Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
Awadhesh Kumar Yadav vs General Manager, N E Rly on 6 February, 2026
Reserved on 21.01.2026
Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad
This the 06th day of February, 2026
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A)
Original Application No. 290 of 2017
1. Awadhesh Kumar Yadav, S/o Late Ram Pratap Yadav, R/o Vill
- Mahamudpur, Post - Aunrihar, District - Ghazipur.
2. Shambhu Yadav, S/o Late Shri Ram Yadav, R/o Vill -
Molanapur (Taalgaon), Post - Jakhanian, District - Ghazipur.
3. Santosh Kumar Srivastava, S/o Late Bhagwati Lal, R/o Vill -
Rucchapar, Post - Larroad, District Deoria.
4. Ajit Kumar Yadav, S/o Late Shivnarayana Yadav, R/o Vill -
Sugahi, Ward No. 12, Post - Salempur, District - Deoria.
........... APPLICANT
By Advocate: Shri A.K. Dave and Shri Anil Kumar Singh
Versus
1. Union of India through the General Manager / Senior Deputy
General Manager, North East Railway, Gorakhpur.
2. The Divisional Railway Manager, North East Railway, Varanasi.
3. Dileep Kumar Kushwaha, Working as Cabinman at Railway Station,
Basdih Road, Balia, North East Railway, Gorakhpur.
4. Dharmendra Singh Pankaj, Working as Cabinman at Railway
Station, Saidpur Bhitari, Ghazipur, North East Railway, Gorakhpur.
5. Narad Nath, Working as Cabinman at Railway Station, Nandganj,
Ghazipur, North East Railway, Gorakhpur.
6. Prem Kumar Singh, Working as Cabinman at Railway Station,
Chitbaragaon, Balia, North East Railway, Gorakhpur.
RITU RAJ
SINGH
1|Page
7. Diwan Santosh Kumar, Working as Cabinman at Railway Station
Gautamsthan, Saran (Chapara, Bihar), North East Railway,
Gorakhpur.
8. Rama Shankar Yadav, Working as LCP at Railway Station Unaula,
Gorakhpur, North East Railway, Gorakhpur.
..........RESPONDENTS
By Advocate: Shri Vijay Kumar Singh, Shri Vinod Kumar and
Shri R B Pal.
ORDER
(By Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (Judicial) Shri A.K. Dave and Shri Anil Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Vijay Kumar Singh and Shri Vinod Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, were present at the time of hearing.
2. The instant original application has been filed by the applicant seeking following relief:
"(i) To quash the order dated 09-03-2017 (Annexure No. A-1) passed by the respondent no 1 and 2.
(ii) Direct the respondents to consider the promotion of the applicants on the post of Assistant Station Master in accordance with law.
(iii) To pass any order which this Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit under the circumstances of the case.
(iv) To award cost in favour of the applicant."
3. The instant original application has been filed by the applicants challenging the order dated 09.03.2017 passed by the respondent no 1 and 2 by way of which the respondents have selected the respondents no 003 to 8 (private respondents) on the posts of Assistant Station Master issued in view of notification / advertisement dated 24.02.2016. The contention of the applicants is that respondents have illegally selected non-deserving and ineligible candidates. They have alleged that they were fulfilling the requisite eligibility criteria as was RITU RAJ SINGH
2|Page prescribed in the notification / advertisement and despite being successful at all the stages of the examination, the respondents have not selected them and instead they have illegally selected respondents no 03 to 08. The applicants have also alleged that the respondents have changed the terms and conditions of the advertisement midway through the selection process as the private respondents are Group D employees with less than five years service but still they were permitted to appear in the examination. Thus, by way of the present OA, the applicants have sought quashing of the order dated 09.03.2017 with further direction to the respondents to consider the promotion of the applicants on the post of Assistant Station Master in accordance with law.
Counter on behalf of respondents no 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 has been filed on 13.07.2018 wherein it has been stated that the aforesaid persons were not Group D employee at the time of issuance of advertisement and thus the conditions of completion of 5 years service did not apply on them. The aforesaid candidates were Group C employee and hence they appeared in the selection process in which they turned out to be successful and thus no illegality and infirmity cannot be attributed to their selection as the entire selection process was carried out in accordance with extant rules and procedure.
Counter reply has also been filed on behalf of the respondent no 8 wherein it has been contended that the aforesaid candidate was already working on Group C post and not on Group D post and thus his length of service was immaterial in view of the condition prescribed in the advertisement. It has also been stated that the respondent no 8 was fully eligible to appear in the selection process and entire selection process was carried out in accordance with rules and the candidate was successful in every stage of the examination viz. written test, psyco test as well as in granting of marks on the basis of service records.
RITU RAJ SINGH
3|Page Supplementary Affidavits dated 09.01.2020 and 12.04.2019 have been filed on behalf of the respondents wherein it has been stated that all the private respondents were working on Group C post at the time of issuance of notification and therefore they were well eligible to appear in the selection process without the condition of any requisite period of service to have been rendered by them. The candidates appeared and the entire selection process was carried out in accordance with rules and just because the applicants could not get selected, they have approached before this Tribunal through this OA and wrongly challenged the selection of the private respondents.
Rejoinders against the aforesaid counters and supplementary affidavit have been filed on behalf of the applicants reiterating the facts and circumstances of the case as have been narrated in the OA. It has been contended that the respondents no 3 to 8 were not eligible to have participated in the selection process as they were not fulfilling the terms and conditions which were prescribed in the advertisement dated 24.02.2016. The private respondents were belonging to Group D category and having lesser years of service than what was stipulated in the advertisement for Group D employees. Furthermore, the terms and conditions of the advertisement like granting of marks on the basis of service records, were changed midway through the selection process which is also bad in the eyes of law.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that a notification dated 24.02.2016 was advertised for departmental competitive examination for promotion on the post of Assistant Station Master through 15% Limited departmental examination. Total posts advertised were 23 out of which 6 posts were reserved for General caste, 6 for Scheduled Caste and 11 for Scheduled Tribe candidates. Applicants had applied being the eligible candidates and appeared in the written examination and were also successful. Psyco test was also RITU RAJ SINGH
4|Page held all the applicants participated in the same and were successful. Result was published vide the impugned order but applicants names were not found in the said result instead those employees who were not eligible to appear in the examination were declared successful. It is also argued that applicants have scored higher marks in the written examination as well as psyco test against the selected candidates yet the applicants were not selected. It is further argued that employees disclosed in the impugned order were Group D employees at the time of filling up of the form and they had not complied continuous 5 years of service in Group D cadre and thus, they were not eligible to participate in the examination. Respondents have wrongly promoted them to appear in the examination and lastly had changed the condition of the notification by adding the marks of service records, and accordingly private respondents were declared successful. It is next argued that all the private respondents were cabinman at the time of issuance of notification and the post of cabinman comes under Group D category. Learned counsel for the applicants further argued that although only the result dated 09.03.2017 have been challenged in the present matter yet, in the rejoinder affidavit, specific plea has been taken that condition of the advertisement have been changed during the selection process which is not permissible. It is also argued that even when amendment in the relief clause to this effect has not been made, then also, applicants' plea in this respect cannot be thrown out. Learned counsel for the applicants have placed reliance on the following case laws:
i. Judgment dated 07.11.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No 2634 of 2013 titled Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors Vs Rajasthan High Court & Ors.
ii. Judgment dated 15.02.2008 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No 1313 of 2008 titled K Manjusree Vs State of AP & Anr.
Learned counsel for the applicants have also relied upon / supplied before the Court the Office Order No 134 of 2013 dated
06.11.2013; Office Order No 113 of 2013 dated 16.09.2013; RBE No RITU RAJ SINGH
5|Page 20 of 2019 dated 05.02.2019 with the subject matter "Reduction in the residency period for promotion from Grade Pay Rs. 1800/- (Level
- 1) to Grade Pay Rs. 1900/- (Level 2).
6. Learned counsel appearing for the official respondents argued that all the private respondents selected vide the impugned order have been promoted in Group C category. Post of cabinman also comes under the category of Group C. Thus, plea taken by the applicants that selected candidates were belonging to Group D category is false. It is also argued that in the IREM as well as in the Railway Board Letter No. (E(NG)I-2008/PM7/4 SLP dt. 19.06.2009, it has been provided that while conducting the LDCE marks against the service records will also be counted. Although no specific stipulation in this respect has been disclosed in the advertisement / notification yet on this ground itself, the selection process cannot be invalidated. It is also argued that applicants have not challenged the eligibility of the selected candidates at appropriate stage and thus at this stage, when they were not successful in the examination, they cannot be permitted to challenge the same.
7. Shri Vinod Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent argued that once the applicants have participated in the selection process they are estopped from challenging the result. It is also argued that private respondents had been permitted in Group C thus they were eligible candidates against the advertisement. It is also argued that no criteria has been changed during the selection process rather the statutory provision provided for selection was adhered to in the selection process. Thus on this ground selection process, when the applicants were not successful, cannot be challenged. It is also argued that although at initial stage, effect and operation of the impugned order was stayed by the Tribunal but during the pendency of the OA, it was modified clarifying that official respondents may proceed with the joining etc. and the same will be dependent on the outcome of the present OA. It is also argued that all the private respondents have been permitted to join rather they have already RITU RAJ SINGH
6|Page obtained second promotion thereafter. Learned counsel for the private respondent has placed reliance upon the following case laws:
i. Judgment dated 07.07.2025 passed by the Allahabad Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal in Original Application No 891 of 2016 titled Dinesh Chandra Yadav Vs Union of India and others.
ii. Judgment dated 19.05.2010 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Manish Kumar Shahi Vs State of Bihar and others reported in 2010 0 Supreme(SC) 481 iii. Judgment dated 05.03.2008 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Dhananjay Malik Vs State of Uttaranchal reported in 2008 LawSuit(SC) 226.
iv. Judgment dated 22.02.2007 passed by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Indian Airlines Limited (Southern Region), Rep. by its General Manager (P), "Airlines House", Meenambakkam, Chennai - 600027 and others Vs K Narayanan & Others reported in 2007 0 Supreme(Mad) 644 v. Judgment dated 01.10.1999 passed by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Dr R Murali Vs D R Kamalakkanan and others reported in AIR 2000 MADRAS 174.
vi. Judgment dated 18.03.1986 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Om Prakash Shukla Vs Akhilesh Kumar Shukla reported in 1986 0 Supreme (SC) 88.
8. Shri R B Pal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no 8 did not appear to argue the matter.
9. We have considered the rival contentions and carefully perused the records and gone through the judgments.
10. Before discussing the facts and submissions of the case, the relevant portion of the judgments as relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties are quoted herein below:
i. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants is quoted herein below:
"CONCLUSIONS RITU RAJ SINGH
7|Page
42. We, therefore, answer the reference in the following terms:
(1) Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of vacancies;
(2) Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness;
(3) The decision in K. Manjusree (supra) lays down good law and is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra).
Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) deals with the right to be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree (supra) deals with the right to be placed in the Select List. The two cases therefore deal with altogether different issues;
(4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
(5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility. However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in the gaps;
(6) Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment. The State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list."
ii. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K Manjusree (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants is quoted herein below:
"30. It was submitted that Administrative Committee and Interview Committee were only delegates of the Full Court and the Full Court has RITU RAJ SINGH
8|Page the absolute power to determine or regulate the process of selection and it has also the power and authority to modify the decisions of the Administrative Committee. There can be no doubt about the proposition. The Administrative Committee being only a delegate of the Full Court, all decisions and resolutions of Administrative Committee are placed before the Full Court for its approval and the Full Court may approve, modify or reverse any decision of the Administrative Committee. For example when the resolution dated 30.11.2004 was passed it was open to the Full Court, before the process of selection began, to either specifically introduce a provision that there should be minimum marks for interviews, or prescribe a different ratio of marks instead of 75 for written examination and 25 for interview, or even delete the entire requirement of minimum marks even for the written examination. But that was not done. The Full Court allowed the Administrative Committee to determine the method and manner of selection and also allowed it to conduct the examination and interviews with reference to the method and manner determined by the Administrative Committee. Once the selection process was completed with reference to the criteria adopted by the Administrative Committee and the results were placed before it, the Full Court did not find fault with the criteria decided by the Administrative Committee (as per resolution dated 30.11.2004) or the process of examinations and interviews conducted by the Administrative Committee and Interview Committee. If the Full Court had found that the procedure adopted in the examinations or interviews was contrary to the procedure prescribed, the Full Court could have set aside the entire process of selection and directed the Administrative Committee to conduct a fresh selection. The resolution dated 30.11.2004 was approved. It did not find any irregularity in the examination conducted by the Administrative Committee or the interviews held by the Selection Committee. The assessment of performance in the written test by the candidates was not disturbed. The assessment of performance in the interview by the Selection Committee was not disturbed. The Full Court however, introduced a new requirement as to minimum marks in the interview by an interpretative process which is not warranted and which is at variance with the interpretation adopted while implementing the current selection process and the earlier selections. As the Full Court approved the resolution dated 30.11.2004 of the Administrative Committee and also decided to retain the entire process of selection consisting of written examination and interviews it could not have introduced a new RITU RAJ SINGH
9|Page requirement of minimum marks in interviews, which had the effect of eliminating candidates, who would otherwise be eligible and suitable for selection. Therefore, we hold that the action of Full Court in revising the merit list by adopting a minimum percentage of marks for interviews was impermissible."
iii. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Shukla (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is quoted herein below:
"23. Moreover, this is a case where the petitioner in the writ petition should not have been granted any relief. He had appeared for the examination without protest. He filed the petition only after he had perhaps realized that he would not succeed in the examination. The High Court itself has observed that the setting aside of the results of examinations held in the other districts would cause hardship to the candidates who had appeared there. The same yardstick should have been applied to the candidates in the District of Kanpur also. They were not responsible for the conduct of the examination."
iv. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Dr R Murali (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is quoted herein below:
"45. In the decision reported in 1986 Writ LR 207 (Rathnaswamy, Dr. A. v. Director of Medical Education), their Lordships considered what is meant by 'prospectus and how far Selection Committee is bound by it. In para 2 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus, "......The only aspect argued before us is that the norms of reservation not having been expressed in the prospectus should not be implemented. Then the question is what is the place and significance of a prospectus with regard to admissions to educational courses. We shall not mix up and confuse the prospectus as understood in Company law parlance with the prospectus for educational courses. Prospectus in company law means any document described or issued as a prospectus and includes any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement or other document inviting offers from the public for the subscription or purchase of any shares in or debentures of a body corporate. If there had been an omission to mention the relevant features and if RITU RAJ SINGH 10 | P a g e on account of that a purchaser of what was offered for sale and sold was obliged to resile from the transaction the Courts view the matter from an entirely different angle. There again Courts have expressed their own reservation as to what type of omission should entitle the share holders to get rid of their shares. Forgetting the notion of the prospectus in the company law, parlance, we must deal with the matter from the practical angle of selection of candidates for educational courses offered by Institutions run by the State. The principle has been uniform that violation of the norms of admission laid down and rules and regulations governing the same with immunity have been forward upon and many times have been struck down. These rules and norms are there to be strictly and solemnly adhered to. They alone should be the guidelines for such admissions. In fact, the very decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh v. Sanjay Gulati, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, countenances this principles. The word 'prospectus' is derivative from the word 'prospect'. One of the dictionary meanings for the word 'prospect' is 'to look around', 'to make a search', 'to explore'. A prospectus issued with regard to admission to educational courses is a declaration to the candidates that a field for development of educational potentialities is available for exploration and that there could be a chance of success. It is a piece of information. But, at the same time, we shall not belittle the significance of the need to set out in the prospectus itself a summary or an essence of the norms and rules which should guide and which will be adopted for selection of the competitors in the field of exploration in educational development or at least indicate in the prospectus that there are norms and rules which shall govern. It is highly desirable that a summary or an essence of the relevant norms and rules governing such admissions are set out in the prospectus themselves or their existence at least is indicated therein. But an omission to do so shall not be taken advantage of by way one to negate and ignore the very norms and rules. The very rules and norms have come to be laid down only to govern and to be adhered to and not to be ignored and breached. It is true that if the relevant norms and rules are set out or referred to in the prospectus, a controversy of the present nature would have been very wisely avoided. But the RITU RAJ SINGH 11 | P a g e omission in the prospectus is not an omission or erosion or deletion of the very norms and rules themselves. The norms and rules subsist and they have to hold the field...."
v. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of K Narayanan (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is quoted herein below:
"The principle of estoppel is considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in various decisions.
(i) In the decision reported in AIR 1978 SC 28 (I.L.Honnegouda v.
State of Karnataka and others) the Honourable Supreme Court held thus, "In view of our judgment in Appeals Nos.883 and 898 to 905 of 1975:
(Reported in AIR 1977 SC 876) which has just been delivered and the fact that the appellant acquiesced to the 1970 Rules by applying for the post of the Village Accountant, appearing before the Recruitment Committee for interview in 1972 and 1974 and taking a chance of being selected, the present appeal which questions the constitutionality of Rules 4 and 5 of the 1970 Rules cannot be allowed. It is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs."
(ii) In 1986 (Supp) SCC 285 (Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla) in paragraph 24, the Honourable Supreme Court held thus, "24. Moreover, this is a case where the petitioner in the writ petition should not have been granted any relief. He had appeared for the examination without protest. He filed the petition only after he had perhaps realised that he would not succeed in the examination. The High Court itself has observed that the setting aside of the results of examinations held in the other districts would cause hardship to the candidates who had appeared there. The same yardstick should have been applied to the candidates in the district of Kanpur also. They were not responsible for the conduct of the examination."
(iii) In AIR 1995 SC 1088 = (1995) 3 SCC 486 (Madan Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir), (SCC p.9) it is held thus, "9. The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a RITU RAJ SINGH 12 | P a g e result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla (AIR 1986 SC 1043) it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such a petitioner."
(iv) The above said decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court were followed by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in AIR 2000 MADRAS 174 (R.Murali v. R.Kamalakkannan) (FB) and in paragraph 55, question No.2 was answered thus, "Question No.2: We hold that writ petitioners are not entitled to challenge the selection after having participated in the written examination on the principle of estoppel."
vi. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhananjay Malik (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is quoted herein below:
"8. In Madan Lal vs. State of J & K, (1995) 3 SCC 486, this Court pointed out that when the petitioners appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned, the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Therefore, only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed writ petitions. This Court further pointed out that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the present case, as already pointed out, the writ petitioners respondents herein participated in the selection process without any demur; they are estopped from complaining that the selection process was not in accordance with the RITU RAJ SINGH
13 | P a g e Rules. If they think that the advertisement and selection process were not in accordance with the Rules they could have challenged the advertisement and selection process without participating in the selection process. This has not been done."
vii. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manish Kumar Shahi (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is quoted herein below:
"We also agree with the High Court that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the petitioner's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article d 226 of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition.
Reference in this connection may be made to the judgments in Madan Lal v. State of J&K, Marripati Nagaraja v. Govt. of A.P, Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam 17 and K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines."
viii. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Allahabad Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal in the case of Dinesh Chandra Yadav (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is quoted herein below:
"Learned counsel for the applicant has also further referred to and relied upon the judgement of this Tribunal in O.A./1334/2015 (Anwar Khan and others vs Union of India and ors) dated 20.03.2024 wherein the applicants had requested that this Tribunal may restrain the respondents from applying the principle of reservation while making the proposed promotion to the post of Loco Pilot (Passenger) by non-selection method. The applicants also sought the relief that the respondents be directed to make the proposed promotion strictly on the basis of seniority-cum- suitablity as per common seniority of candidates irrespective of their RITU RAJ SINGH
14 | P a g e caste or tribe status. The applicants in the aforesaid OA had approached this Tribunal before any action was taken by the respondents and they have not participated in the selection process. In the present case, three posts were earmarked for the SC candidates in the notification No. एम.ई.एल/मु लो. िनरी क/मुगल/2014 dated 02.07.2015 (Annexure A-2 of the OA). The applicant has taken part in the selection knowing fully well regarding the provision of certain posts kept reserved for the SC Learned counsel for the applicant has also further referred to and relied upon the judgement of this Tribunal in O.A./1334/2015 (Anwar Khan and others vs Union of India and ors) dated 20.03.2024 wherein the applicants had requested that this Tribunal may restrain the respondents from applying the principle of reservation while making the proposed promotion to the post of Loco Pilot (Passenger) by non-selection method. The applicants also sought the relief that the respondents be directed to make the proposed promotion strictly on the basis of seniority-cum-suitablity as per common seniority of candidates irrespective of their caste or tribe status. The applicants in the aforesaid OA had approached this Tribunal before any action was taken by the respondents and they have not participated in the selection process. In the present case, three posts were earmarked for the SC candidates in the notification No. एम.ई.एल/मु लो. िनरी क/मुगल/2014 dated 02.07.2015 (Annexure A-2 of the OA). The applicant has taken part in the selection knowing fully well regarding the provision of certain posts kept reserved for the SC community. At any stage the applicant has not challenged the notification dated 02.07.2015 declaring that out of 9 vacant posts under consideration, six are unreserved while three are reserved for SC candidates. If the applicant had to challenge the illegality of reservation in the promotion at the first place, he should have done it at the stage of notification itself but instead he participated in the selection process and his cause of action arose only after the final result was declared. Had the applicant qualified finally, he would have no cause for challenging the impugned promotion order dated 04.12.2015 which has been passed on the terms of the said notification. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Manish Kumar Shahi vs State of Bihar and Others SLP (C) No.26226 of 2008 decided on May 19, 2010 [(2010) 12 Supreme RITU RAJ SINGH 15 | P a g e Court Cases 576] referring to the judgements in the case of Madan Lal v. State of J&K, Marripati Nagaraja v. Govt. of A.P., Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam and K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines has categorically held that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that 19% marks has been earmarked for viva voce test, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria and the process of selection. Further in the case of Chandra Prakash Tiwari and others Vs. Shakuntala Shukla and others reported in (2002) 6 SCC 127 it was observed that "no right can be claimed when a candidate appeared in the examination without any protest". Furthermore, in Madan Lal and others vs. State of J & K and others reported in (1995) 3 SCC 486, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held in para 9 that "...In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, [1986] Supp SCC 285 it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such petitioner."
11. In this matter, as is evident from the record, the applicants have applied for the promotion to the post of Assistant Station Master against the vacancy advertised on 24.02.2016. Private respondents (respondents no 3 to 8) had also applied for the same. Applicants and private respondents appeared in the written examination. Till that date, eligibility of the private respondents who have been selected against the advertised vacancies was not made by the applicants. It further appears that applicants and private respondents have also appeared thereafter for psyco test and they were declared successful. It further appears that final result challenged in this matter was declared on the basis of records of service also. In the OA, only the non-eligibility of the private respondents has been challenged but in the rejoinder, allegations regarding change of the advertisement conditions at later stage have also been made.
12. In this matter, notification issued clearly indicates that only this fact was mentioned in it that selection would be made on the basis of written examination as well as psyco test. Final result has RITU RAJ SINGH 16 | P a g e been declared allotting marks on the basis of the service records also. Certainly, nothing was mentioned regarding allotment of marks for preparation of result on the basis of the service records also. Changing of conditions during selection process has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) wherein in the conclusion part, it has clearly been held in conclusion no 2 that eligibility criteria for being placed in the select list, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant rules, so permit. In the present matter, although allotting of marks against the service records have not been disclosed in the advertisement, yet, the extant rules / Railway rules contained in IREC clearly provides that for promotion against the departmental quota, marks shall also be allotted against the service records. If a statutory provision provided for selection of the candidates through LDCE is taken into consideration in light of the ratio laid down in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak (supra), counting of marks against the service records at the time of preparation of final result cannot be taken as changing the conditions of the advertisement midway of the recruitment process. Thus, applicants' prayer in light of the ratio laid down in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) is not liable to be accepted.
13. Now we proceed to deal with the issue as to whether applicants' prayer to challenge the eligibility of the private respondents can be allowed. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, some of which have been referred hereinabove, has held that once the candidate has appeared in the selection process without any protest or challenging the terms and conditions of the advertisement, at subsequent stages when he has not been successful in obtaining the selection, he cannot be allowed to challenge the selection process. In the present matter, private respondents' claim is that they had been promoted to Group C post and they were not RITU RAJ SINGH 17 | P a g e belonging to Group D category at the time of advertisement, thus requirement of the advertisement for five years continuous service in Group D category is not applicable to them. Learned counsel appearing for the parties have placed documents containing rival positions. As regards to Group C or Group D category, we have minutely analysed the same and find that at Annexure No CR-4 filed along with the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the official respondents, RBE No 5/2010 has been issued by the Railway Board in which clear classification of category of services of the railway department have been mentioned. The present advertisement is relating to the year 2016. Nothing is on record brought by the parties to show that aforesaid RBE has been withdrawn. If the private respondents whose names have been found in the impugned order / select list were in Grade Pay of Rs 1900 and they claimed that they have been promoted in Group C and the aforesaid RBE also support the plea of the private respondents, we are of the view that submissions raised on behalf of the applicants that private respondents were not belonging to Group C category are not acceptable. It is pertinent to mention here that eligibility / non eligibility of the private respondents have not been challenged at initial stage. The present OA has been filed by the applicants when they were unsuccessful. They had participated in the selection process along with the private respondents. A list of successful candidates of the written examination was also published and at that time also, applicants have not challenged the eligibility / non eligibility of the private respondents. Even they had participated in the psyco test and no challenge was made at that stage also. Thus, in view of the settled proposition of law, at later stage when the applicants were not successful in getting the selection, they are estopped from challenging the final result.
14. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussions and analysis, we are of the considered opinion that no case is made out to grant any relief to the applicants. They had appeared in the examination along with RITU RAJ SINGH 18 | P a g e the private respondents and at no stage of the examination, the applicants had protested or challenged the participation of the private respondents in the examination. Only when they were unsuccessful in the exam and private respondents turned out to be successful in the same, they challenged the eligibility and participation of the private respondents. The same is unacceptable in view of the case laws as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Secondly, the contention of the applicants that terms and conditions of the advertisement / notification were changed mid way through the examination process just to accommodate the private respondents, is also devoid of substance and meaningless as discussed hereinabove. Therefore, the instant case is liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed being devoid of merits. The effect and operation of the impugned order remains intact.
15. All the associated MAs stand disposed of. No costs.
(Mohan Pyare) (Justice Om Prakash VII)
Member (Administrative) Member (Judicial)
(Ritu Raj)
RITU RAJ
SINGH
19 | P a g e