Madhya Pradesh High Court
Julekha Bi vs Dinesh Nirwani on 9 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160
1 SA-1339-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI
SECOND APPEAL No. 1339 of 2024
JULEKHA BI
Versus
DINESH NIRWANI
Appearance:
Shri Harish Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri Dattatray Kale, learned counsel for the respondent.
Heard on : 17.12.2025
Pronounced on : 09.02.2026
ORDER
This appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the appellant/defendant against the concurrent findings rendered by the trial court in Civil Suit No.A/722/2016 in judgment and decree dated 22.07.2023 as affirmed by the first appellate court in Civil Regular Appeal No.11A/2024 vide judgment and decree dated 24.04.2024.
2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are that the respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for eviction on the ground under Section 12 (1) (a) (c) (g) (h) and (f) of The M.P. Accommodation Control Act against the defendant/appellant on 24.11.2016 with respect to tenanted premises situated in Ward No.16 of Municipal Council, Mahidpur having house No.88/9. It was averred in the plaint that the plaintiff/respondent is the owner and title holder of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 2 SA-1339-2024 tenanted premises which he received in family settlement which was later on recorded for acknowledgement vide family settlement deed dated 08.01.2006. Originally his father was owner of the said property and before him his grand father. It was averred in the plaint that in family settlement the plaintiff/respondent received a total area of 20x60 fts. including the suit property. It was averred that in the tenanted premises there are two rooms and one open space which is called Otlaa (in vernacular language). It is covered by a tin shade. The width and length of tenanted premises is 9.6x30 fts. It was averred in the plaint that the tenanted premises was given on rent by the grand father of the plaintiff Late Shri Bhagwan Das Ji in the year 1950 to the father of the defendant/appellant- Late Shri Gani Mohammad and after death of his grand father the tenancy continue by his father Late Shri Hanuman Prasad Ji and after his death on 19.03.2005, the respondent/plaintiff was receiving rent. It was also averred in the plaint that the defendant/appellant is residing in the tenanted premises along with her elder sister Jaina Bai after the death of their father Gani Mohammad. It was further averred in the plaint that the respondent/plaintiff intended to construct a well-furnished market on the suit property for which necessary permissions have been taken from the Municipal Council, Mahidpur. Apart from this, according to family settlement right to passage is required to be given from the property which has come in his share in the family settlement, therefore, he is in bonafide need of the tenanted premises. In addition to this, it was also averred that the appellant/defendant has not paid rent of the said premises from January, 2016. It was also averred that the tenanted premises Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 3 SA-1339-2024 is in dilapidated condition and not in condition for habitation of any person for which the notice was duly given to the defendant/appellant. As such, the suit was pressed on different grounds i.e. bonafide need, default of rent and for its repair as well as demolition and construction of market.
3. The appellant/defendant filed written statement in denial of plaint pleadings, however, the tenancy was admitted. It was admitted in the written statement that the grand father of the plaintiff Late Shri Bhagwan Das Nirwani had given the suit premises to Late Shri Gani Mohammad on a rent of Rs.10 per month. However, it was also stated that Collector is the manager of the temple and Bhagwan Das Ji was the Pujaari of the same, thus, the tenanted premises was not in the title and ownership of the plaintiff. The ground of bonafide need was also denied. It was also denied that the suit property is in dilapidated condition.
4. The trial court after recording evidence concluded that the appellant/defendant failed to lead any evidence so as to establish that the suit property is not in the ownership and title of the plaintiff. The consideration before the trial court was in the form of the document Ex.P1- the family settlement, document Ex.P2- certificate of Municipal Council, Mahidpur and Ex.P-32 which demonstrates the name of grand father of the plaintiff Bhagwan Das. All these documents proved that the plaintiff/respondent is the owner and title holder of the suit property. In para 58 and 59, the trial court recorded specific findings that there is complete absence of any document to even show prima facie that the temple belongs to government and it is not of the ownership of the plaintiff/respondent. The trial court also recorded in Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 4 SA-1339-2024 para 59 that the defendant/appellant admitted in its written statement the tenancy since last 100 years. After such a long time raising doubt on the title of the landlord is not sustainable in absence of any material to the contrary. Apart from this, learned trial court after considering the evidence available on record also concluded that the appellant has not paid the agreed rent. It has also been found that the plaintiff is in the bonafide need of suit property in terms of Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. As such, after recording all these findings the trial court decreed the suit on the ground of Section 12(1) (a) (f) (g) and (c), however, it did not found proved 12(1)
(h). The trial court accordingly passed judgment and decree dated 22.07.2023 thereby directing defendant/appellant to vacate the tenanted premises within two months. Apart from this, arrears of rent were also directed to be paid.
5. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court filed Regular Civil Appeal No.11A/24. Along with the appeal, an application under Section 41 Rule 27 of CPC was also filed by the appellant/defendant before the first appellate court. The first appellate court after considering the record of the trial court passed the impugned judgment and decree on 24.04.2024 thereby not only affirmed all the findings as recorded by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff/respondent, however, even issue with respect to ground under Section 12 (1)(h) was also decided in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. The first appellate court while considering the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27, while deciding the appeal on merits, has recorded in para 10 that in view of the settled position of law in the case of Malyalam Plantations Limited Vs. State of Kerala, AIR Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 5 SA-1339-2024 2011 SC 559, the appellant was not able to prove the circumstances for entertaining the application under Order 41 Rule 27 as the documents which are sought to be placed on record are of the date 21.03.2006 and 16.03.2006 and as they were not produced before the trial court in time and the circumstances under which those could not be placed on record was not explained properly, the said explanation was rejected.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant while criticising the impugned judgment and decree has stressed upon the fact that while recording the findings against the appellant, the trial court as well as first appellate court has ignored the fact that the decree for bonafide need in terms of Section 12
(f) could not have been granted in view of the fact that the plaintiff was not able to prove his title on the suit property. For a decree under 12(1)(f), parties are required to prove its title as the said provision contains words "owner thereof" and as the plaintiff failed to prove that he is the owner of the tenanted premises the decree on the ground of bonafide need could not have been passed. As regards the issue of decree on the ground of Section 12(1)
(c), learned counsel for the appellant submits that the plaintiff was not owner of the suit property as such the defendant/appellant was well within his right to raise issue of title before the Court. As regards the decree on the ground of Section 12(1)(g), learned counsel submits that for a decree under Section 12(1)(g), the Court should have considered the provision of Section 18 thereby protecting the rights of the tenant which has not been done, thus, on this ground also the decree is not sustainable. He further submits that as regards the ground which was found proved by the appellate court by Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 6 SA-1339-2024 reversing the findings of the trial court referring the provision of Section 12(1)(h), the same could not have been done in absence of any cross- objection by the respondent/plaintiff. He thus submits that both the courts below have erred in not considering the pleadings and evidence as raised by the appellant and for this reason both of them are not sustainable. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court rendered in the cases of Dayal Das Vs. Rajendra Prasad Gautam, 2012 (2) M.P.L.J. 460 and Vinay Eknath Lad Vs. Chiu Mao Chen, 2019 (20) SCC 182.
7. Although the Court has heard the arguments on the question of admission of appeal, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has made a short submission that the courts below have given concurrent findings of facts which cannot be re-appreciated under Section 100 and the only question of existence and substantial questions of law has to be examined.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. The present appeal has been filed against the concurrent findings of facts. The trial court granted decree of eviction based on the ground of 12(1)
(a) (c) (g) and (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. The learned trial court on the basis of Ex.P1-family settlement, Ex.P2- certificate issued by the Municipal Council, Mandsaur and Ex.P32-document showing ownership of Bhagwan Das Ji, grand-father of the plaintiff has held that the plaintiff is the title holder and owner of the suit property. Specific findings have been recorded by the trial court in para 58 and 59 in this behalf. It has also been recorded that there are no documents at all to show that the suit property Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 7 SA-1339-2024 belongs to the government and plaintiff is not the owner of the same. The court has also recorded a finding that since last about 100 years, the tenancy has been admitted. This categorically finding of the trial court has been affirmed by the first appellate court in the appeal filed by the appellant. Now, in this appeal under Section 100 this finding of fact cannot be reappreciated as the same are purely findings of fact and on perusal of the record, this Court is satisfied that the same are not perverse to the record.
10. As regards the question of bonafide need in terms of Section 12(1)(f), both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings in this behalf holding that the plaintiff/respondent is the owner of the suit premises and he is in bonafide need of the same. This again is finding of fact. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros., (1998) 6 SCC 748 in para No.8 has held as under:-
"8. That apart, on merits, the only other question relates to the bonafide requirement of the appellant that does not give rise to any substantial question of law. It is entirely a matter to be decided on an appreciation of the evidence. On a perusal of the judgment of the High Court, it is evident that it had interfered with a finding of fact arrived at by the Second Additional District Judge, Giridih in the first appeal on an appreciation of the evidence. The High Court made an attempt to reappreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that the appellant failed to prove his bona fide requirement. In fact, after a scanty discussion of the evidence, the High Court observed, "in this view of the matter I find and hold that the plaintiff miserably failed on factual aspect also to prove his bona fide necessity". The High Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction in appreciating the evidence on record."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ragavendra Kumar Vss Firm Prem Machinery & Company, AIR 2000 SC 534, in para 9 and 10 has held Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 8 SA-1339-2024 as under:-
"9. The only question to be decided in the suit was whether plaintiff-landlord wanted the suit premises for the bona fide requirement. The bona fide requirement of the landlord does not give rise to any substantial question of law and it has to be decided on the appreciation of evidence. This view was also expressed by this Court in Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. & Anr., JT (1998) 5 SC 540: (1998 AIR SCW 2781: AIR 1998 SC 2730).
10. The learned Single Judge of the High Court while formulating first substantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff-landlord admitted that there were number of plots, shops and houses in his possession. We have been taken through the judgments of the courts below and we do not find any such admission. It is true that the plaintiff-landlord in his evidence stated that there were number of other shops and houses belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
11. It is thus clear that if the findings of fact have been recorded by the trial court and by the first appellate court then the same cannot be interfered with by reappreciation of evidence and as found by this Court on perusal of record there is no perversity in these findings. As such, in an appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC the cannot be interfered with. As regard the ground taken by the appellant that while deciding the issue of Section 12 (1)
(g), the Court has not considered the issue of protection under Section 18 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. Suffice it to say that the decree has not only been granted by the trial court under Section 12 (1)(g) but it was Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 9 SA-1339-2024 also under Section 12(1)(f). As such once bonafide need of the plaintiff is established and it held that he is in need of the suit premises for his bonafide need then there arises no question of protection under Section 18 of the Act. The some what similar question was considered by this Court in the case of T.R. Sah Vs. Smt. Kundan Kaur and Others .,2006 (1) MPLJ, 41 wherein the Court held that the landlord after pleading his bonafide requirement for himself and his family, if stated that the premises are in a damaged condition and requires repairs then the same is not an independent ground but a part of the ground under Clause (e) i.e. for bonafide need and if a decree is given by concurrent findings on the ground of bonafide need then no interference is called for on the ground of providing any protection under Section 18 of the Act.
12. Apart from above it has also to be seen that in the WS, the appellant/defendant clearly admitted his tenancy to the grand father of the appellant and also the fact that it continued thereafter. It is settled position of law that in an eviction suit ownership is not required to be proved like a title suit. The plaintiff has sufficiently shown his better title on the suit property in comparison to the appellant. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375 has held in para 10 as under:
"10. While seeking an ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement under clause (f) abovesaid the landlord is required to allege and prove not only that he is a "landlord" but also that he is the "owner" of the premises. The definitions of "landlord" and "tenant" as given in clauses (b) and ( i) of Section 2 of the Act make it clear that under the Act the concept of landlordship is different from that of ownership. A person may be a "landlord" though not an "owner" of the premises. The factor determinative of landlordship is the factum of Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 10 SA-1339-2024 his receiving or his entitlement to receive the rent of any accommodation. Such receiving or right to receive the rent may be on the own account of the landlord or on account of or for the benefit of any other person. A trustee, a guardian and a receiver are also included in the definition of landlord. Such landlord would be entitled to seek an eviction of the tenant on one or more of such grounds falling within the ambit of Section 12(1) of the Act which do not require the landlord to be an owner also so as to be entitled to successfully maintain a claim for eviction. Clause (f) contemplates a claim for eviction being maintained by an owner-landlord and not a landlord merely. Though of course, we may hasten to add, that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. In M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma [(1981) 3 SCC 36] it was held that an "owner-landlord" who can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. In Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra [1988 Supp SCC 710] this Court held that it was essential to sustain a claim of eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act to establish that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises. However, the Court upheld the ownership of the landlord having been proved on the basis of an admission of the ownership of the plaintiff made by the defendant in reply to the notice given before the institution of the suit and the recital of the name of the plaintiff as the owner of the property contained in the receipts issued by the landlord Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 11 SA-1339-2024 to the tenant over a period of time. Thus, the burden of proving ownership in a suit between landlord and tenant where the landlord- tenant relationship is either admitted or proved is not so heavy as in a title suit and lesser quantum of proof may suffice than what would be needed in a suit based on title against a person setting up a contending title while disputing the title of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, pleading and proving ownership, in the sense as it carries in rent control law, is one of the ingredients of the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act."
13. This issue was considered by this Court in the case of Asif Ali v. Rahandomal, 1985 SCC OnLine MP 14. The Court held in para 12, 13 and 14 as under:
"Thus, whether the words used in the relevant Clauses relating to eviction of tenants on the ground of bona-fide requirement of the landlord were 'if he is the owner thereof' as was the position in the M.P. Act or they were 'in this clause the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to In Clause (d) of Section 2' as was the position in the Bihar Act, it is clear from the abovesaid observations of the Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim's case (supra) that the basic idea behind using the said words was to make it clear in view of very wide definition of the word 'landlord' contained in the rent Acts that right to evict a tenant on the ground o f bona-fide requirement would be available only to such landlord who was receiving or was entitled to receive rent on his own account i.e. the person who in the event of reversion of tenancy of the tenant bad the right to occupy the accommodation in his own right. While using the words in the abovesaid Clauses it was not intended that the person concerned i.e. the landlord must necessarily be the 'absolute owner' of the plot of land on which the accommodation stood.
In the above connection, it may be pointed out that a similar need to resolve the language of the Clause relating to eviction of tenants in the light of widely worded definition of the word 'landlord' used in the definition Clause had arisen before a Division Bench of this Court in Mohammad Nurul Huda v. Kikabhoy [AIR 1953 Nag 251.] under the Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 12 SA-1339-2024 old C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The word 'landlord' was defined in Clause 2(4) of the said Order. The Clause relating to eviction of tenants was Clause 13(1). It is tree that the words 'if he is the owner thereof' were not used in Clause 13(1). But, then it is interesting to note how even in the absence of the said words it became necessary for the Court to proceed to interpret the two provisions in a, reasonable way. In the said regard, the relevant observations of the Division Bench were as follows "It is, no doubt, true that the word 'landlord' as defined in clause 2(4), Rent Control Order, would include a person like the petitioner 'who manages the property of some one else and collects rent thereof. In our opinion, however, the tern 'landlord' as used in Clause 13(1) cannot be given such an extended meaning and that that term must mean only a lesser or a person in whom the reversion of the lease has actually vested If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted and the word 'landlord' given the meaning accorded to it by the definition, then it would also be open to the agent of the landlord to set out his own need for terminating the tenancy of the tenant. Quite clearly, that is not the object of the clause at all. The needs in the Sub-clause are necessarily the needs of the lesser or someone else who is dependent upon the lesser and not those of the agent."
In the opinion of this Court, from the abovesaid discussion it is clear that the words 'if he is the owner thereof' as used in Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 do not mean that apart from being a landlord the plaintiff seeking eviction of his tanant under the said Clauses must necessarily be the 'absolute owner' of the accommodation or of the land on which the accommodation stands. It may be that the absolute ownership of the accommodation or of the land on which the accommodation stands vests in another person and the plaintiff himself is only a tenant of the said person. It may be that the person having absolute ownership may be in a position to disposes the plaintiff on the basis of his title or on the basis of any breach of the lease. Yet, as against the defendant i.e. his tenant, the plaintiff remains the 'owner' in Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 13 SA-1339-2024 case he is receiving or entitled to receive rent from the defendant on his own account i.e. in case be is the person who in the event of reversion of tenancy of the defendant has the right to occupy the accommodation in his own right."
It is thus clear that for bonafide need absolute ownership is not required to be established. The requirement is that only a better title is to be shown, which in the present case the plaintiff has sufficiently shown. Thus no infirmity found in this regard in the impugned judgments.
14. As regards the the decree on the ground of nuisance in terms of Section 12 (1)(c), the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Keshar Bai Vs. Chhunulal, 2014 (11) SCC 438 in para 14 has held as under:-
"14. There is a specific reference to the registered document under which the appellant purchased the suit building from the earlier landlord in the plaint. Yet, in the written statement the respondent denied the title of the appellant. We notice that there are several documents on record relating to the ownership of the appellant, apart from the registered sale deed, such as municipal tax receipts, ration card etc. Yet, the respondent refused to acknowledge the appellant's title. He denied it in his evidence. This is not a simple case of denial of derivative title by a person who did not know about the purchase of the building by the landlord. Even after going through the relevant documents relating to the appellant's title the respondent feigned ignorance about it. The High Court has accepted that in his cross-examination the respondent has stated that he was not accepting the appellant as his landlady. The High Court has, however, gone on to say that by this piece of evidence no decree of eviction can be passed against the respondent under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act because the respondent will have no occasion to establish in what circumstances he denied the title of the appellant. The High Court has further held that the respondent was within permissible limit in asking the appellant to produce documentary evidence about his title as a landlord. The High Court, in our opinion, fell into a grave error in drawing such a conclusion. Even denial of a landlord's title in the written statement can provide a ground for eviction of a Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 14 SA-1339-2024 tenant. It is also settled position in law that it is not necessary that the denial of title by the landlord should be anterior to the institution of eviction proceedings. This is so stated by this Court in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishnarao(deceased) by LRs."
15. As such once, tenancy was admitted and title was denied then burden was very upon the appellant/defendant to prove such pleadings. However, he fails to lead any evidence whatsoever so as to establish that the respondent/plaintiff is not having title of the suit premises. Particularly, considering that in the written statement it has categorically been admitted that grand father of the plaintiff had given suit premises to the father of the defendant on rent of Rs.10 per month, this Court does not find any perversity with the findings of both the Courts in the impugned judgment and decree.
16. As regards the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in the case of Dayal Das (supra), in the said case the facts are distinguishable from the facts of the present case because in the present case tenancy has been specifically admitted and the title has been proved by the plaintiff by leading evidence which was considered by the trial court in para 58 and 59 particularly Ex.P-1, Ex.P-2 and Ex.P-32. Similarly, the case of Vinay Eknath (supra) would also not come to rescue the appellant/defendant as in the present case, the ownership has been proved by the plaintiff/respondent which the appellant failed to rebut by leading any cogent evidence. Even if the documents filed before the first appellate court along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 are seen then also it will come to the fore that in the said documents it is mentioned that the name of the Collector is deleted as manager which goes to show that even the said document has not established that the government is the owner of the suit Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4160 15 SA-1339-2024 property.
17. As such, in the considered opinion of this Court, there are no substantial questions of law involved in the present appeal and there is no perversity in the findings recorded by both the courts. Hence, the admission to the appeal is declined. Consequently, the same is dismissed. However, considering the fact that the appellant is in tenancy for a substantial long period, she is provided a period of two months from today to evict the suit premises and handover the possession of the same to the respondent/plaintiff.
(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI) JUDGE N.R. Signature Not Verified Signed by: NARENDRA KUMAR RAIPURIA Signing time: 2/10/2026 6:56:15 PM