Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Kranti Chaurasia vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 11 December, 2018
(1)
WP-28241-2018
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh
WP-28241-2018
(KRANTI CHOURASIA Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH)
Jabalpur; Dated: 11-12-2018
Mr. D.K. Tirpathi, Advocate for the petitioner.
Heard.
The petitioner is aggrieved by order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-
P/1), whereby appeal of respondent No.2 against the order of Collector is
allowed.
Mr. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No.2 alongwith her candidature for the post of Anganwadi Saheka submitted a certificate of Sarpanch dated 12.06.2016. The said certificate issued by Sarpanch is in relation to certification that respondent No.2 is a deserted woman. He submits that said certificate of desertion cannot be issued by Sarpanch. It can be issued by a Court of competent jurisdiction under the Hindu Marriage Act or under other relevant statute.
I have heard him at length.
The point involved in this case is no more res integra. In 2016 SCC Online MP 3631, [Neelam Gupta vs. State of M.P. and other] the parties were at loggerhead on the question whether petitioner therein was a "deserted woman" under the scheme. This Court opined as under:
"7. Before dealing with rival contentions of the parties, it is apposite to note relevant portion of policy dated 10.7.2007 which reads as under:
"v&2 ¼v½ 'kgjh ,oa lkekU; xzkeh.k {ks=& 1- vuqlwfpr tkfr@vuqlwfpr tutkfr dh efgyk ds fy;s 5 vad 2- xjhch js[kk ds uhps jgus okys ifjokj dh efgyk ds fy, 10 vad 3- fo/kok ifjR;Drk@rykd'kqnk@30 o"kZ ls vf/kd vk;q dh vfookfgr efgyk ds fy, 10 vad"Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Date: 13/12/2018 13:19:28 (2)
WP-28241-2018
8. Admittedly, there is no definition of 'desertion' in the scheme. However, the intention behind aforesaid clause shows that it is a beneficiary provision which gives certain weightage to woman of SC/ST category, woman of a family living below poverty line and widow, deserted and divorced woman. In addition, 10 marks are earmarked for woman of more than 30 years of age. This beneficiary provision is made to give helping hand to the woman candidates of aforesaid categories. As per the intent of this provision, provision needs to be interpreted liberally. Strict principles flowing from Hindu Marriage Act cannot be made applicable in the present case. This is trite that the best interpretation is that which takes care of text and context both. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in 1977 (2) SCC (The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee) held as under:
".... To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul of the Regulation. The judicial key to construction is the composite perception of the deha and the dehi of the provision."
9. The same view is taken in (1987) 1 SCC 424 (Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.) and (2013) 3 SCC 489 (Ajay Maken v. Adesh Kumar Gupta). The judgment of Savitri Pandey (Supra) is arising out of a matrimonial matter. Thus, strict principles of Hindu Marriage Act were applicable in the said case. The said judgment of the court is based as per the statutory provision applicable therein. A conjoint reading of para 8, 9 and 10 makes it clear that Supreme Court has dealt with the question of desertion "for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act". In para 10 of the said judgment, the Apex Court made it clear that aspect of question of desertion was dealt with in relation to a matrimonial matter. This is settled in law that a judgment is a precedent on a point which is actually decided by Supreme Court and not on a point which is logically flowing from it. One additional fact may change the precedential value of the judgment. See (2007) 5 SCC 371 (Commissioner of Customs (Port), Chennai v. Toyota Kirloskar Motor (P) Ltd.), (2003) 2 SCC 111 (Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.) and 2000 (2) MPLJ 491 (FB) (Archana Kumar v. Purendu Prakash Mukherjee). Thus, in my view, the judgment of Savitri Pandey (Supra) cannot be pressed into service in the present case
12. Reverting back to the policy, it is clear that policy is made in order to give benefit to woman of certain categories. The purpose is to provide some employment to deprived, aged, downtrodden woman. Once it is admitted by learned Commissioner that petitioner's husband is not traceable for five-six years as per the scheme, it is sufficient to provide 10 marks to a woman in the head of "desertion". The order impugned is liable to be interfered with because under the Scheme neither any declaration from any competent court is required for desertion nor any competent authority is specified for issuing such certificate. On these counts, the Additional Commissioner could not have disturbed the impugned orders before him. For these cumulative reasons, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand. Inspite of contradictions in duration of desertion in various documents, facts remains, that learned Commissioner has given a specific finding that Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Date: 13/12/2018 13:19:28 (3) WP-28241-2018 petitioner's husband is not traceable since five-six years. In this view of the matter, desertion should be understood in common parlance and not in the teeth of Hindu Marriage Act."
In the light of Neelam Gupta (supra) the contention of Mr. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner needs to be rejected. Since certificate of Sarpanch was filed alongwith the candidature and said certificate was not shown to be fake or illegal, no fault can be found in the impugned order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-P/1). Admission of this petition is declined. Petition is dismissed.
(SUJOY PAUL) JUDGE s@if Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Date: 13/12/2018 13:19:28