Madhya Pradesh High Court
Satya Prakash Pandey vs Chairman & Managing Director ... on 24 February, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978
1 WP. No.10 of 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 24th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 10 of 2012
SATYA PRAKASH PANDEY
Versus
CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR M.P.M.K.V.V. CO. LTD. GOVIND
PURA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Arjun Parihar - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Ravi Jain- Advocate for respondents through video conferencing.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed seeking following relief(s):
(1) The orders marked as Annexure P/9 and Annexure P/10 may kindly be quashed.
(2) The period of suspension since 11 March 2002 to January 23005 may kindly be treated on duty.
(3) The respondents may be directed to pay remaining amount of salary for the suspension period i.e.11.03.02 to January, 2003 on duty for all purposes.
(4) Any other suitable relief in the facts and circumstances may also be awarded with costs.
2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that departmental enquiry was initiated against petitioner by order dated 23.12.2009 by which punishment of NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 2 WP. No.10 of 2012 stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect was imposed. Against the said order, petitioner preferred an appeal which too has been dismissed by order dated 16.10.2010. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that petitioner was not on an authorized strike but he had given a notice before going on strike. Allegations against the petitioner that petitioner had misbehaved with the senior officers are also false as petitioner has been acquitted in a criminal case involving similar allegations. It is further submitted that petitioner has not been paid the salary for the period of suspension and accordingly, it is prayed that not only order dated 16.10.2010 as well as order dated 23.12.2009 is bad in law. But petitioner is entitled for the full salary of period of suspension.
3. Heard learned counsel for petitioner.
4. The counsel for petitioner was not in a position to refer to any provision of law or any judgment passed by Supreme Court or High Court. However, he was very aggressive in arguing on the basis of factual aspects. He was not in a position to even submit about the scope of judicial review in service matter/departmental enquiry.
5. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for petitioner, this Court would like to consider the scope of judicial review in the departmental matters.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Bhupendra Singh decided in Civil Appeal No. 8546-8549 of 2024 has held as under:-
23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'Constitution') in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated:
'7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 3 WP. No.10 of 2012 Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.' (emphasis supplied)
24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State Bank of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned Judges of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:
'21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723: (1964) 3 SCR 25: (1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 4 WP. No.10 of 2012 whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. xxx
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 5 WP. No.10 of 2012 evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64].
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do. xxx
26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.' (emphasis supplied)
25. In State Bank of India v S K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, two learned NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 6 WP. No.10 of 2012 Judges of this Court held:
'28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271:
1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] , the dividing line between quasijudicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable -- a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : 1985 AC 374, HL] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing -- applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called -- that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding -- which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 7 WP. No.10 of 2012 ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity". To illustrate -- take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66: (1963) 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid -- or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980 AC 574: (1979) 2 All ER 440: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it would be a case falling in the latter category -- violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice -- in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct -- in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 :
(1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.'
26. In Union of India v K G Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794, it was opined:
'14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 8 WP. No.10 of 2012 view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223: (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.
15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.' (emphasis supplied)
27. The legal position was restated by two learned Judges in State of Uttar Pradesh v Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310:
'15. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. The court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the evidence as if it was a court of appeal. The approach of the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court in accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the matter back to the High Court.'
28. Turning our gaze back to the facts herein, we find that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench acted as Courts of Appeal and went on to re-appreciate the evidence, which the above-enumerated authorities caution against. The present coram, in Bharti Airtel Limited v A S Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418, has laid down:
'29. As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 9 WP. No.10 of 2012 facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.' (emphasis supplied) Thus, it is clear that this Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and cannot interfere in the findings of fact, unless and until they are based on no evidence.
7. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that since petitioner had given a notice to respondents that he will be going on hunger strike until death therefore it can not be said that petitioner was authorizedly absent from his duty. Counsel for petitioner was not in a position to point out the provisions of law under which he can go on hunger strike until death, however, when the attention of counsel for petitioner was drawn towards the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and requested to find out as to whether there is any provision for going on hunger strike or not? The counsel for petitioner pointed out the provisions of Section 22 and 23 of Industrial Disputes Act and submitted that since the petitioner had given a notice on 04.03.2002 that he will be going on hunger strike with effect from 07.03.2004, therefore, his strike was legal in accordance with law.
(At this stage, it was noticed that counsel for petitioner instead of listening to the Court or concentrating on his case was playing with mobile. Thus, this conduct of counsel for petitioner cannot be appreciated, hence strongly deprecated) NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 10 WP. No.10 of 2012
8. Accordingly, counsel for petitioner was directed to point out as to whether notice which was given by petitioner on 04.03.2002 was in accordance with provisions of Section 22 of Industrial Disputes Act or not? Instead of answering the query, counsel for petitioner started reading Annexure P-1 and was all the time insisting that since petitioner had serious grievance and which were not being redressed by respondents, therefore, he was left with no other option but to go on hunger strike. After reading of Annexure P-1, petitioner was all the time insisting that since legitimate claims were not being decided therefore, petitioner had a valid reason to go on strike. Whether petitioner had valid reason or not is not the subject matter of this petition. Whether the conduct of petitioner in going on hunger strike until death was in accordance with law or not is the question?
9. Accordingly, counsel for petitioner who had deliberately skipped the last paragraph of Annexure P-1 was requested to read out that paragraph. In that paragraph, it is mentioned that his grievance be redressed by 25.01.2002 otherwise he would go on hunger strike until death from 26.01.2002. This application/notice was given on 24.12.2001. Thereafter, it appears that matter was amicably settled and by Annexure P/2, petitioner suspended his hunger strike which was to commence from 26.01.2002. Therefore, it is clear that for all practical purposes notice dated 24.12.2001 by which petitioner had expressed his intention to go on hunger strike with effect from 26.01.2002 had come to an end. Thereafter, it appears that on 04.03.2002, petitioner gave another application which reads as under:
"Ikzfr] Jheku vfrfjDr v/kh{k.k vfHk;Urk egksn;] lapkyu ,oa la/kkj.k laHkkx e-iz- jkT; fo|qr eaMy McjkA }kjk%& mfpr ek/;eA NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 11 WP. No.10 of 2012 fo"k;%& leL;kvksa ds fujkdj.k ckcr~A lanHkZ%& izkFkhZ dk vkosnu fnukad 22-01-2002- egksn;] Lkfou; fuosnu gS fd izkFkhZ ds lanfHkZr vkosnukuqlkj ,oa fnukad 23-01-2002 dks gq;s le>kSrs ds vuqlkj Jheku~ th }kjk IkzkFkhZ ds leL;kvksa dk fujkdj.k fnukad 28-02-2002 rd ugha fd;k x;k gS] ftlds ifj.kkeLo:i izkFkhZ dks vR;ar vkfFkZd] ekufld] 'kkjhfjd] ikfjokfjd ,oa lkekftd ijs'kkfu;ksa dk lkeuk djuk iM jgk gSA vr% Jheku th ls iqu% fuosnu gS fd IkzkFkhZ dh 5 lw=h; leL;kvksa dk fnukad 6-3-2002 rd vfuok;Z :i ls pkgk x;k fujkdj.k iznku djus dh d`ik djsa] vU;Fkk izkFkhZ }kjk ck/; gksdj vkids dk;kZy; ds le{k fnukad 7-3-2002 ls vkej.k vu'ku izkjEHk fd;k tkosxkA ftldk lEIkw.kZ mRrjnkf;Ro Jheku th o e.My iz'kklu dk gksXkkA IkzkFkhZ fnukad% 4-3-2002 ¼,l- ih- ik.Ms;½ dk;kZ- lgk- Js.kh r`rh;
e-iz- jkT; fo|qr e.My Vsduiqj"
10. In this application, it is specifically mentioned that in case if grievances are not redressed, then he would go on hunger strike with effect from 07.03.2002. It is nowhere mentioned that earlier call for hunger strike was suspended, therefore, in continuation of the notice dated 24.12.2001, he will go on hunger strike on 07.03.2002. Notice dated 07.03.2002 was an independent notice thereby informing the respondents that he would go on hunger strike from 07.03.2002. Therefore, it is clear that only of three days' notice was given by petitioner to the respondents that unless and until his grievances are redressed by 06.03.2002, he would go on hunger strike from 04.03.2002.
11. Section 22 of Industrial Disputes Act reads as under:
22. Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs.
(1) No person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike, in breach of contract-
(a) without giving to the employer notice of strike, as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before striking; or NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 12 WP. No.10 of 2012
(b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or
(c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings.
(2) No employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen-
(a)without giving them notice of lock-out as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before locking-out; or
(b)within fourteen days of giving such notice; or
(c) before the expiry of the date of lock-out specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings.
(3) The notice of lock-out or strike under this section shall not be necessary where there is already in existence a strike or, as the case may be, lock-out in the pubic utility service, but the employer shall send intimation of such lock-out or strike on the day on which it is declared, to such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government either generally or for a particular area or for a particular class of public utility services.
(4) The notice of strike referred to in sub-section (1) shall be given by such number of persons to such person or persons and in such manner as may be prescribed.
(5) The notice of lock-out referred to in sub-section (2) shall be given in such manner as may be prescribed.
(6) If on any day an employer receives from any person employed by him any such notices as are referred to in sub-section (1) or gives to any persons employed by him any such notices as are referred to in sub-
section (2), he shall within five days, thereof report to the appropriate Government or to such authority as that Government may prescribe the number of such notices received or given on that day."
12. Accordingly, counsel for petitioner was directed to point out as to NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 13 WP. No.10 of 2012 whether petitioner had given sufficient notice before going on hunger strike or not and whether a notice of two days can be said to be a valid notice in the light of Section 22 of Industrial Disputes Act.
Two days' notice cannot be said to be a valid notice as required under Section 22 of Industrial Disputes Act because it neither conforms to the requirement of Section 22(1)(a) nor (b) of Industrial Disputes Act. Under these circumstances, if petitioner went on hunger strike on 07.03.2002 then it cannot be said that it was in accordance with law and therefore, respondents did not commit any mistake by holding that he is guilty of misconduct. At this stage, it is submitted by counsel for petitioner that since he was criminally tried for misbehaviour with the officers and he has been acquitted in the said criminal case which was instituted against him for misbehaving with officers, therefore, it is clear that finding of guilt recorded by enquiry officer which is accepted by the disciplinary authority is bad in law.
13. Accordingly, counsel for petitioner was directed to point out as to whether mere acquittal in the criminal case would ipso facto result in exoneration in a departmental enquiry or not? It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that acquittal in the criminal case would automatically result in acquittal in departmental enquiry. However, he did not cite even a single judgment in support of his contention. Unfortunately, the submission made by counsel for petitioner cannot be accepted.
14. The Supreme Court in the case of General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank & Others Vs. B S N Prasad decided on 21/1/2025 in Civil Appeal No.6327 of 2024 has held as under:
16. It is well settled that an acquittal in a criminal case is no ground to exonerate a delinquent in disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof differs in these proceedings. It is well settled that the adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 14 WP. No.10 of 2012 be gone into in writ jurisdiction. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India and Others, in paragraphs 12 and 13, this court held thus:
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 15 WP. No.10 of 2012 nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718: AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38], this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
(emphasis added) Thus, even if a person has been acquitted in a criminal case, still that would not result in automatic exoneration in the departmental enquiry for the simple reason that degree of proof of criminal case is much higher than the degree of proof in departmental matters. The departmental cases are decided on the preponderance of probabilities whereas criminal cases are decided on strict standard of proof.
15. It is next contended by counsel for petitioner that since petitinoer was under suspension therefore he is entitled for full salary for the period of suspension.
16. Although counsel for petitioner could not point out any law in his favour but FR 54-B, Sub Rule 3 reads as under:
"(3) Where the authority competent to order re-instatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8), be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended:
Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reason directly attributable to the Government servant it may, after giving him an opportunity to NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 16 WP. No.10 of 2012 make his representation within 60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served in him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine."
Once a person is placed under suspension, then it is for the disciplinary authority to find out as to whether suspension of petitioner was wholly unjustified or not and only after giving finding that the suspension order was wholly justified, full wages for the period of suspension can be granted. In the present case, petitioner has been held to be guilty and was saddled with punishment of stoppage one increment with cumulative effect. Therefore, it is clear that suspension of petitioner was not wholly unjustified.
17. At this stage, it is submitted by counsel for petitioner that he should have been granted some time to cite the judgment in his support. Aforesaid submission made by counsel for petitioner cannot be considered. Once the case is listed then lawyer must come with full preparation and he/she cannot advance his/her arguments in piecemeal.
18. If the lawyer has decided to raise one ground then he must come fully prepared with supporting law and he cannot seek an adjournment on the ground that for the time being his factual arguments may be considered with liberty to cite the judgment at a later stage.
19. Accordingly, the prayer to cite the judgment at a later stage is hereby rejected.
20. Under these circumstances, petitioner is not entitled for full wages for the period of his suspension. Even otherwise, no perversity or lapse in decision making process in departmental enquiry was pointed out.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3978 17 WP. No.10 of 2012
21. As no case is made out warranting interference, petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) Judge Rashid Digitally signed by RASHID KHAN Date: 2025.02.25 18:38:22 +05'30'