Legal Document View

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

- Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc - ...
Upgrade to Premium
[Cites 19, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Sri Sathya Sai Loka Seva Trust vs Sri Sathya Sai Central Trust on 19 April, 2022

                          1


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

      DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF APRIL, 2022

                       BEFORE

           THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.NATARAJ

            R.S.A. NO.140 OF 2019 (DEC)

BETWEEN:

1.   SRI SATHYA SAI LOKA SEVA TRUST,
     A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST
     HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
     SATHYA SAI GRAMA
     MUDDENAHALLI,
     CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUKA-562101
     AND DISTRICT,
     REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.

2.   SRI. B.N. NARASIMHAMURTHY,
     AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS,
     SON OF B.N. NARASIMHAIAH
     AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
     R/AT SATHYA SAI GRAMA,
     MUDDENAHALLI,
     CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUKA
     AND DISTRICT-562101.

     LATE SRI M ISHWARA BHAT
     SON OF LATE M ISHWARA BHAT
     HE IS DECEASED AND HIS NAME IS NOMINALLY
     SHOWN IN THE MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL.

3.   SRI. K. SANJIVA SHETTY
     AGED ABOUT 89 YEARS,
     SON OF K. KANTAPPASHETTY
     PRESENTLY RESIDING AT
     SATHYA SAI GRAMA, MUDDENAHALLI,
     CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUKA
     AND DISTRICT-562101.
                             2


4.     SRI. B. NARAYANA RAO
       AGED ABOUT 91 YEARS,
       SON OF LATE K. VASUDEV RAO
       AT SATHYA SAI GRAMA
       MUDDENAHALLI,
       CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUKA
       AND DISTRICT-562101.

5.     SRI. K. VASANTRAJ
       AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS,
       SON OF LATE K. NARAYANA BHAT
       AT SATHYA SAI GRAMA
       MUDDENAHALLI,
       CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUKA
       AND DISTRICT-562101.

6.     SRI. MAHENDRA S HEGDE
       AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS,
       SON OF LATE SRIPAD S HEGDE
       AT SATHYA SAI GRAMA
       MUDDENAHALLI,
       CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUKA
       AND DISTRICT-562101.
                                         ...APPELLANTS

(BY SRI. SUSHEEL KUMAR JAIN, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W
  SMT. REVATHY ADINATH NARDE, ADVOCATE (THROUGH VC))

AND:

1.     SRI SATHYA SAI CENTRAL TRUST,
       A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST
       HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
       PRASHANTI NILAYAM-515134,
       PUTTAPARTHY,
       ANANTHAPURA DISTRICT,
       ANDHRA PRADESH-515134.
       REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY

2.     SRI. T.K. BHAGAWAT
       SON OF T.R. BHAGAWAT
       AGED ABOUT 81 YEARS,
       R/O NO.4072, PADMA, 30TH CROSS,
                           3


     BANASHANKARI II STAGE,
     BENGALURU-560070.

     SRI. V. SRINIVASAN
     AGED ABOUT 78 YEARS,
     SON OF M.R. VENKATARAMAN
     SRINIDHI, NO.3,
     SATHYANARAYANA AVENUE,
     R.A. PURAM, CHENNAI-600028
     (SINCE DECEASED HIS NAME SHOWN NOMINALLY)

3.   SRI. K. CHAKRAVARTHY,
     IAS (RETD)
     SON OF LATE R. KRISHNAMACHARI
     AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
     SOUTH 5, B-2,
     PRASHANTI NILAYAM
     PUTTAPARTHY
     ANANTPURA DISTRICT
     ANDHRA PRACDESH-515134

4.   SRI JUSTICE A.P. MISHRA
     SON OF LATE KANHAIYA LAL MISRA
     AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
     R/O NO.27, PARK ROAD,
     ALLAHABAD, UP-211002

5.   SRI. VIJAYA L KELKAR
     AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
     SON OF LATE LAXMAN VISHNU
     R/O A 701, BLOSSOM BOULEVARD
     SOUTH MAIN ROAD,
     KOREGAON PARK
     PUNE-411001

6.   SRI. S.S. NAGANANDA
     AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
     SON OF S.G. SUNDARASWAMY
     NO.50, NAMAN, 2ND CROSS,
     ACHAIAH CHETTY LAYOUT
     R.M.V. EXTENSION
     BENGALURU-560080.
                            4


7.   SRI. R.J. RATNAKAR
     AGED 45 YEARS,
     SON OF LATE R.V. JANAKIRAMAIAH
     SIVALAYAM STREET
     PUTTAPARTHY
     ANANTAPURA DISTRICT
     ANDHRA PRADESH-515134

8.   SRI. U.GANGADHARA BHAT
     AGED ABOUT 85 YEARS,
     SON OF LATE SUBBANNA BHAT
     AT SATHYA SAI VIHAR ALIKE
     BANTWALA TALUKA
     DAKSHINA KANNADA
     DISTRICT-574235.
                                         ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. K.G.RAGHAVAN, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
    SRI. MADHUKAR M DESHPANDE ADVOCATE FOR
    CAVEATOR/RESPONDENT NO.7)

      THIS R.S.A. IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 READ WITH
ORDER XLI RULE 1 READ WITH SECTION 151 OF CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE DATED 12.12.2018 PASSED IN R.A. NO.102/2016 ON
THE FILE OF THE III ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT
CHIKKABALLAPURA ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND SETTING
ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 16.09.2016 PASSED ON IA NO.5 IN
OS NO.141/2015 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL. SENIOR CIVIL
JUDGE AND CJM., CHIKKBALLAPUR ALLOWING THE IA NO.5
FILED UNDER ORDER 7 RULE 11(a) AND 11(d) READ WITH
ORDER II RULE 2 READ WITH SECTION 151 OF CPC., FOR
REJECTING THE PLAINT.

     THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 07.04.2022, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
                                5


                            JUDGMENT

This Regular Second Appeal is filed by the defendants No.1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in O.S. No.141/2015 before the Prl. Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Chikkaballapur (henceforth referred to as 'Trial Court') challenging the Judgment and Decree dated 12.12.2018 passed by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge at Chikkaballapur (henceforth referred to as 'First Appellate Court') in R.A. No.102/2016, by which, it reversed the Order of the Trial Court dated 16.09.2016, rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Order II Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth referred to as 'CPC' for short).

2. The parties shall henceforth be referred as they were arrayed before the Trial Court.

3. The suit in O.S. No.141/2015 was filed for the following reliefs :

"i) Declare that the minutes of the Board of Trustees meeting on 11.9.2012, item No.10 relating 6 to amendment of the deed of trust, is illegal, null, void and non est and issue a consequential direction that the same should not be given effect to or implemented.
ii) Declare that the alleged meeting of the Board of Trustees of Sri. Sathya Sai Loka Seva Trust allegedly held on 12.9.2012 at Muddenahalli is illegal, null, void and non est in law and the appointment of defendants 5 to 8 as trustees of Sri.Sathya Sai Loka Seva Trust at the said meeting is illegal, null, void and non est and consequently restrain the defendants 5 to 8 from acting or holding out, representing or discharging any duties as trustees of Sri. Sathya Sai Loka Seva Trust and restrain defendants 2 to 4 from discharging any duties as trustees of Sri. Sathya Sai Loka Seva Trust.
iii) Declare that the Deed of Amendment dated 12.9.2012 registered as Document No.CKB-4-00133-

2012-13 in Book IV CD No.CKBD81 in the office of Sub Registrar, Chikkaballapur executed and registered by defendants 2, 4 and 4 amending the Trust deed of Sri. Sathya Sai Loka Seva Trust as null and void, non est, and is not binding on Sri. Sathya Sai Central Trust and its Trustees.

iv) Direct the defendants to deliver up the deed of Amendment dates 12 September 2012 for 7 cancellation and endorsement by the concerned authorities.

v) Declare that defendant 5, 6, 7 and 8 are not appointed validly as trustees of Sri. Sathya Sai Lok Seva Trust and consequently restrain them from acting, holding out or discharging any powers or duties as trustees of the said trust."

4. The plaintiffs claimed that the plaintiff No.1 is a public charitable trust and plaintiffs No.2 to 9 and defendant No.9 are its trustees. They claimed that a Society named Loka Seva Vrinda (henceforth referred to as "Society") was formed prior to 1978 with its principal office at Alike, Bantwal Taluk, Dakshina Kannada District and had a branch at Muddenahalli in Chikkaballapur Taluk, Kolar district. It had established two schools, one at Alike and the other at Muddenahalli. The person steering the Society expired and hence his family members and office bearers of the Society who were devotees of Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba of Puttaparthi, approached him seeking solutions to the difficulties faced by them in running the two schools. Consequent thereto, the members of the 8 Society resolved at a general meeting held on 22.02.1978, to form a "public charitable trust" and transfer all the properties of the society to the "trust". Hence, the defendant No.1 came into existence as "Sri Sathya Sai Loka Seva Trust" (henceforth referred to as "Sai Loka Seva Trust"). Ever since the formation of the Sai Loka Seva Trust, all the properties of the erstwhile society stood vested in the Trust and Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba held dominion over the assets of Sai Loka Seva Trust and discharged all the liabilities and provided ways and means for running the schools. He appointed a Council of Management to Sai Loka Seva Trust, which functioned according to his directions and guidance. The plaintiffs claimed that the two schools under the Trust flourished in an exemplary manner. They claimed that Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba arranged for the funds whenever needed by these schools. The Trust deed by which defendant No.1 was constituted contained clause VI which related to a sole trustee and his power to appoint other trustees and read as follows :

9

"VI. Bhagwan Sri Sathya Sai Baba shall be the Sole Trustee. After he sheds his mortal coil, the persons nominated by him shall be Trustees and they shall hold office for such periods as the Bhagavan may have fixed. In the absence of fixation of any Tenure, the Trustee/s so nominated by him shall hold office for life. Vacancies occurring in the Office of Trustee after Bhagavan shall be filled by the remaining Trustees in Office and if no one such is in Office, then the nominee/s of Sri Sathya Sai Trust, (Karnataka) shall be the Trustee/s."

5. In the year 2008, Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba pondered over the need for continuity of the Trust under his overall control and thus desired to amend the Trust deed of Sai Loka Seva Trust, which was followed by an amendment dated 30.06.2008 relating to the appointment of Trustees, which is extracted below :

"Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba shall be the First Trustee and shall hold Office for life. The Trust shall have a maximum of 5 Trustees. The First Trustee and after Him Sri Sathya Sai Central Trust, a registered Public Charitable Trust, shall nominate the other Trustees from time to time to hold Office at the pleasure of the First Trustee/Sri Sathya Sai Central Trust."
10

6. Following this, Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba appointed his ardent devotees as Trustees of the plaintiff No.1 and four other devotees as members of the Council of Management of plaintiff No.1. Unfortunately, Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba left to his heavenly abode on 28.04.2011. Following this, in exercise of power under clause VI of the Trust Deed of Sai Loka Seva Trust, the plaintiffs passed a resolution appointing defendant No.3, plaintiff No.8 and Sri. B.R. Vasuki as the trustees of defendant No.1. The plaintiff No.1 expanded its board of Trustees by appointing the members of Council of Management as the Trustees of plaintiff No.1. Later, due to the persistence of defendant No.1, the plaintiff No.1 passed a resolution dated 27.06.2011 and appointed defendants No.2, 4 as the Trustees of defendant No.1. The plaintiffs claimed that though the defendant No.1 was functioning under the guidance of plaintiff No.1 but it was allowed to function independently.

11

7. The plaintiffs alleged that a few months later, the defendant No.2 claimed that Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba was subtly instructing him to set up schools in several parts of Karnataka. Thus, he started contacting devotees of Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba all over the world for collection of funds. They also formed a Trust named Sri Sathya Sai Saraswathi Trust with the active support of the alumni and encouragement of defendant No.2. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant No.2 started criticising some of the members of plaintiff No.1 and spread rumours that plaintiff No.1 and its trustees were out to de-stabilize the defendant No.1.

8. The plaintiffs alleged that on 11.09.2012, a meeting of the board of trustees of defendant No.1 was held at Bengaluru in the chambers of plaintiff No.8. One of the items on the agenda was the adopt of a Code of conduct for the Trustees and employees of defendant No.1. This subject was put off since some of the Trustees demanded more time to discuss. On the same night, 12 plaintiff No.8 left to Dharwad on professional work. The defendant No.2 sent an e-mail to plaintiff No.8 on 12.09.2012 to attend an emergency meeting of the board of Trustees of defendant No.1 at 5.00 p.m. on the same day at Muddenahalli. The plaintiff No.8 objected to the meeting and requested not to conduct the meeting. Nonetheless, the defendant No.2 replied that in view of the resignation of Sri. B.R. Vasuki, a meeting was held to fill the vacancy, which was objected by plaintiff No.8 contending that it was only for plaintiff No.1 and its trustees to fill the vacancy. The plaintiffs alleged that though the amendment of the Trust deed of Sai Loka Seva Trust was not on the agenda of any meeting conducted by defendant No.1, yet on 12.09.2012, the three trustees of defendant No.1 executed a deed of amendment amending clause 6 of the Trust deed dated 14.08.1978, which read as follows :

"VI. Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba is the First Trustee for the life. Now that Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba has shed his mortal coil, after Him, i) Sri. U. Gangadhara Bhat, ii) Sri. B.N.Narasimha Murthy, 13
iii) Sri. M. Ishwara Bhat iv) Sri S.S.Naganand and v) Sri. B.R.Vasuki, are holding offices of Trustees for life. The Trust shall have maximum of Nine trustees.

Any vacancy/vacancies in the office of Trustee/s, shall be filled by the remaining Trustees holding office."

9. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of this illegal amendment of the Trust deed, the trustees of the plaintiff No.1 were deprived of their right to appoint trustees to the defendant No.1. They also claimed that the defendant No.1 was always under the control of the plaintiff No.1 as all the properties of the defendant No.1 were vested in Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba, who desired that after he shed his mortal coil, the right to appoint trustees of the defendant No.1 should be with the trustees of the plaintiff No.1. Therefore, the plaintiffs challenged the legality and validity of the amendment to the Trust deed and the consequent appointment of some of the defendants who were appointed by the existing trustees of the defendant No.1, by filing a suit before the Civil Court. 14

10. The defendants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Order II Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC contending that the suit was filed to vindicate public rights concerning a public charitable Trust and therefore, the suit without the leave of the Court or the Advocate General was not maintainable.

11. The application was contested by the plaintiffs who contended that they did not seek to vindicate any public rights but were trying to enforce their private and individual rights to appoint trustees of the defendant No.1.

12. The Trial Court after considering the reliefs sought for in the suit, held that the suit ought to have been filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence allowed the application and rejected the plaint.

13. An appeal preferred by the plaintiffs before the First Appellate Court was allowed and the First Appellate Court held that the plaintiffs were not attempting to vindicate any public rights or to seek settlement of any 15 scheme for administration of the defendant No.1. The First Appellate Court held that the plaint indicated that the plaintiffs were not interested in the administration of the defendant No.1 but were only attempting to seek restoration of the right to appoint trustees to the defendant No.1. The First Appellate Court therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Trial Court rejecting the plaint.

14. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 have filed this Regular Second Appeal.

15. The learned senior counsel Mr.Susheel Kumar Jain representing the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 submitted that the reliefs in the suit fell within the sweep of Section 92 of the CPC, in as much as, the defendant No.1 was a public charitable Trust and that the plaintiffs sought various reliefs which were covered under Section 92(1)(a),

(b) and (h) of the CPC. He further contended that the 16 reliefs not falling under Section 92(1)(a) could be granted under Section 92(1)(h). The learned senior counsel therefore contended that the suit was not maintainable before the Civil Court without obtaining leave of the Court. He also submitted that the plaintiffs had specifically pleaded in the plaint that "the action of the defendants 1 to 3 is clearly a breach of trust and renders them actionable in law". He also invited the attention of the Court to paragraph No.45 of the plaint and contended that the plaintiffs had attributed mala fides against the defendants in administering the Trust and therefore, the plaintiffs ought to have sought the leave of the Court before initiating any action whatsoever. Further, he contended that the plaintiffs had challenged the appointment of Trustees and as such, removal of any Trustee from any public religious charitable trust should be only in accordance with Section 92(1)(a) of the CPC.

16. In reply, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff No.8 submitted that the regular second appeal is 17 not maintainable since a revision petition under Section 115 of the CPC., is maintainable. He also contended that Section 92 of the CPC., need not be resorted to protect the individual or private rights of the Trustees of the plaintiff No.1 and therefore, the suit was properly filed before the Civil Court.

17. This appeal was admitted to consider the following substantial questions of law:

1) Whether the Regular Second Appeal was maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case in view of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or whether a revision petition was maintainable?
2) Whether the right of plaintiff No.1 to nominate the trustees to the defendant No.1 was a personal right?
3) Whether the deprival of such a right amounted to breach of an essential term of the trust and therefore the suit under Section 92 was alone maintainable?
4) Whether the First Appellate Court committed an error in holding that the suit filed was only to vindicate the personal right of the plaintiffs and 18 therefore was maintainable before the Civil Court?

18. The learned Senior Counsel for the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8, Sri.Susheel Kumar Jain and the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff No.8, Mr. K.G. Raghavan, were heard on the substantial questions of law framed by this Court. The copies of the plaint as well as the deed of trust dated 14.08.1978 and the first amendment in the year 2008 as well as the latest impugned amendment, furnished by the learned counsel for the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 are perused.

19. Addressing arguments on the first substantial question of law, the learned Senior Counsel for the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 submitted that the rejection of a plaint is deemed to be a decree under Section 2(2) of the CPC. Consequently, there was no proceeding that was pending before the Trial Court. He contended that therefore, the plaintiffs rightly filed an appeal before the First Appellate Court under Section 96 of the CPC. He 19 submitted that the disposal of the first appeal resulted in a judgment and decree by which the proceedings were terminated before the First Appellate Court and thus a second appeal under Section 100 of CPC was maintainable. He invited the attention of the Court to Section 115 of the CPC and contended that Section 115 is applicable only in a situation where a proceeding is pending before the Civil Court and only against an interlocutory order. He submitted that since the First Appellate Court has passed a Judgment and Decree, such a decree cannot be varied or reversed in a revision petition under Section 115 of the CPC.

20. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff No.8 submitted that the order passed by the Trial Court was an interlocutory order disposing off an application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Order II Rule 2 read with Section 151 of CPC and the net effect of allowing the appeal by the First Appellate Court is that, it had rejected the application filed under 20 Order VII Rule 11 Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Order II Rule 2 read with Section 151 of CPC. Therefore, he contended that the Order passed by the First Appellate Court was an order disposing off an interlocutory application and therefore, a revision petition alone is maintainable under Section 115 of the CPC.

21. A reading of the said section makes it apparent that a revision petition under Section 115 of CPC is maintainable only against an order passed by the Trial Court in a proceeding that is pending. In the present case, since the plaint was rejected, nothing obviously was pending before the Court. The order rejecting the plaint was an expression of an adjudication, which so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determined the rights of the parties. In fact Section 2(2) of CPC which defines a "decree" specifically states that it shall be deemed to include rejection of the plaint. Thus, the legal position is that against an order rejecting the plaint, only an appeal under Section 96 of CPC lies and not a revision. 21 Therefore, the plaintiffs precisely filed regular appeal before the First Appellate Court invoking Section 96 of CPC. The First Appellate Court after considering the appeal has disposed it off, which has again resulted in a decree, and therefore, no proceeding was pending before the First Appellate Court. Consequently, the question of filing a revision petition against the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court does not arise. The defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 have rightly filed this second appeal. The question regarding maintainability of this Regular Second Appeal is therefore answered accordingly and it is held that Regular Second Appeal is maintainable.

22. In so far as the second substantial question of law is concerned, the learned senior counsel for the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 submitted that a public trust can have no personal right and therefore the suit to enforce such non existent personal rights, without seeking leave of the Court was not maintainable.

22

23. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff No.8 submitted that the desire of Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba and the intention of the Trust was to ensure that the Trust should function under the plaintiff No.1 and to ensure this, the right to appoint trustees to the defendant No.1 was reserved to the Trustees of plaintiff No.1. He submitted that such a right was an independent and an individual right and therefore the suit to enforce such a right fell outside Section 92 of CPC.

24. It is necessary to note that the trust deed dated 14.08.1978 declared that the properties mentioned in the Schedule to the trust deed was transferred by the founder trustee to the sole trustee Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba, who retained absolute discretion to delegate any of his powers, functions or duties in respect of the trust, to any person or to frame any rules or by-laws for the management of the Trust and its institutions. He was the sole trustee who was entitled to nominate trustees of the defendant No.1 for such period as he may have fixed. In 23 the absence of any fixed tenure, the trustees so nominated could hold office for life. The trust deed provided that vacancies occurring in the office of trustees after Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba, would be filled by remaining trustees in office and if no one is in office then the nominees of the plaintiff No.1 would be the trustees. The founder of the trust, also being the author of the trust had spelt out that the properties mentioned in the schedule to the trust shall forever be under the management of Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba or his nominee trustees of Sai Loka Seva Trust (Karnataka). It is not in dispute that Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba helmed the trust under whose patronage the educational institutions flourished. The Trust was irrevocable. However, the covenants of the deed could be amended by the trustees in office from time to time without however affecting the character of the trust and its objects. Later, the trust deed was amended on 30.06.2008, in terms of which Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba continued to be the first trustee who held the office for life. The Sai Loka Seva Trust was to have a maximum 24 of five trustees. Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba ordained that after him Sri Sathya Sai Central Trust (plaintiff No.1) shall nominate the other trustees from time to time to hold office at the pleasure of the first trustee / Sri Sathya Sai Central Trust. Therefore, the sole trustee Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba had conferred the right on the plaintiff No.1 to nominate trustees to the defendant No.1. The purpose of such a device was to ensure that the defendant No.1 was always under the umbrella of the plaintiff No.1. The right to appoint trustees by the plaintiff No.1 to the defendant No.1 was therefore an individual right that the plaintiff No.1 and its trustees possessed and such right was capable of being enforced in a Court of law. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 that the plaintiff No.1 being a public charitable trust had no individual rights, is unacceptable, as a public charitable trust is a legal entity which can represent through its trustees. The right of the plaintiffs to appoint trustees to the defendant No.1 is a right conferred by the Trust deed and is purely a 25 management concern, which does not affect the objects or the functioning of the defendant No.1. This right was created by Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba to ensure the continued patronage, support of the plaintiff No.1 to the defendant No.1 and also that it remains under the umbrella of the plaintiff No.1 forever.

25. In Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati and Another v. Ramji Tripathi and Another (1974) 2 SCC 695, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the case of installation of a person "S" as the Shankaracharya of the Math on the basis of a Will executed by the deceased Head of the Math, which was opposed by persons interested in the Math, who installed another person "K" as the Shankaracharya. Those persons who were interested in the Math filed a suit under Section 92 of CPC against "S". They primarily wanted a declaration that "K" was duly installed and that the Court should appoint him as the Shankaracharya. The Court held thus -

"It is quite immaterial whether the trustees pray for declaration of their personal rights or deny 26 the personal rights of one or more defendants. When the right to the office of a trustee is asserted or denied and relief asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside s. 92. ii) We see no reason why the same principle should not apply, if what the plaintiffs seek to vindicate here is the individual or personal right of Krishnabodhashram to be installed as Shankaracharya of the Math."

In Aurobindo Ashram Trust and others V. R. Ramanathan and others, AIR 2016 SC 237, the Supreme Court was considering the case of grant of leave to file a suit under Section 92 of CPC. In that case, the plaintiffs sought to remove the Trustees alleging that they had failed the philosophy of Sri.Aurobindo. The allegations were based on a book titled "The Lives of Sri.Aurobindo" , which contained distortions relating to the life of Sri.Aurobindo. The Supreme Court that the allegations made in the plaint indicate that the suit has been filed to remedy the infringement of a private right or to vindicate a private right, then the suit would not fall within the ambit of Section 92 of CPC.

In Rugghan Prasad v Dhanno AIR 1927 All 257, the Allahabad High Court was dealing with a case where the Trustees who were supposed to appoint their successors to a public trust failed to do so. The successor of the founder of the Trust sought 27 for a declaration that he was entitled to appoint the Trustees. The suit was decreed and was questioned on the ground that a suit under Section 92 was to be filed. The Court answering the question held "Section 92 of the Civil P. C. enumerates certain suits which can be brought after obtaining permission of the Legal Remembrancer. These suits can only be brought when there has been an alleged breach of a trust, or where direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. Secondly, these suits must be for one of the eight objects enumerated from (a) to (h) in the section. None of these clauses directly cover a suit of the nature of the present declaratory suit. The essential difference is that the plaintiff in this case does not admit that there are any trustees in existence. His contention is that the trust has been left without any manager and that he is entitled to step in. In our opinion, Section 92 makes no provision for a suit of this nature and we cannot find that the plaintiff is debarred from suing directly in a civil Court."

26. The High Court of Bombay in Navroji Manekji Wadia vs. Dastur kharsedji Mancherji [ILR 1904 28 Bombay 20] held that a suit by the trustees of a fire temple for the vindication of the right of management which was vested in, and actually being exercised by, them 28 and those they represent at the date of the obstruction by the defendant was a suit to enforce private rights.

27. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs have contended that the meetings dated 11.09.2012 and 12.09.2012 were non est as they were not held in accordance with law and consequently, the amendment of the Trust deed is illegal, null and void and to declare that the defendants No.5, 6, 7 and 8 are not appointed validly as trustees of Sai Loka Seva Trust and consequently restrain them from acting, holding out or discharging any powers or duties as trustees of the said trust. The plaintiffs were not the representatives of the public and they did not seek for any reliefs that fell within Section 92(1) (a) to (h) of the CPC. If the meetings dated 11.09.2012 and 12.09.2012 were not conducted in accordance with law, the plaintiffs are entitled to question it and get all the consequent action annulled. The rights that the plaintiffs attempted to resurrect were the individual rights of the Trustees of plaintiff No.1 to nominate trustees of the 29 defendant No.1. There was no allegation of breach of trust or mismanagement or for framing a scheme of management etc.

28. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 that in similar circumstances the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Gupta and Another v. M/s. Sitalaxmi Sahuwala Medical Trust and Others [(2020)4 SCC 321] had held that "the reliefs claimed by the appellant in the suit are not reliefs for enforcing any private rights but reliefs for the removal of the defendant as trustee and for appointment of a new trustee in his place, and therefore, the suit was not brought by the appellant in their individual capacity, but was representing all the beneficiaries.

29. It is relevant to note that in Ashok Kumar Gupta's case (supra) the suit was filed for framing a scheme of administration of a Public Charitable Trust since it was claimed that a person who did not have any qualification or expertise to manage the trust had been in 30 control of the Trust and that the objects of the Trust were not getting fulfilled. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Gupta's case (supra) was therefore not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.

30. In that view of the matter, the substantial question of law No.2 is answered and it is held that the right of the plaintiff No.1 to nominate trustees to the defendant No.1 was an individual right available to the plaintiff No.1 and its trustees.

31. The substantial questions of law No.3 and 4 are since intertwined, the same are taken up together for consideration.

32. The learned Senior Counsel for the defendants No.1, 2, 4 to 8 submitted that Section 92 of the CPC is a complete code that provides remedy against any breach of the conditions of the Trust and the plaintiffs have accused the defendants of committing breach of trust. He 31 submitted that the challenge to the amendment of the Trust was nothing but challenging the authority of the Trust and the consequent relief of removal of the trustees had to be only in accordance with Section 92(1)(a) of the CPC. He submitted that the power to grant reliefs is not restricted to what is provided under Section 92(1)(a) to

(g) but also includes further or other reliefs as the nature of the case may require. The learned counsel relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Gupta's case (supra) and contended that reliefs claimed in the suit were for removal of the defendant as trustee and for appointment of new trustees in their place and therefore, fell within Section 92(1)(a) and (b) of the CPC. He therefore, submitted that the suit in the present form was not maintainable and the Trial Court had rightly rejected the plaint.

33. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff No.8 submitted that the plaintiffs were not interfering with the administration of the defendant No.1 32 and they had not accused the defendant No.1 of any breach of the conditions of the Trust. On the contrary, he contended that the plaintiffs were only trying to restore their private rights to appoint trustees to the defendant No.1 which was recognized under the trust deed dated 14.08.1978. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati (supra) as well as the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Charan Singh and Another v. Darshan Singh and Others [1975 (1) SCC 298]. He also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R. and others [(2008)4 SCC 115] and the judgment of the High court of judicature at Madras in Rabiammal Ahamed Maideen Educational Trust, A Public Charitable Trust represented by its Secretary and Correspondent, S.M. Miskeem and Others v. K.A.Ahamed Maideen represented by his power Agent N.M.A. Noor Maideen and others [2012-4-L.W. 141] and contended that not every suit relating to a public 33 charitable trust has to be tried under Section 92 of the CPC. He also relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Christopher Karkada and others vs. Church of South India, represented by its Moderator and others [ILR 2012 Kar 725]. He further submitted that Section 92(1)(h) of the CPC has to be read ejusdem generis with Sections 92(1)(a) to 92(1)(g) as held by the Apex Court in the case of Charan Singh and Another v. Darshan Singh and Others [(1975) 1 SCC 298]. He therefore, submitted that the scope of Section 92(h) of the CPC cannot be expanded to include all suits filed against a public charitable trust.

34. For the purpose of easy reference, Section 92 of the CPC is extracted below:

"92. Public charities.-(1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having 34 obtained the [leave of the Court], may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree-
(a) removing any trustee;
(b) appointing a new trustee;
(c) vesting any property in a trustee; (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property];
(d) directing accounts and inquiries;
(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;
(f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;
(g) settling a scheme; or
(h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.
(2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (20 of 1863), or by any corresponding law in force in the territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were 35 comprised in Part B States, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section.
(3) The Court may alter the original purposes of an express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and allow the property or income of such trust or any portion thereof to be applied cy-pres in one or more of the following circumstances, namely:-
(a) where the original purposes of the trust, in whole or in part,
(i) have been, as far as may be, fulfilled; or
(ii) cannot be carried out at all, or cannot be carried out according to the directions given in the instrument creating the trust or, where there is no such instrument, according to the spirit of the trust; or
(b) where the original purposes of the trust provide a use for a part only of the property available by virtue of the trust; or
(c) where the property available by virtue of the trust and other property applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in conjunction with, and to that end can suitably be made applicable to any other purpose, regard being had to 36 the spirit of the trust and its applicability to common purposes; or
(d) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, were laid down by reference to an area which then was, but has since ceased to be, a unit for such purposes; or
(e) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, have, since they were laid down-
(i) been adequately provided for by other means, or
(ii) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community, or
(iii) ceased to be, in law, charitable, or
(iv) ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective method of using the property available by virtue of the trust, regard being had to the spirit of the trust."

35. Section 92 of CPC provides for filing a representative suit and not suits brought to remedy an infringement of an individual right or to vindicate a private right. The mere fact that a suit incidentally claims relief specified in the Section does not bring the suit under Section 92. It must be brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights. While deciding whether the suit falls within this 37 section or not, the Court must have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and the purpose for which it is brought. The Apex Court in the case of R.M.Narayana Chettiar v. N.Lakshmanan Chettiar [1991(1) SCC 48] held "a suit under Section 92 of the CPC., is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or that the directions of the Court are necessary. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the suit has got to be brought in conformity with the provision of Section 92 of the CPC."

36. It is now well settled that in a suit against public trust, it is only the allegations in the plaint that shall be looked into in the first instance to see whether the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92 of the CPC. The three conditions essential for the application of Section 92 of the CPC., are as follows:

"(i) There is a trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature.
38
(ii) there is a breach alleged of such trust or the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such trust.
(iii) the relief claimed is one or the other of the reliefs mentioned in the section.
(iv) the mere fact that a suit claims relief specified in the section does not bring the suit under Section 92 of the CPC.
(v) It must be brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights. In deciding whether a suit falls within this Section, the Court must have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and the purpose for which it is brought."

37. In Sugra Bibi. v. Hazi Kummu Mia [AIR 1969 SC 884], it was held that the mere fact that the suit relates to the Public Trust of religious or charitable nature and the reliefs claimed fall within some of the clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 92, that would not by itself attract the operation of Section, unless the suit is of a representative character instituted in the interest of public 39 and not merely for vindication of the individual or personal rights of the plaintiffs.

38. In a suit filed against a public charitable trust, if the emphasis in the suit was on purely private and personal disputes, leave granted to file a suit under Section 92 of the CPC was not legal, as held by the Apex Court in Vidyodaya Trust (supra). The Apex Court has observed as follows:

"To put it differently, it is not every suit claiming reliefs specified in Section 92 that can be brought under the Section; but only the suits which besides claiming any of the reliefs are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights. As a decisive factor, the Court has to go beyond the relief and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiff has sued and the purpose for which the suit was brought. The Courts have to be careful to eliminate the possibility of a suit being laid against public trusts under Section 92 by persons whose activities were not for protection of the interests of the public trusts". In Perumalammal vs. R. Guruammal (2008 (3) CTC 476) it was held that consultation with the beneficiaries of the original deed was 40 necessary where the trustees proposed modification in the original trust deed. It was held that the exclusion of the beneficiaries by creating a new trust deed was not valid.

39. Since this Court has held that the suit filed is to vindicate individual rights of the plaintiffs, a suit before the Civil Court without resorting to the procedure contemplated under Section 92 of the CPC was maintainable. Hence the substantial question No.(iii) is answered and it is held that in the facts of this case, the deprival of a right to appoint trustees to defendant no.1 did not amount to breach of an essential term of the trust and therefore, the suit without resorting to Section 92 of the CPC was maintainable. Consequently, the substantial question No.(iv) is answered and it is held that the First Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding that the suit filed was only to vindicate the personal right of the plaintiffs and therefore, suit was maintainable before the Civil Court.

41

In view of the above, this appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.

Pending I.A., if any, does not survive for consideration.

Sd/-

JUDGE hnm