accused cultivated 80-90 Bighas of land. The lease deed in favour of the accused though unregistered, served collateral purpose of showing that the lands were held by the accused for cultivation. Relying on the said decision of the Supreme Court, it can also be held that Exhibit No. 1 even if can be termed as an unregistered lease deed, can be used for the collateral purpose of showing that an agreement was entered into in writing by the defendant/ appellants after the creation of its tenancy under the respondent and during the pendency of the said tenancy that it would vacate the disputed premises with the expiry of the period as contained in the said deed, i.e., on the expiry of 30th June, 1989.
26. In our view, therefore, Clause (v) of the Exhibit No. 1 should be treated to be an agreement in writing entered into by the appellant with the respondent subsequent to the creation of the appellants tenancy and during the pendency of its tenancy to the effect that the appellant had agreed in writing with the landlord to deliver vacant and preaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord after a particular period and having failed to do so clearly brought itself within the mischief of Clause (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
27. The trial Court also after considering the evidence on record found that D.W. 1, who was the Managing Director of the defendant company, admitted in his evidence the existence of the alleged fresh tenancy agreement dated 1st July, 1987 wherein he signed as the Managing Director of the company, and he further admitted in cross-examination that the company should respect the, agreement as per law. Accordingly, the trial Court rightly held that it could be safely held that there, was a positive admission of the company that Exhibit No. 1 was a company agreement and the terms contained therein were to be respected by it, which were thus binding on the parties. We also agree with the above observations of the learned trial Judge. The deposition of the D.W. 1 if taken in its true perspective, would clearly appear that the appellant-company had accepted the disputed agreement (Exhibit No. 1) and intended to act upon it and as such, it is binding on the parties.
28. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Saral Chandra Das v. Smt. Sarajini Rudraja , wherein it was held inter alia, relying upon two decisions of the Privy Council in the case of Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli AIR 1914 PC 27 : (42 IA 1) and Sri Rajah Malraju Lakshmi Venkayyama Rao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao Bahadur AIR 1916 PC 9 : (43 IA 138), that where a compulsorily registerable agreement is not registered but has been acted upon, it is binding on the parties though the agreement is inadmissible in evidence. In this case it has already been discussed hereinbefore that D.W. 1 in his evidence had clearly staled that Exhibit No. 1 was a company agreement and the company would honour the agreement.
29. Moreover, though Rent Act is a beneficial legislation, it must be read reasonably and justly. If more limitations arc imposed upon the right to hold the properly, then it would expose itself to the vice of unconstitutionally. Such an approach to a beneficial statute is not warranted. One should iron out the creases and should take a creative approach as to what was indicated by a particular provision as has been held by the Apex Court of our country in the case of Yudhister v. Ashok Kumar, : Further, Rent Control Act is a beneficial enactment not for tenants alone, but for landlords as well as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises v. Syeda Vajhinunissa, . Moreover, even if a tenancy is created by a contract and/ or if there be a contractual tenancy, if such contract falls within the purview of Rent Act, the Rent Act would apply, notwithstanding any such contract, and the tenant cannot claim that his tenancy is governed by the contract and not by the Rent Act:
30. Lastly, we are also of the view that as Clause (v) of the disputed document (Exhibit No. 1) clearly comes within the ambit of Section 13(1)(k) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the question of service of notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 of the plaintiff also does not arise at all.
31. We, therefore, concur with the findings of the learned trial Judge and the appeal, accordingly, stands dismissed without any order as to costs.
32. The prayer for stay of operation of the order as made by Mr. Sadhan Roychowdhury, learned Advocate for the appellant, however, is refused.
A.B. Mukherjee, J.
33. I agree.