Madras High Court
Munuswamy vs S.S. Nathan on 28 October, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)CTC40, (1996)IMLJ176
ORDER S.S. Subramani, J.
1. This Revision is filed by the landlord in R.C.O.P No. 42 of 1988, on the file of Rent Controller (District Munsif), Tiruppur. He filed the petition for eviction on the ground that the tenant has committed wilful default in paying the rent, and also on the grounds of change of user and bonafide requirement for own occupation, i.e., for the occupation of his son, who is married and living with the landlord.
2. Before eviction proceedings started, the landlord issued notice on 1-11-1988. In that notice, he stated mat there was a prior negotiation between the parties wherein the tenant had agreed to vacate the premises within six months, and on the date of notice, the agreed period is due to expire, and that he was just reminding the tenant about the assurance. In the notice, he has stated that the building is required bona fide for the occupation of his son Ranganathan who is married and has two sons. On 18-11-1988, the tenant sent a reply. He denied the so called assurance referred to in the notice. He also disputed the claim of the landlord that the building is required for his bona fide own occupation. He denied the allegation that the building was put to non-residential user. It was thereafter the Eviction Petition was filed. In the eviction petition, he has stated that along with him, his son is also residing along with his wife and two children. Further, he has got five daughters, of whom three are married, and the second daughter who is a widow is also living with the petitioner in the same house with her two children. Under these circumstances, the landlord wants his married son and his family to live in a separate residence. The other two grounds are, default in paying rent and also conversion of the building into non-residential. It is also stated in the petition that close to the schedule building, the petitioner has got another building wherein one Thiagarajan is residing, being employed in a banian company opposite to that building. The petitioner has stated that the rent from that building is Rs. 475/- whereas the rent from the petition mentioned building is Rs. 350/- and since he is despending only on the rental income, he wants the schedule building so that the income may not be affected.
3. A detailed counter affidavit was filed reiterating the contentions raised in the reply notice.
4. Before the Rent Controller, Ex.A-1 and A-2 were marked and the petitioner examined himself as P.W.1. The respondent examinrd himself as P.W.1 and another witness as P.W.2. Ex.R-1 to R-8 were marked on the side of the respondent.
5. The Rent Controller, as per Order dated 12-12-1989, held that the landlord is not entitled to any relief, Alt the grounds of eviction were found against the landlord.
6. Regarding the claim for bona fide own use, the Rent Controller was of the view that the requirement is that of the son, and if so, the son ought to have been examined, and the non- examination of the son was considered as a serious inroad into the claim of bona fide requirement for own use. The Rent Controller also found that the claim of the landlord that so many persons are residing in the same house is not substantiated by any documentary evidence. At the same time, the Rent Controller found that the claim of the tenant that the landlord wanted a higher rent and when the same was refused to be paid, the petition for eviction was filed is not correct. The Rent Controller found that there was never a demand for enhanced rent, The other grounds were also found against the landlord. But in this Revision Petition, we are concerned only with the point as to whether the requirement of the landlord bonafide for the use of his son, is made out by the landlord.
7. When the matter was taken on Appeal, the Appellate Authority also confirmed the decision of the Rent Controller, mainly relying on the decision reported in (1984 (2) M.L.J. 6) (Jagannatha Chettiar v. Swarnmbal), wherein Ratnam, J., as he then was, has observed that 'the non-examination of the person for whom the premises required is fatal to the petition'.
8. Against the concurrent finding, a Revision was filed before this Court, and, as per Order dated 18-11-1994, the revision was allowed. At the time the respondent did not appear. The concurrent decision of the Authorities below was set aside. The matter was taken before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the Order of this Court, and directed that the matter be disposed of afresh after hearing the parties. It is thus the Revision has come for rehearing.
9. Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act enables a landlord to get possession of a residential building in case it is for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family, if he or the member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned. But that section is controlled by clause (e) wherein it is stated that if the claim of the landlord is bona fied, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application.
10. In this case, it is admitted that Ranganathan, son of the landlord is not possessing any residential building of his own, and from the evidence, it is clear that he is also residing along with the landlord. He is also a member of the family of the landlord in view of the definition Under Section 2(6) of the Rent Control Act. As per the decision reported in 1975 - I - M.L.J. 337 (Annamalai and company, by its partners. S. Sundaram Chettiar v. Sital Act), it has to be held that the petitioner will be entitled to get an order of eviction against the landlord even if the landlord is residing in his own building, for , the person for whose requirement the building is sought, is not in possession of any building of his own. In the said decision, it has been held thus:-
"....The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that both under the main part of section 10(3)(a) (i) and (iii) as well as the second proviso to that section the respondent is not entitled to file this application. According to the learned Counsel when the respondent obtained an order of eviction and got possession of a building, though for the purposes of residence and business of her husband she shall be deemed to be in occupation for purpose of her residence and business of the building which is her own and therefore she would not satisfy the conditions prescribed Under Section 10(3) (i) and (iii), Even if it can be considered that the prior order of eviction was for purpose of her husband's business the proviso bars entertainment of another application by the respondent. On a plain and grammatical reading of the language used in clause 10 (3) (a) (i) (iii) I am unable to accent this contention. In my opinion the owner of a residential premises could invoke the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(i) if the building is required for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family. The condition imposed under that section of 'not occupying residential building of his own' is to be understood with reference to the person for whose occupation the building is required. Therefore even if the owner of the house is occupying another residential building of his own he could apply for eviction of a tenant of another building if that building was required for the occupation of any member of his family. In clause (3) of that sub-section the words used are "if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of business which he or any member of his family is carrying on a non-residential building....which is the own, "Thus here also in the case of eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building the condition to be satisfied is that the person for whose business the building is required shall not be in occupation of a non-residential building of his own. In other words, the landlord though he may be in occupation of a non- residential building for purpose of his business, could apply for eviction of a tenant in respect of another non-residential building if required, for the purpose of a business which any member of his family is carrying on provided the person for whose benefit the non-residential building was required by the landlord is not already in occupation of non-residential building of his own. Any other construction in my opinion would nullify the amendment of the section by introduction of the words 'any member of his family. 'The second proviso to this sub-section could apply only to a case where the main part of sub-clause (i) and (iii) is applicable for if the landlord-petitioner does not satisfy the requirement of clauses (i) and (iii) on the ground itself the petition would be liable to be dismissed and there can be no occasion for invoking the provisions of the proviso....."
In view of the said decision, the petitioner is qualified or is eligible to file a petition for eviction.
11. The other question to be considered is, whether the landlord has come to this Court with bona fides.
12. Both the Authorities below have accepted the evidence of the petitioner mainly for the reason that the son for whose requirement the building is required, was not examined. According to both the Authorities below, the son is the best person to speak about the requirement and he must have been examined so that the Authorities below might be in a position to understand the bona fides of the requirement, and the evidence of the petitioner cannot be substituted for the evidence of his son.
13. The Authorities below relied on the decision reported in 1984 - II M.L.J. 6 (R. Jagannatha Chettiar v. Swarnmbal). In paragraph 6 of the judgment, it has been held thus:-
"....Apart from this, the best person to speak to the requirements for her own use would be the daughter of the landlord and she has not been examined. .... ....."
But, when we go through the later portion of the judgment, we find that the decision was not on the basis of the absence of evidence of the daughter. The learned Judge dismissed the petition on the maintainability itself. In fact, the question of bona fides was not a matter in issue in that case where the learned Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that the landlord is disqualified for filing any application. The said observation of the judgment can only by an obiter.
14. In 1983 (2) R.C.J. 610 (V.R. Shah and Anr. v. TV. Visalakshi), a similar question came for consideration before this Court. Mohan, J., as he then was, held thus:
"....The law does not require that be landlord herself must enter into box and depose evidence.....If all the requirements of section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act are tested in the light of section 10(3)(e) that will be enough to grant the relief.
The learned Judge considered the judgments of various High Courts and came to the conclusion that the bona fide is not a matter of subjective satisfaction. The Court will have to consider the claim of bona fide taking into consideration various circumstances. Similarly in 1983 - II - M.L.J. 354 (P. S. Palaniappa Chettiar v. A. Simen George), it was held thus:-
"It is not necessary that the landlord alone should got into box and depose about his bona fide requirement. Even his own agent or anybody on his behalf whose evidence is cogent, convincing and trustworthy can be taken on its face value either for upholding or for rejecting the case of the landlord. Under the circumstances the failure on the part of the landlord to go into the box and examine himself cannot be taken as a ground for not upholding his claim of bona fide requirement of the dismissed premises."
15. In 1984 K.L.T. 1016 (Bhaskaran v. Unni), a learned Judge of the Kerala High Court has held thus:-
" There may be a variety of justifiable grounds which preclude the landlord from giving evidence in the case directly and in person. To consign a petition for eviction to an irredeemable door in such cases, for the only reason that the landlord did not himself give the evidence, even when there was abundance of other evidence establishing the claim, would be a gross deflection of the course of justice. It is not an inflexible requirement of law that the landlord should necessarily enter the witness box to give the evidence. It would depend upon the facts of each case. P.W.2 the husband of the landlord was fully competent to swear to the material facts establishing the specific plea put forward as a ground for eviction. In a sense, he was more competent to speak about the material facts such as the termination of his contract of service in Nigeria and the consequent necessity for a return to the home State. It was be who had correspondence and conversation with the tenant. To insist that even in such a case the landlady herself should appear in court and give evidence is totally unreasonable"
The same was followed by the Same High Court in the decision reported in 1986 K.L.T. 663 (Subaida v. Krishnan) wherein it was held thus:-
" What the landlord is to establish is that he bona fide needs the building. This can be proved in any manner provided under the Evidence Act, namely, by adducing oral or documentary evidence. In this case the landlord is a Muslim Pardanishan lady. Her husband has given evidence in the Rent Control Petitions. He has stated that his wife is Pardanishan lady and does not usually go to public offices. He has also spoken about the need of the landlord for the buildings. He was fully competent to swear to the material facts to prove the bona fide need of the landlord. In a sense he is more competent to speak about the material facts when the landlord herself, since it has come out in evidence that he is attending to all such matters on her behalf. To insist that even in such a case the landlady herself should appear in court and give evidence is totally unreasonable.
16. In (1993) 2 SCC 68 (Gulraj Singh Grawal v. Dr. Harbans Singh and Anr.), on a similar point their Lordships have held as follows (in paragraphs 7 and 8) ".... it would be appropriate to dispose of the challenge made to the finding of fact of landlord's personal need, on which this question arises. The finding on this question of fact recorded by the appellate authority has been affirmed by High Court. Can this finding be reopened now?
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the personal need found proved is only of respondent 2, son of respondent 1, who did not enter the witness-box and, as stated in an affidavit filed in this Court, ever he is carrying on his profession at a place about 25 kms. away from Ludhiana, in our opinion, this finding of fact is un-assailable. The High Court has clearly observed that no meaningful argument could be advanced on behalf of the appellant to challenge this finding of the appellate authority. Respondent 1 who is the father of respondent 2, has supported and proved the need of respondent 2, who also is a landlord. The fact that for want of suitable accommodation in the city of ludhiana, respondent 2 is at present carrying on his profession at some distance from Ludhiana is not sufficient to negative the landlord's need. In these circumstances, the (non- examination of respondent 2 also, when respondent 1 has examined himself and proved the need of the landlord, is immaterial and, at best, a matter relating only to appreciation of evidence, on which ground this finding of fact cannot be reopened....."
17. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a decision reported in AIR. 1995 Kerala 4 (Thomas John v. P. Kochasmini Amma and Ors.). According to me, this decision of the Kerala High Court may not be of any assistance to the respondent, and no adverse inference can be drawan from the non- examination of the son of the landlord. In the said decision, their Lordships of the Kerala High Court have accepted the principle laid down in the decisions reported in 1984 KLT 1016 (supra) and 1986 KLT 663 (supra), but distinguished the same on the ground that the evidence in that case was not sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the Court regarding the bona fides of the claim. The learned Judges said that the issue whether the landlord is to be examined or the person for whose requirement the premises is needed is to be examined, should be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant portion of paragraph 21 of the said judgment reads thus:-
" The position therefore is that in every case the petitioner cannot be insisted to tender evidence to speak about the bona fide need for own occupation. But it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the two decisions aforementioned the husband was speaking on behalf of the wife and the requirement was for the occupation of both of them. Under such circumstances the husband was competent to speak on behalf of the wife and as observed in those decisions he would be more competent. The question how far the non-examination of the landlord is material has therefore to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. In short, what is required is the satisfaction of the Rent Controller that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. That has to be tested on the materials available including the oral testimony to ascertain the state of mind of the person who needs the building for own occupation."
Learned counsel for the respondent, on the basis of the said decision wanted me to hold that bona fide means 'state of mind', and that the state of mind can be manifested only by the person who desires the building for his occupation, I cannot accept the argument of the learned counsel, especially in view of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1596 (Mattulal v. Radhe Lal), where their Lordships held thus:-
"...mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business is not decisive. It is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is (bonafide). The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one and merely because a landlord asserts that he wants the non- residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business, that would not be enough to establish that he requires it for that purpose and that his requirement is bona fide. The word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show - the burden being upon him - that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business....."
If (bonafide) means only state of mind, the assertion of the landlord could be sufficient. When the same depends upon various other circumstances and the Court has to rely on those circumstances, it is not the state of mind alone, but something more has to be considered by this Court. That apart, even that decision only supports the view whether, on the evidence adduced, (bonafide) is proved or not.
18. While interpreting the Rent Control Act, the Supreme Court has held in (1979) 1 SCC 273 (Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan dead by L. Rs. and Ors.) that the Rent Control Act strikes a balance between the landlord and the tenant, and the same should be interpreted in such a way as to achieve the object of the landlord to evict a tenant where it so provides. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, their Lordships have held thus:-
"...It seems to us that the connotation of the term 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country......."
The said decision was followed by the Supreme Court again in the decision reported in (1980) I SCC 296. In paragraph 16 of the said judgment, their Lordships held thus:-
"....Before discussing the relevant provisions of the Act it may be necessary to observe that the Rent Control Act is a piece of social legislation and is meant mainly to protect the tenants from frivolous evictions. At the same time, in order to do justice to the landlords and to avoid placing such restrictions on their right to evict the tenant as to destroy their legal right to property certain salutary provisions have been made by the legislature which give relief to the landlord. In the absence of such a legislation a landlord has a common law right to evict the tenant either on the determination of the tenancy by efflux of time or for default in payment of rent or other grounds after giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act. This broad right has been curtailed by the rent control legislation with a view to give protection to the tenants having regard to their genuine and direct needs. While a rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants, if should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance one of the grounds for eviction which is contained is almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord's bonafide personal necessity. The concent of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical................."
19. When we consider the provisions of the Rent Control Act especially in the case where the landlord puts forward a case for eviction on the ground that he requires the building for the occupation of any member of his family, that is a case of dependency of that member of the family of the landlord. That dependency has to be considered from a broader and humane outlook. It is not a case where the members of the family are claiming occupation as of right, but where the landlord feels that he must provide them with an accommodation. He feels that it is his duty to provide them accommodation so as to have a proper family relationship. The requirement for separate accommodation may be for the member of the family. But the bona fide is on the landlord. So, the non-examination of the person for whom it is required is not the basis. Even if the member of the family for whose occupation the building is required shows bona fide in case the claim of the landlord is lacking in good faith, the petition cannot be allowed.
20. Section 10(3)(e) of the Act says that the claim of the landlord must be bonafide. If we consider the provisions of the said Act in that view and interpret the same in humanitarian point of view, for keeping good relationship or maintain a healthy relationship between the members of the family, it cannot be said that it is merely a statement that will have to be considered for showing good faith. Even if the requirement is for the member of the family, the claim is only by the landlord. It is that claim that has to be put forward in the petition. Taking into account this proposition, it cannot be said that merely because the dependent's son is not examined, the petition for eviction is lacking in good faith.
21. In 1991 (2) KLT 862 (Rajamma v. Leela), a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court said that there cannot be an absolute distinction between the need of the landlord and the need of a member of his family. Their Lordships, after following the decisions reported in 1983 (1) RCJ (Karnataka) 516 (Dr. Syed Sibgathulla v. C.M. Abdul Azeez Khan) and 1983 (1) RCJ (Delhi) 158 (Shri Butha Singh v. Shri H. V. Nayar), held thus (in paragraph 15 and 16) We do not think Section 11(3) of the Act makes an absolute distinction between the needs of the landlord himself and that of any member of his family dependent on him. In our view, the need of the dependent who is a member of the family can also be that of the landlord because the need is related to dependents. The question would be one of bona fide of the claim and if it is not in doubt, the claim must succeed. But, then, the bona fides cannot be doubted and the claim cannot fail for the only reason that in the notice the need canvassed in the petition was not projected. With respect, we arc unable to hold that (Ayanashilingam Chettiar v. Chunilal Samji) ILR 1980 (1) 310, lays down the correct law.
In Narayana Pillai v. Ponnappan Achari, 1980 KLT 871, it was helds:
"Though in strict legal parlance dependence may mean looking up for support or maintenance, in the context in which that term appears in S. 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act it connotes a wider concept and covers a larger field. It takes in a person who is not financially dependent upon the landlord but who would in the normal course look up to the landlord to provide him with the facility of a building possessed by the landlord. Whether the landlord would do so or not to such a dependent would depend on various facts and circumstances including the financial situation in which the landlord is placed, the degree of closeness or intimacy with the dependent who seeks the provisions of such building and other similar matters of relevance."
In Dr. Syed Sibgathuila v. CM. Abdul Azecz Khan, 1983 (1) RCJ (Karnataka) 516, the question that arose for consideration was whether " in an application made by landlord Under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, which enables the recovery of possession of a premises from the tenant if it is bonafide and reasonably required by the landlord fro occupation "by himself, an order for recovery of possession can be made if it is made out that the premises is required for the residence of his major son".
It was held:
"... the construction sought to be placed on the word 'himself by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that it only refers to the landlord in person or his dependents, who reside with him and not scperately. Such a construction, in our view, is too technical and artificial as it would the provision of its real intention and purpose and it does not merit acceptance. Under variety of circumstances, the actual occupation of the premises by another has to be regarded constructively as the occupation by the 'emanation' of the landlord himself."
In Shri Butha Singh v. Shri H.V. Nayar, 1983 (1) RCJ 158 (Delhi), the Delhi High Court held:
"If the children of a landlord have no accommodation of their own for residence, they would depend upon parents for residence. Further it would be reasonable to conture the word 'himself in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act to include the family of the landlord including his son, sons wife and their children.........."
22. In fact, the proposition that 'bona fide is state of mind' was first enunciated by the Bombay High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1981 Bombay 1 (Nanalal v. Smt Samratbai). The said decision was overruled by the Bombay High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1984 Bombay 340 (Nathulal Gangabaks Khandelwal and Ors. v. Smt Nandubai and Ors.). While considering the same, their Lordships of the Bombay High Court referred to the decision in AIR 1981 Bom, 1 (supra) and extracted the relevant portion which reads thus:-
The respondent, who is the landlady, has not been examined in support of her case nor has she been examined as a witness on commission. On this ground alone the suit of the respondent ought to have been dismissed because the bonafide requirement which, as I have mentioned above is a state of mind and something more must be proved in this case. Ramanlal, the respondent's son, is said to be her constituted attorney but that could only be for the purpose of conducting the case but his evidence cannot be substituted for the legal evidence of the landlady herself."
After extracting the above, their Lordships held thus :-
"With respect we do not find ourselves in agreement with the proposition which has been adumbrated by the learned single Judge in the extracts quoted above. What is required to be done by a landlord for obtaining possession Under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Act or under Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order for permission to determine the tenancy is to establish that he needs or requires the premises bona fide for his own use and occupation. The question whether the landlord so requires or needs the premises or the house and whether such need requirement is bona fide or not would be a question of fact which of course the landlord would have to establish for success in the case. Neither the provisions of the Bombay Act non the Rent Control Order make any provision as to how and in what way the landlord has to establish these two facts. Under Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act he has to satisfy the Court in this regard and under Clause 13 (3) (vi) he has to satisfy the Rent Controller. It would appear that the evidence which the landlord would adduce to establish these factors should be sufficient to satisfy the Court or the Rent Controller as the case may be. In the absence of any specific provision as to how the need or the requirement has to be established, these facts could be proved by the landlord by adducing any evidence which satisfies the Court or the Rent Controller. It may be that certain facts which are needed to establish these requirements arc in the personal knowledge of the landlord alone and could not be proved unless he is examined. In such a case it may be necessary for the landlord to step in the witness-box and the authority concerned may not accept any other evidence. But if these two factors can be established by any other evidence, than that of the landlord, by putting on record circumstances which sufficiently indicate that the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his use and occupation, we fail to sec why it should be necessary as a matter of law that the landlord must examine himself with fatal consequence if he omits to do so. It may be as has been said by the learned single Judge in Nanalal's case (AIR 1981 Bom.1) that bona fide requirement is states of mind though it may be something more. But if that is required to be established is (bona fide) requirement, one fails to see why it should be necessary to be done only by the evidence of the landlord and none else if such requirement can be established to the entire satisfaction of the authorities concerned by any other evidence. In our view, the learned single Judge, has laid down the proposition in a very wide, absolute and abstract terms. In our view, the question whether the evidence with regard to the bona fide requirement of the landlord should not be accepted in a given case in the absence of the evidence of the landlord himself, would depend upon the facts and evidence in that particular case and any absolute proposition as has been done by the learned single Judge cannot be laid down in this behalf. It is for these reasons that we, with great respect to the learned single Judge, do not agree with what he has said and in our view Nanalal's case does not lay down the correct law in this respect."
23. So, on the basis of the above settled position of law, the findings of the Authorities below that since the son of the landlord has not been examined, the petition is lacking in good faith, cannot be accepted. On the basis of the available evidence, whether the petitioner is entitled to succeed, was not properly considered by the Authorities below. The Rent Controller was of the view that since the landlord has not produced the electoral card or the ration card to show the number of persons residing in that house, the landlord has not substantiated his claim. This observation pre-supposes that only if the landlord proves the number of persons residing in his house, he can ask his son to go and live separately. That is not the law. The landlord has come to Court, to provide for his son, to maintain good family relationship. The larger the number, the bickerings in the family will also be more. In such a contingency, it is the duty of the father to see that his dependants retain good family relationship and if he feels that that relationship can be maintained by providing separate accommodation for his son and his family, it cannot be said that that statement or claim is lacking in good faith. It is not the state of mind of the son, but the good intention on the part of the father to ask his son to have a separate residence. For the said purpose, the father also need not show that among the members of the family, there is misunderstanding or that they are exchanging bad words. It is only to avoid a strained relationship, a separate accommodation is sought for. The law does not say that only if the landlord his case about the number of members in his family, another member can be provided a separate residence. The landlord may be in a position to accommodation his son and his family also in his house, even without providing a separate accommadation. But that is not the intention of the legislation. As stated earlier, the dependency has to be interpreted more in a humane atmosphere.
24. When the landlord was examined, he spoke in terms of the petition. He said that he wants to provide a separate residence for his married son since there are other members in his family including married daughters, and thus there is a big establishment. When the respondent was examined on this aspect, he only pleaded ignorance. When there is positive evidence adduced by the landlord that his family which is a big establishment is living in the building in question, the insistance by the Rent Controller that electoral card or ration card should have been produced, is not justified. Even though the law permits the landlord to get eviction, the procedure adopted by the Authorities below has disabled the landlord from getting it. That should be avoided. On going through the evidence in this case, I feel that the Authorities below have misdirected themselves in interpreting the law, and misinterpreted the evidence itself.
25. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision reported in AIR 1988 SC 1060 (Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar) where in their Lordships interpreted Section 10(3)(a)(iii) read with Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Their Lordships held that the bona fide will have to be proved before getting an order of eviction. It must be a justified claim or a rightful claim. I am bound by the said decision and I follow the same in this case also. On the basis of the evidence adduced in this case, I am of the view that the landlord has proved his just claim and is, therefore, entitled to get an order of eviction.
26. Learned counsel for the respondent also reminded me of my jurisdiction, sitting in Revision.
27. I am well aware of the revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Control Act, namely, that I should not re-appreciate the evidence, as if I am sitting in Appeal. But when the Authorities below have completely ignored the provisions of law and have been too technical in interpreting the Section so as to deny the landlord the benefit of getting an order of eviction, the same can be rectified in Revision. The illegality committed by the Authorities below both in misunderstanding the law and also misinterpreting the evidence can be corrected in Revision.
28. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, The Judgments of the Authorities below are set aside. R.C.O.P. No. 42 of 1988 filed by the petitioner for eviction is allowed, allowing the petitioner (landlord) to get an eviction of the respondent (tenant) on the ground that he requires the building for his own occupation, i.e., for the residence of his married son.