Bombay High Court
Jaisingh Vithoba Girase vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 29 October, 1999
Equivalent citations: AIR2000BOM317, AIR 2000 BOMBAY 317, (2000) 2 ALLMR 518 (BOM)
Author: S.B. Mhase
Bench: S.B. Mhase
JUDGMENT S.B. Mhase, J.
1. Both these petitions have been filed by the petitioners challenging the proceedings of the no confidence motion dated 30-9-1998 expressed against them while the petitioners were the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of Agricultural Produce Market Committee Dondalcha, by Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. The petitioner in writ petition No. 4617 of 1998 was Vice-Chairman of the said market committee while the petitioner in writ petition No. 4621 of 1998 was the Chairman of the said Market Committee. On 18-9-1998, twelve members of the said Market Committee submitted a requisition to the Collector, Dhule, to call a special meeting of the said market committee to express no confidence motion against both the petitioners under Section 23A of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963. The separate requisition in respect of each of the petitioner was submitted. On the basis of these requisitions, the Collector by this order dated 24-7-1998 directed that the meeting of the members of the said market committee shall be called on 30-9-1998 at about 12.00 noon at the office of the said market committee and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Shirpur was appointed to preside over the said meeting. In consonance with the same on 24-9-1998 itself, a notice was issued to both the petitioners stating that the requisition dated 18-9-1998 under Section 23A of the said Act has been filed with him and the special meeting has been fixed on 30-9-1998 at 12-00 noon at the office of the said market committee which will be presided over by the Sub Divisional Officer, Shirpur. It is mentioned in the said intimation that the separate notice of the meeting is being sent to the petitioners. On 24-9-1998 itself the Collector issued the separate notice to both the petitioners informing them that the special meeting of the market committee has been scheduled on 30-9-1998 at 12.00 noon to express no confidence motion against the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the said Market Committee and requested both the petitioners to attend the said meeting. This notice was accompanied with the requisition submitted by the requisltionists. In accordance with the said notice special meeting of the said market committee was held on 30-9-1998 which was presided over by the Sub Divisional Officer, Shirpur and 13 persons were present in the said meeting. However, one Shri M. C. Padavi was the Assistant Registrar Co-operative Societies and even though he is the member of the said committee was not entitled to vote in the said meeting and accordingly has not voted in the said meeting. Therefore the resolution was passed in the said meeting by 12 persons. There was no one in the meeting to oppose the said resolutions passed against each of the petitioners. The said market committee consists of 17 members and out of 17 members, 12 members have expressed no confidence, and therefore, the motion was declared to have been passed against both the petitioners namely the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the said market committee which was passed by a majority of not less than two thirds of the total number of members (excluding the members who have no right to vote). The petitioners have challenged this act of expressing the no confidence motion against them.
3. So far as the Vice-Chairman Shri Jaysinha Girase is concerned, he has received the notice of no confidence motion along with the requisition and the intimation as stated earlier. Therefore, the ground of challenge by the Vice-Chairman does not cover the ground of non-service of the notice of the special meeting. As far as Chairman Gulabrao Patil who is the petitioner in writ petition No. 4621 of 1998 is concerned, amongst all other common grounds; he has challenged the meeting on the ground of non-service of notice of no confidence motion to him. Therefore, according to the Chairman, the meeting is vitiated because the notice of the said meeting was not served on him.
4. So far as the notice to be served on the petitioner in writ petition No. 4621 of 1998 is concerned, the documents produced by the respondent Sub-Divisional Officer point out that the intimation of the said meeting which is required to be given as per the proviso of Sub-section (3) of Section 23A of the said Act, has been served on Kanchan Gulabrao Patil. It is further revealed that a separate notice of the meeting annexed with the requisition was also served on Kanchan Gulabrao Patil. It is the contention of the petitioner that thus the notice has not been served personally on the petitioner. From the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Sub-Divisional Officer has stated in para No. 4 that notice of special meeting for considering the vote of no confidence was duly served on the wife of Shri Gulabrao Patil, who is major person as per the provisions of law, which is enclosed to the said reply. Thus the Sub-Divisional Officer made a statement that the notice was served on the wife of Gulabrao Patil, namely the Chairman. However, in the affidavit-in-reply which has been filed by the respondent No. 12 who is the member of the said market committee, he has stated in para No. 7, that the petitioner intentionally refused to accept the service of notice on false pretext that the petitioner was not at home. However, his son "Kanchan Gulab Patil" who is about 23 years old was duly served with the notice of no confidence motion.
5. It is pertinent to be noted that after this affidavit and the affidavit of the Sub-Divisional Officer the petitioner has filed rejoinder wherein he submitted that the petitioner has no son namely Kanchan and as such there is no question of service of notice on said Kanchan as he was not the Chairman of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Dondaicha nor he is the member of the family of the petitioner. The petitioner further submitted that no notice was served on him or his wife and no name of his wife has been shown revealing the details about the place, date etc. He submitted that the petitioner has no wife by name Kanchan. Therefore, controversy has arisen who is "Kanchan Gulab Patil," who has accepted the notice. Therefore, the Sub-Divisional Officer, has ultimately filed affidavit of Talathi, who had been actually to the house of the petitioner for serving the said notice. The said affidavit was filed on 4-8-1999. Shri Khaimar, who is the Talathi of village Dondaicha, has stated in his affidavit that the notices to be served on the petitioner were handed over to him by the Tahsildar Sindkheda and instructed to serve on the petitioners. Accordingly, on 26-9-1998, he took the notice of requisition of the no confidence motion and went to village Dhamane, Taluka Sindkheda where the present petitioner resides and approached his house at about 12.00 noon. He further stated that the door of the house was opened by one lady. He asked her as to whether the petitioner was in the house. The said lady told that the petitioner had gone to Pune. On being asked as to who she is, she told that she is the wife of the petitioner, and therefore, the notice was served to the said lady. He further explained that however the lady took the said notice inside the house, while the affiant was waiting outside the house. The lady came with the second copy of the notice signed as Kanchan Gulabrao Patil. On being asked as to who has signed, she replied that she has signed. He further stated that now in view of the controversy, he carried out the verification and has found that Kanchan Gulabrao Patil is the son of the petitioner, aged 22 years, and his name appears in the voters list at Sr. No. 421 shown as Sonawane Kanchan Gulabrao. He stated that the Kul name or the Surname of the petitioner is Sonawane. He produced on record, the certified copy of the voters list wherein the name of the petitioner appears at Sr. No. 416, in House No. 136 and the voters from Sr. No. 416 to 421 are resident of house No. 136. The name of Kanchan Gulabrao Sonawane appears at Sr. No. 421. In Column of relation, the word "Va" appears which means father, as explained at the bottom of the said voters list. Thus, it shows that Gulab Gorakh Sonawane is the father of Kanchan Gulabrao Sonawana. After the affidavit is filed by the Talathi, as stated above, the petitioner again filed affidavit of Pramilabai Gulabrao Patil, stating that no Talathi had visited the house on 26-9-1998 nor her son namely Rishikesh Gulabrao has signed the alleged notice. It is further denied that there is no son namely Kanchan Gulabrao Patil and there was no talk with the said Talathi. Thus evidence by way of affidavit is on record. What is pertinent to be noted is that the petititioner has not denied that his Kul name and/or surname is Sonawane and that his name and names of his family members appear in the voters list at Sr. No. 416 to 421. Even though affidavit of Pramilabai has been filed at a later stage, she has also not stated that her name is not as shown in the voters list at Sr. No. 417. On production of the said voters list, which shows that Kanchan Gulabrao is member of the family of the petitioner related as son with the petitioner. It was for the petitioner to explain as to who is said Kanchan. It is further interesting to note that the petitioner has not denied the house number shown in the said voters list. Thus, it becomes crystal clear from the voters list and the affidavit of the Talathi that there exists a person Kanchan Gulabrao Sonawane, who is residing in house No. 136 of village Dhamane which is the place of residence of the present petitioner and that said Kanchan has accepted the said notice. In fact, under these circumstances, the petitioners should have produced the affidavit of Kanchan Gulabrao Patil to state that the signature showing that the notice of no confidence motion was served on him as the family member of the petitioner is incorrect and denying the same. The petitioner has thus failed to produce the best possible evidence.
6. Apart from the above facts, the contention of the petitioner has been negatived on the fact that the Vice-Chairman Shri Girase, has filed writ petition No. 4320 of 1998 which came for disposal on 30-9-1998. The said petition was filed on 28-9-1998 by the vice-chairman Girase which was circulated for 30-9-1998. On the said date the Chairman presented a petition across the bar which petition was subsequently numbered as W. P. No. 3754 of 1999. The common order was passed by this Court. From the petition of the Chairman, it appears that the petition was prepared on 29-9-1998 and was sworn on 29-9-1998. Along with the said petition the petitioner Chairman has annexed at Exhibit "A" a copy of the notice issued by the Collector, calling the special meeting of the said Market Committee on 30-9-1998 at 12-00 noon. No doubt that the said copy show that it is addressed to Jaysing Vithoba Girase, namely the Vice-Chairman, however that also shows that the Vice-Chairman has received the notice of the meeting of said no confidence motion as a Vice Chairman and also as a member of the market committee to express no confidence against the Chairman. Above all, the notice specifically states that the meeting has been called to express vote of no confidence against the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman. Therefore, the net result of this proceeding and the documents produced on record is that on 29-9-1998 itself the petitioner Chairman of the said Market Committee had a notice of the fact that a special meeting to discuss the no confidence motion has been called. Not only that, but the writ petition No. 4320 of 1998 filed by Vice-Chairman Girase contained all the documents which were annexed to the said notice. Thus these proceeding point out that on 29-9-1998 the petitioner was aware of the fact that the special meeting has been called to discuss the no confidence motion against him. Therefore, he has approached this Court. All these facts clearly establish that the petitioner had notice. The above referred facts in respect of service through Kanchan is concerned that also points out that Kanchan being member of the petitioner Chairman's family, has accepted the notice, and therefore, we find that there was proper service of the notice of special meeting of no confidence motion to be expressed against the petitioners, and therefore, the contention raised by the petitioner that there was no notice to the petitioner of the said meeting is hereby rejected. On the contrary, we find that all sorts of efforts have been made by the petitioner to make out a show that notice was not served when in fact the petitioner had notice of the said special meeting called by the respondent Collector.
7. Thereafter common grounds have been raised by the petitioners challenging the said meeting. Mr. Jadhav, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the following procedure is reflected from Section 23A which has not been followed by the respondent No. 1, and therefore, no confidence motion be quashed. He submitted that -
(1) Firstly the market committee must pass a resolution expressing no confidence against the Chairman and Vice-Chairman by two-thirds of members of the market committee;
(ii) Thereafter half of the members of the market committee shall move the requisition to the Collector.
(iii) On receipt of such requisition, the Collector, shall convene a special meeting of the Market Committee to discuss no confidence motion convening the meeting within 15 days.
Thus the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is failure on the part of the Legislature to state as to what should be a majority to pass the no confidence in the special meeting called by the Collector. Thus, he submitted that it is an incomplete legislation. With a restraint, we observe that the argument advanced by the learned counsel is fallacious. Section 23 of the Act lays down :
(1) A Chairman or a Vice-Chairman shall cease forthwith to be Chairman or Vice-Chairman as the case may be, if the Market Committee by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members (excluding the members who have no right to vote) at a special meeting so decides;
(2) The requisition for such special meeting shall be signed by not less than one half of the total number of members (excluding the members who have no right to vote) and shall be sent to the Collector under Intimation to the Director;
(3) The Collector shall within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the requisition under Sub-section (2), convene a special meeting of the Committee;
Provided that, when the Collector convenes such special meeting of the committee, he shall give intimation thereof to the Chairman, or as the case may be, Vice-Chairman and also to the Director.
4(a) A special meeting to consider a resolution under Sub-section (1) shall be presided over by the Collector or the officer authorised by him in this behalf, but the Collector or such officer or the Director (if present) shall have no right to vote at such meeting.
(b) The members of the Committee who have no right to vote may take part in the discussion, but shall not vote.
(5) If the motion of no confidence is not carried as aforesaid or if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum, no such fresh requisition for considering motion want of confidence in the same Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall be made, until after the expiry of six months from the date of such meeting.
8. On bare perusal of the aforesaid section, it will reveal that the arguments as suggested and submitted by the learned counsel is not possible to be read in that section. We find that the learned counsel has lost sight of the fact that Sub-section (1) states that the resolution has to be passed in a special meeting and on such resolution being passed by not less two-thirds of the majority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman shall cease to hold the office. Sub-section (2) states that the requisition for such a meeting shall be signed by.......". Therefore, the words such a special meeting appearing in Sub-section (2) refer to the special meeting as stated in Sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) lays down that the Collector shall convene a special meeting within a period of fifteen days after receipt of requisition as stated in Sub-section (2), and therefore, ultimately the special meeting which is contemplated to be convened under Sub-section (3) is the said special meeting which, is stated in Sub-section (1). Sub-section (4) specifically makes a reference to the special meeting as stated in Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (5) also makes a reference to the meeting in Sub-section (1) by stating "such meeting" i.e. the special meeting which is called to express no confidence. Therefore, a meeting to express no confidence, as contemplated in Section 23A is only one special meeting on the basis of requisition submitted as provided in Sub-section (2) of the said section. On the contrary the interpretation submitted by the learned counsel that first the no confidence motion shall be expressed by two third members and thereafter the requisition shall be filed by one-half members is on the face of the record untenable in law because the moment two-third members pass the resolution expressing no confidence, seat of Chairman or the Vice-Chairman becomes vacant, and therefore, there is no question of again making requisition by one half members on the basis of said resolution. The learned counsel gave an unwarranted emphasis on the word resolution and tried to develop a submission and interpret the said section giving absolutely different scheme which is not warranted by Section 23A. Not only that but what we find is that if the interpretation as made by the learned counsel which we have stated earlier, if accepted, leads to the illogical, unwarranted interpretation of the said section. The said interpretation absolutely violates the language and the scheme provided by the Legislature in the said section, and therefore, we reject the said inter-pretation put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners thereafter submitted that Section 23A even though provides that notice should be issued within a period of 15 days by the Collector as provided in Sub-section (3) convening a special meeting, still there is no mode provided for issuing the said notice and serving it. He submitted that under these circumstances, the procedure as laid down in Section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 should have been followed by the Collector. Section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act states :
"Where any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act) made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any documents to be served by post whether the expression "serve" or either of the expressions "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.
Thus, in short, the learned counsel relying on this Section submitted that notice should have been sent and/or should have been given by registered post. What we find that Section 23 requires that the Collector shall within 15 days from the date of receipt of the requisition under Sub-section (2) convene a special meeting of the Committee. This Section does not authorise or require the notice to be served by post, and therefore, we find that Section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 is not applicable when the Collector is convening a special meeting as provided in Sub-section (3). Section 28 applies where the Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post. Such is not the case in the present matter, and therefore, submission made by the learned counsel that the Collector, should have followed the procedure of Section 28 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, while convening the meeting under Sub-section (3) of the said Act is not tenable in law and we therefore, reject the said submission.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioners thereafter submitted that Section 23A suffers from the several lacunae. According to the learned counsel, no procedure for convening a special meeting has been stated in the said section. The learned counsel further submitted that the intimation under Sub-section (2) and under Sub-section (3) is to be given to the Director and the same has not been given by the respondent Collector. It is further submitted that Sub-section (5) makes a reference to the quorum. However, no quorum has been provided in respect of the said special meeting, and therefore, learned counsel ultimately submitted that there is excessive delegation in favour of the Collector. He submitted that there is abdication of powers by the Legislature in favour of the Collector which violates Article 162 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the said section shall be struck down. He further submitted that the power vested with the Collector is unguided power. He tried to invite our attention to the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965, the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act and more specifically the provisions and the Rules in respect of no confidence motions to be carried out against the officers of the said Institutions. What we find is that those provisions are not pari materia with Section 23 of the Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963. Sub-section (2) of Section 73-ID of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act states that the requisition shall be made in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. Not only that but Section 165(2) XXXV-C of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, gives powers to make rules to the State Government to prescribe the requisition form and the manner in which the motion of no confidence can be brought under Section 73-ID. Similar is the position in respect of the other Acts which have been referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, the rules in that respect have been framed. However, that does not mean that unless some mode is followed. Section 23A of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 is not valid. What we find that the scheme under the other Acts is slightly different. Not only that but what should be the procedure in respect of no confidence motion under each of the Act is a matter to be considered by the Legislature and the Legislature in its wisdom has framed Section 23A of Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, without giving power to the State Government or any other authority to make Rules. Section 60 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 does not make a provision giving powers to the State Government to make Rules in respect of the meeting, special meeting and no confidence motion to be expressed under Section 23A of the Act, and therefore, no Rules have been framed. Not only that but Section 23A also does not provide that no confidence motion and/or requisition shall be carried out and/or submitted as prescribed. What we find is that the Section 23A is a Code in itself. It does not require that there shall be any reasons or grounds for expressing no confidence motion. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman holds the said office at the will of the members of the said Market Committee, and therefore, they can hold the office till the members of the Managing Committee desire. Moment Chairman and Vice-Chairman lose confidence, even though for no reasons, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman has to vacate the said office if the resolution is passed by two-third of the majority. A reference can be made to the case in the case of Ramkrusna v. Kisan. This is a case under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. Section 55 which is similar to Section 23A of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 as quoted in the said judgment is to the following effect (at page,306 of AIR) :
"Section 55. (1) A President or a Vice-President shall cease to be President or Vice-President as the case may be, if the council by a resolution passed by a majority of the total number of Councillors (excluding the co-opted councillors) at a special meeting so decides, (2) The requisition for such a special meeting shall be signed by not less than one-fourth of the total number of councillors (excluding the co-opted councillors) and shall, if such meeting is to be convened for considering the resolution for removal from office -
XX XX XX XX XX (4) xx xx xx xx
The co-opted councillors present at the meeting shall have no right to vote on any resolution relating to the removal of the Presi-
dent or the Vice-President".
Thus it will be evident that Section 23A(1) Sub-section (2) and Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (4) are practically ad-verbatim same except the number of persons required to express no confidence motion and/or for submission of the requisition. It has been observed by this Court in the above referred case that (at page 313-314 of AIR) :
"18. It will thus appear that the tenure of the office of the President is wholly at the pleasure and the will of the majority of the councillors and he can stick to that office only so long as he enjoys the confidence of the majority. As soon as he loses the confidence of the majority, he is not entitled to continue in his office. It may be that the President is not guilty of any misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or is not guilty of any disgraceful conduct. He may be an honest man or a man of integrity and may be very able, competent and efficient in his work, but still there could be honest policy differences between the President and the majority of the Councillors; there might be honest ideological differences between them, in which case the administration would not be smooth and the majority might not be able to carry on their policy or programme if the President were to hold different or opposite views, though honestly. In such cases, it would not be desirable that a person who does not enjoy the confidence of the majority of the Councillors should head the Council and it is for this reason that the Legislature seems to have deliberately framed Section 55 of the Act in the manner it has done by which only the 'will' of the majority has to prevail for passing a resolution that the President shall cease to be the President though no grounds or reasons are required to be given in the requisition to move such a resolution. In our view, this has been advisedly done by the Legislature and we cannot attribute a different meaning to it as is pressed upon us by the learned counsel for the petitioner."
We adopt the same view, in view of the fact that the provision is part materia same.
11. We further find that this Section 23 has taken precaution viz. in respect of the members of the market committee who are Government employees or employees of market committee. They are allowed to discuss but are not allowed to vote. They are not involved in political decision. Therefore, precaution has been taken that such members of the committee, even though may take part in the discussion, but shall not vote. We further find that the provision has been made that if the motion could not be carried out as aforesaid or if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum, no such requisition for considering fresh motion shall be carried out for a period of six months and thus the Legislature has protected the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman from facing repeated no confidence motions. Further the said section has also provided taking care that it is not possible for the Collector every time to attend the said meeting, to give authorisation by him to that effect and that they shall not participate by way of voting in the said meeting. Thus we find that section provides for submission of a requisition by a particular number of members of the market committee, on receipt of such requisition the Collector shall convene a special meeting within fifteen days, that the intimation of requisition and of the meeting shall be given to the Director and that intimation of the said meeting shall be given to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Thereafter the provision for presiding over the said meeting and laying down the provisions in respect of roll of the Collector, Director and/or Officer authorised by the Collector to preside over the meeting. It also lays down as stated earlier the roll of the members, who can participate, but who cannot vote in the meeting etc. It further lays down the consequences of the motion being not carried out as provided in earlier parts of said section and/or the meeting could not be completed for want of quorum. Thus we find that Section 23 is a Code in itself regulating the procedure for expressing no confidence as against the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Market Committees and there is no abdication of powers as has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. We also do not find any substance in the submission that the power vested with the Collector is an unguided power and/or suffers from excessive delegation. We reject the said submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. On the contrary, we find that said section is not violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the arguments developed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners based on Article 162 of the Constitution of India and unguided powers, excessive powers, abdication of powers etc. are hereby rejected.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners tried to point out to us that Sub-section (5) contemplates quorum because it states that if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum, no such requisition shall be brought for consideration of the no confidence motion until after expiry of six months. The learned counsel pointed out that no quorum has been provided in Section 23A. Shackleton on the Law and Practise of Meetings (Sixth Edition) has given a definition of Quorum as follows :
The word Quorum denotes the number of members of any body of persons whose presence at a meeting is requisite in order that business may be validly transacted and that its acts may be legal."
It has been further stated :
Where the Articles of Association of a Company do not prescribe the number of Directors required to constitute a Quorum, number of member who usually act in conducting the business of a company will constitute quorum. 'Quorum' is minimum number of members of the committee who are required to transact the business of the said committee.
However, in the special meeting under Section 23A of Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act. the business to be transacted is to be transacted by a majority of not less than two-thirds, and, therefore, even if requisitionists who are not less than one-half of the total number of members are present but not less than two-thirds are not available, the resolution cannot be passed. If members present in the meeting are less than two-thirds of the total members then in that eventuality, the resolution fails, and therefore, minimum number of members who are required to conduct the business of expressing no confidence motion against the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman is not less than two thirds and that will be a quorum for such meeting. Any number of members less than that, even though allowed to transact the business of expressing no confidence motion, results into non passing of the said resolution of no confidence motion, and therefore, that cannot be said to be a quorum. Therefore, in a case wherein the members present in the special meeting are less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the committee, the said meeting is without any quorum, and therefore, the meeting cannot be held. Therefore, it is not necessary to fix up quorum by framing necessary bye-
laws as provided in Section 27 of the said Act. Thus, we do not find any substance in the contentions raised by the learned Counsel that in the absence of providing of Quorum either in the section or Rules, Section 23A is inadequate provision and therefore, we reject the said contention also. We make It clear that these observations about quorum are only applicable to special meeting called under Section 23A of the Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, and not to other Acts unless the provisions are pari materia same.
13. The last contention raised by the learned Counsel is that one Mr. M. C. Padavi. was present in the said meeting who was not the member of the Market Committee, and therefore, the meeting was attended by the person who is not a member of the Market Committee. He further submitted that he was not representative of the Director. However, Section 13(1)(f) states that the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies of the district or his representative, who shall have no right to vote, is a member of the Market Committee. This is a Market Committee located at Dondaicha inTaluka Sindkheda and therefore, the Assistant Registrar has been appointed as a representative of Deputy Registrar who was not entitled to participate in the voting. Therefore, his presence was permissible as per the said section. However, it was not permissible for him to vote. The proceeding shows that even though he was present, he did not vote in the said meeting. In the affidavit, which has been filed by the Sub-Divisional Officer who has presided over the meeting, it has been stated that the Assistant Registrar Sindkheda was present at the time of special meeting being author- ised representative of the District Deputy Registrar Dhule, and therefore, the grievance made by the learned Counsel that unauthorised person and/or persons who are not members of the market Committee were present in the said meeting, is hereby rejected.
14. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the minutes of the meeting which has been produced on record show that within 25 minutes, both the resolutions were passed. He submitted that the Vice-Chairman Girase has submitted an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer who presided over the said meeting, informing and requesting that the notice of the meeting has not been served on all the members of the committee, and therefore, the meeting should be cancelled. The learned Counsel submitted that even though Vice-Chairman was present in the meeting and has submitted an application at 12.00 noon, it is not reflected in the proceeding book. In the affidavit-in-reply the Sub-Divisional Officer has clarified that notices were duly served on all the members and also the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, and he was satisfied about that. Not only that but he his further stated that the Vice-Chairman submitted the application and left the meeting hall, and therefore, as he did not participate in the meeting, his presence has not been shown. It is not the case of the Vice-Chairman also that he participated in the meeting. Thus, it only appears that he sub-mitted the application requesting to cancel the meeting and having found that the meeting is not being cancelled, he left the meeting hall and therefore, his presence has not been shown rightly, in the minutes of the said meeting. Therefore, we do not find any force in the said submission of the learned Counsel, and therefore, we reject the same.
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the petitioner has raised an objection that as there is a provision in the Mahafashtra Co-operative Societies Act that whenever requisition is submitted to the Collector, he shall get it ascertained as to whether the requisitionists are the genuine persons and thereafter proceed to call a special meeting. In the similar way in the present matter also the Collector and the Sub-Divisional Officer should have ascertained as to whether the persons who have submitted the requisition and/or attending the meeting are the members of the market committee. The Presiding Officer has clarified that the members who are present at the time of meeting did not raise any objection in this respect, and therefore, it was not necessary for him to find out whether the members were genuine and/or signatues were genuine. What we find is that the members are known to each other. Not only that but the Vice-Chairman who claims that he had been to the said meeting could have also pointed out the bogus persons who are not the members of the Market Committee who are attending the meeting, but he has not done so and therefore in the absence of such objection being raised it was not necessary for the respondent Officer to verify the genuineness of the signatures and/or of the persons in the said meeting. We do not find any substance in the said contention and it is hereby rejected.
16. Apart from the above, we would like to mention here that it is revealed while arguing the matter that after the no confidence motion was expressed against the present petitioners, there was election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman on 26-10-1998 and the new Chairman and the Vice-Chairman were elected. The notice of the election programme has-been placed on record at Exhibit B dated 15-10-1998 and it is further revealed that the present petitioner Gulabrao Patil, who challenged the resolution as Chairman has also seconded the candidature of the Chairmanship in the meeting dated 26-10-1998. In fact, when the petitioner has challenged the said no confidence motion, it was inappropriate on his part to second the candidature of any person to elect the Chairman in his place. It is further revealed that thereafter the no confidence motion has also been carried out against the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman who were elected in the meeting dated 26-10-1998 and thereafter again the new Chairman and Vice-Chairman have been elected who are presently looking after the duties of the said posts. This Chain of events itself show that the present writ petitions have become infructuous. However, as the petitions were admitted, we have considered submissions made by the learned Counsel and dealt with them as stated in the foregoing paragraph.
17. In the result, we find that there is no substance in both the writ petitions. Therefore, both the writ petitions are hereby rejected with costs.