Allahabad High Court
Ayodhya Prasad vs State Of U.P. on 6 April, 2026
Author: Manish Mathur
Bench: Manish Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:23863
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1043 of 2004
Ayodhya Prasad
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Visay Pratap, Hari Pal Singh, Huzoor Alam Alvi, Karunesh Singh, Manoj Gupta, Shiv Shankar Mishra, Shivanshi Mishra, Sudhaker Prakash
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Govt.Advocate
Court No. - 12
HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.
1. Heard Mr. Shiv Shankar Mishra, learned counsel for appellant and learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent/State.
2. Criminal Appeal has been filed against judgment and order dated 16.04.2004 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.17, Lucknow in Sessions Trial No. 488/01 (State of U.P. v. Ayodhya Prasad and others) arising out of Case Crime No. of 291 of 1995 under Section 302 IPC, Police Station Malihabad, Lucknow convicting and sentencing appellant under Section 306 I.P.C. to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of fine, he shall undergo three months additional imprisonment.
3. As per prosecution version, appellant was married to the sister of complainant but was harassed on account of the fact that she was unable to conceive despite six years of marriage having passed. Allegation levelled was that due to aforesaid fact, she suffered continuous harassment to such an extent that she was compelled to commit suicide.
4. After lodging of F.I.R. No. 291 of 1995 under Section 302 IPC, investigation ensued resulting in filing of charge-sheet under Section 306 I.P.C. The charge-sheet omitted Section 302 IPC and therefore, charges were framed only under Section 306 IPC ignoring the provisions of Sections 302 and 304-B IPC.
5. After leading of prosecution and defence witnesses, impugned judgment has been passed convicting appellant under Section 306 IPC.
6. Learned counsel for appellant submits that for purposes of applicability or conviction under Section 306 IPC, it was imperative for Trial Court to have recorded satisfaction with regard to applicability of Section 107 IPC read with Section 108 IPC in order to ascertain the fact whether appellant was an abettor in the suicide. It is submitted that a perusal of impugned judgment will make it evident that no such satisfaction having been recorded, conviction under Section 306 IPC has been erroneously recorded. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2017(1) JIC Reports 120 (SC).
7. Learned Additional Government Advocate has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for appellant with submission that statements of complainant as PW1 and other family members as PW2, PW3 and PW4 have corroborated the aspect of harassment of deceased at the instance of appellant to such an extent that she was compelled to commit suicide. It is submitted that continuous harassment amounted to cruelty and therefore presumption under Section 113-A Evidence Act has been rightly drawn against appellant.
8. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, applicability of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC requires examination. The aforesaid provisions are as follows:-
"306. Abetment of suicide. ? If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." 107. Abetment of a thing. ? A person abets the doing of a thing, who ? First ? Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly ? Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly ? Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1 ? A person, who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that doing.
Explanation 2 ? Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
9. Section 306 IPC pertains to abetment of suicide stipulating that if any person commits suicide, the person who abets commission of such suicide would be punished with imprisonment in the manner indicated.
10. Section 107 IPC pertains to abetment and indicates that a person who instigates any person to do that thing or intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission, abets doing of such a thing and would therefore an abettor as per Section 108 I.P.C.
11. In view of aforesaid definitions, the aspect which could bring a person within the scope of an abettor would be that such a person instigates any other person to do a particular thing. The said aspect would also include an act or omission to do an act which would result in the commission of a particular thing, as in the present case, suicide by the deceased.
12. For applicability of Section 306 read with Section 107 I.P.C. therefore it would be essential for the trial court to record a finding that the accused has instigated the deceased to commit the offence such as suicide by a particular act or omission which has resulted in suicide particularly if that the accused was aware and had knowledge that by such act or omission, suicide would result.
13. The said aspect has also been considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Shenbagavalli v. Inspector of Police, Kancheepuram reported in AIR OnLine 2025 SC 495 in the following manner:-
"15. Section 306 requires a person having committed suicide as a first requirement but for abetment of such commission, which is essential, the ingredients must be found in Section 107 IPC. The requirement of abetment under Section 107 IPC is instigation, secondly engagement by himself or with other person in any conspiracy for doing such thing or act or a legal omission in pursuance to that conspiracy and thirdly intentionally aids by any act or an illegal omission of doing that thing. In large number of judgments of this Court it stands established that the essential ingredients of the offense under Section 306 IPC are (i) the abetment; (ii) intention of the accused to aid and instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. Merely because the act of an accused is highly insulting to the deceased by using abusive language would not by itself constitute abetment of suicide. There should be evidence suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. (M. Arjunan V. State represented by its inspector of Police; (2019) 3 SCC 315)" (emphasis supplied)
14. The judgment has also placed reliance on judgment rendered in Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2019 Supreme Court 4570 to hold that for the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. The said aspect has also been considered in the case of Gurcharan Singh (supra) in the following manner:
"14. The definition quoted above makes it clear that whenever a person instigates or intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission, the doing of a thing, a person can be said to have abetted in doing that thing.
15. As in all crimes, mens rea has to be established. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Sec 107 of the IPC, the State of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove mens rea, there has to be something on record to establish or show that the appellant herein had a guilty mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the deceased. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. However, what transpires in the present matter is that both the Trial Court as well as the High Court never examined whether appellant had the mens rea for the crime, he is held to have committed. The conviction of Appellant by the Trial Court as well as the High Court on the theory that the woman with two young kids might have committed suicide, possibly because of the harassment faced by her in the matrimonial house, is not at all borne out by the evidence in the case. Testimonies of the PWs do not show that the wife was unhappy because of the appellant and she was forced to take such a step on his account."
15. In the considered opinion of this Court, the impugned judgment does not advert at all to provisions or applicability of Section 306 read with Section 107 I.P.C. indicating any proximate cause at the behest of appellant which would deem that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. No specific act or omission on the part of appellant which was proximate to the suicide has been recorded in the impugned order which has convicted the appellant only on the general ground of continuous harassment for the period of five years of marriage and suspicion cast upon him due to his absence subsequent to the death of deceased.
16. As indicated here-in-above, in the case of Shenagavalli (supra), for applicability of Section 306 read with Section 107 I.P.C., there has to be evidence suggesting that the accused intended by his act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide and merely because the act of insulting the deceased by abusive language would not constitute abetment of suicide. Similarly in the case of Gurcharan Singh (supra) also the aspect of mens rea is required to be established to determine culpability under Section 306 read with Section 107 I.P.C and that the appellant had a guilty mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abeted the suicide. Ingredients of mens rea cannot be assumed but has to be visible and conspicuous, which cannot be only because of verbal abuse of the deceased.
17. In Naresh Kumar versus State of Haryana reported in (2024)3 SCC 573, it has been held that for applicability of Section 306 read with Section 107 I.P.C., twin conditions of foreseeing the consequences of the act and its desirability to let it happen are the twin conditions required. The relevant paragraph is as follows:
"23. Had there been any clinching evidence of incessant harassment on account of which the wife was left with no other option but to put an end to her life, it could have been said that the accused intended the consequences of his act, namely, suicide. A person intends a consequence when he: (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue, and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind (a "subjective" test)."
18. In Prakash v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3835, the following has been held:
"14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well-established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide.
15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide."
19. The said aspect has also been considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Abhinav Mohan Delkar versus State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC Online 1725 in the following manner:
"22. What comes out essentially from the various decisions herein before cited is that, even if there is allegation of constant harassment, continued over a long period; to bring in the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107, still there has to be a proximate prior act to clearly find that the suicide was the direct consequence of such continuous harassment, the last proximate incident having finally driven the subject to the extreme act of taking one's life. Figuratively, 'the straw that broke the camel's back'; that final event, in a series, that occasioned a larger, sudden impact resulting in the unpredictable act of suicide. What drove the victim to that extreme act, often depends on individual predilections; but whether it is goaded, definitively and demonstrably, by a particular act of another, is the test to find mens rea. Merely because the victim was continuously harassed and at one point, he or she succumbed to the extreme act of taking his life cannot by itself result in finding a positive instigation constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely by what goes on in the mind of the victim."
20. It therefore transpires that for applicability of Section 306 read with Section 107 I.P.C. there has to be proximate prior act indicating mens rea and involving a mental process of instigating the other person to do the particular thing such as the commission of suicide which will attract the offence of abetment.
21. In such circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the aspect of appellants abatement in the suicide of deceased particularly since the aspect of mens rea has also not been proved or adverted to in the impugned judgment.
22. In Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2014 Supreme Court 1782, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also adverted to Section 113 A of the Evidence Act regarding presumption as to abatement of suicide by a married women and has held as follows:
"26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The term "the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband" would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry demand, nor would the reasoning adopted by the courts below would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to fall under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257: (AIR 2004 SC 2790: 2004 AIR SCW 1283), wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A etc. and held that, unlike Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty. Even though those facts are established, the Court is not bound to presume that suicide has been abetted by her husband, Section 113-A, therefore, gives discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word 'cruelty' in Section 498-A IPC."
23. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present facts circumstances, although the said presumption particularly pertains to any allegation under Section 498-A I.P.C. but would also be applicable only in case of aspects of presumption including a demand for dowry.
24. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgments in the present facts and circumstances, therefore, the aspect of harassment of deceased at the instance of appellant to such an extent and to such proximity of the event that it left with the deceased no other option but to commit suicide requires to be examined.
25. The impugned judgment for purposes of recording conviction under Section 306 IPC has placed reliance on the deposition of PW1-Keshana and PW2-Rameshwar. The statement of PW1-Keshana in her examination-in-chief has stated that marriage took place six years prior to the incident and was the second marriage of deceased. She also stated that the deceased had one son from her previous marriage and has stated with regard to harassment of the deceased at the instance of appellant on account of the fact that she was unable to conceive. PW1-Keshana has also deposed to the fact that death has occurred within a period of seven years from the date of marriage. She also stated that it is on account of such harassment of the deceased that she was compelled to commit suicide.
26. The statement of PW2-Rameshwar has also been indicated by Trial Court in the impugned judgment corroborating the aforesaid aspects of harassment of the deceased on account of her not able to conceive. It is therefore on the basis of the aforesaid statements of PW1-Keshana and PW2-Rameshwar that Trial Court recorded the fact that deceased suffered humiliation and harassment at the instance of appellant due to her inability to conceive. The Trial Court has also recorded a finding that the deceased had two children from her previous marriage but both of them passed away during subsistence of her second marriage. The Trial Court has thereafter resorted to provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act to record a finding that since harassment occurred within a period of seven years from the date of marriage leading to suicide of the deceased, provisions of Section 306 IPC were made out.
27. However, from perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is also evident that despite the fact that deceased is said to have been burnt to death by pouring kerosene, provisions of neither Section 302 IPC nor 304-B IPC have been invoked and conviction has been recorded only on account of Section 306 IPC.
28. In the present facts and circumstances, the statements of PW1-Keshana and PW2-Rameshwar only indicate general accusation of appellant being the source of harassment of the deceased resulting in her death within a period of seven years from marriage. There is no specific incident of harassment indicated at the instance of appellant either by PW1-Keshana or PW2-Rameshwar. The proximity of such harassment which has led to suicide has not been established by either of the witnesses.
29. The Trial Court while noticing the fact that deceased had two children from her prior marriage with both of them passing away during subsistence of second marriage has not addressed, the impact of such an event in the suicide of deceased.
30. In view of discussion made here-in-above, it being evident that provisions of Section 306 IPC read with 107 IPC have not been clearly established beyond reasonable doubt, in the considered opinion of this Court, Trial Court erred in recording a conviction of appellant under the aforesaid provisions.
31. In view of above, the impugned judgment and order dated 16.04.2004 pertaining to conviction and sentence of appellant is therefore set aside. Appellant stands acquitted under Section 306 I.P.C.
32. The appeal therefore stands allowed.
33. Since the appellant is in jail, he shall be released forthwith unless wanted in any other case. The bail bonds are cancelled and sureties discharged.
34. Appellant is directed to file personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Court concerned in compliance of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, corresponding to Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.
35. Let a copy of this judgment and original be transmitted to Trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.
(Manish Mathur,J.) April 6, 2026 lakshman