Delhi High Court
Madan Iron Stores And 65 Ors. vs Delhi Development Authority And 82 Ors. on 13 October, 1970
Equivalent citations: ILR1970DELHI824
JUDGMENT Hardayal Hardy, J.
(1) In this writ petitionunder Article 226 of the Constitution, 66 petitionershave joined together to challenge what is described inthe petition as illegal and arbitrary allotment of biggersize ware-housing plots by Delhi Development Authority(respondent No. 1) to certain individuals and firms whoare imp leaded as respondents Nos. 5 to 82 in the petition (2) The impugned allotment of plots in the NarainaIndustrial Area developed by respondent No. 1 and iscovered by the Zonal Development Plan for Zone B-7(Naraina Village Area) under the Master Plan for Delhi.It is contended that the said allotment has been madein violation of the afore-mentioned Zonal and MasterPlans and is also an infraction of the fundamental rightsof the petitioners guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
(3) Respondent No. 1 which, for the sake of brevity,will hereafter be described as the.' "Authority" or the"D.D.A.", is a statutory authority under the DelhiDevelopment Act 61 of 1957, empowered to dispose ofland acquired by the Central Government for the purpose of planned development of Delhi. respondent No. 2 is the Land Allotment Advisory Committeeconstituted for the purpose of advising the Lieut. Governor (respondent No. 4) who is also the ex-officio Chairman of respondent No. 1. The Chief Executive Councellor of the Metropolitan Council is the nominatedChairman of this Committee.
(4) Briefly stated, the petitioners' allegations arethat petitions Nos. 1 to 63 and respondents Nos. 5 to82 are iron and steal merchants ca.rrying on business inMotia Khan Area, New Delhi, which is one of the severalarea where iron and steel merchants are carrying ontheir business in compact groups. Most of thesemerchants are members of one or the other of the following four associations: (I)Iron and Steel Scrap (Eabar) Merchants Association (Regd.) Motia Khan, New Delhi.(ii) Nav Nirman Co-operative House BuildingSociety Ltd., Motia Khan, New Delhi.(iii) Motia Khan Co-operative House BuildingSociety Ltd., Motia Khan, New Delhi.(iv) Iron Merchants Association (Regd.) MotiaKhan, New Delhi.
(5) The first three association (petitioners Nos. 64 to 66)will hereafter be referred to as petitioner-associations,while the fourth association (respondent No. 83) will bedescribed as respondent-association. Petitioners 1 to31 are members of petitioner-association No. 64. Petitioners 32 to 42 are members of the petitioner-association No. 66 while petitioners 43 to 63 are members ofpetitioner-association No. 65.
(6) On 1-9-1962, the Master Plan prepared by the D.D.A.under section 7 of the Act and approved by the Central Government under sections 9 and 10 of the Act came intooperation. On 24-7-1967, the Central Government approved the Zonal Development Plan for Zone B-7(Naraina village Area) under section 9(2) of the Act the said Zonal Development Plan provides for 257 acresof land for Service Industries.
(7) By means of an advertisement published in theleading daily newspapers of Delhi dated 29/10/1965, respondent No. 1 invited applications in a prescribedform for the allotment of industrial plots of sizes varyingfrom 1/8 acre to 1 acre (approximately) in differentindustrial areas from those industrial units which werelocated in non-conforming areas of Delhi, i.e., areasfor which the Master Plan has prescribed land use otherthan industrial.
(8) In November, 1965, members of all the afore-mentioned four associations of Motia Khan includingpetitioners 1 to 63 and respondents 5 to 82, applied forthe allotment of ware-housing plots of the size 1/8 acreand 1/4 acres, i.e., about 600 and 1200 square yardseach, in the Rewari Industrial Line Ware-housing Scheme.
(9) On 20-8-1966, respondent No. 2 passed a resolutionrecommending allotment of plots of 1/8 acres each to themembers of the respondent-association in the NarainaIndustrial Areas, Phase Ii, which is three miles nearerthe main city of Delhi while the members of the threepetitioner-associations were recommended for allotmentof plots in the far-flung area comprised in Rewari LineIndustrial Scheme, Phase Ii, on the ground that therewould not be sufficient number of plots in the later area.The petitioner-associations protested against the actionof respondent No. 2 with the result that on 4-3-1967 and16-5-1968 the said respondent passed two other resolutions. By its last-mentioned resolution the members ofthe petitioner-associations were aso allotted plots in theNaraina Industrial Area. But while they were allottedplots ranging between 125 of 333 square yards in areathe members of the respondent-association were uniformly allotted plots measuring 450 square yards each.On 18-6-1968, the Land Sales Officer of the D.D.A.issued letters to individual applicants informing themabout the area of plot allotted to each of them pursuantto the decision of respondent No. 2 dated 16-5-1968.
(10) On 8-12-1969, the members of the three petitioner-associations were called upon to deposit the secondInstallment of the premium for the smaller size plots inNaraina Industrial Area, which was paid by them underprotest.
(11) On 16-3-1970, respondent No. 1 held the draw of lotswhereby specific plots of 450 square yards in area wereallotted to each of respondents 5 to 82 and smallerplots were allotted to each of the petitioners 1 to 62.The petitioners have annexed to the petition a table(Annexure XXIV) showing the area under occupationof each petitioner in Motia Khan, the area applied forand allotted to each as also the specific number of theplot in accordance with the draw. They have also annexed another table (Annexure XXV) giving similar particulars in respect of respondents 5 to 82. Between 16-5-1968 and 16-3-1970, the patitioners sent several representations and letters of protest to various authorities including the Lieut. Governor, the Union Home Minister andthe Central Minister for Works, Housing and UrbanDevelopment ; but without any effect.
(12) On 25-3-1970, they filed the present petition andobtained an ex-parte order of stay of operation of The results of the draw of lots held on 16-3-1970 which,after service of notice on the respondents, was confirmedtill the decision of the petition.
(13) The petitioner contend that all the three resolutionsdated 20-8-1966, 4-3-1967 and 16-5-1968 are illstal,arbitrary, discriminatory and malafide and are, therefore,liable to be struck down. The grievance of the petitioners is that although the members of the four associationswere similarly placed in every respect and had alikeapplied for allotment of plots in one area, respondents5 to 82 have been unduly preferred and each of themhas been allotted a plot measuring 450 square yardsadjacent to the main road, the petitioners have beenallotted smaller size plots in the interior of the area.
(14) The main affidavit in opposition has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 4 by Shri M.L. Mongia, Secretary of the D.D.A. An affidavit has also been filed byShri Bose Mullick, Vice-Chairman of the D.D.A. inreference to the allegations concerning him. ShriKanayalal, Secretary of the respondent-association andone Shri Dharam Vir Bali, have also filed separateaffidavits supporting the action of respondents 1 and 2.
(15) In the affidavits filed in opposition to the petition,besides objections on merits, certain preliminary objections have been raised to the maintain ability of the petition. Before discussing the objections on merits, wewould like to deal with the preliminary objections onwhich a great deal of emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the respondents.
(16) The first objection is that each petitioner has aseparate and independent cause of action arising from the allotment of plot to him. A joint petition by 63petitioners (leaving aside the other three petitionerswho being associations could not be joined at all), isnot maintainable. Reliance for this argument is placedon a decision of the punjab High Court in RevenuePatwaris Union Punjab and others v. State of Punjab ( where the learned Judges(K.L. Gosain and A.N. Grover JJ.) following the decisionof Rajagopala Ayyangar J. in S.M. Muhammad lbrahim v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Pudukottai (A.I.R. 1956 Madras 626 and M. S. Gawpathi Nadarand Sons Factory v. The State of Madras , held that the fact that the relief prayedfor by the several individuals, each of whose individualright was alleged to have been invaded improperlyby the impugned order, was grounded on a commonobjection, did not afford any basis for a joint writ petition by several petitioners aggrieved by similar orders.
(17) The facts in the case decided by the Punjab HighCourt and also in the two cases before RajagopalaAyyangar J. of Madras High court are entirely different.Here the petitioners' grievance does not arise from anyright of an individual having been invaded improperlyby the impugned resolutions. The petitioners in thiscase claim to have been discriminated against as a class.They have a common and joint interest in the subject-matter in controversy.
(18) We were next referred to two decisions of AllahabadHigh Court in Uma Shankar Rai and others, v. DivisionalSuperintendent, Northern Railway Lucknow and others ( and Chandra Kishore andothers v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (. The former is a Bench decisionof V.D. Bhargava and R.A. Misra JJ. where the learnedJudges relying on the statement of law in Halsbury'sLaws of England (Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, page 783.paragraph 1325) held that two or more persons cannotjoin in a single application for a writ of mandamusto enforce separate claims. There must be separatewrits.
(19) The above statement of law has been repeated inVolume Xi, page 83, paragraph 155 of Halsbury's Lawsof England (Simond's Edition). It, however, admitsof an exception and a joint application is permissibleagainst a common or class injury done by a commonorder or orders. This exception was noticed by Kumarayya J. in re : A. Gopala Krishna Rao (A.I.R. 1957 AndhraPradesh 88 and was also referred to in the case ofGanesh Navak v. Land Acquisition Collector (65 CalcuttaWeekly Notes 908. Both these decisions were followedby B.N. Banerjee, J., in Gadadhar Ghosh v. State of WestBengal ( where a petitionby fifty three individuals challenging a notification under section 4 and a declaration made under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was held maintainablealthough all the petitioners did not claim to be jointlyinterested in all the plots under acquisition and wereprobably also entitled to separate plots of land underdifferent rights.
(20) In fact the maintainability of a joint petition in certaincircumstances cannot be said to have been disapprovedeven by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Courtin the case of Uma Shankar Rai and others which hasbeen noticed by us. V. D. Bhargava, J" who wrote thejudgment of the Bench himself referred to the viewof law as stated by Ferris in his extraordinary LegalRemedies (1926 Edition) at page 275 on the basis ofsome American decisions. It was there said :- "THErule is that persons having a commonand joint interest in the subject-matter in controversy may bejoined as relators while those havingseparate and distinct rights may not."
(21) In Chandra Kishore and others'), which was decidedby V.G. Oak, J., every one of the 12 petitioners had adistinct and separate interest in operating his Motor Vehicle under his own permit. There was no questionof discrimination against the petitioners as a class norwas there any joint or common injury as such. Eventhen the irregularity was held to be curable by the petitioners being required to pay up the prescribed courtfee as if 12 separate writ petitions had been filed.
(22) Mr. Frank Anthony, learned counsel for the petitioners, cited on the other hand, another decision ofAllahabad High Court in Haji Abdul Quayum v KeshavSaran and others whereV. Bharagava, J., (as his Lordship then was), sitting withB.D. Gupta, J. over-ruled a preliminary objection raisedon the ground that the petition filed jointly by morethan one person, should not have been allowed. Itwas held that all the 16 writ petitioners had a commoncause of action and were seeking a common relief arisingout of identical facts. There was no reason why theyshould not all join together and seek the issuance ofone single writ so as to serve the object of all the petitioners. The same view was taken by a learned SingleJudge of that High Court in N.C. Upadhya and othersv. State of Uttar Pradesh and others where ajoint patition filed by fifty petitionerswho were tenants of the bungalows sought to be acquired,was held to be maintainable. There is thus no meritin this preliminary objection which is accordingly repelled.
(23) The next preliminary objection is one the groundof laches and delay and is sought to be supported bythe decisions of the Supreme Court in Rabindra NathBose and others v. Union of India and others and Ms Tilockchand Motichand and others v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of SalesTax, Bombay and arother . It was argued that the original decision regardingallotment of plots to respondents 5 to 82 in NarainaIndustrial Area was taken as far back as 20-8-1966while the present petition was only filed on 25-3-1970,i.e., more than 3 years after the cause of action hadarisen.
(24) Mr. Frank Anthony in reply to the objection submittedthat the decision regarding allotment of plots in NarainaIndustrial Area to respondents 5 to 82 was, no doubt,taken in August, 1966, but the petitioners were not sitting quiet during this interval ; they were all along agitating against the decision and ultimately succeededin prevailing upon respondents 1 and 2 to decide that they too would be allotted plots in the same area. Thatdecision was taken on 16-5-1968. But since that decisiontoo was not acceptable to the petitioners, they kept onagitating further against it and it is only when they foundthat respondents 1 and 2 were bent upon giving effectto their decision which the petitioners felt was arbitrary,illegal, mala fide and discriminatory that they approached this Court for redress. The culminating point ofthe process of allotment that bad started with the resolution of 20-8-1966 but was modified on 16-5-1968,was reached when respondents 1 and 2 tried to implement their final decision by the draw of lots held on16-3-1970. The wrong done by the resolution of 20-8-1966did not merely begin and end with that resolution.
(25) There was, therefore no question of any bar of limitationagainst the petitioners nor could their demand be treatedas a State demand.
(26) There is great deal of force in the submission madeby Mr. Frank Anthony. It is true that the variousrepresentations which the petitioners were making afterthey came to know in November, 1966 that respondents5 to 82 had been recommended for allotment of plotsin Naraina Industrial Area while they themselves wereto be placed in the Rewari Industrial Line Scheme,were not statutory representations which could havethe effect of extending time. It is also true (that it isonly the time taken for the decision of an appeal or revision against an order which is prescribed under theStatute and not any and every representation whichthe party aggrieved by the order may choose to make,that can afford explanation for the delay. In the present case, however, fortunately for the petitioners, therepresentations made by them bore some fruit and theoriginal decision of allotting plots in two separate areas,was modified by respondents 1 and 2 and in its placeit was decided that all genuine parties should be allotted plots in Naraina Industrial Area. That decisionwas taken on 16-5-1968. The real grievance of the petitioners thus relates to the alleged arbitrary and discriminatory character of that decision. That decisionis well within the period of limitation and there is alsoample justification for the delay, because it was on8-12-1969 only that respondent No. 1 issued freshallotment demand letters to members of the petitioner--associations calling upon them to deposit the secondInstallment of the premium for the smaller size plotsallotted to them in Naraina Industrial Area. Therefore,this objection of the respondents also fails and is rejected.
(27) The third preliminary objection is based on theexistence of an alleged alternative remedy providedunder the Act. It was argued that under section 21 of the Act the power of the D.D "THEREis no force in the first point.First, the point was not taken in the High Court.Secondly it is settled that the existence of a remedy by way of revision does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a petitionunder Article 226. Moreover, the petitioner hadalleged that the Collector had no jurisdictionto demand the deposit or duty pending the appealsas the notification dated 4/05/1963, was badin so far as it applied S. 129 of the CustomsAct. In these circumstances, it was not necessaryfor the petitioner to have filed revision."
(28) In this case, we are far from satisfied that sections 21 and 41 of the Act can be treated as alternative remedieswhich are equally effective. In the first place, it is doubtful if the Central Government is bound to issue anydirections to the Authority at the instance of a privateparty. That apart, even on facts, the objection doesnot appear to be well-founded. The petitioners haveattached to the petition a copy of the representationaddressed by them to the Lieut. Governor on 31-5-1968(Annexure XV). This was followed by yet anotherrepresertation dated 1-7-1968 (Annexare XVI-A). On27-1-1970, when they failed to obtain redress fromDelhi Administration, they sent a memorandum to theCentral Minister for Works, Housing and Urban Development, Shri K.K. Shah. But all these representationsfailed to evoke any response from the above mentionedauthorities with the result that ultimately the petitionershad to move this Court.
(29) This objection must therefore fail and is rejected.
(30) This brings us to the merits of the controversy betweenthe parties. The relevant facts as to which there isno dispute, are these. The petitioners and respondents5 to 82 are all iron and steel merchants. They havebeen carrying on their business in an area where, according to the "land use'" prescribed under the Master Plan,they can no longer be allowed to do so. There is nothingto suggest that the conditions under which they havebeen carrying on their business are in any way dissimilar. On the other hand, there are clear indicationsthat they are all similarly circumstanced. Section 21 of the Act provides that subject to any directionsgiven by the Central Government under the Act, theAuthority may dispose of any land acquired by theCentral Government and transferred to it, to suchpersons, in such manner and subject to such terms andconditions as it considers expedient for securing thedevelopment of Delhi according to Plan. There canbe no doubt that this power is coupled with a duty toact fairly and reasonably. All the four associationsapplied for allotment of plots in one area, viz., the RewariIndustrial Line Scheme. But when their applicationscame up for consideration, the Land Allotment AdvisoryCommittee (Respondent No. 2) found that althoughthe four associations with a total membership of 317had applied for plots of 1/8 acre for each member, inthe Rewari Line Industrial Area and those who wereasking for bigger size plots were prepared to cut downtheir demand, the existing available number of plotsof 1/8 acre were only about 100. It was.. therefore.considered necessary that if all the applicants were tobe accommodated, some of the bigger plots would haveto be re-carved out and a portion of the area ear-markedfor Group Industries would also have to be divertedfor allotment of plots to them. it was at that stage,decided that the members of the respondent-association may be allotted plots of 1/8 acre each in the NarainaIndustrial Area, Phase Ii and the area shown for GroupIndustries in that scheme may be suitably carved outinto plots of 1/8 acre for this purpose.
(31) It is not denied, as indeed it could not be, that theNaraina Industrial Area is three miles nearer the maincity which is the chief consuming centre for the ironand steel goods and, therefore, offers from the point ofview of trade and commerce several advantages whichthe Rewari Line Area does not possess. No attemptwas made on behalf of the respondents to deny thisfact and the only justification put forth was the onecontained in the resolution, namely, that there werenot enough plots in the Rewari Line Area to satisfythe demands of all the applicants.
(32) Prima fade there is nothing unreasonable about thisexplanation, for it has to be borne in mind that whenthe Authority is faced with such a situation, it musthave some discretion in the matter. But that discretioncannot be arbitrary and has to be exercised in a justand reasonable manner. The resolution passed byrespondent No. 2 on 20-8-1966 does not disclose anybasis for exercise of that discretion. Why the membersof respondent-association alone were singled out forpreferential treatment has not been explained atall. Thevice discrimination is thus writ large in this resolutionLearned counsel for the respondents strenuouslyargued that the petitioners bad no legal right to theallotment of plots in any particular area. Their onlyright was to obtain alternative plots against those theywere asked to surrender. Their is no force in thisargument. If the circumstances under which certainpersons were carrying on their business and the circumstances which bad led to their displacement werethe same, then the State could not discriminate betweenone set of persons and confer certain benefits on themwhich it denied to others. In such a situation, if itwas found that all the applicants could not be accommodated in one area, an attempt could have been madeeither to reduce the size of the plots or to carve out somemore plots or as a last resort, to draw lots among allthe applicants so as to allot the available plots to theluckier ones and to accommodate the rest in othercomparable areas. Respondent No. 2 could not arbitrarily pick up the members of the respondent-associationfor more favorable treatment ignoring the claims ofothers.
(33) The vice of discrimination that was introduced bythe resolution of 20-8-1956, is however, no longer ofimportance, because meanwhile some of the partieswho had previously applied for allotment were notfound to be genuine and on 4-3-1967, the Land Allotment Advisory Committee, passed the second resolution.According to that resolution, the applications of thosewho had neither an office nor a godown in Motia Khanor in any other non-conforming area were decided tobe rejected straight away. The remaining applicantsof the four Motia Khan associations were to bedividedinto the following two categories :- (A)Applicants who had godowns in Motia Khan area(B) Applicants who had only offices in Motia Khanbut had godowns elsewhere in some other nonconforming area.
(34) It was recommended that in the first instance, casesfalling under category A only may be considered. Thenumber of such cases was expected to be nearly 170.Of those the applicants who had been allotted land inNaraina Industrial Area were to be allowed to remainthere but their plot size was to be reduced to 500 squareyards. The remaining applicants under this categorywere to be accommodated in Naraina Industrial Areaand in the Jhilmila Thirpur Industrial Area whereabout 60 plots of 500 square yards each. could be carvedout for that purpose, the exact location could be decidedin each individual case by draw of lots. As regardsapplicants in category B, as well as others who hadware-houses in other non-conforming areas, it wasrecommended that they might be accommodated inRewari Line and Wazipur Industrial Areas. TheCommittee was also of the view that it would neitherbe possible nor desirable to concentrate all ware-housingunits in the particular area and that it would be expedientand useful to spread the iron and steel ware-housesin different areas.
(35) It is not for us to say as to how far the Committee'sview about spreading out the iron and steel ware-housesin different areas, was right. Perhaps it was, but thatdecision has to be left to the Committee which canbe trusted to know what particular allocation well bestachieve the purposes of the Plan. No fault can alsobe found with the Committee's recommendation inaccommodating applicants in different areas when thetotal number of available plots in Naraina IndustrialArea was 100 as against 170 applicants. The vulnerablepart of the resolution, however, lies in this that whilerespondents 5 to 82 were allowed to remain un-touched asif they were a class apart, the allocation of plots in otherareas was confined to the remaining applicants. If the Committee was prepared to adopt the procedure ofdrawing lots among the other applicants belonging toca.tegory A after respondents 5 to 82 were separatedoff, for the purpose of determing as to who among themshould be allotted the remaining plots in Naraina Industrial Area and who should be sent to Jhilmila Tahirpur Industrial Area, we fail to see why the same procedure could not be adopted in respect of the entire lotof 170 applicants, even on the supposition that thedivision of applicants into categories A and B was areasonable classification.
(36) Respondent No. 2, however, gave a go-by to thisresolution as well and instead passed on 16-5-1968a third resolution in which the entire basis of allotment was completely changed. The said resolutionreads as under :- "LANDAdvisory Committee dated 16-5-1968.No. 43 Subject-Allotment of Warehousing Plotsto the Iron Dealers of Motia Khan. The matterrelating to the allotment to the Iron dealers ofMotia Khan in Naraina Phase Ii for WarehousingArea was considered. Those who were found to begenuine parties in the enquiry and who had alsodeposited the second Installment of receiving thedemand/allotment letter, may be allotted plots ofthe size between 450 to 500 sq. yards in NarainaPhase Ii and for the other applicants who havebeen found genuine iron dealers, plots of smallersize about 200 to 300 yards may be allotted inNaraina. For this purpose if the present Warehousing Area falls short of requirements a part of adjoining Industrial Area may be taken and theremaining dealers be accommodated therein. Forthe iron dealers of the second category consideration of the size of plots will also be based onthe existing area in occupation of each unit."
(37) The validity of the above resolution has been attackedby the petitioners firstly on the ground that the allotmentof ware-housing plots in the Naraina Industrial Areawhich is ear-marked for Service Industry, and not forany other industry, is contrary to the Master Plan which,it is said, has not been modified in accordance with theprovisions of section 11A of the Act and secondly, thatit was passed with Shri Vijay Kumar Malhotra in thechair without the matter being on the agenda and withoutany formal discussion. Allegations of mala fides havealso been made and. it is said that the allotment of warehousing plots to respondents 5 to 82 is motivated byextra-legal and political considerations inasmuch asone of the members of the respondent-association,Shri Dharam Vir Ball (Respondent No. 69) is an-influential member of the Metropolitan Council and a closeassociate of Shri Vijay Kumar Malhotra, Chairman ofrespondent No. 2, who is the Chief Executive Councillor. Both Shri Dharam Vir Bali and Shri Vijay KumarMalhotra, it is stated, belong to the same political party,viz., Bharatiya Jan Sangh and that "the discriminatorypolicy adopted throughout in. the matter of allotmentof the ware-housing plots, favoring the respondent-association. and its members consistently to the detriment of the trade and business interests of the threepetitioner-associations, is designed to benefit the respondent association." Yet another ground of attack isthat the very besis of classification of the applicantsfor the allotment of bigger plots is wholly arbitrary anddesigned to benefit responndents 5 to 82. The excuseput forth in the resolution that they had already paidthe premium (second Installment) soon after receivingletters for the allotment of plots in Naraina IndustrialArea, it is said, can hardly hold water and is a mere pretence because petitioners 1 to 63 and other membersof the three petitioner-associations were not even askedat any time to pay the premium for plots in the NarainaIndustrial Area. In their case, therefore, the questionof payment of the second Installment of premium didnot arise at. all. Moreover, even with respect to plotin the Rewari Line Area, they were told by respondent No. 1 vide its letter dated 28-6-1967 (Annexure XIV)that the date by which their members should pay thesecond Installment of the premium would be communicated to them after the question of allotment of plotsin Naraina Industrial Area was decided.
(38) At the hearing of the petition the first ground ofattack was not pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Even otherwise there is no merit in thatground. That apart, its acceptance will hurt the petitioners as much as respondents 5 to 82 because it is underthis very resolution that plots have been allotted inNaraina Industrial Area to the petitioners as well.
(39) The allegation about their solution having been passedwithout the matter having been formally on the agendaor without any discussion is entirely meaningless, forif anything the resolution was rather an attempt atsoftening the blow by accommodating the petitionersin the same Industrial Area with respondents 5 to 82.
(40) The charge of mala fides is also entirely baselessand it is regrettable that such a serious charge shouldhave been. made by the petitioners without proper inquiry and without there being any foundation, for thesame, The decision to allot plots in Naraina IndustrialArea to respondents 5 to 82 was taken by respondent No. 2 on 20-8-1966 under the Chairmanship 'of Mr.Mir Mushtaq Ahmed. the then Chief Executive Councillor, representing the Congress part in the MetropolitanCouncil and not when the Committee was headed byShri Vijay Kumar Malhotra. The later resolutionsmerely allowed that decision to remain undisturbed.
(41) Both Dr. L.M. Singhvi and Mr. M.N. Phadke,learned counsel for the respondents, vehemently arguedthat the petition should be dismissed on this groundalone. It is true that petitioners who invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article226 of the Constitution, are required to exercise utmostcare, inform themselves fully of all relevant facts, andstate them fully. They should neither suppress anymaterial or relevant fact nor make any false allegations,particularly those imputing lack of bona fides to publicauthorities. In the present case, the conduct of the petitioners is certainly blame-worthy in so far as itattributes motives to Shri Vijay Kumar Malhotra andwere it not for the fact that the decision taken by respondents 1 and 2 is clearly assailable on the groundof discrimination, we would have denied relief to the petitioners.
(42) We are, however, of the opinion that the action ofrespondents 1 and 2 is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and has consequently to be struckdown. The petitioners have a just grievance and merelybecause they have either on account of ignorance oras a result of wrong advice, made a false allegation ofimputing political bias to Shri Vijay Kumar Malhotra,they should not be non-suited on that ground alone.The resolution of 16-5-1968 accords recognition to the petitioners' claim that the members of all the four associations should be accommodated in Naraina IndustrialArea. If that is so, then there is no reason why respondents 5 to 82 should be allotted plots varying insize between 450 to 500 square yards each while the petitioners and others should be allotted plots of smaller size between 200 to 300 square yards. Actuallyeach of the 78 respondents, viz., respondents 5 to 82,has been allowed a plot having an area of 450 squareyards. The only reason, which appears to have weighedwith the Committee and which according to the learnedcounsel for the respondents, placed respondents 5 to82 in a separate class, is that they had already deposited the second Installment of premium whereas the petitioners had not done so. That reason is wholly unsupportable. If respondents 1 and 2 wanted to allotplots in Naraina Area to the applicants who had paidthe second Installment before the specified date, theyought to have issued, in the interest of justice and fail-play, allotment demand letters to all the applicants ofthe four Motia Khan Associations simultaneously callingupon each to pay the premium for a plot in NarainaArea by the specified date making it clear that the available plots would only be allotted to those who hadpaid the premium before that date. No such opportunity was given to the petitioners. They were never askedto pay any Installment in respect of plots in the NarainaIndustrial Area. Even with respect to Rewari Lineplots, all the petitioners were not served with any lettersof demand and eventually they were all told that the timefor payment had been deferred and yet that very groundis being put forth as separating them off from respondents 5 to 82. The last portion of the resolution isequally arbitrary. If the criterion for determining thesize of the plot to be allotted to each applicant is to bethe existing area in his or its occupation, as appears tohave been done in the case of iron dealers of the secondcategory, then there is no reason why the same criterionshould not be applied to all the applicants of MotiaKhan Area who had applied for were-housing plots inone and the same Industrial Scheme. The dividing line between the two categories is not only artificial but clearlyarbitrary. The arbitrary and if we may say so, theinequitous character of the! allotment is apparent from the fact that two of the respondents (respondents68 and 79) who were previously occupying an area of 40and 30 square yards each, have been allotted 450 squareyards each and there are several others who havesimilarly benefited by the allotment. On the other hand,petitioner No. 5 who was previously occupying an areaof 1100 square yards, has been allotted an area of 333square yards.
(43) Respondents 1 and 2 were invested with considerable statutory powers in the matter of acquisition anddistribution of land. Even if the powers exercisedby them are held to be administrative in character,they were under a duty to act fairly. Ex fade, theresolution of 16-5-1968 is bad because there is no intelligible or reasonable classification with respect to the petitioners who indubitably formed one class with respondents 5 to 82. There is no rational nexus betweenthe alleged classification and the objects of sections 6 and 7 of the Act and the Master Plan.
(44) On behalf of the respondents, great stress was laidon a Bench decision of this Court in Mrs. Sheila Kapurand others v. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi 1968 D.L.T.438, to which one of us was a party. The case of Sarojini v. Market Shopkeepers Association (Regd.) and anotherUnion of India 1964 P.L.R. 1144 decided by H.R.Khanna J. (as his Lordship then was) was also citedby the learned counsel. The facts in both those caseswere entirely different and the principle of law laid downtherein has no application to the facts of the present case.
(45) Mr. Phadke, learned counsel for the respondents,put forth another argument and urged that it was notnecessary that the material justifying discriminationshould appear in the order itself. According to thelearned counsel, though the resolution in form talksof those who have paid two deposits and those whohave paid only one, in substance, the classificationbetween respondents 5,50,82 and the petitioners is thatbetween allottees and non-allottees and since the allotment in favor of respondents 5 to 82 was made as aresult of the resolution dated 20-8-1966, this Courtin exercise of its discretion should not interfere. The argument is not well-founded. The vice of discrimination lies in the allotment itself. It is not open to anadministrative authority in the first place to createan artificial class by practicing discrimination and thento justify the discrimination on the basis of that classification. The argument about the time lag betweenthe resolution of 20-8-1966 and the filing of the writpetition has already been considered and repelled. Wecannot allow that argument to be raised over againas if by a side-wind.
(46) Mr. Phadke then referred to the following passagein a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rash BehariChatterjee v. Fagu Shaw and others (: "ARTICLE14 of the Constitution ensuresequality among equals: its aim is to protectpersons similarly placed against discriminatorytreatment. It does not. however, operate againstrational classification. A person setting upa grievance of denial of qenail treatment bylaw must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to theirprejudice and the differential treatment hadno reasonable relation to the object soughtto be achieved by the law."
and submitted that in the present case there is no evidence about the petitioners being similarly circumstanced as respondents 5 to 82 and that merely becausethey had all applied together for allotment of plots orwere previously carrying on business in the same areadid not warrant the inference that they were similarlycircumstanced. In view of what we have said before,we are unable to accept this argument.
(47) It was finally argued by both Dr. Singhvi and Vir.Phadke that this Court ought not to disturb the allotment that had already been made after a protractedwrangle between the parties as it was likely to entaillot of administrative work and cause considerable embarrassment. There is no doubt that our decision maynot only cause administrative inconvenience but alsocertain amount of embarrassment. But we cannotshrink away from what we consider to be our plainduty by any such consideration.
(48) The result of the fore-going discussion is that the petition succeeds and the decision regarding allotment ofplots as a result of the various resolutions passed byrespondent No. 2 and adopted by respondent No. 1and all resulting action following those resolutions isqu?shed and set aside and respondents 1 and 2 are directed to make a fresh allotment of plots applying a commondenominator to all the members of the four MotiaKhan Associations whose claims for allotment maybe found to be genuine. There will be, however, noorder as to costs.