Patel vs Gujarat on 17 October, 2011

[Cites 15, Cited by 0]

Gujarat High Court

Patel vs Gujarat on 17 October, 2011

Mr.Dipan A. Desai, learned advocate, waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and with the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the petition is being heard and finally decided.

2. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred with a prayer to issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate direction, quashing and setting aside the decision dated 01.03.2011, taken by the respondent University, whereby the results of the petitioners of all the subjects for the First Semester Examination, have been cancelled, and the petitioners have been debarred from appearing in the next two Summer/Winter examinations, to be held by the University.

3. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are that, the petitioners are students of the First Year, studying in Shri Swaminarayan Pharmacy College ("College" for short). The examinations for all subjects in the Faculty of Pharmacy for the First Semester of academic Year 2010-2011, were held in the month of January 2011. One of the subjects in the Faculty of Pharmacy for the First Semester of Academic Year 2010-2011, was that of Elementary (Remedial) Mathematics, for which the examination was held on 13.01.2011. The petitioners appeared in the said examination on 13.01.2011. According to the petitioners, the petitioners were amongst 45 students appearing in the said examination, who were divided into two Class rooms, one containing 30 students and the other containing 15 students. The petitioners were all sitting in the same room, containing 30 students. It is stated in the petition that the examination was held strictly under the supervision of the Observer deputed by the respondent University, and two Supervisors selected by the Observer in the premises of the College. After the examination, the Answer Sheets were duly sealed in the presence of the Observer and sent to the respondent University. On 14.02.2011, the Incharge Registrar of the respondent University addressed letters to the petitioners asking them to remain present before the Examination Committee of the respondent University, in connection with unfair means cases registered against them, at 1:00 P.M. on 22.02.2011. It was also stated in the said communication that a penalty as contemplated in Circular dated 03.11.2010 of the respondent University, was proposed to be imposed upon the petitioners. The petitioners presented themselves before the Examination Committee of the respondent University on 22.02.2011, and denied having resorted to any sort of corrupt or unfair practices. The petitioners were informed by the College that the respondent University had cancelled the results of all the examinations of the First Semester in the Faculty of Pharmacy. The petitioners were also informed by the College that the respondent University, by decision dated 01.03.2011, had debarred them from appearing for the next two Summer/Winter Examinations, to be held by the said University. The petitioners approached the College authorities, pointing out that they were innocent and have not indulged in any unfair practices during the examination, and requested that the College take up the matter with the respondent University. Letters dated 11.03.2011 and 15.03.2011 were addressed by the College authorities to the Registrar of the respondent University, requesting him to take a lenient view in the matter. However, the Incharge Registrar of the respondent University, vide letter dated 01.04.2011, addressed to the Principal of the College, informed him that the earlier decision taken by the Examination Committee of the respondent University would be maintained. Being aggrieved by the impugned decision communicated to them vide communication dated 01.03.2011, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present petition.

4. Mr.D.C.Dave, learned Senior Advocate with Mr.Jigar M.Patel, learned advocate for the petitioners, has made the following submissions:

(I) That the initiation of action against the petitioners is based solely on the Report of the Examiner which is based on inferences, surmises and conjectures, and no independent inquiry of any sort, by any expert body, has taken place to verify the contents of the said Report.

(II) Referring to the communication dated 01.04.2011, it is submitted that the Incharge Registrar of the University has informed the petitioners that as per the Examiner's Report, answers to Question No.4 (A and B) and Question No.1(c) are found to be the same, therefore, it is a case of mass copying and the petitioners should remain present before the Examination Committee on the stipulated date and time, in order to render their defences. However, the Report of the Examiner was never supplied to the petitioners, therefore, the petitioners were not in a position to make adequate defences before the Examination Committee, as it was not known to them, on what basis the Examiner had inferred that mass copying had taken place and that the petitioners were involved in the same.

(III) That the Observer and Supervisors who were present in the Examination Hall have not made any Report or complaint regarding mass copying having taken place in the Examination Hall where the petitioners were seated. The Examination Committee has acted merely upon the inference arrived at by the Examiner in his Report, without any other corroborating material on record. The Examination Committee ought to have independently verified the Report made by the Examiner in order to arrive at a satisfaction. However, this course of action has not been adopted and the Report of the Examiner has been accepted in toto, straightway, without application of mind.

(IV) It is noteworthy that the decision of the Examination Committee has not been supplied to the petitioners at any point of time. The petitioners are, therefore, at a loss to know what factors have weighed with the Examination Committee while awarding such a harsh punishment. The decision of the Examination Committee has merely been communicated to the petitioners by the Principal of the College by communication dated 01.03.2011, without disclosing the reasons for taking the said decision. As such, the action of the respondent University in this regard is arbitrary.

(V) The Report of the Examiner has come to light only before this Court by way of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent. It indicates that similar mistakes were committed by the petitioners in three questions, on the basis of which an inference has been drawn that the petitioners have indulged in mass copying. The Examiner, by his communication dated 22.02.2011, addressed to the Controller of Examinations, has reiterated his original decision. However, the Examination Committee has not subjected the Report of the Examiner to further scrutiny by any Expert Body, but has accepted the inferences and suspicions raised therein without application of mind, for reasons that remain undisclosed till date.

(VI) Not only has the Report of the Examination Committee not been supplied to the petitioners, the same has never seen the light of day and has been withheld from this Court as well. Though, in paragraph-5 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent-University, it is stated that the petitioners were asked to attempt the questions which had allegedly been copied, before the said Committee, to which the students gave a correct answers. According to the respondent-University this substantiates the case against the petitioners. However, this explanation appears to be an afterthought as it is not known what reason has weighed with the Examination Committee while taking the impugned decision. By not supplying the petitioners the Report of the Examiner and the decision of the Examination Committee, grave violation of the principles of natural justice has occurred. Though this has not been specifically pleaded in the petition, it is a question of law that can be raised at any stage of the pleadings, especially, if it is supported by material on record, as in the present case. The petitioners have been gravely prejudiced as they were not in a position to make an effective and adequate defence due to non-supply of the Report of the Examiner and the decision of the Examination Committee.

(VII) The punishment meted out to the petitioners is extremely harsh and disproportionate. The petitioners have been debarred from appearing in all examinations for a period of two years, which punishment has been rendered as per the Circular issued by the respondent-University. This severe punishment has been inflicted only on the basis of an inference drawn by the Examiner, therefore, it is shockingly disproportionate, as the allegation against the petitioners is that they all have given wrong answers, and a more lenient view ought to have been taken.

(VIII) That the petitioners have not gained any unfair advantage as all the questions alleged to have been copied are wrongly answered. The petitioners have not been permitted to attend classes for the past six months. This, as well as the punishment meted out to them, has resulted in civil consequences, and will have an adverse effect upon their future and careers.

(IX) That the present is a case of no evidence. Not only have the petitioners not been given an adequate opportunity of hearing and have been prejudiced due to non-supply of material record, there is also no semblance of evidence against them, except the Report of the Examiner which is based upon an inference. It is not known to the petitioners on what basis the Examination Committee has arrived at a satisfaction so as to accept the said Report in toto.

On the above grounds, it is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, that as there is a serious violation of the principles of natural justice, the impugned decision may be quashed and set aside, and the petition allowed.

5. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the following judgments:

(i) Siddharth Mohanlal Sharma v. South Gujarat University - 1982 GLH 648

(ii) Prasida Kismatkumar Trivedi v. Principal, Sarvajanik College of Engineering & Technology and another - AIR 2000 Gujarat 244

(iii) Neha Jain v. University of Delhi and Anr. - AIR 2002 Delhi 403

6. The petition is opposed by Mr.Dipan A.Desai, learned advocate for the respondent-University, by making the following submissions:

(A) Though it has been argued at the Bar that the principles of natural justice have been violated, no such averment has been made by the petitioners in the entire petition. On the contrary, it has been mentioned that the petitioners have been informed of the Charge and of the penalty, therefore, the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice is not made out. In any case, denial of the principles of natural justice has to be specifically pleaded and proved, and in the absence of any pleadings to that effect, the petitioners may not be permitted to raise this contention. Alternatively, even if it is found, though not admitted, that the principles of natural justice have been violated, the petitioners would have to show what prejudice has been caused to them, which has not been done, as it is nowhere stated in the petition that they have been prejudiced due to non-supply of the Report of the Examiner. Reliance has been placed upon the following judgments on this point:

(i) State of Karnataka And Another v. Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employees' Association And Others - (2002)3 SCC 302

(ii) City Montessori School v. State of Uttar Pradesh And Others - (2009)14 SCC 253

(iii) Haryana Financial Corporation And Another v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja - (2008)9 SCC 31 (B) Though admittedly, the Examiner's Report was not supplied to the petitioners, however, no demand for the same was made by them. The petitioners have stated that they have not indulged in copying, which means that they were very much aware of the allegations against them, on the basis of which the proceedings were initiated. Though a copy of the actual decision taken by the Examination Committee has not have been supplied to the petitioners, it has been conveyed to them, and they were aware of the same. In any case, the actual decision is not required to be communicated to the petitioners and it is sufficient that they have been informed regarding the same, therefore, the petitioners have not been prejudiced in any manner.

(C) Though the Observer and the Supervisors may not have reported any incident of mass copying, it cannot be presumed that no such event took place.

There may not be direct evidence of copying, but the Examiner has formed an opinion on the basis of indirect evidence, after examining the answer-sheets. This is sufficient for the Examination Committee to take a decision that the petitioners have indulged in mass copying. The opinion of the Examiner has not been formed on the basis of mere presumption, but is based upon probability, as all the petitioners were sitting in the same examination hall, and have given identical, wrong answers, to three questions. The only plausible explanation for this would be that they have copied from each other. With regard to this submission, reliance has been placed on the following judgments:

(i) Union Public Service Commission v. Jagannath Mishra - (2003)9 SCC 237

(ii) Prem Parkash Kaluniya v. The Punjab University And Others - (1973)3 SCC 424

(iii) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary And Higher Secondary Education v. K.S.Gandhi And Others - (1991)2 SCC 716

(iv) Director (Studies), Dr.Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition & Catering Technology, Chandigarh And Others - (2009)1 SCC 59

(v) Dr.J.P.Kulshrestha And Others v. Chancellor, Allahabad University And Others - (1980)3 SCC 418 (D) That cases of malpractice in examinations should be dealt with iron hands, so as to maintain educational standards. The penalty prescribed by the respondent-University cannot be said to be disproportionate, and no leniency can be shown on misplaced sympathy. On the ground of proportionality, the following judgments have been referred to by the learned advocate for the respondent-University:

(i) Charanjit Lamba v. Commanding Officer, Southern Command & Ors. - AIR 2010 SC 2462

(ii) Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board And Another - (2010)6 SCC 614 On the strength of the above submissions, it is submitted that the petition be dismissed.

7. I have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and perused the averments made in the petition and the documents annexed thereto.

8. At this stage, it would be relevant to examine the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent-University, to the effect that it is incumbent upon the petitioners to plead violation of the principles of natural justice, and prove that non-supply of the Report of the Examiner and the decision of the Examination Committee has caused prejudice to them, resulting in miscarriage of justice. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent-University, that the petition contains no pleadings to this effect. On this point, reliance has been placed on Paragraph-21 of the judgment in Haryana Financial Corporation And Another v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja (supra). The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

"21. From the ratio laid down in B.Karunakar it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the inquiry officer's report to the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside."

It would also be relevant to notice the ratio of the said judgment that is encapsulated in Paragraph-44 thereof, as below:

"44. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that though supply of report of the inquiry officer is part and parcel of natural justice and must be furnished to the delinquent employee, failure to do so would not automatically result in quashing or setting aside of the order or the order being declared null and void. For that, the delinquent employee has to show "prejudice". Unless he is able to show that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer has resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, an order of punishment cannot be held to be vitiated. And whether prejudice had been caused to the delinquent employee depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down."

(emphasis supplied)

9. Though it is true that the petitioners have not specifically pleaded in the petition that the principles of natural justice have been violated by not supplying them a copy of the Examiner's Report and the decision of the Examination Committee, and prejudice has been caused to them due to this, however, before this Court, ample submissions on both these points have been made by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, while referring to material on record. The Supreme Court, in Paragraph 21 of Haryana Financial Corporation And Another v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja quoted hereinabove, was referring to the ratio laid down in the case of ECIL v. B.Karunakar - (1993)4 SCC 727 while holding that it is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of the report in question had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. The said observations made in the context of the ratio in the case of ECIL v. B.Karunakar (supra), cannot be taken to mean that a legal submission regarding violation of the principles of natural justice and resultant prejudice caused, cannot be taken into consideration by the Court, as it has not been specifically pleaded in the petition, even though oral submissions in this regard have been made during the course of the hearing. It is a settled position of law that a legal ground can be raised at any time during the proceedings, though it may not be specifically pleaded. In Haryana Financial Corporation And Another v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court in Paragraph-44, that whether prejudice has been caused or not, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down.

10. Submissions regarding violation of the principles of natural justice and prejudice caused to the petitioners have to be substantiated from the material on record, and if the petitioners have been successful in doing so, the Court cannot close its eyes to this aspect, only because there are no pleadings to this effect in the petition. In the view of this Court, a legal submission, such as violation of principles of natural justice, and prejudice caused to the petitioners, can be taken note of by the Court, if it flows from the facts and circumstances of the case and is substantiated by material on record. In the present case, the submissions made in this regard by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners are supported by the record. It is admitted by the learned advocate for the respondent-University that no show cause notices were issued to the petitioners, and the Report of the Examiner was never supplied to them. It is not disputed that the decision of the Examination Committee and reasons in support thereof, has also not been supplied to the petitioners. In such circumstances, violation of principles of natural justice and resultant prejudice caused to the petitioners is writ large and emerges strongly from the record. There is no justifiable reason why this Court cannot, or should not, take note of the said submissions.

11. The Incharge Registrar of the respondent-University has merely communicated to the petitioners to remain present before the Examination Committee, by communication dated 14.02.2011. However, the said communication is not in the form of a show cause notice, asking them to render their explanations regarding the allegations against them. The type of unfair means is stated to be "mass copying" as per the Report of the Examiner, as three questions are found to be answered in the same manner by all the petitioners. It is stated that the petitioners are to remain present before the Examination Committee on the stipulated date and time, in order to render their defences, and if they are found guilty, punishment will be imposed upon them based upon the Circular dated 23.11.2010.

12. As, admittedly, no show cause notice has been issued to the petitioners, they cannot be said to have been in a position to reply effectively to the allegations. What proceedings took place before the Examination Committee is not known, as no record of the same has been supplied to the petitioners. Neither has this Court been apprised of the same. It appears that the petitioners were asked to attempt the questions that have allegedly been copied, before the Examination Committee. From the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent-University, it seems that the petitioners attempted all three questions correctly, whereas their answers to the same questions in the examination paper had been wrong. The petitioners denied having indulged in mass copying. It is pertinent to note that the proceedings that took place before the Examination Committee, the grounds on which the Examination Committee arrived at the final decision and the reasons that weighed with it in upholding the Report of the Examiner, have never seen the light of the day. Not only has the decision of the Examination Committee and the reasons in support of the same not been supplied to the petitioners, this record has also not been produced before this Court. In such circumstances, it is not possible to ascertain how, and for what reasons, the Examination Committee has arrived at its final conclusion regarding infliction of punishment upon the petitioners. Further, it does not transpire from the material on record that the Report of the Examiner was further verified by an Expert Committee. The grounds on which the Examination Committee has arrived at a satisfaction regarding the correctness of the Examiner's Report, are also not on record, as they were not supplied to the petitioners.

13. From the above sequence of events, it does transpire from the record, that the principles of natural justice have been violated. By not supplying the petitioners with the Report of the Examiner and the decision of the Examination Committee, the petitioners have been gravely prejudiced, as they would not have been in a position to put up an adequate defence, in the absence of such crucial material. The decision of the Examination Committee appears to have been reviewed at the request of the Principal of the College, but even the College does not appear to have been supplied with the relevant material. The College had requested the respondent-University to take a lenient view, which request was not acceded to by the University.

14. The Court is conscious of the fact that ordinarily, decisions of educational institutions in educational matters should not be lightly interfered with, by Courts and Tribunals. It is the need of the day that standards of education ought to be maintained, and in order to ensure this end, educational institutions are within their rights to take action, in cases where it is detected that students have indulged in unfair means. However, the action taken by educational institutions is required to conform with settled principles of law and fairness, and should be free from arbitrariness. The principles of natural justice ought to be followed, especially if the action entails civil consequences which is likely to cause prejudice to the petitioners. An opportunity of hearing, means a reasonable and adequate opportunity. Not supplying crucial documents to the petitioners would mean that they have not been granted a reasonable and adequate opportunity of hearing, as they would be unable to make an adequate defence, in absence of the Report of the Examiner. Having been put in a position where they are unable to make an effective defence would certainly cause prejudice to the petitioners, especially in view of the nature of punishment imposed upon them.

15. In Malavkumar Arunbhai Patel v. Sardar University And Others, this Court, after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court, has held as below:

"22. The provisions of Section 23(xxxii) of the Act make it clear that the Syndicate was fully empowered to constitute the "Unfair Means Committee". Therefore, the ground taken by the petitioner that the Committee, being contrary to the Ordinance of the University, had no power to inflict the punishment upon the petitioner and that the proceedings should be declared null and void is not correct and is not accepted.

23. Any action taken by an administrative or quasi judicial authority which entails civil consequences should only be taken after complying with the principles of natural justice. Although the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula, it cannot be disputed that the doctrine of natural justice exists not only to secure justice but also to prevent the miscarriage of justice. It is true that strict rules of evidence do not apply in proceedings such as those which took place in the case of the petitioner before the "Unfair Means Committee". However, even the requirement of preponderance of probabilities has not been adhered to since the impugned Notification dated October 4,2000 as well as the Minutes of the proceedings which led to the passing of the impugned order do not disclose the material which was available with the committee which pointed out the involvement of the petitioner in the incident. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is also not a speaking one and does not disclose the reasons or the grounds on which the decision to permanently debar the petitioner has been taken.

24. In A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 the aim and relevance of the principles of natural justice have been clearly enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in para 20 thereof, which reads as under:

"20.

The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (Audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, D/- 15-7-1968 = (AIR 1969 SC 198) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case."

25. Further in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant, reported in (2001)1 SCC 182, the Supreme Court has held as under in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the reported judgment:

"Since the decision of this Court in Kraipak's case (A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India) one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean? Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge v. Baldwin very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances - who then is a reasonable man - the man on the clapham omnibus? In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds good even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below (SCC p.387,para

8) "8.

The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in H. K. (an infant), In re. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case as 'insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances'. However, even the application of the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Everything will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, L.J observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk:

"The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth."

2. While it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine, the law courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most-accepted methodology of a governmental action."

26. It is now an accepted proposition of law that any statutory body which is entrusted by statute with discretion, must act fairly. It does not matter whether its functions are described as judicial or quasi-judicial on the one hand, or as administrative on the other. Even an administrative order, which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. Although the expression 'civil consequences' has not been defined anywhere, the observation made in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 at para-66 on page 440 is relevant in this context and reads as below:

"What is civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, by passing verbal booby-traps? 'Civil consequences' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties material deprivation and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence"

27. The permanent debarring of the petitioner from appearing in any examinations conducted by the University and from seeking admission in any of the courses to be conducted by the University, no doubt entails serious civil consequences. In these circumstances, the rule of Audi Alteram Partem should have been followed by the respondents. The principle that no man should be condemned unheard and both sides must be heard in order to ensure fairness on the part of the deciding authority or body before passing any order is well known. A person against whom any action is sought to be taken which entails civil consequences must have knowledge about the allegations/ charges/materials against him on the basis of which such a decision is sought to be taken.

28. The Committee such as the "Unfair Means Committee"

constituted by the respondent No.1 can be said to be acting quasi-judicially, although the Statute may not provide, in so many words, that the authority passing the order is required to act judicially. The very nature of rights affected are such that the authority passing the order is, in fact, required to act judicially and in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Fairness in action is a fundamental ingredient of the principles of natural justice wherein justice should not only be done but should also manifestly be seen to be done, in order to ensure that the authority arrives at a just decision which affects the rights of a person."

16. Applying the principles of law enunciated in the above-mentioned judgment to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioners have not been supplied with a copy of the Report of the Examiner before they were asked to appear before the Examination Committee. Mere mention of the conclusion arrived at by the Examiner in the communication dated 14.02.2010 issued to them, directing them to appear before the Examination Committee, is not the same as supplying the entire Report. The said Report has been annexed, for the first time, with the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent-University. It indicates in detail, the reasons for the inference drawn by the Examiner to the effect that there has been mass copying. Had the petitioners been supplied with a copy of the said Report, they may have been in a better position to defend themselves before the Examination Committee. It was incumbent upon the respondent-University to supply a copy of the Report to the petitioners before they appeared before the Examination Committee. Just because no specific demand was made for the same does not absolve the University from its obligation to act fairly. It cannot be ignored that the petitioners are young students, some of them minors, and are not legally trained persons; therefore, merely because no specific demand was made for the Report, which ought to have been given to them in the first place, cannot be permitted to operate to their disadvantage.

17. It is not disputed that the decision of the Examination Committee and the reasons in support thereof have neither been supplied to the petitioners, nor produced before this Court. It is, therefore, not known what weighed with the Examination Committee while upholding the stand taken by the Examiner. Further, there is no material on record indicating that the Report of the Examiner was subjected to further scrutiny by any Body of Experts. This would be necessary in view of the nature of punishment inflicted on the petitioners. As such, it is evident that the principles of natural justice have not been followed by the University and the defences of the petitioners have been materially prejudiced.

18. Lastly, it cannot be denied that the punishment imposed upon the petitioners, debarring them from appearing for examinations in all subjects, for the next two years, entails serious civil consequences. The stricter the punishment, in the view of this Court, the more the need for adhering scrupulously to the principles of natural justice and the rule of Audi Alterem Partem.

It is a settled position of law that even an administrative order which entails civil consequence must be passed consistently with the rules of natural justice. In the present case, the said Rules have not been followed adequately, inasmuch as the opportunity given to the petitioners to appear before the Examination Committee appears to be more of a formality, where no adequate or effective defence could be put up by them.

19. For the aforestated reasons, the petition is partly-allowed. The impugned communication dated 01.03.2011, communicating the punishment imposed upon the petitioners by the respondent-University, is quashed and set aside, as being violative of the principles of natural justice. However, liberty is reserved to the respondent-University to take fresh action, in accordance with law, by following the principles of natural justice and providing the petitioners with all relevant material, including the Report of the Examiner and the actual decision of the Examination Committee, before any further action is taken.

20. It is clarified that, as this Court has interfered only on the grounds of violation of the principles of natural justice, the merits of the case have not been entered into, and for this reason, it is not considered necessary to deal with the other contentions raised by the learned advocates for the respective parties, and the decisions cited at the Bar.

21. It is further clarified that, it is open to the College in which the petitioners are studying to permit the petitioners to attend classes, if thought fit, subject to any further decision that may be taken by the respondent-University.

22. Rule is made absolute, to the above extent. There shall be no orders as to costs.

(Smt. Abhilasha Kumari, J.) (sunil) Top

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Gujarat High Court