Shri Yash Jalan vs Directorate Of Enforcement Through Its ... on 25 February, 2026

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Jharkhand High Court

Shri Yash Jalan vs Directorate Of Enforcement Through Its ... on 25 February, 2026

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

                                                       2026:JHHC:5862




 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
            Cr.M.P. No.2686 of 2025
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Shri Yash Jalan, aged about 30 years, son of Shri. Mahesh Kumar Jalan, resident of 1, Ballygunge Park Road, 11- C&D, Ballygunge, P.O. Ballygunge, P.S. Ballygunge, District: Kolkata-700019, West Bengal ... ... Petitioner Versus Directorate of Enforcement through its Assistant Director, having it Zonal Office, Plot No.1502/B, Airport Road, P.O. & P.S. Airport Road, District: Ranchi-834002.

                                        ...   ...     Opp. Party
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate For the Opp. Party : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate

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C.A.V. on 04.02.2026 Pronounced on 25.02.2026

1. The instant criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for quashing the entire criminal proceedings in connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022 arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order taking cognizance dated 17.07.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, P.M.L. Act, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder, learned Special Judge, has been pleased to take cognizance under Sections 3 and 70 of the PML Act and further directed the office to issue summon against the accused/petitioner.

2026:JHHC:5862 Factual Matrix

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that: -

(a) The alarming issue of illegal mining and its impact on the environment in the Sahebganj area has also drawn the attention of the National Green Tribunal (NGT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, as observed in the case of Sayyed Arshad Nasar v.

Union of India & others. In this case, damage assessment committee was established and tasked with submitting a comprehensive report encompassing various parameters. Furthermore, the NGT, in an order dated 05.12.2019, explicitly remarked that "it is more than evident that the State machinery and the regulatory authorities had allowed a free run to the operation of mines and crusher units resulting in the present sordid condition.

(b) Moreover, in accordance with the report submitted to the Hon'ble NGT, it is explicitly stated that 125 First Information Reports have been filed against various persons for offences related to illegal mining, storage, and transportation.

(c) Despite numerous First Information Reports being lodged regarding illegal mining in Sahebganj and its adjacent regions, such unlawful activities 2 2026:JHHC:5862 persist unabated. The investigation has unveiled significant illegal mining operations in Sahebganj, Jharkhand, accompanied by the illicit transportation of minerals via roads, railways, and inland vessels. Investigation has revealed that the syndicate utilized substantial quantities of explosives to conduct illegal blasting.

(d) This unlawful blasting occurred both in entirely unlicensed mining sites and within licensed mining leases where it far exceeded the legally permitted geographical boundaries and/or extraction quotas.

(e) These activities are substantiated by several First Information Reports filed for offences under Sections 411 and 414 as well as various other sections of the IPC, in addition to offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, and Section 8 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986, all pertaining to illegal mining as previously mentioned and are also designated offences under the PMLA.

(f) To unearth the broader context and conduct a comprehensive investigation, the said 50 First Information Reports relied upon were consolidated into the existing ECIR.

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(g) Furthermore, the issue of illegal mining and its environmental ramifications is under investigation, taking into account the NGT's observations and various First Information Reports related to illegal mining.

(h) On the aforesaid facts prosecution complaint was filed in the court of Learned Special Judge P.M.L. Act, Ranchi and the same has been registered as ECIR 04/22. The main prosecution complaint and subsequent supplementary prosecution complaint has been filed are: -

a) Original Prosecution Complaint (PC):

Filed against Pankaj Mishra (A-1), Bachhu Yadav (A-2), and Prem Prakash (A-3) on 16.09.2022.

b) Ist Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPC-1) Filed against Pashupati Yadav (A-1) on 19.06.2023.

c) IInd Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPC- II):

Filed against Krishna Kumar Saha (A - 5) Bhagwan Bhagat (A-6), and Tinkal Kumar Bhagat (A-7) on 02.09.2023.

d) IIIrd Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPC-III):

Filed against Sunil Yadav (A-8) and M/s Singhwahini Transports and Logistics (A - 9) on 20.10.2023.

e) IVth Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPC-IV):

2026:JHHC:5862 Filed against Rahul Yadav (A-10) and M/s Maya Holiday Inn (A-11) on 01.03.2024.

f) Vth Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPC- V):

Filed against the accused persons including the present petitioner arraigning him as accused no. A- 19 alleging therein that investigation has revealed that Pankaj Mishra, by leveraging his political influence, orchestrated a massive criminal syndicate that was systematically engaged in illegal mining, transportation, and extortion in the Sahibganj district of Jharkhand. This criminal enterprise generated huge proceeds of crime, estimated to be in excess of ₹1000 Crores, through the commission of scheduled offences. These Illicit funds were then laundered through a complex web of financial transactions involving the accused persons herein and their associated entities to conceal their criminal origin and project them as untainted property.

The accused persons arraigned in this complaint, namely Rajesh Yadav Dahu Yadav (A-12), Heera Lal Bhagat (A-13), Bishnu Prasad Yadav (A-14), Pavitra Kumar Yadav (A-15), Nimay Chandra Shil (A-16), M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), M/s Rayadav Transportation Pvt. Ltd. (A-18), and Shri Yash Jalan (A-19) acted as key operatives and facilitators of this syndicate. They were knowingly and directly involved in various processes and activities connected with the proceeds of crime. 5

2026:JHHC:5862 This included the generation of PoC through illegal mining, its concealment in the form of cash; its use in acquiring assets, and its integration into the formal economy through a web of corporate entities. Specifically, entities like M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), through its director Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), knowingly provided critical logistical support by supplying the vessel M.V. Infralink-III for the illegal transportation of minerals. Furthermore, M/s Rayadav Transportation Pvt. Ltd. (A-18), a company controlled by the family of the key operative Rajesh Yadav (A-12), was used as a corporate vehicle to hold and launder the syndicate's illicit funds.

(i) During the investigation, proceeds of crime were identified and seized. This includes unexplained cash of Rs.3,49,51,900/- (Rupees Three Crores, Forty-Nine Lakhs, Fifty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred) from the premises of the accused herein. Additionally, bank balances amounting Rs.2,47,67,174.17 (Rupees Two Crore Forty-Seven Lakh Sixty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Seventy- Four and Seventeen Paise) were frozen, which includes a balance of Rs.63,39,452/- held in the account of M/s Rayadav Transportation Pvt. Ltd. (A- 6

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18). Various high-value movable properties, which were used as instrumentalities of the crime, were also seized, including an inland vessel, M.V. Infralink-III, operated by the syndicate and owned by the company of Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), along with several industrial stone crushers.

(j) The investigation has established that the accused persons have committed the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002, by knowingly being a party to the processes and activities connected with the proceeds of crime. Accordingly vide order dated 17.07.2025 cognizance has been taken by the learned special Court.

(k) It has been averred in the petition that the petitioner is absolutely innocent and has committed no offence at all and has no connection with the said incident by any stretch of imagination and further there of violation Section 223 of BNSS because before taking cognizance the opportunity of hearing has not been given to the present petitioner, therefore, the entire criminal proceeding in connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022 arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order taking 7 2026:JHHC:5862 cognizance dated 17.07.2025 be quashed and set aside.

3. It is evident that FIR No. 85 of 2020 dated 22.06.2020 was registered by Barharwa Police Station, Sahibganj District, Jharkhand under Section 147, 149, 341, 342, 323, 379, 504, 506 r/w 120-B of IPC, 1860 against Pankaj Mishra & Others on the basis of the complaint of one Shri Sambhu Nandan Kumar who was allegedly threatened and obstructed on 22.06.2020 by the persons accused in the F.I.R. from participating in the tender for Barharwa Toll. It was alleged by the complainant that he was asked by the accused Pankaj Mishra over the phone, not to participate in the tender, on the refusal of which, he was attacked by the mob, at the behest of Pankaj Mishra.

4. A charge sheet bearing no. 231 of 2020 dated 30.11.2020 in connection with the aforementioned case was filed before the Ld. Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahebganj under Section 147/149/341/323/504/506 of the IPC against Eight Accused Persons.

5. Further, on 15.01.2021, the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahebganj, took cognizance of the Charge Sheet under Section 147/149/341/323 /504/506 of the IPC.

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6. An ECIR No. 03 of 2022 was recorded on 08.03.2022 by the Directorate of Enforcement based on FIR No. 85 of 2020 dated 22.06.2020 lodged by Barharwa Police Station, District Sahebganj, Jharkhand, as Section 120B is a scheduled offence under Part A of Schedule to the PMLA, 2002.

7. Accordingly, original prosecution complaint dated 16.09.2022 has been filed against the prime accused namely Pankaj Mishra (A-1), Bachhu Yadav (A-2), and Prem Prakash (A-3) and consequently, cognizance of the said offences has been taken by the competent court on 20.09.2022 for the offence under Section 3 of PML Act 2002, punishable under Section 4 of the Act 2002. Thereafter, series of prosecution complaint has been filed against the accused persons and lastly Vth Supplementary Prosecution Complaint (SPC-V) has filed against the accused persons including the present petitioner arraigning him as accused no. A-19 alleging therein that investigation has revealed that Pankaj Mishra(A-1) by leveraging his political influence, orchestrated a massive criminal syndicate that was systematically engaged in illegal mining, transportation, and extortion in the Sahibganj district of Jharkhand and this criminal enterprise generated huge proceeds of crime, in excess of ₹1000 Crores, through the commission of scheduled offences and these Illicit funds 9 2026:JHHC:5862 were then laundered through a complex web of financial transactions involving the accused persons including the present petitioner herein and their associated entities to conceal their criminal origin and project them as untainted property.

8. It has further been alleged that Shri Yash Jalan (A-

19) and other accused persons acted as key operatives and facilitators of this syndicate. They were knowingly and directly involved in various processes and activities connected with the proceeds of crime. Specifically, entities like M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), through its director Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), knowingly provided critical logistical support by supplying the vessel M.V. Infralink-III for the illegal transportation of minerals. During the investigation, proceeds of crime were identified and seized. This includes unexplained cash of Rs.3,49,51,900/- (Rupees Three Crores, Forty-Nine Lakhs, Fifty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred) from the premises of the accused herein. Accordingly, taking into consideration the aforesaid factual aspect and fact unearthed during investigation vide the special Court vide order dated 17.07.2025 has opined that since the cognizance has already been taken in this case, therefore, prima facie case is made against the aforesaid accused 10 2026:JHHC:5862 persons including the present petitioner and accordingly directed to issue the summons against them

9. The instant petition has been filed for quashing of the entire case and order dated 17.07.2025 on the ground that the said order has been passed in the utter violation of procedural mandate as stipulated in the Section 223 of the BNSS.

Submission made on behalf of the petitioner

10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the following grounds for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance:

(a) Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during the investigation, numbers of searches were conducted by a team constituted by the E.D. and nothing incriminating was recovered so far as the present petitioner is concerned.

(b) It has been submitted that the petitioner is absolutely innocent and has committed no offence at all and has no connection with the said incident by any stretch of imagination. The opposite party has falsely implicated the Petitioner in the present case with an oblique motive without any independent and Bonafide application of mind.

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(c) He has submitted that the petitioner is not even named in any of the First Information reports, subject matter to ECIR Case No.04 of 2022 arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 and the initiation of the present criminal case against the petitioner by filing Vth Supplementary prosecution complaint is bad in law and liable to be set aside.

(d) It has further been contended that on perusal of order taking cognizance, it appears that order as has been passed is arbitrary and in mechanical manner. The learned Special Judge took cognizance in violation of the First Proviso to Section 223 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "the BNSS") since no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner prior to taking such cognizance.

(e) Learned senior counsel contends that the provision of affording an opportunity of hearing to the accused prior to taking cognizance has been introduced in the new regime of criminal laws after the introduction of the BNSS and was absent in its predecessor-statute, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). It is argued that the said provision is mandatory and any 12 2026:JHHC:5862 contravention of the same leads to curbing the fundamental right to life and personal liberty, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, of the accused.

(f) The learned counsel for the petitioner in order to substantiate this limb of argument has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kushal Kumar Agarwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221 wherein it was held that a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) shall be governed by Sections 200 to 204 of the Cr. P.C. and, as such, the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which has now replaced the Cr. P.C., and the embargo incorporated therein is to be complied with and in violation of the same, the order taking cognizance has to be set aside.

(g) It has been contended that the finding of the learned Special Court that since the cognizance has already been taken in this case, therefore, there is no requirement of pre-cognizance herein in terms of Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is highly misconceived and contrary to the judicial pronouncement as by 13 2026:JHHC:5862 filing 5th supplementary prosecution complaint, new accused person is to be added to face the trial and therefore, since the new accused persons are to be added by way of 5th supplementary prosecution complaint, therefore pre-cognizance herein is mandatory compliance of the mandatory provision and due to violation of the said mandatory provision, the entire criminal proceeding herein including the order dated 17.07.2025 has already been vitiated.

(h) It has further been contended that the order was passed without recording any subjective satisfaction regarding issuance of process against the accused persons. The co-accused have also been granted bail by the various orders passed by this Court.

(i) As per the Vth supplementary prosecution complaint, it is alleged that the petitioner is an accused Sahebganj (M) P.S. Case No. 84 of 2022, which relates to the offence of illegal mining. Even though this F.I.R. was not registered under any section of illegal mining or illegal transportation, but assuming the Sahebganj (M) P.S. Case No. 84 of 2022 is registered for illegal mining against the petitioner, the present ECIR 14 2026:JHHC:5862 is not maintainable against the petitioner as the Sahebganj (M) P.S. Case No. 84 of 2022 has already been quashed and set aside by the Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Cr.M.P. NO. 3504 of 2022 vide order dated 15.04.2024 and therefore as on date there is no predicate offence is pending against the petitioner.

11. Based upon the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the entire criminal proceeding in connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022 arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order taking cognizance dated 17.07.2025 may be quashed and set aside.

Submission made on behalf of the Opp. Party-E.D.

12. Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel for the Opp. Party- E.D. has taken the following grounds in defending the order impugned including the order taking cognizance: -

(a) Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the E.D. has vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with ECIR Case No.04 of 2022 arising out of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 including the order taking cognizance dated 17.07.2025.

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(b) He has further submitted that series of prosecution complaints in the said case against various individuals have been filed and entities involved in the illegal mining and money laundering.

(c) The original prosecution complaint was filed on 16.09.2022 against Pankaj Mishra (A-1), Bachhu Yadav (A-2) and Prem Prakash (A-3). Subsequently, the 1st Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 19.06.2023 against Pashupati Yadav (A-4). Lastly, the Vth Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 30.06.2025 followed by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Supplementary Prosecution Complaint against Rajesh Yadav @ Dahu Yadav (A-

12), Heera Lal Bhagat (A-13), Bishnu Prasad Yadav (A-14), Pavitra Kumar Yadav (A-15), Nimay Chandra Shil (A-16), M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd (A-17), M/s Rayadav Transportation Pvt. Ltd. (A-18) and Yash Jalan (A-19), the present petitioner.

(d) The petitioner's primary contention that the proceedings are not maintainable as he is not an accused in any predicate offence is legally misconceived and irrelevant for a prosecution under the PMLA, 2002. It is a settled position of 16 2026:JHHC:5862 law that the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA is an independent offence. The statutory prerequisite is the existence of a "criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence"

from which proceeds of crime are generated, not that every person accused of money laundering must also be an accused in the predicate FIR.

(e) In the instant case, the investigation is predicated on FIR No. 85/2020, which includes the scheduled offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC. Furthermore, the investigation has subsumed over 50 other FIRs detailing a massive criminal conspiracy orchestrated by a syndicate led by Pankaj Mishra (Accused No. 1). This syndicate was involved in illegal mining, extortion, and transportation, generating proceeds of crime estimated to be in excess of Rs. 1000 Crores through the commission of scheduled offences. The investigation has conclusively established that the petitioner and his company, M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd.

(Accused No. 17), "knowingly assisted" in a critical activity connected with these proceeds of crime, thereby squarely falling within the ambit of Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002.

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(f) the petitioner's reliance on the quashing of FIR No. 84/2022 is a misleading attempt to obfuscate his role in the larger conspiracy. The PMLA investigation is not predicated on this single FIR. The core criminal activity that generated the proceeds of crime is the large-scale illegal mining, which is evidenced by numerous other subsisting predicate offences, including FIR No. 63/21 (Section 307 IPC) and FIR No. 28/22 (Sections 307 & 120-B IPC).

(g) It has been contended that the petitioner's claim of the transaction involving Rs. 2.75 Crores being a legitimate business transaction is a fallacious argument designed to give a colour of legitimacy to the proceeds of crime. The investigation has established a clear and direct money trail proving that this amount was paid to the petitioner's company, M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), by M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics (A-9) ie. the primary operational arm of the syndicate. The accounts of M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics (A-9) and its partners were found to be repositories of illicit funds, having received unexplained cash deposits exceeding 20.67 Crores in the accounts of M/s 18 2026:JHHC:5862 Singhwahini Transport & Logistics and its partners.

(h) So far as the non-adherence of the mandate of Section 223 is concerned in the present matter, cognizance of the offence under PMLA was already taken on 20.09.2022 in ECIR No. 04/2022, upon the filing of the original Prosecution Complaint against Pankaj Mishra and others. This judicial act stands concluded and need not be repeated for each subsequent accused.

(i) It has further been contended that under the Explanation to Section 44(1)(ii) of the PMLA, any supplementary complaint filed on the basis of further investigation is deemed to be part of the original complaint, whether or not the newly added accused were named in the original complaint. Therefore, the act of summoning the petitioner based on the supplementary complaint is not a fresh cognizance but a step taken post cognizance.

(j) Further contention has been made that grant of bail to the accused/petitioner cannot made ipso facto eligible to the accused for quashing of the case under inherent power rather order granting bail and quashing under 528 BNSS are the provisions operating in the different field. 19

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(k) It has been contended that the instant petition is being devoid of any merit, founded on a misleading and selective presentation of facts and constitutes a manifest abuse of the process of the Court.

(l) As the controlling mind, the petitioner is directly and vicariously liable for his company's act of knowingly assisting in an activity connected with proceeds of crime and being a direct beneficiary thereof.

(m) Further, it has been contended that the order which was passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi, after due application of judicial mind to the voluminous and incriminating evidence presented in the 5th Supplementary Prosecution Complaint.

(n) It has further been contended that it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to say that the petitioner is absolutely innocent and has committed no offence at all and has no connection with the said incident by any stretch of imagination.

13. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED has submitted that in view of the aforesaid, no interference is required and the instant case may be dismissed. 20

2026:JHHC:5862 Analysis

14. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials available on record.

15. Before adverting into facts of the instant case it will be profitable to discuss herein the ambit and scope of inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS.

16. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (corresponding section 528 BNSS) are the exception and not the rule. Under this section, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions "abuse of process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191.

17. It is settled proposition of law that to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (corresponding section 528 BNSS) the High Court has to be 21 2026:JHHC:5862 fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. Reference in this regard may be taken by the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 330] which reads as under:

"29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, 22 2026:JHHC:5862 and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice."

18. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1 SCC 568] the powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India were highlighted and the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:

"29. Regarding the argument of the accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary 23 2026:JHHC:5862 to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]."

19. In Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar [(2008) 14 SCC 1], the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. and under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are unlimited, that the High Court could make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In a concurring order passed in the very same case, it was observed in addition that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the High Court is free to consider even material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether charge as framed could be maintained.

20. In Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home [(2019) 11 SCC 706], referring to the provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

"16. There is nothing in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court 24 2026:JHHC:5862 [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 :

(2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237]. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court."

21. Thus, it is settled position in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.

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22. As can be gathered from the above, Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS recognizes the inherent powers of the High Court to quash initiation of prosecution against the accused to pass such orders as may be considered necessary to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is a statutory power vested in the High Court to quash such criminal proceedings that would dislodge the charges levelled against the accused and based on the material produced, lead to a firm opinion that the assertions contained in the charges levelled by the prosecution deserve to be overruled.

23. While exercising the powers vested in the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C./528 BNSS whether at the stage of issuing process or at the stage of committal or even at the stage of framing of charges, which are all stages that are prior to commencement of the actual trial, the test to be applied is that the Court must be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused would lead to a conclusion that their defence is based on sound, reasonable and indubitable facts. The material relied on by the accused should also be such that would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss the accusations levelled against them as false.

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24. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled proposition of law this Court is now adverting to the leading contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties.

25. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he has not been named in the predicate offence, therefore, culpability of the present petitioner in the alleged offence under Section 3 of the PML Act 2002 is not maintainable. Further, it has been contended that there is clear violation of Section 223 of the BNSS and no opportunity of hearing has been given to the Petitioner at pre-cognizance stage and same is the sheer violation of the natural justice. It has further been contended that the petitioner is absolutely innocent and has committed no offence at all and has no connection with the said incident by any stretch of imagination.

26. Per contra, the learned counsel for ED has contended that there is ample evidence against the present petitioner and since the order dated 17.07.2025 has passed. After due consideration of all the legal and factual aspect, therefore no interference is required by this Court. Further it has been contended that Act 2002 focuses on the act of concealing or converting proceeds of crime, and those who facilitate this process, even if they were not involved in the original criminal activity, can still be prosecuted for money laundering. It has further been contended that in 27 2026:JHHC:5862 the instant, cognizance of the offence under PMLA was already taken on 20.09.2022 upon the filing of the original Prosecution Complaint dated 16.09.2022 as such this judicial act stands concluded and need not be repeated for each subsequent accused. Further under the Explanation to Section 44(1)(ii) of the PML Act 2002, any supplementary complaint filed on the basis of further investigation is deemed to be part of the original complaint, whether or not the newly added accused were named in the original complaint, therefore for issue of summoning process there is no need to resort the procedure as per the mandate of Section 223 BNSS.

27. In the backdrop of the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the parties and further taking into consideration the factual aspect of the instant case, the following issues are to be appreciated by this Court:

"(I) Whether as per the mandate of Section 223 BNSS, at pre-cognizance stage the opportunity of hearing to the petitioner/accused is required to be given even in the cases where cognizance has already been taken on 20.09.2022 on the basis of original prosecution complaint?

(II) Whether in the instant case the proceeding against the present petitioner is 28 2026:JHHC:5862 not maintainable as he is not an accused in any predicate offence?

(III) whether prima facie the sufficient material is available in the instant case against the petitioner for further proceeding?"

Re: Issue No- I

28. This Court has gone through the order taking cognizance as well as various paragraphs of the counter affidavit.

29. To comprehend the conspectus of the issue, it would be pertinent to reproduce Section 223 BNSS, which reads as under:--

"223 : Examination of complainant-

(1) A Magistrate having jurisdiction while taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:

Provided that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard:

Provided further that when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses-

(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or

(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 212.

Provided .....

(2) ..."

2026:JHHC:5862

30. From the comprehensive reading of this Section, it becomes evident that though under Section 200 Cr. P.C. (now S. 223 BNSS) at the stage of pre-cognizance, no Notice was required to be served upon the accused, this aspect has undergone a change in Section 223 BNSS, to which the proviso is added that no Cognizance of an Offence can be taken without giving a prior opportunity to the accused of being heard.

31. Thus, Section 223 provides an added safeguard that no cognizance shall be taken without affording the accused an opportunity of being heard.

32. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to understand the meaning of word "cognizance" which was explained by the Apex Court in Narayan Das Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 111 that when a cognizance is taken of an offence, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is difficult to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance.

33. It is only when the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and sub- sections of Chapter XVI of Cr. P.C. or under Section 204 of Chapter XVII, that the Court can be positively stated to have applied his mind and taken cognizance. 30

2026:JHHC:5862

34. Similarly, in Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654 the Apex Court reiterated the observations made in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 250. The cognizance involves application of mind to the given facts to ascertain whether the Accused needs to be summoned. The purpose of recording statements prior to taking cognizance, is only to ascertain if any prima facie case is disclosed in the Complaint and thereby enable taking of cognizance in appropriate cases and avoid unnecessary harassment of the Respondent/Accused.

35. From the express language of the Section 223 and the aforesaid meaning of "Cognizance", it is abundantly evident that taking Cognizance of an Offence is the stage when the Magistrate applies his mind to the Complaint for the purpose of proceeding as per provisions of Chapter XVI of BNSS.

36. While under the erstwhile Section 200 Cr. P.C. and S. 202 Cr. P.C. (which are para materia with Section 223 and 225 of BNSS), it was clear that till the stage of Cognizance, the Accused had no role and it is only after the Cognizance was taken that summons were issued to the Accused. However, under the BNSS, there is a marked change as a procedural safeguard has been incorporated by way of first proviso to S. 223 (1) BNSS which mandates that 31 2026:JHHC:5862 no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.

37. It requires to refer herein that it is a cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence, reiterated in numerous judgments by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 492, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that cognizance is taken of the offence to initiate proceedings, not of the individual offenders. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:

"18. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the relevant provisions of law as also various judicial pronouncements, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in equating issuance of process with taking cognizance by a criminal court and in quashing the proceedings treating them as time- barred.

19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of" and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.

20. "Taking cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal 32 2026:JHHC:5862 application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance.

21. Chapter XIV (Sections 190-199) of the Code deals with "Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings".

Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in certain circumstances. Sub-section (1) thereof is material and may be quoted in extenso:

"190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- section (2), may take cognizance of any offence--

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed."

22. Chapter XV (Sections 200-203) relates to "Complaints to Magistrates" and covers cases before actual commencement of proceedings in a court or before a Magistrate. Section 200 of the Code requires a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath. Section 202, however, enacts that a Magistrate is not bound to issue process against the accused as a matter of course. It enables him before the issue of process either to inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding further. The underlying object of the inquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the accused. It thus allows a Magistrate to form an opinion whether the process should or should not be issued. The scope of inquiry under Section 202 is, no doubt, extremely limited. At that stage, what a Magistrate is called upon to see is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused.

23. Then comes Chapter XVI (Commencement of proceedings before Magistrates). This Chapter will apply only after cognizance of an offence has been taken by a Magistrate under Chapter XIV. Section 204, whereunder process can be issued, is another material provision which reads as under:

"204. Issue of process.--(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be--

(a) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or 33 2026:JHHC:5862

(b) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction.

(2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed.

(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-

section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint.

(4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint.

(5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 87."

24. From the above scheme of the Code, in our judgment, it is clear that "Initiation of proceedings", dealt with in Chapter XIV, is different from "Commencement of proceedings" covered by Chapter XVI. For commencement of proceedings, there must be initiation of proceedings. In other words, initiation of proceedings must precede commencement of proceedings. Without initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV, there cannot be commencement of proceedings before a Magistrate under Chapter XVI. The High Court, in our considered view, was not right in equating initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV with commencement of proceedings under Chapter XVI.

30. Again in Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B. [AIR 1959 SC 1118 : (1960) 1 SCR 93] this Court observed that when cognizance is taken of an offence depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuance of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or a warrant of arrest of the accused cannot by itself be regarded as an act of taking cognizance of an offence. It is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XV or under Section 204 of Chapter XVI of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and thereby had taken cognizance of an offence (see also Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W.B. [AIR 1963 SC 765 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 953] and Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala [(1978) 4 SCC 58 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 496] )"

38. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence 34 2026:JHHC:5862 depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance.

Further it is evident that "Initiation of proceedings", dealt with in Chapter XIV Cr.P.C., is different from "Commencement of proceedings" covered by Chapter XVI Cr.P.C. For commencement of proceedings, there must be initiation of proceedings. In other words, initiation of proceedings must precede commencement of proceedings.

Without initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV, there cannot be commencement of proceedings before a Magistrate under Chapter XVI. Further when cognizance is taken of an offence depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XV or under Section 204 of Chapter XVI of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and thereby had taken cognizance of an offence.

39. Further, there is no dispute and same cannot be disputed that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of BNSS puts an embargo on the power of the Court to take Cognizance upon a Complaint, by providing that no Cognizance of an Offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.

2026:JHHC:5862 This proviso marks a substantive procedural safeguard that did not exist under the earlier regime.

40. But the question arises herein that whether the said procedural safeguard is required to be followed in the cases where the cognizance has already been taken on the basis of the original prosecution complaint.

41. In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion this Court is now re-adverting to factual aspect of the case.

42. In the present case, the Ld. Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi, had already taken cognizance of the offence of money laundering in ECIR Case No. 04/2022 on 20.09.2022 upon the filing of the original Prosecution Complaint against Pankaj Mishra(A-1) and others. This was the singular point at which the court first took judicial notice of the offence.

43. It requires to refer herein that a Supplementary prosecution Complaint is in a Continuation of original prosecution complaint and it is the outcome of the further investigation. Herein the 5th Supplementary Prosecution Complaint, through which the petitioner has been arrayed, an accused is not a fresh complaint and the cognizance of the offence has already been taken on 16.09.2022.

44. It requires to refer herein that the Explanation to Section 44(1)(ii) of the PMLA creates a legal fiction wherein it has been mentioned that a complaint "shall be deemed to 36 2026:JHHC:5862 include any subsequent complaint in respect of further investigation... against any accused person... whether named in the original complaint or not."

45. Therefore, the 5th prosecution complaint is legally subsumed into the original complaint and the issuance of summons against the petitioner is a procedural step under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 227 of the BNSS) which has to be taken in a case where cognizance of the offence is complete.

46. The petitioner's reliance on the proviso to Section 223 of the BNSS is fit to be accepted since, the cognizance of the offence in the original Prosecution Complaint was taken on 20.09.2022, long before the BNSS came into force i.e. 01.07.2024, hence, the applicability of said proviso of Section 223 BNSS cannot be applied retrospectively to overturn a judicial act that was validly completed under the earlier law. It is settled connotation of law as settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602 wherein it has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that procedural laws are not retrospective unless expressly stated. Therefore, provision of BNSS cannot applied herein in order to invalidate a validly completed judicial process under existing provision of Cr.P.C.

2026:JHHC:5862

47. Furthermore, even if the BNSS were applicable, the stage for a pre-cognizance hearing under Section 223 had already passed in 2022 when the Ld. Court first applied its judicial mind to the offence.

48. Further it needs to refer herein that the Saving Clause of BNSS i.e. Section 531(2)(a), excludes Pending Investigations. Thus, the saving clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS mandates that where an investigation was pending prior to the commencement of the BNSS on 01.07.2024, all subsequent proceedings, including the taking of cognizance, shall be governed by the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

49. In the instant case, the investigation commenced with the recording of the ECIR on 08.03.2022. Therefore, the provisions of the Cr.P.C., 1973 which do not provide for a pre-cognizance hearing for the accused are applicable. Therefore, the petitioner's argument on this ground is therefore, the petitioner's argument seeking pre-cognizance hearing is not fit to be accepted.

50. So far as the applicability of the ratio rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kushal Kumar Agarwal (supra) is concerned wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the PMLA complaint was filed after 1 July 2024, Section 223 BNSS shall apply, 38 2026:JHHC:5862 mandating an opportunity of hearing to the accused before cognizance.

51. It is evident from the factual aspects of the said case that a complaint was filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the PMLA") on August 2, 2024 and the appellant of the case was shown as accused in the complaint. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking into consideration that prosecution complaint was filed on 02 August 2024 and cognizance of the offence was appeared to be taken firstly on 20.11.2024 and by that BNSS has already been enforced 01.07.2024, has quashed the impugned order dated 20th November, 2024, on the ground of non-compliance with the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 223 of the BNSS. But herein in the instant case since cognizance of the offence has already been taken on 20.09.2022 by the competent Court after filing of the original prosecution complaint dated 16.09.2022 and since the cognizance has already been taken in this case the learned trial court taking into consideration of the aforesaid fact has passed the order dated 17.07.2025 with observation that the prima facie case is made against the aforesaid accused persons including the present petitioner and thereafter trial court passed the order of issuance of summons against them. Therefore, in the given fact and 39 2026:JHHC:5862 circumstances of the instant case the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kushal Kumar Agarwal (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable herein.

52. Further it needs to refer herein settled proposition of law that the applicability of the judgment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each and every case and there cannot be any universal application of the judgment rather each judgment is to be decided on the basis of fact of each case. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:

"47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed."

53. Thus on the basis of discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the considered view that there is no dispute and it cannot be disputed about the applicability of the proviso of Section 223 of BNSS that at the pre-cognizance stage the opportunity of hearing must be given to the accused but since in the instant case, cognizance of the offence has already been taken on 20.09.2022 on the basis 40 2026:JHHC:5862 of the original prosecution complaint dated 16.09.2022 and the said action of cognizance has already been saved by virtue of saving clause of Section 531 (2) (a) of BNSS and further the learned trial taking in to consideration the aforesaid aspect has passed the order dated 17.07.2025, as such the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 17.07.2025 may be quashed on the basis of non-adherence of the proviso of Section 223 of BNSS is not fit to be accepted.

54. Accordingly, issue no.I is answered against the petitioner.

Re-Issue No. II

55. Further the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that petitioner is not named in the FIRs, he cannot be prosecuted under PMLA.

56. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that under the scheme of the PMLA, any person who directly or indirectly attempts to indulge, or knowingly assists in any process connected with proceeds of crime, can be prosecuted even if is not an accused in the predicate offence.

57. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pavna Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Appeal No. 2779/2023) held that who could commit an offence under the PMLA may not be 41 2026:JHHC:5862 named in the scheduled offence. The statutory prerequisite is the existence of a "criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence" from which proceeds of crime are generated, not that every person accused of money laundering must also be an accused in the predicate FIR.

58. Further the offence of money laundering as contemplated in Section 3 of the PMLA has been elaborately dealt with by the three Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929 in which it has been observed that Section 3 has a wider reach. The offence as defined captures every process and activity in dealing with the proceeds of crime, directly or indirectly, and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy to constitute an act of money laundering. Of course, the authority of the Authorised Officer under the Act to prosecute any person for the offence of money laundering gets triggered only if there exist proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the Act and further it is involved in any process or activity. Not even in case of existence of undisclosed income and irrespective of its volume, the definition of "Proceeds of Crime" under Section 2(1)(u) will get attracted, unless the property has been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The 42 2026:JHHC:5862 property must qualify the definition of "Proceeds of Crime"

under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act. As observed, in all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of "Proceeds of Crime" under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be the crime properties.

59. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pavana Dibbur vs. The Directorate of Enforcement (supra) has considered the effect of the appellant not being shown as an accused in the predicate offence by taking into consideration Section 3 of the Act, 2002 and has observed that an accused under PMLA need not necessarily be named in the scheduled offence if they are involved in laundering proceeds of crime. The decision clarifies that the offence of money laundering is independent of the predicate offence. The accused need not be part of the initial crime to be held liable for laundering the proceeds. The law focuses on the act of concealing or converting proceeds of crime, and those who facilitate this process, even if they were not involved in the original criminal activity, can still be prosecuted for money laundering. For ready reference the relevant excerpt of the aforesaid judgment is being referred herein which reads as under:

"It is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence. What is held in paragraph 270 of the decision 43 2026:JHHC:5862 of this Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary supports the above conclusion. The conditions precedent for attracting the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA are that there must be a scheduled offence and that there must be proceeds of crime in relation to the scheduled offence as defined in clause (u) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the PMLA."

60. Based upon the definition Clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act 2002 which defines "proceeds of crime", the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe that clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of PMLA defines "property" to mean any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible.

61. To constitute any property as proceeds of crime, it must be derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The explanation clarifies that the proceeds of crime include property, not only derived or obtained from scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. Clause (u) also clarifies that even the value of any such property will also be the proceeds of crime.

62. It has further been clarified that if a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime, in that case, he can be 44 2026:JHHC:5862 held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence.

63. This ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., 2022 SCCOnline SC 929, wherein it was held that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence.

64. It is pertinent to mention herein that respondent ED was not investigating the commission of illegal mining as an independent offence but has traced the proceeds of crime generated therefrom.

65. In the instant case, the investigation is predicated on FIR No. 85/2020, which includes the scheduled offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC. Furthermore, the investigation has incorporated over 50 other FIRs detailing a huge criminal conspiracy composed by a syndicate led by Pankaj Mishra (Accused No. 1). This syndicate was involved in illegal mining, extortion, and transportation, generating proceeds of crime estimated to be in excess of Rs. 1000 Crores through the commission of scheduled offences.

2026:JHHC:5862

66. It is revealed during the investigation that the petitioner "knowingly assisted" in a critical activity connected with these proceeds of crime, thereby squarely falling within the ambit of Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002, therefore, the Petitioner's plea that since he is not named in the FIRs, he cannot be prosecuted under PMLA is not fit to be accepted.

67. Accordingly, issue no. II is answered herein. Re-Issue No. III

68. It has been contended that petitioner is absolutely innocent and has committed no offence at all and has no connection with the said incident by any stretch of imagination. The opposite party has falsely implicated the Petitioner in the present case without any cogent or reliable evidence.

69. This Court has gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order and also gone through the supplementary prosecution complaint.

70. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the provisions of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent.

71. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of 46 2026:JHHC:5862 crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

72. It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money- laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

73. It needs to refer herein the definition of "proceeds of crime" as provided under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:

"2 (1) (u) "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property 3[or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country] 4[or abroad]; [Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;]"

74. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or 47 2026:JHHC:5862 obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

75. In the explanation, it has been referred that for removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book by way of Act 23 of 2019.

76. It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving explanation under Section 2(1)(u) is by way of clarification to the effect that whether as per the substantive provision of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country but by way of explanation the proceeds of crime has been given broader implication by including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be 48 2026:JHHC:5862 derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

77. The "property" has been defined under Section 2(1)(v) which means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located.

78. The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x) which means schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The "scheduled offence" has been defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads as under:

"2(y) "scheduled offence" means-- (i) the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule."

79. It is evident that the "scheduled offence" means the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.

80. The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 3 of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:

"3. Offence of money-laundering.--Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or 49 2026:JHHC:5862 knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. [Explanation.-- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,-- (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:-- (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.]"

81. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that "offence of money laundering" means whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

82. It is further evident that the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as 50 2026:JHHC:5862 untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.

83. The punishment for money laundering has been provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002.

84. The various provisions of the Act, 2002 along with interpretation of the definition of "proceeds of crime" has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (supra) wherein the Bench comprising of three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent of the Act, 2002.

85. It is evident that the purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence of money laundering, but also to provide measures for prevention of money laundering. It is also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act. This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act.

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86. The predicate offence has been considered in the aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration the explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under the definition of the "proceeds of crime" as contained under Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence, meaning thereby, the words "any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence"

will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime.

87. In the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) it has been held that the Authority under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of "proceeds of crime". Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment 52 2026:JHHC:5862 and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a standalone process.

88. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law and further in order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the parties this Court has gone through the Vth supplementary prosecution complaint (in short referred as SPC V) which has been annexed with the main petition.

89. It is evident from the record that the prosecution in the present case was initiated based on the registration of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 dated 08.03.2022 registered by the Respondent (ED) under provisions of the PMLA. The said ECIR/RNZO/03/2022 dated 08.03.2022 arises out of an FIR Barharwa P.S. Case No. 85/2020 dated 22.06.2020 registered by the Barharwa Police Station in respect of a toll tender case against various accused persons. Subsequently, the Respondent identified four more FIRs - and these FIRs were also clubbed as predicate offences for the investigation of ECIR/RNZO/03/2022.

90. Thereafter, the Respondent further identified several FIRs registered against various persons for offences pertaining to illegal mining, storage and transportation, and these FIRs were also clubbed as predicate offences for the purposes of investigation into ECIR/RNZO/03/2022. 53

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91. In the said VTH supplementary prosecution complaint, the role and other incriminating material against the present petitioner has been mentioned, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid prosecution complaint, are being quoted as under:

"8.12 Statement of Shri Yash Jalan (A-19) dated 16.08.2022: In his statement recorded under Section 50 of PMLA, Shri Yash Jalan, Director of M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), admitted to his role in the management and operations of the company. He confirmed the existence of a charter agreement between his company and M/s Singhwahini Transport for the use of the vessel M.V. Infralink-III. While he denied having direct knowledge of the illegal nature of the cargo being transported, his admission of being the operational and commercial head of the company confirms his central role in entering into the agreement which facilitated the syndicate's illegal transportation activities. [RUD No. 6] 8.13 Statement of Shri Mahesh Jalan dated 17.08.2022:

The statement of Shri Mahesh Jalan, father of Yash Jalan and a co-director in the company, corroborates the key role played by his son. Shri Mahesh Jalan stated that while he was a director, his role was limited to handling technical aspects only, and that his son, Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), was exclusively responsible for all the commercial and day-to-day operational affairs of the company. This statement further establishes Yash Jalan's position as the person in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. [RUD No. 10] 10.8 Evidence against M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17) and its Director, Shri Yash Jalan (A-

19) 10.8.1 The investigation has conclusively established that M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., a Kolkata-based company, was knowingly involved in the offence of money laundering by providing its inland vessel, the M.V. Infralink-III, for the illegal transportation of stone chips, which constitute proceeds of crime. The vessel was found to be an essential tool used by the criminal syndicate to facilitate the movement of illicitly obtained materials, thereby playing a key role in the laundering of proceeds arising out of scheduled offences.

10.8.2 On 26.07.2022, the Directorate of Enforcement intercepted the vessel (Registration No. WB 1809) and found it operating without any valid permission or regulatory clearance, which led to the registration of FIR No. 84/2022. Statements recorded from the vessel's crew confirmed that the vessel had routinely transported trucks loaded with illegally mined stone chips, many of which lacked valid challans. The operations were reportedly 54 2026:JHHC:5862 managed and controlled by associates of Pankaj Mishra, further linking the vessel's activities to a well-established money laundering network.

10.8.3 Further investigation revealed that the vessel M.V. Infralink-III was owned by M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. This fact was confirmed by Shri Mangi Lal Bhutoria, a Director and majority shareholder (holding 2/3rd shares) of the company, in his statement dated 22.11.2022. He stated that the vessel, referred to as 'Infralink 3', was purchased for approximately 27-8 Crores. Crucially, he admitted that the company had entered into a business arrangement with M/s Singhwahini Transport Pvt. Ltd., a company controlled by Rajesh Yadav Dahu Yadav (A-12), who is the identified operator of the syndicate.

10.8.4This connection is substantiated by the financial investigation which established that a sum of 22.75 Crores was transferred from the bank account of M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics to the account of M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. This payment represents the consideration for using the vessel to further the criminal activity and constitutes proceeds of crime acquired by A-17 and its director, A-19. The statement of Shri Shyamal Chandra Sarkar, affiliated with the company, further corroborated the existence of a commercial relationship involving the leasing of vessels to Rajesh Yadav and Sunil Yadav. This payment and arrangement confirm that the company was not only aware of but also financially benefitted from the criminal activity. [RUD No. 8] 10.8.5 As the vessel was being utilized to commit scheduled offences under the PMLA and was instrumental in transporting and concealing proceeds of crime, it falls within the definition of "property" under Section 2(1)(v) of the PMLA, 2002. Accordingly. the vessel was frozen under Section 17(1-A) of the PMLA, and this action was later confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The cumulative evidence clearly establishes that M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., by knowingly providing its assets for the commission of criminal acts and by deriving monetary benefits from such activity, committed the offence of money laundering and is liable to be prosecuted under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the PMLA, 2002.

10.8.6 The culpability for these actions is fixed upon Shri Yash Jalan (A-19). While he denied direct knowledge of the illegality in his statement dated 16.08.2022, his position as the controlling mind of the company is firmly established by the statements of his co-directors. Statement of Shri Mangi Lal Bhutoria (Director and majority shareholder) dated 22.11.2022: He unequivocally stated that Shri Yash Jalan was solely and exclusively responsible for all day-to-day operations and commercial decisions, including the decision to enter into the agreement with Rajesh Yadav's company. 55

2026:JHHC:5862 Statement of Shri Mahesh Jalan (Director and father of Yash Jalan) dated 17.08.2022: He corroborated that his own role was purely technical and that his son, Shri Yash Jalan, was exclusively responsible for all commercial and operational affairs of the company.

10.8.7 The cumulative evidence, therefore, proves that Shri Yash Jalan, as the director in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., knowingly provided the company's asset for the commission of a scheduled offence and was a direct beneficiary of the proceeds of crime. His actions, and those of his company, squarely fall within the definition of money laundering under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the PMLA.

13 SPECIFIC ROLE OF ACCUSED PERSONS/ENTITIES IN OFFENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING UNDER SECTION 3 OF PMLA, 2002 13.10 M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (Accused No. 17) This corporate entity, through its directors, knowingly became a party to the offence of money laundering by providing its property as an instrument of crime, thereby violating Section 3 read with Section 70 of the PMLA. Knowingly Assisting in the Process of Money Laundering:

The culpability of the company and its management is established by the statement of its own director, Shri Mangi Lal Bhutoria. While attempting to feign ignorance of the company's operations, Shri Bhutoria repeatedly stated that all day-to-day affairs, operational decisions, and agreements were handled exclusively by his co-director, Shri Yash Jalan. He specifically stated that it was the decision of Yash Jalan to enter into an agreement with the company of Rajesh Yadav Dahu. This establishes that Shri Yash Jalan was the person "in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business" at the relevant time, making the company vicariously liable for knowingly allowing its asset to be used for a criminal purpose under Section 70 of the PMLA, 2002.

Acquisition of Proceeds of Crime: The investigation has established that the company was a direct beneficiary of the criminal activity, having received ₹2.75 Crore from Rajesh Yadav's firm, M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics. The acquisition of this payment, derived from the illegal transport business, constitutes a direct involvement in the proceeds of crime.

M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., through its Director Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), who was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business, knowingly allowed its vessel to be used for a criminal purpose. By permitting the use of its property in the commission of a scheduled offence and by being a direct beneficiary of the proceeds of crime, the company has committed the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and is liable for punishment under Section 4 of the said Act.

2026:JHHC:5862 13.12Shri Yash Jalan (Accused No. 19) Shri Yash Jalan (A-19), as the director in charge of and responsible for the business of M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), knowingly assisted the syndicate and was a party to activities connected with proceeds of crime, thereby committing an offence under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the PMLA. His role is established as under:

Knowingly Assisting in the Process of Money Laundering: The primary role of A-17, under the direction of A-19, was to provide the critical instrumentality of crime-the vessel M.V. Infralink-III-which enabled the syndicate to transport illegally mined stone chips and thus generate proceeds of crime. The vessel was intercepted operating illegally, leading to FIR No. 84/2022, and was frozen as property used in the commission of a scheduled offence. By entering into a charter agreement with the syndicate's front firm, M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics, Shri Yash Jalan knowingly allowed the company's asset to be used for a criminal purpose.

Acquisition of Proceeds of Crime: M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. was a direct beneficiary of the criminal activity, having received ₹2.75 Crores from the syndicate's tainted funds held in the account of M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics. The acquisition of this payment, derived from the illegal transport business, constitutes a direct involvement in and acquisition of proceeds of crime. Direct Culpability: While Shri Yash Jalan denied knowledge of the illegality of the cargo, his role as the controlling mind is established by the statements of his co- directors. Shri Mangi Lal Bhutoria (majority shareholder) and Shri Mahesh Jalan (father and co-director) both stated unequivocally that Yash Jalan was solely and exclusively responsible for all operational and commercial decisions of the company, including the decision to enter into the agreement with Rajesh Yadav's firm. This makes him the person "in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business" under Section 70 of PMLA. By knowingly permitting the use of his company's property as an instrument of crime and by being a direct beneficiary of the proceeds of crime, Shri Yash Jalan (A-19) has committed the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and is liable for punishment under Section 4 of the said Act."

92. It has come in the prosecution complaint that the M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., a private company controlled by Yash Jalan, was a direct and known facilitator in the ongoing money laundering operations. The said company owned and operated an inland cargo vessel M.V. 57 2026:JHHC:5862 Infralink-III (Registration label No. WB 1809) which was deployed for transporting stone chips mined illegally across the river route from Sahibganj to other states. The said vessel was intercepted by the Directorate on 26.07.2022 and was found to be plying without valid permits. FIR No. 84/2022 was registered in connection with this incident, and Section 50 statements of the vessel crew confirmed that the vessel routinely carried trucks loaded with illegally mined stone chips, many of which lacked valid mining challans.

93. The investigation has revealed that M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17) received Rs. 2.75 Crores from M/s Singhwahini Transports and Logistics, a firm whose accounts were shown to contain proceeds of crime from illegal mining. The said amount was received without any legitimate commercial justification, and the petitioner has failed to furnish any credible explanation for the same.

94. It has come on record that the amount of Rs. 2.75 Crores transferred to the petitioner's company constitutes proceeds of crime as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA and its possession and use by the Petitioner OR M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. constitutes the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the Act.

95. Further, it has come on record that Mangi Lal Bhutoria, Director and majority shareholder of M/s Marine 58 2026:JHHC:5862 Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., categorically stated in his statement dated 22.11.2022 under Section 50 of the PMLA that Yash Jalan (present petitioner) was solely and exclusively responsible for all day-to-day operations and commercial decisions of the company, including its dealings with M/s Singhwahini Transports and Logistics.

96. The aforesaid fact has been substantiated by the position was further corroborated by Mahesh Jalan, father of the petitioner and a Director of the company, in his statement dated 17.08.2022, confirming that his son Yash Jalan was exclusively responsible for all commercial and operational affairs of the firm.

97. In view of the control exercised by the petitioner over A-17 and the material demonstrating knowing participation in laundering of proceeds of crime, prima facie it appears that the petitioner is squarely liable under Section 70 of the PMLA, 2002.

98. Further the Investigation has established a clear and direct money trail proving that this amount was paid to the petitioner's company, M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (A-17), by M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics (A-9) i.e., the primary operational arm of the syndicate. The accounts of M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics (A-9) and its partners were found to be repositories of illicit funds, having received unexplained cash deposits in the 59 2026:JHHC:5862 accounts of M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics and its partners. The payment of Rs. 2.75 Crores to the petitioner's company was made directly from these proceeds of crime.

Therefore, the payment of Rs. 2.75 Crores from these tainted accounts to the petitioner's company was not a legitimate consideration but was, in fact, the proceeds of crime being laundered as payment for services that facilitated the commission of the offence.

99. Thus, prima facie from investigation, it appears that Yash Jalan and his company M/s Marine Infralink Logistics Pvt. Ltd., were not mere third parties but were known facilitators and direct recipients of proceeds of crime. The inland vessel operated by them was a critical tool in the syndicate's operations, and their financial dealings with key accused entities establish a clear nexus with the predicate offences and money laundering activities.

100. Thus, the material on record, establishes a strong prima facie case against the petitioner for having committed the offence of money laundering under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the PMLA, 2002.

101. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the supplementary complaint has been filed on the basis of concrete and corroborated material, which demonstrates the petitioner's active participation in the offence of money laundering. The evidence includes:

2026:JHHC:5862 i. The petitioner's vessel (M.V. Infralink-III) being used as an instrumentality for the transportation of illegally mined stone chips; ii. The receipt of Rs. 2.75 Crores from the syndicate's main operational front, M/s Singhwahini Transport & Logistics-a sum confirmed to be proceeds of crime; and iii. The order of the Ld. Adjudicating Authority dated 26.12.2022, which confirmed the vessel's involvement in the offence of money laundering.

102. Thus, it would be evident from the material collected that the present petitioner had indulged and knowingly is a party and is actually involved in all the activities connected with the offence of money laundering. These multifaceted activities explicitly encompass the use or acquisition, possession, concealment, and projecting or claiming as untainted property of the ill-gotten proceeds of crime.

103. Consequently, based upon the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation, prima facie, it appears that the material is available against the present petitioner.

104. Accordingly, issue no.III is being answered.

105. It needs to refer herein that the offence of conspiracy under Section 120B IPC is specifically included as a scheduled offence in the PMLA when read with any 61 2026:JHHC:5862 other substantive offence. Further, it is settled position that conspiracy takes its colour from the underlying offence.

106. In the present case, the ECIR was rightly registered as the conspiracy was integrally connected with the commission of other offences relatable to the Schedule and therefore, validly invoked the jurisdiction under PMLA.

107. Further, the petitioner's reliance on the quashing of FIR No. 84/2022 is a misleading attempt to obfuscate his role in the larger conspiracy. The PMLA investigation is not predicated on this single FIR. The core criminal activity that generated the proceeds of crime is the large-scale illegal mining, which is evidenced by numerous other subsisting predicate offences, including FIR No. 63/21 (Section 307 IPC & Section 27 of the Arms Act) and FIR No. 28/22 (Sections 307 IPC, 120-B IPC & Section 27 of the Arms Act). Furthermore, the evidence gathered during the interception of the vessel M.V. Infralink-III on 26.07.2022 remains highly relevant. The statements of the vessel's master, Ajijul Seikh, and supervisor, Anand Singh, recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002, confirmed that the vessel routinely transported trucks laden with illegally mined stone chips without valid challans and that its operations were managed by co-accused Bachhu Yadav (Accused No.

2). This evidence irrefutably proves the use of the petitioner's property as an "instrumentality of crime" under 62 2026:JHHC:5862 the Explanation to Section 2(1)(v) of the PMLA, a fact that is not erased by quashing of a procedural FIR related to the vessel's operating permit.

108. Further, multiple scheduled offences exist in relation to the predicate acts forming the basis of the instant case. The ECIR was not registered in isolation but in continuation of offences disclosed in predicate FIRs which disclose cognizable offences under the IPC and other statutes falling within the PMLA Schedule.

109. It is evident from the Vth supplementary prosecution complaint filed against the petitioner and other co accused persons, is supported by substantial evidence gathered during the investigation. Furthermore, prima facie, there is ample evidence establishing the petitioner's involvement in the offence of money laundering, which is further corroborated by statements of witnesses in the instant case. Further, the petitioner's role has already been discussed herein in detail in the preceding paragraphs, therefore, the averments of the petitioner are not fit to be accepted.

110. Be it noted that the legal presumption under Section 24(a) of the Act 2002, would apply when the person is charged with the offence of money laundering and his direct or indirect involvement in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, is established. The 63 2026:JHHC:5862 existence of proceeds of crime is, therefore, a foundational fact, to be established by the prosecution, including the involvement of the person in any process or activity connected therewith. Once these foundational facts are established by the prosecution, the onus must then shift on the person facing charge of offence of money- laundering to rebut the legal presumption that the proceeds of crime are not involved in money-laundering, by producing evidence which is within his personal knowledge of the accused.

111. It needs to refer herein that there are parameters of quashing the entire criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance and at the time of quashing the entire criminal proceeding, the High Court is required to look into the matter with circumspection and if cogent reasons are there, then only, the quashing of the cognizance order, is made out.

112. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Odisha VS Pratima Mohanty, 2022 0 AIR(SC) 41 by taking into consideration the judgment rendered in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. vs Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604 has held that normally in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the criminal proceedings/FIR should not be quashed, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being referred herein: - 64

2026:JHHC:5862 "At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the impugned judgment and order the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the act and Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has entered into the merits of the allegations and has conducted the mini-trial by weighing the evidence in detail which, as such, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions is wholly impermissible. As held by this Court in the case of State of Haryana And Ors. vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604, the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent an abuse of process of any court and/or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the said decision this Court had carved out the exceptions to the general rule that normally in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the criminal proceedings/FIR should not be quashed."

113. It needs to be reiterated herein that the settled position of law as discussed and referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs that power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in exceptional cases, the present matter does not warrant the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction. It is a well-settled principle that this power is to be invoked sparingly, and only where the allegations, on their face, do not disclose the commission of any offence.

114. In the instant case, the Prosecution Complaint discloses a grave economic offence involving the laundering of proceeds of crime, supported by documentary, financial, and testimonial evidence. Hence, allowing the trial to proceed is in the interest of justice, and the petitioner's attempt to prematurely terminate the prosecution is not fit to be accepted.

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115. In view of the facts as discussed hereinabove as also taking into consideration the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court which has been referred in the preceding paragraphs, this Court is of the view that prima facie there are materials against the petitioner, which has been appreciated by the learned Court and thereafter, order dated 17.07.2025 has been passed.

116. Hence, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove and taking into consideration the settled position of law as discussed and referred hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that there is no illegality in the order dated 17.07.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 04 of 2022 in ECIR/RNZO/03/2022.

117. Considering the above discussed materials, the plea of the petitioner that there were no sufficient grounds against him, cannot be countenanced, consequently, the instant petition is, hereby, dismissed.

118. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) A.F.R. Rohit/ Uploaded on 27.02.2026 66

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