Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shri Barakya vs Union Of India on 4 November, 2024
Author: Avanindra Kumar Singh
Bench: Avanindra Kumar Singh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109
1 MA-3000-2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH
ON THE 4 th OF NOVEMBER, 2024
MISC. APPEAL No. 3000 of 2017
SHRI BARAKYA AND OTHERS
Versus
UNION OF INDIA
Appearance:
Shri Ankit Saxena - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Devesh Bhojne - Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
This appeal has been filed by the appellants/claimants under section 23 of the Railways Claim Tribunals Act, 1987 aggrieved by the judgment dated 15.9.2017 passed by Railway Claims Tribunal, Bhopal [for short the "Tribunal"] in Claim Case No.OA/IIu/BPL/2014/0010 [Shri Barakya and others Vs. Union of India] by which the application by father, mother, two minor children (daughter and son) of deceased-Alkesh has been rejected by holding that claimants could not prove their case and the evidence on record is doubtful.
2. Against the aforesaid dismissal of claim application by the Tribunal this appeal has been filed by the claimants on the ground that Tribunal has not given correct finding the same is against the material available on record. The question before this Court is whether instant appeal can be allowed by granting compensation to the appellants/claimants in the facts and circumstances of the case.
3. As per claim application deceased-Alkesh who was resident of Betul on Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 2 MA-3000-2017 09.2.2010 had gone to Hoshangabad to his sister's house. On the same day when same while returning from Bhopal to Hoshangabad when he tried to board in unknown train at that juncture he slipped down on the platform and accordingly sustained grievous head injuries. Thereafter, deceased was admitted to Hospital at Hoshangabad and then he was shifted to Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. During treatment the deceased expired. It was averred that deceased was carrying railway ticket in some pocket, which got lost in the aforesaid accident. It was further submitted that wife of deceased had already expired prior to the death of deceased and, therefore, claim application has been filed father, mother and two minor children of deceased.
4. The Police investigated the matter and filed Annexure-A/1 regarding unnatural death which is by 'Chowki Prabhari', GRP Hoshangabad. Annexure-
A/2 is Merg Intimation, in which, death of cause is mentioned as fall down from train. Annexure-A/3 is 'Naksha Panchayatnama'. Annexure-P/4 is Post-mortem report in which multiple injuries to the body have been mentioned. It is also mentioned that findings are consistent with the history of fall from train.
5. The Railway Department has denied that appellants/claimants are entitled for any compensation. However, in their written statement it is submitted that deceased was trying to board in moving train as a result he slipped and fall down from train.
6. As per report of Senior Divisional Safety Commissioner, Bhopal it is mentioned that deceased-Alkesh died when he was trying to board the train. His leg got slipped and he fall down from train but he did not have any train ticket with him, therefore, claimants are not entitled for any compensation.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 3 MA-3000-2017 Supreme Court in Kamukayi and others Vs. Union of India , [Civil Appeal No.3799/2023 decided on 16.5.2023] and Union of India Vs. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and others, (2008) 9 SCC 527.
8. Learned counsel for the Railway in support of his case has relied on the decision of Coordinate Bench of this Court in M.A.No.1313/2014 [Smt.Satya Kumari and another Vs. Union of India] wherein challenge was made to dismissal of claim application and the Coordinate Bench maintained the dismissal of the claim application on the ground that nobody had seen that 75 years old deceased has purchased the ticket but the instant case is distinguishable from that case as in the present case Applicant Witness (Sunil) has deposed that he had purchased ticket from and while trying to board the running train he slipped and fell down.
In the cross-examination evidence of this witness in sum and substance has remained unrebutted. In fact, question has been proposed to him that when he and deceased went to the Station train was about to leave, which he has accepted.
Therefore, case before this Court is distinguishable on fact from the decision in Smt.Satya Kumari (supra) .
9. In the case of Kamukayi (surpa) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that victim/deceased falling down from running train and sustained grave injuries resulting in amputation of right hand. The investigation revealed that death was outcome of Railway untoward incident. The Claims Tribunal held that appellants failed to prove that deceased died in untoward incident as he was not a bonafide passenger making the Railway liable for grant of compensation. But as per investigation report prepared under Rule 7 of 2003 Rules the fact about untoward incident is proved and fully established which was supported by the testimony of the witnesses. Therefore, decisions of both the courts (Tribunal & High Court) Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 4 MA-3000-2017 were held to be without considering the documents regarding investigation. There was evidence that ticket was purchased and given to the deceased and hence, appeal was allowed and Railway was directed to pay compensation.
10. In the case of Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 35, 37, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52 & 53 of judgment held as under:-
"12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1961 SC 647] (AIR para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority [(1984) 4 SCC 356 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 753 :
AIR 1984 SC 1842] (AIR para 11), Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. [(1981) 2 SCC 238 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 316 : AIR 1981 SC 852] (AIR para
13), S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager [(2003) 4 SCC 27 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 380] (SCC para 12).
13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate [(1995) 6 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1385] this Court observed: (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 41-42) "41. In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this Court in Workmen v. American Express International Banking Corpn. [(1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940] wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made the following observations:
(SCC p. 76) '4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109
5 MA-3000-2017 be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the "colour", the "content" and the "context" of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds [(1971) 1 WLR 1381 : (1971) 3 All ER 237 (HL)] ). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court [(1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] we had occasion to say: (SCC p. 447, para 6) "6. ... Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions." '
42. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., has dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book. The nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659 thus:
'A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by--
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).' At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the topic of 'Purposive Construction' in contrast with literal construction. The learned author has observed as under:
'Contrast with literal construction.--Although the term "purposive construction" is not new, its entry into fashion betokens a swing by the appellate courts away Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 6 MA-3000-2017 from literal construction. Lord Diplock said in 1975 :
"If one looks back to the actual decisions of the [House of Lords] on questions of statutory construction over the last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions." The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock in this way-- ... I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it.' "
14. In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive meaning to the expression "accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers" in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, we will be depriving a large number of railway passengers from getting compensation in railway accidents. It is well known that in our country there are crores of people who travel by railway trains since everybody cannot afford travelling by air or in a private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the expression we will be depriving a large number of victims of train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from getting compensation under the Railways Act. Hence, in our opinion, the expression "accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers" includes accidents when a bona fide passenger i.e. a passenger travelling with a valid ticket or pass is trying to enter into a railway train and falls down during the process. In other words, a purposive, and not literal interpretation should be given to the expression.
15. Section 2(29) of the Railways Act defines "passenger" to mean a person travelling with a valid pass or ticket. Section 123(c) of the Railways Act defines "untoward incident" to include the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 7 MA-3000-2017 passengers. Section 124-A of the Railways Act with which we are concerned states:
"124-A. Compensation on account of untoward incidents.--When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the Railway Administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident:
Provided that no compensation shall be payable under this section by the Railway Administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to--
(a) suicide or attempted suicide by him;
(b) self-inflicted injury;
(c) his own criminal act;
(d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity;
(e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to injury caused by the said untoward incident.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, 'passenger' includes--
(i) a railway servant on duty; and
(ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for travelling by a train carrying passengers, on any date or a valid platform ticket and becomes a victim of an untoward incident."
16. The accident in which Smt Abja died is clearly not covered by the proviso to Section 124-A. The accident did not occur because of any of the reasons mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Section 124-A. Hence, in our opinion, the present case is clearly Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 8 MA-3000-2017 covered by the main body of Section 124-A of the Railways Act, and not its proviso.
17. Section 124-A lays down strict liability or no fault liability in case of railway accidents. Hence, if a case comes within the purview of Section 124-A it is wholly irrelevant as to who was at fault.
18. The theory of strict liability for hazardous activities can be said to have originated from the historic judgment of Blackburn, J. of the British High Court in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1866) LR 1 Ex 265] . Before this decision the accepted legal position in England was that fault, whether by an intentional act or negligence, was the basis of all liability (see Salmond on Tort, 6th Edn, p. 12) and this principle was in consonance with the then prevailing Laissez-Faire Theory.
19. With the advance of industrialisation the Laissez- Faire Theory was gradually replaced by the theory of the Welfare State, and in legal parlance there was a corresponding shift from positivism to sociological jurisprudence. It was realised that there are certain activities in industrial society which though lawful are so fraught with possibility of harm to others that the law has to treat them as allowable only on the term of insuring the public against injury irrespective of who was at fault. The principle of strict liability (also called no-fault liability) was thus evolved, which was an exception to the general principle in the law of torts that there is no liability without fault (vide American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol. 74, p. 632).
22. Strict liability focuses on the nature of the defendant's activity rather than, as in negligence, the way in which it is carried on (vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn., p. 247). There are many activities which are so hazardous that they may constitute a danger to the person or property of another. The principle of strict liability states that the undertakers of these activities have to compensate for the damage caused by them irrespective of any fault on their part.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 9 MA-3000-2017 As Fleming says "permission to conduct such activity is in effect made conditional on its absorbing the cost of the accidents it causes, as an appropriate item of its overheads" (see Fleming on Torts, 6th Edn., p. 302).
23. Thus, in cases where the principle of strict liability applies, the defendant has to pay damages for injury caused to the plaintiff, even though the defendant may not have been at any fault.
24. The basis of the doctrine of strict liability is twofold: (i) The people who engage in particularly hazardous activities should bear the burden of the risk of damage that their activities generate, and (ii) it operates as a loss distribution mechanism, the person who does such hazardous activity (usually a corporation) being in the best position to spread the loss via insurance and higher prices for its products (vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn., p. 267).
26. Many jurists applaud liability without fault as a method for imposing losses on superior risk bearers. Their argument is that one who should know that his activity, even though carefully prosecuted, may harm others, and should treat this harm as a cost of his activity. This cost item will influence pricing, and will be passed on to consumers spread so widely that no one will be seriously effected (vide article by Prof. Clarence Morris entitled "Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity" published in Yale Law Journal, 1952, p. 1172).
35. However, we are now witnessing a swing once again in favour of the principle of strict liability. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the crude oil spill in 1988 on to the Alaska coastline from the oil tanker Exxon Valdez, and other similar incidents have shocked the conscience of people all over the world and have aroused thinkers to the dangers in industrial and other activities in modern society.
37. In India the landmark Constitution Bench decision Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 10 MA-3000-2017 of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] has gone much further than Rylands v.
Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] in imposing strict liability. The Court observed:
(M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] , SCC p. 421, para 31) "31. ... If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overheads."
45. Thus, Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provides for compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and this compensation is not for negligence on the part of the employer but is a sort of insurance to workmen against certain risks of accidents.
46. Similarly, Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, Sections 140 and 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, etc. incorporate the principle of strict liability.
47. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124-A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] . In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one.
48. It is recognised that the law of torts is not stagnant but is growing. As stated by the American Restatement of Torts, Art. 1; vide D.L. Lloyd: Jurisprudence:
"The entire history of the development of the tort law shows a continuous tendency, which is naturally not Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109
11 MA-3000-2017 uniform in all common law countries, to recognize as worthy of legal protection, interests which were previously not protected at all or were infrequently protected and it is unlikely that this tendency has ceased or is going to cease in future."
49. There are dicta both ancient and modern that the known categories of tort are not closed, and that novelty of a claim is not an absolute defence. Thus, in Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 1 : JT (1994) 3 SC 492] the Supreme Court observed: (SCC p. 10, para 8) "8. ... law of torts being a developing law its frontiers are incapable of being strictly barricaded."
52. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that there was no fault on the part of the Railways, or that there was contributory negligence, is based on a total misconception and hence has to be rejected.
53. Thus, there is no force is this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."
11. On perusal of the record and in the light of decisions referred to above it seen that in Annexure-A/4 post-mortem report it is mentioned that there are multiple injuries on the body of deceased and findings have been given which are consistent with the history of fall from train. The Tribunal has not referred to this document and has referred to other documents. The findings of the investigation are in favour of the appellants/claimants. From court statement of father of deceased, namely, Barakya it is clear that he in cross-examination admitted that what he has narrated about the incident is on the basis of information from Sunil (son-in-law of brother). Sunil had gone to the Railway Station and stated Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 12 MA-3000-2017 deceased had purchased Ticket. He also stated that ticket was purchased but deceased while trying to board the train when train suddenly started he lost his balance and fell down while boarding the train. In cross-examination he denied that deceased-Alkesh did not purchase the ticket before him. He admitted that when he went to the Railway Station the train was about to leave but it is wrong to state that since train was about to leave, therefore, ticket was not purchased.
Therefore, evidence of Sunil has also proved that deceased was a bonafide passenger and in the incident ticket got lost which is not unusual and quite possible. Hence, it is a case of untoward railway incident.
12. On the other hand in the decision relied by learned counsel for the Railway Smt.Satya Kumari and another Vs. Union of India the challenge was made to dismissal of claim application and the Coordinate Bench maintained the dismissal of the claim application on the ground that nobody had seen that 75 years old deceased has purchased the ticket but the instant case is distinguishable from that case as in the present case Applicant Witness (Sunil) has deposed that he had purchased ticket from and while trying to board the running train he slipped and fell down. In the cross-examination evidence of this witness in sum and substance has remained unrebutted. In fact, question has been proposed to him that when he and deceased went to the Station train was about to leave, which he has accepted. Therefore, case before this Court is distinguishable on fact from the decision in Smt.Satya Kumari (supra).
13. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned above, this Court is of the opinion that Tribunal has not properly decided the claim application by appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record in their true perspective. Consequently, the judgment of the Tribunal dated 15.9.2017 is set Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:54109 13 MA-3000-2017 aside. This Misc. Appeal is allowed. The appellants/claimants are entitled for receiving compensation of Rs.4 lacs alongwith interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of filing of claim petition till actual payment.
(AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH) JUDGE RM Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAJESH MAMTANI Signing time: 05-11-2024 10:54:58