Karnataka High Court
Sri B S Chandrashekar vs State By on 3 February, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
-1-
NC: 2026:KHC:6027
CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023
C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 6283 OF 2023
(482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 9309 OF 2024
(482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
IN CRL.P No. 6283/2023
BETWEEN:
SRI. BYREGOWDA N.R
S/O RAMACHANDRAPPA P
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
R/AT NO. 27, NAGADASANAHALLI
RAJANAKUNTE POST,
Digitally
signed by YELAHANKA TALUK
SANJEEVINI J
KARISHETTY BENGALURU - 560 064.
Location:
High Court of ...PETITIONER
Karnataka
(BY SRI. CHOKKAREDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE BY RAJANUKUNTE POLICE STATION
REPT. BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BANGALORE - 560 001
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027
CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023
C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024
HC-KAR
2. SMT. MUNIPOOJAMMA
W/O LATE MOTAYYA
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
R/AT NO. 130, KOGILU VILLAGE,
YELAHANKA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK
BENGALURU - 560 064
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI. NAGARAJ D., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.PC PRAYING TO
QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.151/2023 DATED 12.07.2023 AS
ANNEXURE-A BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT RAJANUKUNTE P.S.,
FOR AN ALLEGED OFFENCE P/U/S 3(1)(f) AND 3(1)(z) OF SC
AND ST (POA) ACT 1989 AND IPC 1860 U/S 406, 420, 465, 468
ON THE COMPLAINT LODGED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
DATED 12.07.2023, PENDING IN 2ND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT
AND SESSIONS COURT, BENGLAURU RURAL DIST., AT
BENGALURU AS ANNEXURE-B.
IN CRL.P NO. 9309/2024
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. B.S. CHANDRASHEKAR
S/O LATE BYRAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
R/AT NO SHAANUBOGANAHALLI (V),
HESARAGHATTA (HOBLI),
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU - 560 203.
...PETITIONER
-3-
NC: 2026:KHC:6027
CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023
C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024
HC-KAR
(BY SRI. CHOKKAREDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE BY RAJANUKUNTE POLICE STATION,
REPT. BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. SMT. MUNIPOOJAMMA
W/O LATE MOOTAYYA,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
R/AT NO 130, KOGILU VILLAGE,
YELAHANKA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU - 560 064.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI. NAGARAJ D., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.PC (FILED U/S
528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN
CR.NO.151/2023 DATED 12.07.2023 AS ANNEXURE-A
REGISTERED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT RAJANUKINTE P.S.
FOR AN ALLEGED OFFENCE P/U/S 3(1)(f) AND 3(1)(z) OF
SC/ST (POA) ACT, 1989 AND IPC SEC.406, 420, 465, 468
ON THE COMPLAINT LODGED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
DATED 12.07.2023, AS ANNEXURE-B PENDING IN 2ND
ADDL.DISTRICT AND SESSION COURT, BENGALURU RURAL
DISTRICT AT BENGALURU BY ALLOWING THE PETITION.
THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027
CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023
C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024
HC-KAR
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners in both these cases are accused Nos.1 and 2 in a solitary crime in Crime No.151/2023 registered on 12.07.2023, for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465 and 468 of the IPC and under Sections 3(1)(f), 3(1)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ('the Atrocities Act' for short).
2. Heard Sri. Chokkareddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri. K. Nageshwarappa, learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri. Nagaraj D., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, in both these cases.
3. Facts adumbrated are as follows:
3.1. Accused No.2 is the General Power of Attorney holder for the 2nd respondent - complainant and their family members. The family of respondent No.2 was granted land for them belonging to scheduled caste, in the year 1994, with a rider of non-alienation for a period of 15 years. Notwithstanding -5- NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR the non-alienation clause, it transpires that the land was sold in the year 2003, which becomes the subject matter of challenge before the Assistant Commissioner, who annuls the sale on the score that it was sold prior to the expiry of the non-alienation as obtaining in the Saguvali Chit. Thus ends the first sale. The non-alienation comes to an end in the year 2009. Then comes the second transaction, in which, the petitioners come into the picture.
3.2. The second respondent then executes a General Power of Attorney with full consideration in an Agreement of Sale to accused No.2, who is the petitioner in the companion petition. Ten years later, on 21.12.2022, an application is filed seeking permission to enter into a Sale Deed with the grantee -
the complainant. The permission is granted on 21.06.2023. The complainant is then allotted a land in Madhugiri to the extent of 34 guntas as against 30 guntas of land, which became the subject matter of the Sale Deed, in terms of what was noticed by the Deputy Commissioner. The complainant then registers a complaint on 12.07.2023, after the sale of the property by the petitioner in the companion petition to one Sri. Chikkanna on 21.06.2023, which becomes a crime in Crime No.151/2023 for -6- NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR the aforesaid offences.
4. Learned counsel, Sri. Chokkareddy, appearing for the petitioners, would take this Court through the documents appended to the petition to demonstrate that the complainant -
grantee appears before the Sub-Registrar, and enters into an Agreement of Sale. All these proceedings are before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner notices every transaction between the parties and observes that land in a particular place in Madhugiri Taluk should be sold in favour of the complainant by the petitioner in the companion petition as a condition precedent for granting permission to enter into a sale with the petitioner in the companion petition by the complainant. Pursuant to this, the petitioner in the companion petition and the complainant have executed a Sale Deed for the said land. These orders are not under challenge, but what comes about is the registration of the impugned crime. He would submit that if further investigation is permitted in the cases at hand, it would become an abuse of the process of the law.
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5. Learned counsel, Sri. Nagaraj D., representing the 2nd respondent - complainant would vehemently refute the submission in contending that the petitioners have forged the thumb impression of the complainant and have sought permission fraudulently at the hands of the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, the ingredients of the offences punishable under sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are clearly met along with the offence of forgery. He would submit that is for the petitioners to come out clean in the investigation or in a full blown trial. Learned counsel further submits that the land which is granted to the petitioner in the companion petition as a condition precedent for granting permission is somewhere in the corners of Madhugiri Town and the land that is now given up is in Yelahanka. Therefore, the 2nd respondent - complainant has been rendered a raw deal and not a fair deal, is his submission.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
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7. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record, they would not require any iteration. The issue springs from a transaction between the parties. The 2nd respondent and her family is a beneficiary of grants from the hands of the State of 30 guntas of land, as noticed in the schedule. The issue relates to the registration of a crime. For the granted land to be sold, permission would be required from the hands of the competent authority. The competent authority is said to have granted permission on 21.06.2023 for the Agreement of Sale that was executed on 30.03.2023. The proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner assume significance in the cases at hand. The Deputy Commissioner draws up proceedings, a few of the paragraphs of the note sheet maintained before the Deputy Commissioner would become necessary to be reproduced. They read as follows:
"ಉಪ ಾ ಾ ಾ ಗಳ , ೆಂಗಳ ರು ಉತರ ಉಪ ಾಗ ರವರ ಪತ ¸ÀA.J¯ï.J£ï®(ªÉÊJ¯ïPÉ)¹Dgï/205/2022-23 ¢:30.01.2023 ºÁUÀÆ vÀºÀ²Ã¯ÁÝgï, AiÀÄ®ºÀAPÀ vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ gÀªÀgÀ ¥ÀvÀæ ¸ÀA.¦n¹J¯ï/¹Dgï/24/22-23 ¢:19.01.2022 gÀ ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß vÀªÀÄä CªÀUÁºÀ£ÉUÉ vÀgÀÄvÁÛ, ¸ÀzÀj ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è AiÀÄ®ºÀAPÀ vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, ºÉ¸ÀgÀÄWÀlÖ ºÉÆç½, ±Áå£ÀĨsÉÆÃUÀ£ÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ ºÀ¼Éà ¸À.£ÀA.14gÀ d«ÄãÀÄ ªÀÄÆ®vÀB ¸ÀPÁðj UÉÆêÀiÁ¼ÀzÀ d«ÄãÁVzÀÄÝ, F ¥ÉÊQ 0-30 UÀÄAmÉ d«ÄãÀÄ J¯ïJ£ïr/DgïAiÀÄĹ/357/1991-92 gÀAvÉ ªÉÆÃlAiÀÄå ©£ï gÀAUÀAiÀÄå gÀªÀjUÉ ªÀÄAdÆgÁVzÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj ªÀÄAdÆgÁwAiÀÄAvÀAiÉÄ ¢:30.12.1994 gÀ°è ¸ÁUÀĪÀ½ aÃnAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤ÃqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. CzÀgÀAvÉ PÉʧgÀºÀzÀ ¥ÀºÀtÂAiÀÄAvÉ JADgï/23/94-95 gÀ°è ¸ÀzÀj ªÀÄAdÆjzÁgÀgÀ ºÉ¸ÀgÀÄ zÁR¯ÁVgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ PÀAqÀħgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.-9-
NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR ºÀ¼Éà ¸À.£ÀA.14 ¥ÉÆÃr zÀÄgÀ¹ÛAiÀiÁV ºÉƸÀ ¸À.£ÀA.111 JAzÀÄ EArÃPÀgÀtUÉÆArzÀÄÝ, CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¥Àj²µÀÖ eÁw (D¢ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ) d£ÁAUÀPÉÌ ¸ÉÃjzÀªÀgÁVgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR ಈ ಮfೆ> Oಾಂಕ:16.06.2023 ರಂದು ತಕFಾರು/ಾರರು ಮ&ೊVi ಈ ಕjೇ ೆ ಮನ ಸ2#3, Oಾಂಕ:29.03.2023 ರಂದು ಸ2#3ರುವ ತಕFಾರು ಅ!4ಯನು7 \ಂಪkೆದು ಸದ lm3ಎn ಾo0ಯ( ಅನುಮ] <ೕಡಲು QಾವR/ೇ ಅಭ>ಂತರ ರುವR ಲ#?ೆಂದು ಮನ ಸ2#3ರು&ಾFೆ.
ಆದ0 ಂದ ಕಂ( ೆ (22) ಮತು (23) ರ2# ವ 3ರುವಂ&ೆ ಸದ ಜ6ೕನನು7 NಾFಾಟ Nಾಡಲು ಅ ಕೃತ dಾಪನ <ೕಡುವ ಬ ೆq ಸೂಕ ಆ/ೇಶ ೋ ಒl9ದ02# 3ದeಪ(3ರುವ ಅ ಕೃತ dಾಪನವನು7 ತಮi ಅನುsೕದOೆ ಾ% ಮಂ(3zÉ."
(Emphasis added) Two factors emerge from the afore-quoted notes obtaining in the note sheet; one is that the land that the complainant was entitled to be received from the hands of the petitioner in the companion petition is already indicated and the other that the complainant before the Deputy Commissioner undertakes that they have no objection to purchase that land or grant permission and permission can be granted is the indication in the order. This order is not challenged. The permission is granted on 21.06.2023 and accused No.2 - the petitioner in the companion petition sells the property to one Sri. Chikkanna on the same day. Immediately springs the subject crime for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465 and 468 of the IPC.
8. Section 406 of the IPC has its ingredients under
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR Section 405 of the IPC and Section 420 has its ingredients under Section 415 of the IPC. It is un-understandable as to how any criminal breach of trust has taken place in the cases at hand against the petitioners or there is luring with dishonest intention to misappropriate the property from the inception of the transaction, as is obtaining under Sections 405 and 415 of the IPC. Therefore, the offence of Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are loosely laid against the petitioners, which would run foul of the law laid down by the Apex Court in a plethora of judgments. I deem it appropriate to quote a few.
8.1. The Apex Court, in the case of PARAMJEET SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH1, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
13. The contents of the FIR as well as the chargesheet would have to be read in light of the ingredients of Section 420 IPC and the law settled by this Court through various judicial dicta. On perusal of FIR No. 11 dated 14.02.2023 and the subsequent proceedings emanating from it, it is noted that the appellants are accused of offences under Section 420 and Section 120B IPC. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under:
"420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1976
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
xxx 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.- (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."
14. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, ("Inder Mohan Goswami") while dealing with Section 420 IPC, this Court observed thus:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducement must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning."
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR
15. In light of facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that the complainant/respondent No. 3 has failed to make out a case that satisfies the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC. We fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellants herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid Section 420 IPC. On a bare perusal of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offence of cheating as defined under Section 420 IPC is made out at all and we do not find that there is any cheating and dishonest inducement to deliver any property of a valuable security involved in the instant case.
16. It is settled law that for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant/respondent No. 3 was required to show that the appellants had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or representation of buying the said 'ruula set fitting'. Such a culpable intention when the promise was made cannot be presumed but has to be supported with cogent facts. In the facts of the present case, there is a clear absence of dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the appellants as regards the sale and purchase agreement. We must hasten to add that there is no allegation in the First Information Report or the chargesheet indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the appellants right from the time of making the promise or misrepresentation.
Nothing has been said on what the misrepresentations were and how the appellants intentionally deceived the complainant/respondent No. 3. Mere vague allegations by the complainant/respondent No. 3 that the appellants failed to provide a product of a particular specification and failed to replace the faulty machines do not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 IPC.
17. At this point, we must hasten to add that the impugned FIR was filed after a delay of nearly five years.
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR The learned counsel for the complainant/respondent No. 3 has not been able to state before us the reason for the delay and this further raises suspicion about the bona fides of the complainant. The delay in lodging of the FIR, coupled with the vague allegations do not inspire the confidence of this Court to allow the criminal proceedings to continue against the appellants. The complainant had an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit claiming damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights but a route through criminal proceedings, when no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted. Criminal law ought not become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas. The appellants, in our view, could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellants are unsustainable.
18. This Court, in the case of Vesa Holdings P. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, had observed and held that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating but the cases of breach of contract would amount to cheating only where there was any deception played at the very inception. It was further observed that for the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or representation. It was further observed that even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out and that the real test is, whether, the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating.
19. Furthermore, in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami, it was held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. It was further held by this Court that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to continue the criminal proceedings against the appellants herein would cause undue harassment to them because, as observed hereinabove, no prima facie case for the offence under Section 420 IPC is made out.
20. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ("Bhajan Lal") with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
21. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial dictum, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellants herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the appellants herein have been made with a mala fide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue.
22. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the observations of this Court in Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680 wherein it was observed that in recent years, the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for the reason that while the complainant has made allegations against the appellants herein and a charge-sheet has also been filed, he has failed to justify the same before this Court. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly the criminal courts."
(Emphasis supplied) 8.2. The Apex Court, in the case of ARSHAD NEYAZ KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND2, has held as follows:
"... ... ...
16. The contents of the complaint as well as the FIR would have to be read in light of the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC and the law settled by this Court through various judicial dicta. On perusal of the complaint dated 29.01.2021, it is noted that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has filed the said complaint invoking Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under:
"406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.-- Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
xxx
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2058
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
xxx 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.-(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."
17. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 ("Inder Mohan Goswami"), while dealing with Section 420 IPC, this Court observed thus:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducement must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning."
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR
18. In light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to make out a case that satisfies the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC. We fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellant herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid section. On a bare perusal of the FIR as well as the complaint, we do not find that the offence of cheating as defined under Section 420 IPC is made out and we do not find that there is any cheating and dishonest inducement to deliver any property or a valuable security involved in the instant case.
19. It is settled law that for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant/respondent No. 2 was required to show that the appellant had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or representation of not fulfilling the agreement for sale of the said property. Such a culpable intention right at the beginning when the promise was made cannot be presumed but has to be made out with cogent facts. In the facts of the present case, there is a clear absence of dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the appellant during the agreement for sale. We must hasten to add that there is no allegation in the FIR or the complaint indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the appellant right from the time of making the promise or misrepresentation. Nothing has been said on what the misrepresentations were and how the appellant intentionally deceived the complainant/respondent No. 2. Mere allegations by the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the appellant failed to execute the agreement for sale and failed to refund the money paid by the complainant/respondent No. 2 does not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 IPC.
20. On perusal of the allegations contained in the complaint, in light of the ingredients of Section 406 IPC,
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR read in the context of Section 405 IPC, do not find that any offence of criminal breach of trust has been made out. It is trite law that every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence unless there is evidence of a manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation of property entrusted to him. In the case of criminal breach of trust, if a person comes into possession of the property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to its own use against the terms of contract, then the question whether such retention is with dishonest intention or not and whether such retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to establish the ingredients essential to constitute an offence under Section 406 IPC. The complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to place any material on record to show us as to how he had entrusted property to the appellant. Furthermore, the complaint also omits to aver as to how the property, so entrusted to the appellant, was dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his own use, thereby committing a breach of trust.
21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.
22. At this point, we must hasten to add that the complaint was filed after a delay of nearly eight years. Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to impress the Court about the reason for the delay and hence this fact further raises a suspicion about the bona fides of the complainant/respondent No. 2. The delay in lodging of the complaint and FIR, coupled with the vague allegations do not inspire any confidence in the Court to allow the criminal proceedings to continue against the appellant. Further, the complainant/respondent No. 2 had an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit claiming damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights which has not been availed but a route through criminal proceedings, when no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted. Criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas. The appellant therefore, in our view, could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellant are unsustainable.
23. Furthermore, in Inder Mohan Goswami, it was held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. It was further held by this Court that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to continue the criminal proceedings against the appellant herein would cause undue harassment to him because as observed hereinabove, no prima facie case for the offence under Sections 406 or 420 IPC is made out.
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR
24. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ("Bhajan Lal") with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
25. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judgment in the light of the facts of this case, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the appellant herein have been made with a mala fide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. In our view, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue.
26. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the observations of this Court in Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680 wherein it was observed that in recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for
- 24 -
NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 2 has made grave allegations against the appellant herein, he has failed to justify the same before this Court. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts."
(Emphasis supplied) If the law laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments is pitted against the facts of the case at hand, what would unmistakably emerge is that the ingredients for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are not brought out in the allegations made against the petitioners.
9. What remains are Sections 465 and 468 of the IPC, which deal with forgery or using the forged documents for benefits. If the document was a product of forgery, the document seeking permission at the hands of the Deputy Commissioner would have been pleaded as a main issue by the complainant in the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner. The complainant does not plead forgery of any
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR thumb impression but accepts that she would take the land at Madhugiri, with no objection to grant permission. If no forgery was pleaded before the Deputy Commissioner, it is surprising as to how forgery can spring before the police while registering the crime. Therefore, the offences under Sections 465 and 468 of the IPC also cannot be laid against these petitioners in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of DEEPAK GABA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH3, wherein the Apex Court, while interpreting Sections 464, 470 and 471 of the IPC, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
21. Section 471IPC [ "471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record.--Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record."] is also not attracted. This Section is applicable when a person fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record, which he knows or has reasons to believe to be a forged document or electronic record.This Court in Mohd. Ibrahim [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929. This Court, in this case, has cautioned that the ratio should not be misunderstood, to record the clarification, which in the present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail and help to Respondent 2 complainant.We respectfully concur with the clarification as well as 3 (2023) 3 SCC 423
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR the ratio explaining Sections 415, 464, etc. IPC.] , has elucidated that the condition precedent of an offence under Section 471IPC is forgery by making a false document or false electronic record or part thereof. Further, to constitute the offence under Section 471IPC, it has to be proven that the document was "forged" in terms of Section 470 [ "470. Forged document.--A false document [or electronic record] made wholly or in part by forgery is designated "a forged document or electronic record"."] , and "false" in terms of Section 464IPC [ "464. Making a false document.--A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record--First.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently--(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature,with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document, electronic record or *[electronic signature] was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or* Substituted for "digital signature" by Act 10 of 2009, Section 51(e) (w.e.f. 27-10- 2009)Secondly.--Who without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; orThirdly.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration."] .
22. Section 470 lays down that a document is "forged" if there is:
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR
(i) fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as genuine; and
(ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part of the person using the document that it is a forged one.
Section 470 defines a "forged document" as a false document made by forgery.
23. As per Section 464IPC, a person is said to have made a "false document":
(i) if he has made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else;
(ii) if he has altered or tampered a document;
or
(iii) if he has obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.
24. Unless the document is false and forged in terms of Sections 464 and 470IPC respectively, the requirement of Section 471IPC would not be met.
25. In the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent 2 complainant, it is submitted that a few bills were faked/forged, as the goods were not ordered. Reference is made to balance of Rs 79,752 shown on 30-3-2013, which was objected to and thereupon as per the complaint itself the demand/bill was withdrawn. This would not make the bill a forged document or false document, in terms of Sections 470 and 464IPC. The complaint was made in the year 2017, four years after the bill/claim had been withdrawn, reflecting no criminal intent. The bill was not fake or forged, and at best it could be stated that it was wrongly raised. Moreover, the pre-summoning evidence is silent with regard to this bill and mens rea on the part of the accused is not shown and established. Same would be the position with regard to the bill/invoice of Rs 53,215 which was as per the complaint, sent directly
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR to Manav Rachna International at Faridabad. The bill/invoice is not doubted as "forged" or "false" within the meaning of Sections 470 and 464IPC. No doubt, Adhunik Colour Solutions is mentioned as the buyer, and Manav Rachna International as the consignee, albeit the invoice was issued by JIPL. Pre- summoning evidence does not help and make out a case predicated on this bill/invoice. In the counter-affidavit filed before us, it is alleged that since this bill was sent to Faridabad, JIPL had added the GST in the invoice. It is argued that had Respondent 2 complainant supplied the goods, instead of GST, VAT as applicable in Delhi would have been levied, as Respondent 2 complainant was based in Delhi. This argument is rather fanciful and does not impress us to justify summoning for the offence under Section 471IPC. Besides, the assertion is not to be found in the complaint, and cannot be predicated on the pre-summoning evidence.
26. For completeness, we must record that the appellants have placed on record the dealership agreement dated 11-4-2012, which, inter alia states that JIPL has a discretion to establish direct contractual relationship with specific customers, if JIPL feels they can be served better. Further, in such a situation, the dealer, if JIPL agrees, can act as an intermediary. Assuming the bill/invoice had wrongly recorded Respondent 2 complainant as the buyer, it is not doubted that Manav Rachna International was the consignee. At best, Respondent 2 complainant would not be liable, had Manav Rachna International failed to pay. Non- payment is also not alleged in the complaint or the pre- summoning evidence. Reliance on objections vide emails dated 4-7-2014 and 21-7-2014 are of no avail, as they are for the period prior to 31-7-2014, when the bill/invoice was raised.
27. It is evident from the pre-summoning evidence led and the assertions made in the criminal complaint that the dispute raised by Respondent 2 complainant primarily pertains to settlement of accounts. The allegations are:
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR
(i) goods supplied by JIPL were not as per the requirements and demands of Respondent 2 complainant,
(ii) goods supplied were different from the order placed, and
(iii) goods lying with, and returned by Respondent 2 complainant have not been accounted for.
These assertions, even if assumed to be correct, would not fulfil the requirements of Section 405IPC, or for that matter Sections 420 or 471. The material on record does not reflect and indicate that JIPL indeed had the dishonest/culpable intention for the commission of the alleged offences under the IPC. Unless the ingredients of aforesaid Sections of the IPC are fulfilled, the offence under Section 120-BIPC, for criminal conspiracy, would not be made. In fact, a combined reading of the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence does not disclose any element of criminal conspiracy as per Section 120-AIPC. The complaint discloses a civil dispute and grievance relating to the claim made by JIPL. What is challenged by Respondent 2 complainant is the demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p raised by JIPL as the amount payable till the year ending 2016. This assertion made by JIPL is questioned as incorrect. The demand, even if assumed to be wrong, would not satisfy the ingredients of Section 405, or Sections 420 or 471IPC, so as to justify the summoning order. As noted above, JIPL had filed a criminal case under Section 138 of the NI Act as two cheques for Rs 1,93,776 and Rs 4,99,610 issued by them, on presentation, were dishonoured on account of "insufficient funds".
28. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the assertions made in the complaint and the pre- summoning evidence led by Respondent 2 complainant fail to establish the conditions and incidence of the penal liability set out under Sections 405, 420 and 471IPC, as the allegations pertain to alleged breach of contractual obligations. Pertinently, this Court, in a number of cases, has noticed attempts
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR made by parties to invoke jurisdiction of criminal courts, by filing vexatious criminal complaints by camouflaging allegations which were ex facie outrageous or pure civil claims. These attempts are not to be entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold. To avoid prolixity, we would only like to refer to the judgment of this Court in Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny [Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 650] , as it refers to earlier case laws in copious detail."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. What remains is the offences alleged under the Atrocities Act. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the offences under the Atrocities Act also cannot be laid, and more so in the light of the fact that on 21.06.2023 when the land was granted and permission was granted to sell, the complainant has entered into two different sale agreements with third parties, notwithstanding the sale agreement and permission granted in favour of the present petitioners. In fact, the fraud is the other way round and not against the petitioners. Be that as it may.
11. While this Court would not enter into what is the conduct of the complainant, the crime that is so registered against the petitioners, is on the face of it, an abuse of the process of the law and permitting any investigation in the cases at hand would result in patent injustice.
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NC: 2026:KHC:6027 CRL.P No. 6283 of 2023 C/W CRL.P No. 9309 of 2024 HC-KAR
12. With the aforesaid observations, the following:
ORDER
(i) The petitions are allowed.
(ii) The crime in Crime No.151/2023 pending before the II Additional District and Sessions Court, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru, qua these petitioners stands quashed.
(iii) The observations made in the course of the order is only for the purpose of consideration of the case of these petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and will not come in the way of any proceeding pending between the parties before any fora, judicial or quasi-
judicial.
SD/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE SJK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 34 CT:BHK