Delhi District Court
State vs Ms. Manjula Krippendorf on 13 November, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SEEMA NIRMAL
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS -09,
SOUTH-EAST DISTRICT / SAKET COURTS, DELHI
Cr. CASES 91062/2016
STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF
FIR NO. 34/2012
PS DEFENCE COLONY
JUDGMENT
a. CNR NO. DLSE020033972014
b. Name of the Complainant Sh. Anand Prakash
c. Name of the accused & his Ms. Manjula Krippendorf
parentage and address R/o B-56, Defence Colony,
New Delhi
d. Offence charged 341 IPC
e. Date of commission of 17.04.2012
offence
f. Date of Institution 24.01.2014
g. Plea of accused Pleaded not guilty
h. Order Reserved on 13.11.2025
i. Date of Pronouncement 13.11.2025
j. Final Order Acquitted
Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 1 OF 15
STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF
FIR NO. 34/2012
PS DEFENCE COLONY SEEMA Digitally signed by
SEEMA NIRMAL
NIRMAL 17:04:05 +0530
Date: 2025.11.13
Present: Ld. APP for the State.
Sh. Manish Kumar Sharma, Ld. LAC for accused. Accused in person.
BRIEF FACTS AND REASONS FOR DECISION
1. Briefly, the case of the prosecution is that on 17.04.2012, at unknown time, accused Manjula Krippendorf had illegally parked her car bearing registration no. HR-05T-0526 (white Mercedez) in the driveway of B-56, Defence Colony, New Delhi, so as to obstruct the ingress and egress of the complainant Sh. Anand Prakash residing on the first floor of B-56, Defence Colony, Delhi, and wrongfully restrained the complainant and thereby committed offence punishable u/s 341 IPC.
2. This case was registered on the statement of complainant Sh. Anand Prakash who stated regarding complaint about the illegal parking of a car HR05T-0526 white Mercedes by Ms. Manjula Krippendorf, R/o B-56 Defence colony, in the drive way of B-56 Defence colony with the sole intention of obstructing the ingress and Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 2 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL PS DEFENCE COLONY NIRMAL 17:04:10 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 egress of other occupants of the building, in particular the residents of the first floor i.e. complainant and his family. It is stated that Ms. Manjula had her car towed in to the drive way on 4 April 2012 with the intention of obstructing their passage and harassing them. The car was towed by the Delhi Police on April 14th 2012. Ms. Manjula has again had a tow truck place the car in the drive way on 17.04.2012 with the same illegal intentions. It is further stated that the car is junk as the tyres have no air and the car is not capable of moving, hence the sole objective of parking the car in the drive way is to obstruct. The complainant also attached with his complaint copies of three Court orders that specifically prohibited Ms. Manjula from blocking their ingress and egress and disturbing their peaceful possession. He further stated that under the Building Collaboration Agreement, Ms. Manjula has no right to park her car in the drive way. Complainant also attached his sale deed to prove his ownership of the First Floor. He further stated that they have filed more than 30 complaints against Ms. Manjula for various crimes like wrongful restraint, wrongful confinement, blocking passages, etc., and has requested to take strict legal action against her. Thereafter, on the basis of statement of Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 3 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 PS DEFENCE COLONY SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 17:04:14 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 complainant, present case FIR was registered and the accused was arrested. After completion of investigation, final report in the form of charge sheet under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. for the offences under Sections 341/506 IPC was forwarded to the Court against the accused for trial.
3. After taking cognizance of the offences by the court, the accused was summoned. Pursuant to her appearance, in compliance of Section 207 Cr.P.C., copy of charge sheet was supplied to her. Subsequently, after perusal of the judicial file and hearing the parties, a prima facie case against the accused for commission of offence punishable u/s 341 IPC was found to be made out. Accordingly, on 04.07.2014, formal notice of accusation for commission of offence u/s 341 IPC was served upon the accused, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, the matter was posted for Prosecution Evidence.
4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts, examined the following Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 4 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL PS DEFENCE COLONY NIRMAL 17:04:18 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 witnesses; viz.
i) PW-1 Sh. Anand Prakash (complainant),
ii) PW2 HC Sunil Kumar (police witness),
iii) PW-3 Retd. SI Surender Mohan (IO),
iv) PW-4 HC Pawan (police witness),
v) PW-5 W/HC Mukesh (police witness),
vi) PW-6 Inspector Madhurendra (second IO)
5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts, also relied upon the following documents:
1) complaint of complainant as Ex. PW1/A,
2) seizure memo of vehicle bearing no. HR05T0526 as Ex. PW1/B,
3) site plan as Ex.PW1/C,
4) photographs of vehicle bearing no. HR05T0526 as Ex. P,1, Ex. P-2, Ex. P-3 & Ex. P-4,
5) copy of entry no. 1425 in register no.19 as Ex. PW2/A (OSR),
6)Tehrir as Ex. PW3/A,
7)photographs of the spot as Ex. PW3/B1, B2 & B3 respectively,
8) Copy of receipt showing deposit of vehicle in question as Mark A,
6. In addition to the above-mentioned witnesses, the accused persons also admitted factum of registration of FIR no.34/2012, PS Defence Colony and DD No. 16A dated 17.04.2012 as Ex.A-1 to Ex. A-2 respectively, in terms of Section 294 Cr.P.C. vide order dated Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 5 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL PS DEFENCE COLONY NIRMAL Date: 2025.11.13 17:04:22 +0530 07.08.2025 hence, the said witnesses were dropped on the submissions of Ld. APP for State.
7. After completion of prosecution evidence, statement of accused was recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. wherein all incriminating circumstances led against her during the trial by the prosecution witnesses were put to her, affording her an opportunity to give her explanation, if any. Accused pleaded innocence and claimed that she has been falsely implicated in the present case. However, she opted to lead defence evidence and in her defence evidence, accused examined herself as DW1. She relied upon copy of order dated 29.12.2010, passed by the court of Ms. Neelam Singh, Ld. Vacation Judge, ADJ-06, Saket as Ex. DW1/1, copy of order of court of Sh. Harjyot Singh Bhalla, Ld. Civil Judge-01, South District, Saket as Mark DW1/2, photographs of clinic of accused as Mark DW1/3 Colly, copy of complaint with ACP, Defence Colony as Mark DW1/4. Thereafter, the matter was posted for final arguments.
8. I have heard the Ld. APP for the State and the Ld. counsel Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 6 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 34/2012 NIRMAL 17:04:26 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 PS DEFENCE COLONY for the accused and gone through the case file carefully and minutely. After hearing rival contentions and after appreciation of evidence on file, I am of the considered view that prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubts and the arguments advanced by the ld. APP for the state cannot be accepted for the reasons given below.
9. The accused has been charge sheeted for the commission of offence punishable under Section 341 of IPC. For reference, Section 341 of IPC is hereby reproduced as under:
341.-Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
"Wrongful Restraint" has been defined under Section 339 of IPC. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Section 341 of IPC are that: (1)there was some voluntary obstruction caused;(2) the obstruction was such as to prevent any person from proceeding in any direction; (3)the person obstructed had a right to proceed in that direction.
Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 7 OF 15
STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF
SEEMA Digitally signed by
SEEMA NIRMAL
FIR NO. 34/2012 NIRMAL 17:04:30 +0530
Date: 2025.11.13
PS DEFENCE COLONY
10. Coming back to the facts of the present case, it is the case of the complainant that the accused had restrained his way (ingress and egress) by parking her old, damaged, non working condition car in the way to his apartment. It is an admitted fact (admitted by accused in her cross-examination) that the car in question was owned by the accused.
The complainant Anand Prakash appeared in the witness box as PW-1 and in his cross-examination he has stated that on 04.04.2012 the car was towed in the drive way. However, at the same time he also stated in his cross-examination that he can not tell as to which person had towed the car and parked it inside the drive way and later on he came to know that the car had been towed at the instance of the accused. Meaning thereby, the complainant did not have the occasion to see the person who had towed the car and parked it in the drive way and by his testimony itself it is clear that his testimony is hearsay and as such can not be relied upon. Further, PW-3 SI Surender Mohan clearly admitted in his cross-examination that there is a way to ingress and outgress of the property of property of one person at one time. PW-4 HC Pawan also clearly admitted in his cross-examination that there is a way to ingress and outgress of the property of property of one person Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 8 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 17:04:34 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 PS DEFENCE COLONY at one time. This fact is also admitted by PW-5 W/HC Mukesh in her cross-examination. IO of the present case PW-6 Inspector Madhurendra also stated in his cross-examination that because of the car parking, it would be possible to walk through the area in a normal condition as it is a narrow lane due to car parking. Thus, from the testimony of the complainant as well as official witnesses and the IO it is clear that the passage might have narrowed down due to car parking of the accused but it was not completely blocked so that nobody could pass through the passage and there must have been inconvenience to the complainant but it was not completely shut down.
11. Moreover, in Keki Hormusji Gharda vs Mehervan (2009) 6 SCC 475, it was held that the word 'voluntarily' in section 339 of IPC connotes that obstruction should be direct. The obstruction must be a restriction on normal movement of a person. It should be physical one. But there is no evidence to this effect on the file as discussed above. Further, in Rupan Deol Bajaj vs K.P.S. Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194, it was held that the only allegation relating to the wrongful restraint is that the accused stood in front of the appellant in such a manner that she Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 9 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 17:04:38 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 PS DEFENCE COLONY had to move backward. From such act alone it can not be said that he wrongfully restrained her within the meaning of section 339 of IPC to make him liable under section 341 of IPC. Accordingly, the accused can not be held guilty under Section 341 of IPC.
12. Further, from the above discussion, it is clear that the case of the prosecution solely rests on the testimony of a solitary witness namely Anand Prakash, complainant. There is no other eye witness of the present case. Accordingly, the accused can not be convicted on the sole testimony of the complainant especially when the same suffers from contradictions and inconsistencies as discussed above. Reliance in this regard can be placed on Laxman Chandar Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra (Bombay), 2016 (1) AIR Bom.R (Cri) 751, wherein it has been held as follows:- "15. Except Taibai, there was no other witness to the occurrence. The other witnesses i.e. PW No.1 - Laxman Mane, PW 3 - Kashinath Borse, PW 4 - Bhimabai had not witnessed the incident and the alleged assault. The evidence of Kashinath (PW 3) only shows that he had heard exchange of words between the deceased Lahanu and Chander. Bhimabai (PW4) was declared as hostile and Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 10 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL FIR NO. 34/2012 NIRMAL Date: 2025.11.13 17:04:42 +0530 PS DEFENCE COLONY questions in the nature of cross-examination were permitted to be put to her. However, nothing which would advance the prosecution version could be elicited from her even pursuant to such questioning and she categorically denied having seen the appellant giving a dig by elblow to deceased Lahanu. When the criminal act attributed to the appellant, was sought to be established by the testimony of a solitary witness it was absolutely necessary for the court to arrive at a satisfaction that such solitary witness is 'wholly reliable'. For basing a conviction on the testimony of a solitary witness - without any corroboration - the Court must be satisfied that such witness is 'wholly reliable'. In the instant case, there were a number of infirmities and contradictions in the version of Taibai and these infirmities were noticed and recorded by the learned Sessions Judge himself. Apart from these infirmities and contradictory versions, what cannot be overlooked is that the version of assaulting another by giving him a blow by the elbow, itself is an abnormal happening. Why would the person not give a straight and normal blow, if he wanted to hit another and would instead only give a nudge or dig by elbow, was not considered by the learned Sessions Judge. Somebody intending to Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 11 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 17:04:47 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 PS DEFENCE COLONY cause physical hurt to a person, giving such person only a nudge, is quite unheard of. Thus, this improbability coupled with the other infirmities in the evidence of Taibai, and the absence of any corroboration whatsoever to her claim, should have led the learned Sessions Judge to doubt the assertion of Taibai to the effect that the appellant had hit her husband by the elbow."
13. Further, it is well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. Clear and unimpeachable evidence is necessary to convict a person. This court finds that such evidence is absent in this case. Reliance in this regard can be placed on 'Anil s/o Shamrao Sute & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra 2013(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 541'.
14. No independent witness joined: As per the version of the prosecution/official witnesses, no independent witness was joined in the investigation in spite of availability. So, it creates doubt on the prosecution story. In Jeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 274, the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court has held Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 12 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 17:04:51 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 PS DEFENCE COLONY that:
"5. In the opinion of this Court, this revision should succeed on the short ground that there was a legal infirmity in the investigation. It is the case of the prosecution that HC Lekh Raj received the secret information when he was at a public place. The police party was going on patrol. In these circumstances it was mandatory on the part of the Head Constable to associate the independent witness when he could associate it without any difficulty or inconvenience. There is no cogent evidence why the independent witness has not been associated. In these circumstances, to base the conviction of the petitioner solely relying upon the statements of two police officials would be unfair..."
15. Furthermore, the entire investigation conducted by the IO does not seem to be proper. In his cross-examination IO PW-6 clearly stated that he does not remember whether he had gone through the building collaboration agreement Ex.PW-3/X1. In the considered view of this court, said collaboration agreement was a valuable piece of evidence as in the said agreement it is clearly mentioned that as para no.10 of the said agreement clearly states that the drive way/common/open areas on the ground floor will be used by the Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 13 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL PS DEFENCE COLONY NIRMAL Date: 2025.11.13 17:04:55 +0530 builder and owner or their nominee(s)/transferee(s)/tenants for parking of their cars/vehicles and other uses, to which there will be no objection from either party. Thus, from the plain reading of the said clause it is clear that the accused also had a right to park her vehicle in the said area. The IO has further stated in his cross-examination that it is correct that the complainant was a resident of Singapore and he had not seen by visiting the spot whether the complainant was residing at the first floor at the time of present complaint or thereafter. This fact is also admitted by the complainant that he used to reside at Singapore. Thus, it was incumbent upon the IO to investigate whether the complainant was physically present on the spot at the time of filing of the complaint or not. So, the presence of the complainant on the spot at the time of filing of the complaint is also doubtful. The complainant PW-1 as well as IO PW-6 admitted that there were various previous cases and litigations pending between the complainant and the accused in different courts and as there is every possibility that the present case must have been registered by the complainant as a counterblast of the above said litigation. All of this makes the case of the prosecution doubtful.
Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 14 OF 15
STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF
SEEMA Digitally signed by
SEEMA NIRMAL
FIR NO. 34/2012 NIRMAL 17:04:59 +0530
Date: 2025.11.13
PS DEFENCE COLONY
16. In the light of above discussion and reasons, this Court is of the considered view that evidence led by the prosecution is highly insufficient and is discrepant on the material aspects of this case. It is the bounden duty of the prosecution to prove its case against the accused present in the Court beyond the shadow of reasonable doubts. In the instant case prosecution has failed to prove its case and as such while extending the benefit of doubt to the accused, she is hereby acquitted of the charges leveled against her by the prosecution. Case property, if any, be disposed of as per rules after expiry of period of appeal/revision. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance. SEEMA Digitally signed by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 17:05:07 +0530 Date: 2025.11.13 Announced in the Open (SEEMA NIRMAL) Court on 13.11.2025 JMFC-09/ SED/ Saket Courts, New Delhi/13.11.2025 It is certified by me that this judgment contains 15 pages and each Digitally signed page is personally signed by me. SEEMA by SEEMA NIRMAL NIRMAL 17:05:21 Date: 2025.11.13 +0530 (SEEMA NIRMAL) JMFC-09/ SED/ Saket Courts, New Delhi/13.11.2025 Cr. CASES 91062/2016 PAGE 15 OF 15 STATE Vs. MANJULA KRIPPENDORF FIR NO. 34/2012 PS DEFENCE COLONY