Punjab-Haryana High Court
Manmohan Sharma vs Smt. Swaran Kaur And Anr. on 13 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: (2003)133PLR300
Author: S.S. Nijjar
Bench: S.S. Nijjar
JUDGMENT S.S. Nijjar, J.
1. The respondents-landlords (hereinafter referred to as "the respondents") filed a petition under Section 13 of the East Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") through their duty constituted Power of Attorney, Balbir Singh, seeking ejectment of the tenant/petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner") from the ground floor portion of H.No.699, Sector 20-A, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as "the demised premises"), inter-alia on the grounds of non-payment of rent w.e.f. 1.5,1998 onwards and bona fide personal necessity. The landlords are co-owners of the demised premises alongwith Manmohan Singh Grewal and Savraj Singh Grewal. The tenant is in use and occupation of the entire ground floor portion of the aforesaid house at a rent of Rs. 250/- per month, excluding water and electricity charges. Both the respondents, mother and son are presently residing in the United Kingdom. They intend to permanently settle down at Chandigarh. Therefore, it is pleaded that the demised premises are required for their own use and occupation. The land-lady, respondent No. 1, is stated to be 75 years of age. She lives on the 1st Floor as and when she comes from England to Chandigarh. Respondent No. 2 is married and has three children. Therefore, it was stated by the respondents that the demised premises i.e. the ground floor of the house are required for the occupation of the family. It is the case of respondent No. 1 that she finds it difficult to climb the stairs to the first floor due to old age. Furthermore, she is suffering from Asthma and heart disease. Similarly, the son, respondent No. 2 has undergone bye-pass surgery and is also a patient of heart disease. The respondents reside in West Yorkshire in England. In paragraph 5 of the petition it is stated as under: -
"5. That the petitioner No. 1 alongwith her son Daljit Singh Grewal petitioner No. 2 intends to settle down permanently at Chandigarh and both the petitioners are coming to India in the month of December 1999 in connection with the performance of the marriage of their grand-son namely Balraj Singh son of Daljit Singh Grewal and after the performance of the marriage both the petitioner has decided to settle down at Chandigarh in the house in question and do not intend to go abroad on account of health reasons. Petitioner No. 1 is suffering from Asthma and Heart disease and besides that Daljit Singh Grewal petitioner No. 2 has also under gone bye-pass surgery being heart-patient and atmosphere at West Yorkshire is not at all suitable for the petitioners and health of both the petitioners has suffered a lot while residing abroad and both the petitioners has decided not to live in that country and has decided to settle down permanently at Chandigarh. Petitioner No. 1 due to suffering from asthma and Heart disease intends to reside in ground floor portion of the house in question. The first floor portion in her use and occupation is not at all suitable and petitioner No. 1 feels great difficulty in climbing the stairs and moreover the doctors attending to her has advised that petitioner No. 1 should avoid climbing the stairs, certificate to this effect issued by the Doctors is attached herewith. Petitioner No. 1 is suffering from Heart disease and she has developed a tendency of asthma and she is getting injections regularly for asthma and both the petitioners are suffering from the diseases mentioned aforesaid and both the petitioners required the ground floor portion of House No. 699, Sector 20-A, Chandigarh for their personal use and occupation and residence and for the residence of family members who ordinarily reside with the petitioners. The family of the petitioners consist of petitioner No. 1, petitioner No. 2, his wife, three children and the accommodation situated on first floor portion of the house in question is otherwise inadequate and do not meet out the family requirement of the petitioners. It is added that first floor portion which is lying vacant disease suffered by the petitioners is not at all suitable and the petitioners required the ground floor portion for their own use and occupation and for residence and the premises in use and occupation of the respondent are bona fide required by the petitioners for their use and occupation and residence. Many requests were made by the petitioners to the respondent as the same are bona fide required by them but the respondent has been delaying the matter on one pretext or the other."
2. The respondents had earlier also filed petitions for eviction of the petitioner, The petitions were, however, dismissed. The first eviction petition filed by the late husband of respondent No. 1 on the same grounds was dismissed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh on 22.11.76. The second petition filed by respondent No. 1 and Amar Singh was dismissed by the then rent Controller on 10.3.1982. It was averred that the ground floor of the house had been let out through Amar Singh. The appeal filed against the order of the Rent Controller was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 9.3.1983.
3. The petitioner contested the eviction petition. In the written statement, preliminary objection was taken to the effect that the Eviction Petition was not maintainable, being barred under Section 14 of the Act. The rent for the period of 31.5.1997 to 31.5.1998 had already been paid to respondent No. 1 Rent for the period of 1.5.1998 to 31.1.2000 with interest and costs was tendered in Court on 17.4.2000. It was further stated that the eviction Petition has been filed on false and frivolous grounds of personal necessity. The respondents are permanent residents of West Yorkshire. The entire story put forth by the respondents is false and concocted. The real object of the petition was to enhance the rent. The ailment of the respondents was denied. It was further pleaded that children and grand-children of respondent No. 1 are well-settled in the United Kingdom., Her sons have a flourishing business in the United Kingdom. Medical treatment for asthma and Heart disease is far better in West Yorkshire than that of India. The plea that the atmosphere at West Yorkshire is not suitable and that health of the respondents has suffered a lot, is denied as incorrect and concocted. It is stated that the requirement of the respondents is not bona fide, rather coloured one. The Rent Controller framed the following issues:-
1. What is rate of rent? OPP
2. Whether the tender dated 9.2.2k is short and invalid? OPD.
3. Whether the requirement of the petitioner for the demised premises is bona fide? OPP
4. Whether the petitioner has concealed true and material facts from the court? OPR
5. Whether the petition is barred by the provisions of Section 14 of the EPURR Act? OPR
6. Relief.
4. In order to prove their casei respondent No. 1, landlady appeared as PW1. Balbir Singh appeared as PW2. Medical certificate, Ex.P1 and the power of attorney in favour of Balbir Singh, Ex.P2 were tendered as documentary evidence. The petitioner-tenant examined himself as his own witness RW1. He tendered in evidence certified copy of the judgment dated 10.3.1982 and 3.9.83, Ex.R-1 and Ex.R-2. Issues No. 1 and 2 were not pressed. The main contest between the parties was with regard to issue No. 3.
5. After examining the entire evidence, the Rent Controller has held that respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 now intend to settle down permanently in India. They do not have any other house at Chandigarh. Respondent No. 1 came to India in the year 2000. Since then she is residing in her house with Balbir Singh, Power of Attorney who is residing in the barsati portion. Respondent No. 2 intends to settle in India permanently with her. He has a family consisting of his wife and three children. Respondent No. 1 is a patient of Asthma, heart disease and she has knee problems. Thereafter, it has been held that it is difficult for her to climb the stairs, in the medical certificate, Ex.P-1, the English Doctor of respondent No. 1 has stated that "She is a patient of the practice and she suffers from severe arthritis, particularly of the knees, She has a tendency to asthma and requires regular injections for anaemia. She has had ishcaemic heart disease for some ten years." It is further opined that "these conditions limit her mobility and her general health and she would benefit from having ground floor level accommodation." With regard to the admissibility of Ex.P1, the Rent Controller has held that even if it is not proved, there is sufficient evidence on the case file to show that respondent No. 1 is near about 75 years of age. It has been held that her old age is itself an ailment. It has been further held that respondent No. 1 has herself appeared in the court to depose that she is suffering from the diseases mentioned above. Her version has been held to be plausible keeping in view her age and physique. The diseases referred by respondent No. 1 have been held to be common in old people. Therefore, it has been held that the oral evidence of respondent No. 1 cannot be discarded or disbelieved merely on the ground that the same is not supported by any medical evidence. Thereafter, it has been held that respondent No. 1 certainly needs the ground floor for having a comfortable life. The Rent Controller has further held that merely because the respondents are presently residing abroad, the court has no reason to restrain them from using their own property, after settling here in India permanently. It has been held that there is nothing on the record to disbelieve the statement of the respondents that they intend to settle here in India. The Rent Controller has further held that the landlord is the best judge of the requirement and ordinarily, the court should not impose its own standard while deciding the bona fide requirement. The learned Rent Controller further held that unless and until any mala fide or other circumstances are shown, the Court should not discard the plea of the landlord that he requires the premises for personal necessity. Adverting to the evidence of the petitioner himself, it is observed that as RW1, the petitioner has admitted in the cross-examination that both the respondents No. 1 and 2 often pay visit to India from time to time. There is also unrebutted evidence that the respondents do not have any other house, except the house in question at Chandigarh nor they have got any house vacated, after the commencement of the Act. The Rent Controller further held that the court cannot compel the respondent to stay in a hotel or in the house of the relative when they have their own house in the city. On the other hand, it has been held that no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner who can take any other house on rent, With regard to the plea of bar contained under Section 14 of the Act, it has been held that the ground of personal necessity is a continuing cause of action. Keeping in view the old age of respondent No. 1, the changed circumstances and the jntention of respondent No. 2 to settle in India, earlier dismissal of the petitions cannot be taken into consideration while adjudicating the claim put forward in the present petition. Hence the Eviction Petition was allowed. The petitioner was granted 40 days time to vacate the premises. This order was passed on 18.8.2001.
6. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The appellate Authority again after an elaborate discussion of the evidence led by the parties, has dismissed the appeal. The Appellate Authority notices the argument that the respondents-landlords are settled in West Yorkshire for the last more than 45 years. They have a flourishing business there. Sons of respondent No. 1 are having their business in the United Kingdom. Daughter of respondent No. 1 is also living abroad and all her sons and daughters are married. Respondent No. 2 has not stepped into the witness box. Respondents have no business at Chandigarh. In any event, they have sufficient accommodation in their possession to cater for their needs. The petition has been filed only to extract a higher rate of rent. Sons of respondent No. 1 are income-tax payee in United Kingdom. Respondents have given irrevocable power of attorney, copy of which is Ex.P2, to Balbir Singh for a period of ten year from the date of execution. All these facts put together show that they have no intention to settle in India. It was further argued before the Appellate Authority that the first floor portion of the house in question is lying vacant and is in possession of the respondents. Therefore, it is only a mere desire of the respondents to live on the ground floor. It was next contended that since alternative accommodation is available on the first floor, refusal of the landlord to occupy the same would lead to an inference that the need was not bona fide. The Appellate Authority, after discussing the submissions made, has recorded elaborate findings and held that the findings recorded by the Rent Controller on issues No. 3 to 5 are affirmed. The appeal has been dismissed on 21.2.2002. Two months time was granted to the tenant to vacate the premises.
7. Mr. Sharma has reiterated the submissions that were made before the Appellate Authority. He has further laid stress on the fact that respondent no.2 did not appear in the witness box. Therefore, an' adverse inference has to be drawn against the respondent to the effect that if respondent No. 2 had appeared in Court, his testimony would be contrary to the case set up by him. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and Anr., A.I.R. 1999 Supreme Court 1441. In support of the submission that the need of respondent No. 1 for residing in Chandigarh is not bona fide, the learned counsel has relied on the decision in the case of Sohan Devi v. Sh. Parkash Chander, 1983(2) R.C.R., 627. Mr. Sharma has also argued that it would be unnatural for respondent No. 1 to live in India in her old age when her children and grand-children are well-settled in U.K. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Hira Devi v. Sh. Dewan Singh and Anr. (1990-1)97 P.L.R. 180. It is submitted that it is not even the case of respondent No. 1 that she is not getting on well with her family members in U.K. In fact the case is that they are a happy and united family living in U.K. It was also submitted that in fact respondent no.l being an aged lady would need to be looked after by her family members, and therefore, the case set up is totally false. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Lakshmi Devi and Ors. v. Dr. Mela Ram, 1982(1) R.C.R. 259. Lastly it is submitted by Mr. Sharma that even if the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact, this Court would have the jurisdiction to reinvestigate the questions of facts as the powers under Section 15(5) of the Act are much wider than the powers of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. Mr. Sharma has also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, A.I.R. 2001 Supreme Court 2655 and submitted that the Court is duty bound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the Eviction Petition, but also whether any other reasonable and suitable accommodation is available. According to the learned counsel, both the courts below have erred in law in hot appreciating the fact that the first floor portion of the house is available for occupation by the respondents.
8. Mr. Avnish Mittal appearing for the respondents submitted that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below are based on due appreciation of evidence. These findings cannot be said to be either perverse or based on no evidence. Therefore, whilst exercising revisional jurisdiction, this Court would be hesitant in re-appreciating the evidence. Learned counsel has negatived all the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner by also relying on various decisions of the courts. With regard to the earlier petition having been dismissed, learned counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in the ease of Amrit Lal Walia v. Bhagwant Singh, 1989(2) R C.R. 238 and Khewan Singh v. Shri Rameshwar Doss, 1981(1) R.L.R. 376. Learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Saroj Khemka v. Indu Sharma, 2000(2) R.C.R. 31 and submitted that even if the respondents came to India for short periods they would be entitled to have the use of their own house. They cannot be compelled to go to the house of a relative or stay in a hotel. In support of this argument, the learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of K.D. Nagrath (Dr.) v. Mrs. Neena Sarna, 1999(2) R.C.R. 542. The learned counsel has also relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Srirama-murthy v. Mrs. Vasantha Roman, A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 1388 and a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of A.K. Mukherji v. Pradip Ran/an Sarbedhikary and Ors., A.I.R. 1988 Calcutta 259. Thereafter, Mr. Mittal has further submitted that it is for the landlord to decide as to the bona fide requirement. Mere availability of accommodation on the first floor of the house would not be sufficient to discard the claim of the respondents-landlady and her son. In support of the aforesaid submissions the learned counsel has relied on another decision of Delhi High Court in the case of H.C. Goenka v. Brig S.P. Kochar, 12 2000(1) R.L.R., 604.
9. I have anxiously considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. I have also perused the entire record of the case.
10. I am of the considered opinion that the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Vidhyadhar (supra) are of no assistance to the petitioner. It is not disputed that in the present ease, a joint petition has been filed by respondents No. 1 and 2. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, after minute appraisal of the evidence, have accepted the plea put forward by respondent No. 1. Therefore, even if the plea of respondent No. 2 was to be discarded, the findings of fact recorded in favour of respondent No. 1 were sufficient to order the eviction of the petitioner from the demised premises. It is settled proposition of law that in the case of co-owners of the property, everyone of the co-sharers is entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant from the demised premises for his bona fide requirement. This view of mine finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, 1977(1) Rent Law Reporter 224. In paragraph 27 of the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:-
"Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property alongwith others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f) (of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of Section 13(1)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants."
11. The aforesaid judgment has been followed by this Court in the case of Jagdish Lal v. Smt. Tara Devi, 1985(1) R.L.R., 85.
12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact in favour of respondent No. 1. These cannot be reversed lightly or liberally in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act. Such findings of fact can only be reversed, if this Court comes to the conclusion that the findings are based on no evidence or are such that no reasonable court could have come to the same conclusion. The decision of this Court in the case of Sohan Devi (supra) turns on its peculiar facts. The Court came to the conclusion that:-
"From a reading of the averments, in the ejectment petition and the replication, it is clear that the pleas were different, whereas the evidence led is regarding totally different facts."
13. Otherwise, there is absolutely no similarity in the case projected by respondent No. 1 who is an old lady residing in England wanting to shift to this country on account of illness and unsuitability of the climate in England. Similarly the observations made in the case of Hira Devi (supra) are also based on the peculiar facts of that case. This Court declined to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the Appellate Authority in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. It was held that no error of law nor any impropriety has been pointed out. The reliance on the observations made by this Court in the case of Lakshmi Devi (supra) are also not relevant as the same have been made in the peculiar facts of that case. Mr. Sharma has then relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Das v. Ishwar Chander and Ors., (1988-2)94 P.L.R. 478 (S.C.) to submit that this Court has the power under Section 15(5) of the Act to examine the correctness of findings of fact also. In the aforesaid judgment it has been held as follows:-
"11. But here, Section 15(5) of the Act enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality and propriety" of the order under revision, which is quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction. That jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts also, though the revisional court is not "a second court of first appeal" (See Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Marutirao, 1976R.C.R. 128; A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 111).
12. Referring to the nature and scope of the revisional jurisdiction and the limitations inherent in the concept of a 'Revision', this Court in Ranalakshmi Dyeing Works and Ors. v. Rangaswamy Chetiar, 1981(2) R.C.R. 559; 1980(2) R.C.J, 165 (at 167) observed:
"....2 "Appeal" and "revision" are expressions of common usage in Indian statutes and the distinction between "appellate jurisdiction" and "revisional jurisdiction" is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing as it were, on law as well as facts and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction.....Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate jurisdiction but no vice versa. These are general observations. The question of the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with reference to the language employed by the statute...."
13. The criticism of Shri Harbans Lal that it was impermissible for the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the appellate authority, however, erroneous that be, it is not, having regard to the language in which the revisional power is couched tenable. In an appropriate case, the High Court can reappraise the evidence. If the findings of the appellate court are found to be infirm in law."
14. A perusal of the aforesaid observations shows that this Court undoubtedly has the power to appraise the evidence, if the findings of the courts below are found to be infirm in law. However, these observations would be wholly inapplicable in the present case, A perusal of the judgment of the Appellate Authority shows that the learned court has correctly appreciated the legal position. It has been held that respondent No. 1 has appeared as PW1. She has categorically supported the case pleaded by her to the effect that she and her three sons are the owners of the demised premises and that she and respondent No. 2 are landlords of the petitioner and that they have appointed Shri Balbir Singh as their attorney. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority considered the submissions made. It has been held that even if Ex.P1 is excluded from the evidence, there is statement of respondent No. 1 as PW1 on oath regarding her ailment. She is an aged lady of 75. The petitioner was unable to deny that respondent No. 1 is an aged lady. He also could not deny that she is suffering from asthma and heart disease or that respondent No. 2 has undergone bye-pass surgery. The Appellate Authority has observed that old age is itself an ailment. Therefore, if at this stage, respondent No. 1 wants to reside in India in her native land in her house in Chandigarh, her need cannot be held to be not bona fide. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority has adverted to the difficulties respondent No. 1 would face in climbing the stairs to the first floor due to arthritis and pain in the knees. Taking stock of the cumulative evidence, the Appellate Authority has come to the conclusion that the need of respondent No. 1 is genuine and bona fide. Mr. Mittal has rightly relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of A.K. Mukherji (supra). In the aforesaid judgment it has been held that "if on these materials, the courts below have held that it has been satisfactory proved that the petitioner there intends to come back to India and would be living in Calcutta, it is not for the court siting in the 2nd appeal to assume the rule of a thought-reader and to probe into his mind and to hold that he does not or cannot so intend." As was pointed out by Sir George Lowndes in the Judicial Committee in Balasubrahmanya v. M. Subbayya, (A.I.R, 1938 P.C. 34 at p. 35), whether a particular intention can be inferred from a particular state of facts and circumstances is a question of fact and if the Courts below have concurred on this, the superior court must leave it at that. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in I.C.L. (India) Private Limited v. Commr. of L.T., A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1524 at page 1526, 1530: (1972 Tax L.R. 770) is a clear authority for the view that intention is essentially a question of fact. Since I do not find the finding as to intention by the courts below either to be based on "no evidence" or to be palpably so unreasonable as could not be arrived at by any reasonable man, the finding would be beyond challenge. In view of the above I am of the considered opinion that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below do not call for any interference. Mr. Sharma has laid considerable stress on the fact that the whole family of the respondents is residing in U.K. happily. Therefore, it would be unnatural for her to return to India. Arguments of such kind have been repeatedly advanced against Non Resident Indians seeking eviction of the tenants from the demised premises. Mr. Mittal had pointed out the observations made by the Delhi High Court in the case of Saroj Khemka (supra), wherein similar arguments have been raised. After noticing the arguments, Justice Vijender Jain observed as follows: -
"8. ....I do not see any force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if the petitioner visits India, she cannot have her own house for her casual stay as her residence and she has to go to the house of the relatives or has to stay in a hotel in spite of the fact that she has a flat of her own in Delhi. No Court can compel a person to stay in a house of a relative or a hotel and because the said person is staying abroad, he/she has no right to stay in his/her own premises. That will be totally negating the provisions of Section 14(1) (e) of the Act. If a person is residing abroad, he/she owns a flat or a house in Delhi, he/she was to spend a few weeks or a few months then he/she must be allowed to stay in his/her own house. I do not find any infirmity with the finding recorded by learned Additional Rent Controller on this score also."
15. Similar observations were made by the Delhi High Court in the case of K.D. Nagrath (Dr.) (Supra). In paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment, it has been observed, as follows:-
"4. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties. The finding of the Addl. Rent Controller while holding that the requirement of the petitioner and his wife was bona fide and still dismissing the eviction petition on the ground that the sons and other relatives of the petitioner were not put in the witness box, was totally perverse. A person who is settled abroad and has been working as a professional in the present case as a Doctor- has a different and distinct life style. Even if the petitioner has to shift into India in his own house he cannot be compelled to stay only in two bed rooms on ground floor. The tenant cannot dictate to a landlord that he must have to live in two rooms because he is occupying other two rooms on the first floor. Addl. Rent Controller while arriving at the conclusion that the requirement of the petitioner and his wife was genuine and bona fide, completely lost sight of the fact that the petitioner had seven brothers and four sisters who are living in India and not in England. Petitioner would require a room for consultation for his clinic and one room for his guests and relations either from India or abroad. According to our way of life, no evidence is required about the visit of friends and relatives. Friends and relatives do visit occasionally every person until and unless it is brought on evidence that a man is recluse, therefore, requirement of a guest room for that purpose is neither mala fide nor excessive."
16. To my mind, these observations are a complete answer to the argument of Mr. Sharma, that because the first floor of the house is vacant, no eviction can be ordered from the ground floor i.e., the demised premises.
17. In the case of P. Sriramamurthy (supra), the Supreme Court even granted the relief of eviction to the Non-Resident Indian landlords in a petition where eviction was sought only on the ground of wilful default m the payment of the rent for three months. The Supreme Court observed as follows: -
"3. the question is: whether the appellant has committed wilful default of payment? In the counter affidavit filed in this Court, it is specifically stated that lease for 11 months was granted with an intention that after the retirement of the respondent's husband they could come back from the United States of America and settled down permanently in Madras, the demised premises. It is also stated in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit that wife and the husband sustained injuries in a car accident and due to the severe back pain, particularly during winter season, they had decided to come back. In fact, her husband retired from service on April 15, 1995. When the respondents's husband retired from service, they decided to permanently come back and settle down in Madras. Thus it is obvious that they needed their house for personal occupation. It is true that the need for personal occupation was not pleaded. It is settled law that for moulding the relief, subsequent events can be taken note of. Under those circumstances, the relief of eviction could be granted on the ground of personal occupation. The amount of Rs. 24,000/- deposited by the appellant shall be adjusted towards the arrears of the rent. If there is any arrears to be paid time is given to the appellant to pay the same. Six months time from today is granted to the appellant to deliver the vacant possession of the premises on filing usual undertaking within a period of four weeks from today. The respondent is also directed to file an affidavit within a period of six weeks from today that after their coming back from the States, they shall neither let out the building to the third party nor induct any party and shall personally stay in the building and shall not leave back for the United States of America within a period of ten years from today. In the event of their leaving for the United States within the said period, the tenant would be at liberty to seek possession of the premises."
18. These observations fully support the case of the respondents who are shifting back to the native country on account of illness, old age and better climate. I am of the considered opinion that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have correctly accepted the plea put forwarded by the respondents.
19. In the end, Mr. Sharma has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Deena Nath (supra). This decision, in my opinion, is also of no assistance to the petitioner. In that case, the High Court reversed the findings of fact with regard to the ground of personal necessity on the ground that the courts below had ignored the relevant fact situation which has been manifest from the materials on the record. Therefore, it was held that the finding accepting the plea of bona fide requirement of the landlord by the Courts was vitiated. Mr. Sharma relied on the following observations occurring in paragraph 15 of the judgment:-
"15. Thus the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the Court is duty-bound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition put also whether any other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The judgment/order of the Court/authority for eviction of a tenant which does not show that the court/ authority has applied its mind to these statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior Court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision. Bona fide requirement on a first look appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the Court has to bear in mind the statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). If it is found that the Court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective, then the finding regarding bona fide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment. In such case the High Court cannot be faulted for interfering with the finding in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
20. These observations are of no assistance to the petitioner, as both the courts below have given findings with regard to the personal necessity of the respondents, after due appreciation of the evidence within the parameters of the relevant provisions of the Rent Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Ram Das v. Ishwar Chander and Ors., (supra) observed as follows:-
"8. It is no doubt, true that the question whether the requirement of the landlords is bona fide or not is essentially, one of fact, notwithstanding the circumstance that a finding of fact in that behalf is a secondary and inferential fact drawn from other primary or perceptive ones. All conclusion drawn from primary facts are not necessarily questions of law. They can be and quite often are, pure questions of fact. The question as to bona fide requirement is one such."
21. Undoubtedly, findings of fact can be examined by the High Court under Section 15(5) of the Act in appropriate cases, but it must be remembered that the revisional court is not "a second court of first appeal". As noticed earlier, both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact in accepting the bona fide need of the respondents to settle in India in the only house owned by them in Chandigarh. Mr. Sharma had laid considerable stress on the fact that need of the respondents could not be held to be bona fide as two petitions seeking similar relief had been dismissed earlier. The Appellate Authority has observed that the present rent petition was filed in the year 1999. It has also been observed that a lot of change can be seen with the passage of time between institution and disposal of the eviction petition on 21.11.1976 and 10.3.1982 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Appellant Authority on 9.3.1983. The heath which respondent no. 1 was having in the year 1976 or 1982, she cannot be said to be enjoying in the year 1999. It has been observed that she has become pretty old, being 75 years of age and other respondent no. 2, landlord has undergone bye-pass surgery. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Doss and Anr. v. Ram Babu and Anr., 2000(1) R.L.R. 329. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:-
"6. The High Court after examining the facts on this question found that the findings of the Courts below of relating the accommodation after getting it vacated for the personal need in the year 1980 cannot defeat the bona fide need of the landlord for the year 1987.
7. High Court rightly considered the fresh need which was after the passage of seven long years between the last order and the present application made by the landlord by this passage of time the need has changed, his minor son has become major for whose need there was specific pleading and evidence was also led."
22. Clearly, therefore, the view taken by the Appellate Authority cannot be said to be either unreasonable or perverse as the earlier petitions were dismissed in the year 1976 and 1982. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Amrit Lal Walia (supra) and in the case of Khewan Singh (supra). In paragraph 4 of the judgment in the case of Khewan Singh, it has been held as under:-
"4. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any merit in this petition. Admittedly, the present application for ejectment was filed on 18th January, 1972 i.e. more than 16 years after the first application was dismissed. It is a long period and it cannot be said that if once an application is dismissed, then the landlord cannot move the Court subsequently after a lapse of many years on the ground that he requires the premises for his own use and occupation. Both the authorities below have gone into the matter and after going through the whole evidence have come to a firm finding that the requirement of the landlord is a bona fide one. It is a finding of fact, which cannot be interfered with in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction."
23. The aforesaid observations of J.V. Gupta, J. are fully attracted of the facts and circumstances of the present case.
24. A perusal of the above said observations clearly shows that the Eviction Petition was maintainable. These observations also show that this Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the authorities below who had returned the findings of fact after going into the matter and after going through the whole evidence. I, therefore, hold that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below do not call for any interference in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act.
25. In view of the above, this Revision Petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.