Central Administrative Tribunal - Mumbai
Sharad S Pente vs Bhabha Atomic Research Centre on 9 October, 2025
1 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24
Central Administrative Tribunal
Mumbai Bench,
MA No.458/2025 in RA No.07/2025
and
R. A. No.07/2025
in
O. A. No. 348/2024
Today this the 09th day of October, 2025
Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. G. Sewlikar, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Sharad S. Pente
Res. H-103, Rail Vihar,
Sector 04, Kharghar,
Navi Mumbai -410210.
... Review Applicant
(Filed by Review Applicant himself)
Versus
1. Union Of India (UoI)
Through, Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE),
Through, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC),
Through, The Director / Controller,
Trombay, Mumbai - 400085.
....Review Respondent
ORDER (By Circulation)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A) :
MA No.458/2025 By filing the present MA, the review applicant (original applicant) has sought condonation of delay in filing the accompanying RA No.07/2025 vide which seeking review of Order dated 03.04.2024 passed in OA No.348/2025, filed on 18.02.2025. The prayers made in the present MA are as follows:-
"a. The Hon'ble Court may kindly pass order for condoning legal delay, if any, in filing connected Review Application against order dated 03/04/2024 in OA 348/2024.2 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24
b. The Hon'ble Court may kindly pass direction to Registry, to list the connected Review Application for hearing. C. Any other and suitable relief to the Applicant which this Hon'ble Tribunal Court deems fit and necessary to meet the ends of justice, equity and fairness in the nature and circumstances of the case."
2. For the delay in filing the accompanying RA, the review applicant has stated the reasons as under:-
"4. Hon'ble Apex Court upheld that a party cannot made to suffer on account of an act of the court. Part of order under challenge in RA is not pronounced in open court on 03/04/2024.
5. Applicant is not in any advantage by fling RA with delay, if any. There is no any reason for delay and as one judgment in UK quotes about delay, "if there is no reason for delay, that itself is a reason to condone the delay". It will be not fair, not in interest of justice to reject RA for delay.
6. Fact is, this is second round of litigation for same issue, biased CR/ APAR gradings with false departmental enquiry. OA 119/2017 was dismissed arbitrarily after filing MA for taking final order in DE on record and appending array of respondents; shockingly, MA has been discarded and not mentioned about same in final order though it is in record of Tribunal's registry. Very shocking, OA 119/2017 was not listed at all in Cause list dated 16/10/2018, date of dismissal.
7. Same happened in case of OA 27/2015, was dismissed arbitrarily after fling MA for taking RTI documents on record and appending array of respondents; shockingly, MA has been discarded and not mentioned about same in final order though it is in record of Tribunal's registry. OA 304/2017 was dismissed at very first non-appearance, after 3year time span, of Applicant (in-person) without disposing MA for appending array of respondents; Applicant had to file WP for restoration, some sort of harassment of poor litigant. All three OAs (para 6&7) has disposed by same bench (2 on 16/10/2018, 1 on next hearing date 31/01/2019).
8. Hon'ble Apex Court always see merits of case even while deciding for delay condonation, in my case also Court condoned the delay in filing SLP in first round of litigation. In this litigation; it is a case of 'playing fraud on courts' by criminal minded BARC officers/ private respondents in OA, with falsification/ fabrication of documents. Applicant trying to bring them to court of justice, who are functioning like water tanker lobby/ sand mafia (who try to kill non-corrupt officers).
9. CITED ORDERS, PASSED BY HON'BLE APEX COURT:
Uol & anr. Vs Santosh Kumar & ors. Order dated 12/01/21 "1. There is a considerable delay of 305 days in filing of these review petitions even then the delay is condoned."
M/s Raghavendra Vs Uol Order dated 04/07/19 "Delay is condoned."
3 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24Sanjeet Kumar Vs Uol & ors. Order dated 02/11/18 "Condonation of delay is subject to the satisfaction of the court of the existence of sufficient cause. Delay in refiling the special leave petition is condoned."
3. By the present MA, the review-applicant (applicant in original lis) seeks condonation of delay in filing the accompanying RA No.07/2025 seeking review of the Tribunal's Order dated 03.04.2024 passed in OA No.348/2024. The said RA was filed on 18.02.2025 and as such there is a delay of 321 days from the date of passing of the said Order under review.
4. Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, prescribes that a review application shall ordinarily be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of the Order sought to be reviewed. The Rule 17 (1) of CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 provides as under:-
"17. Application for Review - (1) No application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed."
That rule, however, does not oust the Tribunal's power to entertain an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or otherwise exercise the power to condone delay where sufficient cause is shown.
5. The settled test for condonation is whether the applicant has shown sufficient cause for the entire period of delay; the explanation must be credible; and account for the whole period for which condonation is sought. Recent Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions emphasise that condonation is an exception and not a rule 4 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24 and that a party must explain delay satisfactorily, and that the mere strength of the merits of the underlying controversy cannot substitute for a bona fide explanation of delay. Courts/Tribunals have also held that the length of delay is relevant and that a party cannot rely on events occurring after expiry of limitation as a sole ground for condonation. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that although a liberal approach may be adopted to subserve substantial justice in appropriate cases (for example, to avoid grave miscarriage), condonation still requires acceptable explanation tailored to the facts.
6. The reasons as stated by the review applicant are quoted in para 2 above. Rule 17 of the Rules ibid does not operate as an absolute bar. The applicant's M.A. is, therefore, maintainable for consideration on merits of the explanation. However, the explanation must account for the entire period of 321 days. The applicant's averments are, however, deficient, as the applicant does not state when he actually received the copy of the Order dated 03.04.2024 (the limitation clock starts from date of receipt). Simply saying "part of order was not pronounced in open court" is not the same as showing that the applicant did not know the content of the Order or was prevented from filing the review application within 30 days. No document (acknowledgement, postal record, judicial record or affidavit of non-receipt) has been produced to show that the applicant only became aware later or that service/communication caused the delay. In the absence of that fact, foundation the bare assertion is insufficient. 5 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24
7. Further the review applicant relies on a long litany of earlier complaints (OAs dismissed, MAs not taken on record, alleged departmental conspiracy and falsification). These are serious assertions but they are general, unparticularised and do not explain why they prevented filing a review application within the statutory period. The law requires a contemporaneous, specific and persuasive explanation for delay, not general allegations of harassment or that the applicant was "busy in other litigation". The Courts/Tribunals cannot accept open ended assertions as an adequate cause for 321 days delay.
8. The applicant has not assigned a cause much less a sufficient cause for the condonation of the delay.
9. It is profitable to refer to the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court reaffirmed that delay cannot be condoned as a matter of routine; it must be supported by a bona fide and well-substantiated explanation and that vague assertions are not enough. The relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the 6 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24 party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.
33. Therefore, in the case at hand, once it has been established that the reasons provided for condoning the delay in the application filed are not sufficient, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the contentions raised by the learned counsel of Respondents regarding Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
10. Further the applicant pleaded that the delay be condoned because the matter is important and cited the cases in which delay had been condoned. We observe that each case must be decided on its facts and the Tribunal cannot accord condonation simply because the underlying dispute is serious or because other courts in different factual matrices condoned the delay. The Tribunal must be satisfied with the explanation for delay before it permits the matter to be entertained on merits. The review applicant appears to suggest that later events (such as attempts to gather materials, alleged concealment etc.) justify the delay. As a matter of law, events occurring only after the expiry of limitation do not, by themselves, explain why the time allowed by law was allowed to lapse; the applicant must show a cause arising within the limitation period which made filing impossible or prevented the applicant from acting. There is no such showing here.
11. In view of the foregoing reasons and the Hon'ble Supreme Court's aforesaid dictum, we do not find any merit in the present 7 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24 MA filed for condonation of delay in filing the accompanying Review Application No.07/2025 and the same is accordingly dismissed for want of sufficient cause.
RA 07/2025 in OA 348/2024
Since the Order under review had been passed by this Tribunal way back on 03.04.2024 in OA No.348/2024 vide which while issuing notice to the review respondent (respondent no.1 in original lis), this Tribunal deems it fit to consider the present Review Application on merits as well in the interest of justice and the fact that the same has been filed by the applicant in person.
2. By way of the present R.A. filed by the review applicant (applicant in original lis), he seeks review of the Order dated 03.04.2024 passed in O.A. No.348/2024, which reads as under:-
"Heard the party in person.
2. Issue notice to the respondent No.1 returnable on 18th July, 2024.
3. Respondents Nos.2 to 13 are not the necessary parties nor the proper parties. Hence, petition stands dismissed against respondent Nos.2 to 13.
4. List the matter before the Registrar's Court for completion of pleadings."
3. The grounds for seeking review stated by the review applicant are as under:-
"5. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF WITH LEGAL PROVISION The Constitution of India: right to live to access with dignity, right to to justice and Principles of natural justice. Judgment, Supreme Court of India, Union of India & Ors. Vs Shantiranjan Sarkar:
"...delay in filing the original application should not be held to be a bar in granting him an equitable relief. Union of India as a benevolent litigant cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong..."8 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24
Bunch of case laws of DAE cases from High Court A.P and CAT, Hyderabad, for point of limitation. In all such cases unexplained delay of about or more than 14 years has been condoned by Hon'ble judiciary. { 0.A. of 2007 the applicant claims reliefs with effect from the date of his appointment i.e.1993 with all consequential benefits; The applicant in the OA was a direct recruit to the post of SA/A after 1.2.1992, the date on which the post was presumably abolished.} FOR compensation & cost, Applicant is placing reliance on Judgments & Orders and would like to reiterate pleading in para 04.17 above herein. Conspiracy by seniors in BARC /DAE, s a case of gross insensitivity.
Since, the Applicant is surviving without any salary/pension, medical facility to his family is deactivated by BARC (5th litigation initiated by the Applicant); his humble prayer to this Hon'ble Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, be pleased to pass direction to BARC to file, all CR/ APAR of Applicant from date of joining and each & every document pertaining to his departmental enquiry in memorandum of charge sheet dated 14/01/2016."
4. The applicant has himself stated in para 4.1 of the RA that 'The Bench raised a query regarding representation and then offered conditional admission, giving options, either dismissal or notice to only respondent no.1", i.e., on the date of admission of the above mentioned OA on 03.04.2024, which is the order under Review. Further in para 4.2 of the RA, the applicant stated that 'Part of the order, namely 'petition stands dismissed against respondents Nos.2 and 13.' was not pronounced in open court. Assuming that the order was drafted after reviewing the pleadings, it constitutes a grave error on the face of the record and/or a mistake by the court. The applicant has alleged mala fide against all private respondents arrayed in the OA and has also sought reliefs against them. Further in para 4.3, the applicant stated that "Legally and logically, without the personal respondents, nothing remains in the original application. All the arbitrary and illegal actions by them stem solely from bias, malice and a desire to satisfy personal ego. They are functioning in a manner that can be described as anti- 9 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24 national. The applicant is assisting the system in bringing them to court. It is misconception of hon'ble members that Respondents Nos.2 to 13 'are not the necessary parties nor the proper parties.' Applicant also asserted in the RA in para 4.5 that 'This Hon'ble Tribunal has erroneously dismissed the original application for respondent no 02 - 13 with erroneous assumption, 'not the necessary parties nor the proper parties', simply overlooking whole pleadings. This is not only a case of 'error apparent on the face of the record' but also, a case of 'miscarriage of justice'. All personal respondents arrayed in OA, logically as well as legally, and 'proper and necessary' party..."
5. Before delving upon the above grounds of the review applicants, we deem it fit to refer the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the scope of jurisdiction of this Tribunal to review its own Order/Judgment:-
(i) In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharmma Vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Others, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 389, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
"It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 1909], there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
10 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24
(ii) In K. Ajit Babu Vs. Union of India, reported in 1997 (3) SCT 639, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"The right of review is not a right of appeal where all questions decided are open to challenge. The right of review is possible only on limited grounds, mentioned in Order 47 of these Code of Civil Procedure. Although strictly speaking the Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not be applicable to the tribunals but the principles contained therein surely have to extended. Otherwise there being no limitation on the power of review it would be an appeal and there would be no certainty of finality of a decision. Besides that, the right of review is available if such an application is filed within the period of limitation. The decision given by the Tribunal, unless reviewed or appealed against, attains finality. If such a power to review is permitted, no decision is final, as the decision would be subject to review at any time at the instance of party feeling adversely affected by the said decision. A party in whose favour a decision has been given can not monitor the case for all times to come. Public policy demands that there should been to law suits and if the view of the tribunal is accepted the proceedings in a case will never come to an end. We, therefore, find that a right of review is available to the aggrieved persons on restricted ground mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure if filed within the period of limitation."
(iii) In Gopal Singh Vs. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn. & Ors., reported in (2007) 9 SCC 369, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"25. The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has traveled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect."
(iv) In State of W. B. Vs. Kamal Sengupta, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"28. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are :
11 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24
(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a Civil Court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.
(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise.
(iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds.
(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).
(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review.
(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22 (3)
(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger bench of the Tribunal or of a superior Court.
(vii) While considering an application for review, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent.
(viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/Tribunal earlier."
(v) In Subhash vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, reported in 2002 (4) SCT 608 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"3.....The Tribunal could have interfered in the matter if the error pointed out, is plain and apparent. But the Tribunal proceeded to re-examine the matter as if it is an original application before it. This is not the scope of review."
6. Now, having regard to the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the scope of review by this Tribunal, as noticed hereinabove, we observe that review jurisdiction is narrow and limited to the extent of (i) mistake or error apparent on the face 12 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24 of the record; (ii) discovery of new and important matter/evidence which by due diligence could not have been produced earlier, or (iii) other limited grounds recognised by law. It is not an appeal or rehearing of the merits; an error to be corrected by review must be patent one which would strike the eye on mere inspection of the record and not something that requires argument or re-appraisal of evidence. The grounds urged by the review applicant, as extracted above, essentially amount to a re-hearing on merits, which is impermissible in review jurisdiction. The applicant has not demonstrated any patent, self-evident error or clerical/manifest mistake in the Order, identifiable from the record itself, that would justify exercise of review.
7. Insofar as the contention of the applicant that 'part of the order was not pronounced in open court' is concerned, it is evident from para 4.1 of the Review Application itself that the Bench had raised a query regarding representation and thereafter offered conditional admission, giving the applicant the option either for dismissal or for issuance of notice confined to respondent No.1. This clearly demonstrates that the Original Application was admitted and notice was directed only to respondent No.1 only, and not to respondents No.2 to 13. Consequently, the OA was not maintainable against respondents No.2 to 13. The finding that respondents No.2 to 13 are neither necessary nor proper parties was, therefore, rightly recorded in the Order dated 03.04.2024 passed in OA No.348/2024, which is now sought to be reviewed.
13 RA No. 07/25 with MA No.458/25 In OA No.348/24
8. Further we observe that the Tribunal has already assessed whether the personal respondents attract any direct relief or whether the relief sought in the said OA requires their presence for an effective adjudication of the issue involved in the said OA. Review Applicant's bald assertion that "without the personal respondents nothing remains" is conclusory. Further, the said OA is under trial/adjudicatory stage and cannot be converted into a ground for review unless there is manifest mistake on the face of the record.
9. Reliance placed on the above judgments are misplaced, as those decisions are fact specific and do not supply the necessary legal basis for condoning the applicant's long delay in the absence of a credible, particularised explanation showing sufficient cause.
10. In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered view that in the aforesaid Order dated 03.04.2014 passed in OA No.348/2024 under Review, no error apparent on the face of the record exists so as to justify invocation of the power of review. Accordingly, the present Review Application is dismissed on merit as well as it is hopelessly bared by limitation.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Justice M.G. Sewlikar) Member (A) Member (J) /ravi/