Telangana High Court
Dr. V. Shivanand vs V. Hara Gopal on 27 April, 2026
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2487, 2509 & 3913 of 2023
Between:
Dr. V. Shivanand ....
Petitioner
AND
V. Hara Gopal and others ....
Respondents
COMMON ORDER PRONOUNCED ON : 27.04.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
1. Whether Reporters of Local : Yes/No
newspapers may be allowed to see
the Judgment ?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may : Yes/No
be marked to Law Reports/Journals
3. Whether Their Lordship/Ladyship : Yes/No
wish to see the fair copy of judgment
___________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
-2-
VRKR,J
CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2487, 2509 and 3913 of 2023
% 27.04.2026
Between:
# Dr. V. Shivanand .... Petitioner
And
$ V. Hara Gopal and others .... Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri T. Bala Mohan Reddy
^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri Eranki Phani Kumar
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1. (2005) 12 SCC 1
2. (1968) 3 SCR 163
3. 2022 SCC Online SC 1234
4. (1982) 2 SCC 596
5. 2011 SCC Online Mad 2161
6. (2010) 9 SCC 496
7. (1976) 2 SCC 981
8. (2010) 4 SCC 785
-3-
VRKR,J
CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2487, 2509 and 3913 of 2023
Date: 27.04.2026
Between:
Dr. V. Shivanand .... Petitioner
AND
V. Hara Gopal and others .... Respondents
COMMON ORDER:
Heard Sri T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Sri. Eranki Phani Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. Perused the material available on the record. C.R.P.No.2487 of 2023
2. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner, aggrieved by the order dated 10.07.2023 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, at Shadnagar, Ranga Reddy District in I.A.No.274 of 2023 in O.S.No.59 of 2016. By the said Order, the learned Trial Court allowed the application filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (for short 'CPC') permitting amendment of the prayer portion of the plaint by substituting the existing sub-para-No.1 and incorporating the following as sub-para-No.1:
-4-
VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 "That the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are each entitled to 1/4th share, and the plaintiff and defendants are further entitled to equal shares out of the remaining 1/4th share in Item Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties."C.R.P.No.2509 of 2023
3. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 10.07.2023 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, at Shadnagar, Ranga Reddy District in I.A.No.275 of 2023 in O.S.No.59 of 2016. By the said order, dated 10.07.2023, the learned Trial Court allowed the application filed by the respondent Nos.1 and 2, under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC R/w. Section 28 of Civil Rules of Practice (for short 'CRP') seeking impleadment of the proposed respondent as a party to the suit by adding her as respondent No.3/defendant No.3 along with consequential amendment of the plaint, including incorporation of a claim for share, as may be entitled in law, in her favour. C.R.P.No.3913 of 2023
4. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner, aggrieved by the order dated 06.11.2023 (hereinafter referred to as "the Docket order") in O.S.No.59 of 2016 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, at Shadnagar, Ranga Reddy District. By the impugned Docket Order dated 06.11.2023, the learned Trial Court dismissed -5- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 the suit for default for not carrying out the amendment in the plaint.
5. Since all the Civil Revision Petitions arise out of the same Original Suit bearing O.S. No. 59 of 2016 and the parties therein are one and the same, these Petitions are heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common Order.
6. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their status before the learned Trial Court.
I. BRIEF FACTS:
7. The factual matrix leading to the present Civil Revision Petitions is set out hereunder:
(a) The petitioner/plaintiff herein instituted O.S. No. 59 of 2016 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Shadnagar, Ranga Reddy District, seeking partition and separate possession of the suit schedule property bearing Municipal No. 11-123, admeasuring 277 square yards, situated at Shadnagar, claiming 1/3rd share therein.
(b) The respondent Nos. 1 and 2/defendants herein entered appearance and filed their written statement. The suit proceeded to trial, wherein the petitioner/plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 -6- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 and another witness as P.W.2, and the matter had reached the stage of defendants' evidence.
(c) Prior to the institution of the said suit, there were earlier litigations between the parties, namely:
(i) O.S. No. 41 of 2014 filed by respondent No.1 before the learned Junior Civil Judge, Shadnagar, seeking permanent injunction in respect of properties bearing H. Nos. 11-122 and 11-
123 admeasuring about 685 square yards, wherein a categorical stand was taken that the parents of the parties had renounced worldly affairs and were leading a religious life.
(ii) O.S. No. 5 of 2017 filed by the Petitioner before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Shadnagar, seeking declaration of title, recovery of possession, and rectification of municipal records in respect of properties bearing H. Nos. 11-122 and 11-124 admeasuring 468 square yards, wherein pleadings were made regarding such renunciation by Respondent No.3.
(d) It is stated that the said suits were clubbed and trial commenced, and in all such proceedings, Respondent No.3 was not impleaded, consistent with the stand taken by the Defendants.
(e) In the present suit also, from the year 2016 onwards, the Defendants contested the matter but did not file any counter-claim -7- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 nor seek impleadment of any additional party or inclusion of additional properties at the appropriate stage.
(f) However, after commencement of trial, completion of evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, and after lapse of several years, the Defendants filed:
(i) I.A. No. 274 of 2023 under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC seeking amendment of the plaint by introducing paragraph 5-A, adding two additional properties bearing H. Nos. 11-122 and 11-
124 admeasuring 468 square yards as Item No.2, and modifying the prayer relating to shares in the suit schedule properties;
(ii) I.A. No. 275 of 2023 under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC seeking impleadment of the mother of the parties as Defendant No.3.
(g) By separate but contemporaneous orders dated 10.07.2023, the learned Trial Court allowed both the applications, observing that the rights of the parents cannot be denied on the ground of alleged renunciation of worldly affairs and that they are necessary parties for effective adjudication, and further held that no prejudice would be caused to the Petitioner.
(h) Consequent to allowing the applications, the learned Trial Court directed the Petitioner / Plaintiff to carry out necessary -8- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 amendments within a stipulated time, failing which the suit would be liable to be dismissed.
(i) Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner preferred C.R.P. No. 2487 of 2023 against the order in I.A. No. 274 of 2023; and C.R.P. No. 2509 of 2023 against the order in I.A. No. 275 of 2023,
(j) It is the specific case of the Petitioner that he filed a detailed memo dated 23.08.2023 before the learned Trial Court raising objections inter alia that the amendment applications were filed by the defendants; the plaintiff cannot be compelled to amend his own plaint at the instance of the defendants; the provisions of Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC, including the time limit of fourteen days, apply only to the party seeking amendment; and non-compliance thereof cannot entail dismissal of the suit.
(k) It is further stated that no orders were passed on the said memo, and without considering the objections raised therein, the learned Trial Court proceeded to pass a docket order.
(l) Thereafter, by docket order dated 06.11.2023, the learned Trial Court dismissed O.S. No. 59 of 2016 for default on the ground that the Petitioner failed to carry out the amendments.
(m) Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the Petitioner preferred C.R.P. No. 3913 of 2023 contending that the dismissal of the suit -9- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 during the pendency of the earlier revision petitions and without adjudicating the objections raised is illegal and unsustainable.
(n) Thus, the present Civil Revision Petitions arise out of a composite set of proceedings, namely, allowance of amendment, impleadment of a Respondent No.3 and consequential dismissal of the suit for non-compliance.
8. In the above factual backdrop, particularly in light of the objections raised by the Petitioner regarding the applicability of Order VI Rule 17 and Rule 18 of the CPC and the legality of the consequential directions, issued by the learned Trial Court, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the Petitioner and the respondents advanced their respective submissions, which are set out hereunder.
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
(a) Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner/Plaintiff:
9. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner may be summarised as follows:
(A) Challenge to Docket Order dated 06.11.2023:
(a) The learned counsel contends that the learned Trial Court committed a grave error in dismissing the suit for default by docket order dated 06.11.2023, particularly when the very orders -10- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 permitting amendment and impleadment were under challenge before this Court.
(b) It is submitted that passing such a consequential order during the pendency of the revision petitions is contrary to settled principles governing subjudice matters and amounts to procedural impropriety.
(c) It is further contended that the Petitioner had filed a detailed memo dated 23.08.2023 raising specific objections to the enforceability of the directions issued by the learned Trial Court;
however, the said objections were not considered and the Court acted in a mechanical manner.
(d) It is further contended that the application for amendment was filed by the Defendants, and therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be compelled to carry out amendments in the plaint at their instance.
(e) The learned counsel submits that the provisions of Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC, including the stipulation of carrying out amendments within 14 days, apply only to the party who has sought and obtained leave to amend, and not to the opposite party.
(f) In the present case, the learned Trial Court erroneously fastened the obligation upon the Plaintiff and, on alleged non- -11-
VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 compliance, proceeded to dismiss the suit, which is contrary to the statutory scheme.
(g) It is further contended that the petitioner had expressly raised this objection in the memo dated 23.08.2023; however, the Trial Court failed to consider the same before passing the impugned docket order.
(h) In support of the above contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta 1, wherein it was held that amendments are required to be carried out by the party who has obtained leave to amend. Reliance is also placed on Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander 2, wherein it was held that the Court has the power to extend time for carrying out amendments and that procedural provisions should not be applied in a manner resulting in injustice.
(i) It is therefore contended that the dismissal of the suit on the ground of non-compliance with a direction which itself is legally unsustainable is without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. (B) Challenge to Amendment (Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC):
(a) It is contended that the application filed by the defendants under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC is not maintainable, as the 1 (2005) 12 SCC 1 2 (1968) 3 SCR 163 -12- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 provision permits a party to amend his own pleadings and does not enable one party to alter the pleadings of another.
(b) The Defendants, not being the authors of the plaint, have no locus to seek amendment thereof, and if they had any independent claim, the proper remedy was to file a counter-claim. It is further contended that the application was filed belatedly after commencement of trial and completion of evidence, without satisfying the requirement of due diligence. The Trial Court, without examining the issue of maintainability or recording reasons, mechanically allowed the application. (C) Challenge to Impleadment (Order I Rule 10 of the CPC):
(a) The learned counsel submits that the Plaintiff, being dominus litis, cannot be compelled to implead a party against whom no relief is sought. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on Sudhamayee Pattnaik v. Bibhu Prasad Sahoo 3, wherein it was held that unless the Court deems a party necessary for effective adjudication, no party can be forced upon the Plaintiff.
(b) It is further contended that the application for impleadment was filed only at the instance of the Defendants and not by the proposed party, and therefore, the order is unsustainable.
3 2022 SCC Online SC 1234 -13- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 (D) Inconsistency in Defendants' Stand:
(a) It is contended that the Defendants had earlier taken a categorical stand in prior proceedings that the mother had renounced worldly affairs and were leading a religious life. Having taken such a stand, the Defendants cannot now seek impleadment of the said person as a necessary party, and the present attempt is inconsistent and untenable.
(b) In view of the above submissions, it is contended that the impugned orders suffer from patent illegality, non-application of mind, and misapplication of statutory provisions, and are therefore liable to be set aside.
(b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Defendants:
10. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, may be summarised as follows:
(a) The learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants submits that the interlocutory
applications filed under Order I Rule 10 and Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were necessitated by the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. It is contended that the respondents were constrained to seek impleadment of their mother as defendant No.3, as well as amendment of the plaint, schedule, -14- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 and prayer, in order to include all the properties which are the subject matter of the dispute.
(b) It is further submitted that unless such amendments are permitted, there cannot be a comprehensive and effective adjudication of the disputes between the parties. According to the respondents, the nature of a suit for partition requires that all joint family properties and all necessary parties be brought on record so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions. It is therefore contended that the amendments sought were essential for determining the real questions in controversy.
(c) The learned counsel would further contend that no prejudice whatsoever would be caused to the plaintiff by allowing such amendments. On the contrary, it is urged that the proposed amendments would facilitate final adjudication of all disputes between the parties in a single proceeding and would obviate the necessity of future litigation.
(d) It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction in allowing the applications filed under Order I Rule 10 and Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. According to the respondents, the proposed party, being the mother of the parties, is not only a proper party but also a necessary party for the -15- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 purpose of effective and complete adjudication of the dispute in a suit for partition.
(e) The respondents further contend that, pursuant to the orders allowing the said applications, the learned Trial Court had granted sufficient opportunity to the petitioner/plaintiff and had specifically directed the plaintiff to carry out the consequential amendments within the stipulated time. It is submitted that despite such opportunity, the petitioner failed to comply with the directions of the Court.
(f) In view of such non-compliance, it is contended that the learned Trial Court was justified in proceeding further with the matter and in dismissing the suit for default in accordance with law. According to the respondents, the dismissal was a natural consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the directions issued by the Court.
(g) The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the decision in Rani Choudhury v. Suraj Jit Choudhury 4, to contend that once an appeal against an ex parte decree has been disposed of on any ground other than withdrawal, an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC would not be maintainable. By placing reliance on the said judgment, it is sought to be contended 4 (1982) 2 SCC 596 -16- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 that procedural defaults have definite consequences and cannot be lightly ignored.
(h) Reliance is also placed on Solavaiamal v. Ezhumalai Gounder 5, to contend that though, ordinarily, under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, only a party to the pleadings may seek amendment, such principle is not to be applied rigidly in suits for partition. It is submitted that in partition proceedings, both the plaintiff and the defendant stand on an equal footing and are entitled to seek appropriate reliefs. Therefore, a liberal and pragmatic approach is required while considering amendment applications in such suits, so as to ensure complete and effective adjudication of the disputes between the parties.
(i) The learned counsel would emphasize that, having regard to the special nature of partition suits, the scope of amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC must be construed broadly so as to ensure complete adjudication of rights of the parties. It is therefore contended that the orders allowing amendment and impleadment were passed in furtherance of justice and do not suffer from any legal infirmity.
(j) In conclusion, it is submitted that the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional 5 2011 SCC Online Mad 2161 -17- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The respondents accordingly pray that the Civil Revision Petitions be dismissed.
III. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION:
11. In light of the rival submissions and the material on record, the following points arise for determination:
(i) Whether the docket order dated 06.11.2023 dismissing O.S. No. 59 of 2016 for non-compliance is sustainable in law, particularly in the context of the applicability of Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC?
(ii) Whether the orders dated 10.07.2023 passed in I.A. No. 274 of 2023 (under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC), and I.A. No. 275 of 2023 (under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC), are legally valid and in accordance with the statutory requirements governing amendment of pleadings and impleadment of parties?
(iii) Whether the impugned orders suffer from jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or non-application of mind warranting interference under Section 115 of the CPC?
V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: A. Scope & Consequence under Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC:
12. The principal controversy in the present case revolves around the interpretation and application of Order VI Rule 18 of -18- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since the impugned dismissal of the suit is founded upon alleged non-compliance with a direction traceable to this provision, it becomes necessary to examine its scope and ambit. For ready reference, the text of the order VI Rule 18 of the CPC is extracted hereunder:
18. Failure to amend after order:
"If a party who has obtained an order for leave to amend does not amend accordingly within the time limited for that purpose by the order, or if no time is thereby limited, then within fourteen days from the date of the order, he shall not be permitted to amend after the expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such fourteen days, as the case may be, unless the time is extended by the Court"
13. A plain and purposive reading of the above provision makes it manifest that the statutory obligation to carry out an amendment is cast exclusively upon the party who has sought and obtained leave to amend. The provision neither contemplates nor permits the imposition of such obligation upon an adversarial party.
14. Equally significant is the nature of the consequence prescribed under the Rule. The embargo contained therein is confined to forfeiture of the right to amend upon expiry of the stipulated time. The provision does not envisage, either expressly -19- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 or by necessary implication, dismissal of the suit as a consequence of non-compliance.
15. The aforesaid interpretation stands fortified by the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pramod Gupta's case (supra), wherein it was held that the obligation to carry out amendment lies upon the party seeking such amendment and that failure to do so within the time stipulated would only result in the party being precluded from carrying out such amendment thereafter, without entailing penal consequences affecting the lis itself. Accordingly, it would be apposite to extract the relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as under:
"75. It may be true that not only the memorandum of appeal but also the reference was amended. Mr. Rao pointed out that the necessary amendments have been carried out in the application for reference or memorandum of appeal. In terms of Order VI Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such amendments are required to be carried out in the pleadings by a party who has obtained leave to amend his pleadings within the time granted therefore and if no time was specified then within fourteen days from the date of passing of the order. The consequence of failure to amend the pleadings within the period specified therein as laid down in Order VI Rule 18 of the Code is that the party shall not be permitted to amend his pleadings thereafter unless the time is extended by the court. It is not in dispute that such an order extending the time specified in Order VI Rule 18 has not been passed."
16. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the application for amendment was filed by the defendants. However, the learned -20- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 Trial Court while allowing the said application, directed the plaintiff to carry out such amendments and, upon failure to do so, proceeded to dismiss the suit. This course adopted by the learned Trial Court is clearly inconsistent with the statutory scheme underlying Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC. The said provision, on a plain and purposive reading casts the obligation upon the party, who has sought and obtained leave of the Court. The consequence of non-compliance, as contemplated therein, is confined to disabling such party from effecting the amendment after stipulated period, unless time is extended by the Court. The provision does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, contemplate the drastic consequences of dismissal of the suit itself, particularly at the instance of a party, who was not the applicant for amendment. The learned Trial Court, therefore, has clearly misconstrued the scope and ambit of Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC and has imposed a consequence wholly alien to the statutory framework. Such an approach amounts to a jurisdictional error, inasmuch as a power not vested by law has been exercised, resulting in grave prejudice to the petitioner. Consequently, the dismissal of the suit on this ground cannot be sustained in law.
17. Viewed from another perspective, even assuming that there was non-compliance with the direction to carry out amendment, -21- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 the consequence in law could only be that the party seeking amendment would be precluded from incorporating such amendment beyond the stipulated time, unless the court, in exercise of its discretion, extended time. The provision does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, authorise dismissal of the suit. The action of the learned Trial Court in terminating the lis on this ground is therefore, wholly alien to the statutory framework.
18. More importantly, the dismissal has been ordered on the ground of non-compliance not attributable to the plaintiff. The burden under Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC having been wrongly shifted, the impugned order results in penalising a party for a default committed by another, such an approach is contrary to fundamental principles of procedural fairness and cannot be countenanced.
19. Viewed thus, the impugned order suffers from a clear misapplication of statutory provisions, failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law and material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The dismissal of the suit on such ground is therefore, liable to be set aside.
-22-
VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 B. Procedural Law and Substantive Justice:
20. The misdirection becomes more apparent when vieed in light of the broader principle governing procedural laws. It is a settled principle that procedural law is intended to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Procedural prescriptions must therefore be applied in a manner that facilitates adjudication on merits rather than results in denial of justice on technical grounds.
21. In Nair Service Society Limited's case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court held that procedural laws are designed to facilitate justice and that the Court possesses sufficient power to extend time in appropriate cases to avoid injustice. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:
"11. In our view, the contention that the appellant should not be permitted to carry out the amendment allowed by the Supreme Court after the expiry of fourteen days from the date of its judgment, unless the time is extended by that court, is based on a wrong understanding of that judgment. Under Rule 17 of Order VIC.P.C., a party may be allowed to amend his pleading at any stage of the proceedings; it may be even at the stage of appeal or revision. An appellate or revisional court may grant leave to amend the pleading in that court itself, or to amend it in the Court to which the case is remitted for trial or any other further proceeding in the light of the amendment allowed to be made. In both these cases, it is open for the appellate or revisional court, as the case may be, to fix a time within which the amendment is to be carried out. And if any such time is fixed, it can be extended under Order VI Rule 18 only by that court. But if no time is fixed, and the -23- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 case is remitted to a subordinate court for carrying out the amendment and proceeding further with the suit, the court which has jurisdiction to extend the time for carrying out the amendment is that subordinate court, to which the case has been remitted for that purpose. In a case where leave to amend was wrongly refused by a subordinate court, an appellate or revisional court may remit the case to any subordinate court directing that court to allow the amendment and proceed further with the trial of the suit. Then the Subordinate Court has to grant the leave to amend and the party obtaining the leave has to carry out the amendment accordingly. In such a case, the subordinate court may fix a time for carrying out the amendment; or it may not do so. If it does not fix a time, the amendment has to be carried out within fourteen days of obtaining the leave to amend from that court. In either case, the court which has got the power under Rule 18 to extend the time is the court in which the amendment has to be carried out. The fact that leave was originally refused by the Subordinate court, and it was subsequently granted by it as directed by the appellate or revisional court, as the case may be, does not affect the position. In other words, the court which has got the power to extend the time under Order VI Rule 18 C.P.C. to carry out an amendment is the court, which has fixed a time for that purpose; and if no time has been fixed, it is the court in which the amendment has to be carried out."
22. Applying the above principles, the present case, even assuming that there was non-compliance with the direction to carry out amendment, the learned Trial Court was required to examine whether sufficient cause existed or whether the time granted could be extended. The impugned order does not reflect any such consideration, nor any finding of wilful default, particularly on the part of petitioner.
-24-
VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
23. The dismissal of the suit, without examining the nature of the default or the possibility of granting further time, is disproportionate and contrary to settled principles governing procedural law. The consequence imposed by the learned Trial Court is not only severe but also unsupported by the statutory framework. Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC does not authorise dismissal of the suit, it merely restricts the right to amend.
24. The respondents, however, seek to sustain the impugned orders on the ground that the amendment and impleadment were necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the validity of the orders permitting such amendment and impleadment.
C. Amendment and Impleadment -- Statutory
Requirements
(i) Amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC:
25. Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC enables amendment of pleadings for determining the real questions in controversy. However, the proviso to the Rule imposes a restriction that after commencement of trial, amendment shall not be allowed unless the Court is satisfied that despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.
-25-
VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
26. In the present case, the application for amendment were filed after commencement of trial and completion of the plaintiff's evidence. The impugned order does not record any finding as to due diligence nor does it indicate satisfaction of the statutory requirement under the proviso.
27. The absence of such a finding renders the order legally infirm, notwithstanding the liberal approach generally adopted in partition suits.
(ii) Impleadment under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC
28. Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC empowers the Court to add a party whose presence is necessary or proper for effective adjudication of the questions involved. The provisions reads as under:
Order I Rule 10 (2): Court may strike out or add parties:
"...the Court may... add any person... whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved..."
29. The plaintiff being dominus litis, is ordinarily entitled to choose the parties against whom relief is sought and cannot be compelled to implead a person against his will. This principle, however, yields where the Court is satisfied that the presence of such person is necessary or proper for complete and effective -26- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 adjudication. The determinative test is whether in the absence of such party, the Court would be unable to effectively and completely adjudicate upon the issues involved.
30. In Sudhamayee Pattnaik's case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court held that a party cannot be added merely for convenience and that the test is whether such party is necessary for effective adjudication. A "necessary party" is one without whom no effective decree can be passed, while a "proper party" is one whose presence enables the Court to completely and affectively adjudicate upon the disputes.
31. In the context of partition suits, courts have consistently recognized that all co-sharers or persons having a direct interest in the joint property are necessary parties. A liberal approach is generally adopted in such matters to ensure that the entire dispute is resolved in a single proceeding. However, even while adopting such an approach, the Court is required to examine the nature of the interest of the proposed party and to record a clear finding as to whether such party is necessary or property for adjudication.
32. In the present case, the respondents sought impleadment of their mother as defendant No.3. While it may be that such party could have a bearing on the adjudication of the dispute, the -27- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 impugned order does not disclose any examination of the nature of her interest or the necessity of her presence in the proceedings, particularly in view of the stand taken by the respondents in their earlier proceedings. There is no finding as to whether she is a necessary party without whom no effective decree can be passed, or merely a proper party whose presence would facilitate adjudication.
33. The order proceeds on a general assumption that impleadment of the proposed defendant is necessary merely on the ground that she is the mother of the parties, without recording the satisfaction required under law. Such an approach reflects a failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with statutory parameters governing order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
34. Apart from the statutory deficiencies noted above, it is also necessary to consider whether the impugned orders satisfy the requirement of being reasoned judicial determinations D. Absence of Adequate Reasons:
35. A careful perusal of the impugned orders reveals that substantially similar reasoning has been employed while dealing with distinct applications invoking different provisions of law. The -28- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023 orders do not advert to the specific statutory requirements governing each application, nor do they reflect consideration of the objections raised by the petitioner.
36. It is a settled principle that recording of reasons constitutes an essential component of judicial decision-making. A reasoned order demonstrates application of mind and enables effective appellate or revisional scrutiny.
37. In Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan 6, the Honourable Supreme Court held that reasons are the heartbeat of every conclusion and that absence of reasons renders the order unsustainable.
38. Similarly, in Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India 7, it was held that every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons, as this requirement is a basic principle of natural justice.
39. In Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax v. Shukla & Brothers 8, the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that reason is the soul of justice and that a reasoned order is indispensable for proper administration of justice.
6 (2010) 9 SCC 496 7 (1976) 2 SCC 981 8 (2010) 4 SCC 785 -29- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
40. In the present case, the impugned orders do not disclose any independent evaluation of statutory requirements, nor do they reflect consideration of the petitioner's objections. The absence of adequate reasons renders the orders incapable of effective judicial scrutiny.
41. The impugned orders, therefore, suffer from insufficiency of reasons and lack of reasoned consideration, thereby vitiating the exercise of judicial discretion.
42. Having regard to the above discussion, it remains to be considered whether the learned Trial Court was justified in proceeding to dismiss the suit during the pendency of the revision petitions before this Court.
E. Effect of Pendency of Revision Petitions:
43. It is not in dispute that the orders permitting amendment and impleadment were under challenge before this Court at the relevant point of time.
44. In such circumstances, judicial propriety required the learned Trial Court to exercise restraint and refrain from passing consequential orders which would render the pending revision petitions infructuous.
-30-
VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
45. The dismissal of the suit during the pendency of such challenge undermines the revisional process and results in avoidable multiplicity of proceedings. Such a course cannot be sustained.
VI. FINAL FINDINGS:
46. For the reasons set out above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned docket order dismissing the suit is vitiated by misapplication of Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC and by failure to exercise judicial discretion in accordance with law.
47. The interlocutory orders passed under Order VI Rule 17 and Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, are equally unsustainable, having been passed without satisfying the statutory requirements and without recording adequate reasons.
48. The learned Trial Court has thus acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, warranting interference under Section 115 of the CPC.
VII. RESULT:
49. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed.
50. The docket order dated 06.11.2023 passed in O.S. No. 59 of 2016 is hereby set aside, and the suit is restored to file. -31-
VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
51. The orders dated 10.07.2023 passed in I.A. Nos. 274 and 275 of 2023 are also set aside.
52. The said interlocutory applications i.e., I.A. Nos. 274 and 275 of 2023 are remitted to the learned Trial Court for fresh consideration. The learned Trial Court shall independently examine each application, apply the statutory requirements under Order VI Rule 17 and Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, consider the objections raised by the parties, and pass reasoned orders in accordance with law.
53. The learned Trial Court shall thereafter proceed with the suit expeditiously and dispose of the same on merits, uninfluenced by any observations made herein.
54. There shall be no order as to costs.
55. Pending miscellaneous petitions if any, shall stands closed.
___________________________________ VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J Date: 27.04.2026 Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o. AS -32- VRKR,J CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023