Karnataka High Court
Smt Kavitha B vs The State Of Karnataka on 12 March, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
-1-
NC: 2026:KHC:14928
CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 11726 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SMT. KAVITHA B,
WIFE OF SRI HEMANTH KUMAR. M.,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
RESIDING NOW AT NO. 70,
M. S. RAMAIAH ENCLAVE, II MAIN,
HESARAGHATTA MAIN ROAD, BAGALGUNTE,
BENGALURU-560 073,
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. THEJASWINI G., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY BASAVESWARA NAGARA PS,
REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLICE PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU -01
Digitally signed
by SANJEEVINI J
KARISHETTY 2. SRI. NAGARAJU. P.,
Location: High SON OF SRI. PAPANNA,
Court of AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
Karnataka
NOW RESIDING AT 276,
10TH CROSS, 2ND PHASE, 1ST STAGE,
MANJUTHANAGARA, RAJAJINAGAR,
BENGALURU 560 010.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.CHANNAPPA EARAPPA,HCGP FOR R1;
SRI.H RAJANNA., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRL.P FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNNS)
PRAYING TO QUASH THE ALLEGED FIR WHICH IS REGISTERED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 BY ITS STATE PP, HIGH COURT
BUILDING BENGALURU, BASAVESHWARANAGAR P.S,
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928
CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025
HC-KAR
NO.6487,8TH MAIN ROAD, WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 1ST STAGE,
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR BENGALURU 560079 IN THEIR
CR.NO.245/2025 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S
318(4),316(2),352,351(2),3(5) OF BNS 2023 WHICH IS
PENDING BEFORE THE HONBLE IV A.C.M.M BENGALURU.
THIS CRL.P, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.245/2025, pending before the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, for the offences under Sections 318(4), 316(2), 352, 351(2), 3(5) of the BNS, 2023.
2. Heard Smt. Thejaswini G., learned counsel for petitioner, Sri Channappa Earappa, learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and Sri H. Rajanna, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
The petitioner is the accused, the second respondent, the complainant. It transpires that the petitioner is the wife of one Hemant Kumar M. The said Hemant Kumar M. and the complainant are said to be friends; transactions between -3- NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR Hemant Kumar and the complainant happen. The transaction leads to transfer of certain amount in the year 2021, into the account of the husband of the petitioner, to the tune of ₹17,00,000/-. It transpires that, the petitioner is alleged to have executed an 'on demand promissory note' and her husband Hemant Kumar M. has affixed signature as a witness on the said promissory note. On this premise, the complainant has instituted proceedings before the concerned Court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which is pending consideration and simultaneously, seeks to register a complaint, which becomes a crime in Crime No.245/2025 for the aforesaid offences. Registration of the crime is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.
4. Smt. Tejaswini G., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner - accused would vehemently contend that the transaction is not between the petitioner and respondent No.2
- complainant, it is between the husband of the petitioner and respondent No.2. The petitioner and her husband have marital discord today and therefore, the husband has not returned the money to the complainant and the petitioner - wife is now dragged into the web of these proceedings alleging offences -4- NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR punishable under Sections 318(4), 316(2), 352, 351(2), 3(5) of the BNS, 2023, which were Sections 420, 406, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC, the earlier regime. She would further contend that a crime cannot be registered for the purpose of recovery of money.
5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submits that it is the petitioner - wife who gave a promissory note and her husband had signed as a witness. It is a clear case where the wife is also involved in the transaction and therefore, the crime is registered against the petitioner - wife.
The matter is still at the stage of investigation and therefore, the this Court should not interfere at this stage. He seeks dismissal of the petition.
6. Learned High Court Government Pleader on verification of the records would submit that the wife being a government servant had directed that the amount be transferred to the account of the husband. Therefore, the amount is transferred into the account of the husband. Be that as it may.
-5-NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. They are all a matter of record. Since the entire issue is now triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows:
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-7-
NC: 2026:KHC:14928
CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025
HC-KAR
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2ೇaMಾಗ ಕ<=ಾರವರು $ಾನು Bಮ ೆ ಹಣವನುK 2ೊಡುವhDಲW. ?ಾ ಾ\ $ಾ$ೇ dೆwನ [ಾ † ೇRಂ* :ಾOUMೆcೕ$ೆ. ಏ2ೆಂದ%ೆ ನನ ೆ %ಾಜqೕಯ ಾ\ ?ಾಗೂ %ೌOಗಳm ೊತು>. $ಾನು Bಮ ೆ ಹಣವನುK 2ೊಡುವhDಲW ಎಂದು ?ೇa ಅ ಾಚ; ಶಬcಗaಂದ ೈದು, Bೕನು ಮ=ೊ>Rp ಹಣ 2ೇaದ%ೆ 9ೕವ ಸbತ BನKನುK (ಡುವhDಲW ಎಂದು ?ೇa ೆಧ 2ೆ ?ಾqರು=ಾ>%ೆ. ಆದc ಂದ ಕ<=ಾ ರವರು ಸ2ಾ1 ಅT2ಾ ಆದರೂ ನನ ೆ Nೕಸ :ಾಡುವ ಉMೆcೕಶDಂದ ನನKನುK ನಂ(U ಹಣವನK ಪLೆದು ಾಪಸು BೕಡMೆ, ಅ ಾಚ; ಶಬcಗaಂದ ೈದು 9ೕವ ೆಧ 2ೆ ?ಾqರುವ ಕ<=ಾ.( ಮತು> 12 ಲI ರೂ ಹಣವನುK ವ ಾ1ವ ೆ -8- NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR ಪ ೆದು ೊಂ ರುವ ಆ ೆಯ ಗಂಡ ಾದ ೇಮಂತ ಕು ಾರ ರವರುಗಳ ರುದ ಸೂಕ ಾನೂನು ಕ ಮ ಜರು ಸ!ೇ ೆಂದು ೋರು ೊಳ"#$ೇ ೆ.
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(Emphasis added) A perusal at the complaint would indicate two factors.
One, the transaction between the husband of the petitioner and respondent No.2 - complainant and another is that the complaint itself being filed to recover an amount of ₹17,00,000/- from the hands of the petitioner - wife.
9. The complainant himself admits the fact that the alleged loan amount was transferred not to the account of the petitioner - wife but into the account of the husband of the petitioner. If the husband of the petitioner has received the amount of ₹17,00,000/- and the complainant has taken the risk of transferring the amount of ₹17,00,000/- into the account of the husband, it is for the complainant to institute appropriate proceedings against the husband and not run behind the wife of the transferee, to whom he has transferred the amount. Merely because the present petitioner is a government servant and if -9- NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR the government servant is troubled, the amount would settled by the petitioner or her husband. Even otherwise, it is settled principle of law that the criminal law cannot be set into motion for the purpose of recovery of money. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of LALIT CHATURVEDI AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171, has held as follows:
"5. This Court, in a number of judgments, has pointed out the clear distinction between a civil wrong in the form of breach of contract, non- payment of money or disregard to and violation of the contractual terms; and a criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC. Repeated judgments of this Court, however, are somehow overlooked, and are not being applied and enforced. We will be referring to these judgments. The impugned judgment dismisses the application filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. on the ground of delay/laches and also the factum that the chargesheet had been filed on 12.12.2019. This ground and reason is also not valid.
6. In "Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar"4, this Court had referred to Section 420 of the IPC, to observe that in order to constitute an offence under the said section, the following ingredients are to be satisfied:--
"18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of "cheating" are as follows:
(i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission;
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR
(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.
19. To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security)."
7. Similar elucidation by this Court in "V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat"5, explicitly states that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of 'cheating', as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of contract. Further, in the absence of the averments made in the complaint petition wherefrom the ingredients of the offence can be found out, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. saves the inherent power of the High Court, as it serves a salutary purpose viz. a person should not undergo harassment of litigation for a number of years, when no criminal offence is made out. It is one thing to say that a case has been made out for trial and criminal proceedings should not be quashed, but another thing to say that a person must undergo a criminal trial despite the fact that no offence has been made out in the complaint. This Court in V.Y. Jose (supra) placed reliance on several earlier decisions in "Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI"6, "Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd."7, "Vir Prakash
- 11 -
NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal"8 and "All Cargo Movers (I) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain"9.
8. Having gone through the complaint, which was registered as an FIR and the assertions made therein, it is quite clear that respondent no. 2/complainant - Sanjay Garg's grievance is regarding failure of the appellants to pay the outstanding amount, in spite of the respondent no. 2/complainant - Sanjay Garg's repeated demands. The respondent no. 2/complainant - Sanjay Garg states that the supplies were made between the period 01.12.2015 and 06.08.2017. The appellants had made the payments from time to time of Rs. 3,76,40,553/- leaving a balance of Rs. 1,92,91,358/-.
9. We will assume that the assertions made in the complaint are correct, but even then, a criminal offence under Section 420 read with Section 415 of the IPC is not established in the absence of deception by making false and misleading representation, dishonest concealment or any other act or omission, or inducement of the complainant to deliver any property at the time of the contract(s) being entered. The ingredients to allege the offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of money from the appellants. The police is to investigate the allegations which discloses a criminal act. Police does not have the power and authority to recover money or act as a civil court for recovery of money.
10. The chargesheet also refers to Section 406 of the IPC, but without pointing out how the ingredients of said section are satisfied. No details and particulars are mentioned. There are decisions which hold that the same act or transaction cannot result in an offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust simultaneously.10 For the offence of cheating, dishonest intention must exist at the inception of the transaction, whereas, in case of criminal breach of trust there must exist a relationship between the parties whereby one party entrusts another with the property as per law, albeit dishonest intention comes later. In this case entrustment is missing, in fact it is not even alleged. It is a case of sale of goods. The chargesheet does refer to Section 506 of
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR the IPC relying upon the averments in the complaint. However, no details and particulars are given, when and on which date and place the threats were given. Without the said details and particulars, it is apparent to us, that these allegations of threats etc. have been made only with an intent to activate police machinery for recovery of money.
11. It is for the respondent no. 2/complainant - Sanjay Garg to file a civil suit. Initiation of the criminal process for oblique purposes, is bad in law and amounts to abuse of process of law.
12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned judgment is set aside and the present appeal is allowed quashing the FIR and resultant proceedings, including the chargesheet.
13. We clarify that the present appeal only deals with the question of criminal offence. We have not commented or made any observations on the civil rights of respondent no. 2/complainant - Sanjay Garg."
(Emphasis supplied) 9.1. Later, the Apex Court in the case of ARSHAD NEYAZ KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND1, has held as follows:
"... ... ...
16. The contents of the complaint as well as the FIR would have to be read in light of the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC and the law settled by this Court through various judicial dicta. On perusal of the complaint dated 29.01.2021, it is noted that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has filed the said complaint invoking Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under:
"406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.-- Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2058
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
xxx
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
xxx 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.-(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."
17. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 ("Inder Mohan Goswami"), while dealing with Section 420 IPC, this Court observed thus:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducement must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning."
18. In light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to make out a case that satisfies the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC. We fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellant herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid section. On a bare perusal of the FIR as well as the complaint, we do not find that the offence of cheating as defined under Section 420 IPC is made out and we do not find that there is any cheating and dishonest inducement to deliver any property or a valuable security involved in the instant case.
19. It is settled law that for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant/respondent No. 2 was required to show that the appellant had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or representation of not fulfilling the agreement for sale of the said property. Such a culpable intention right at the beginning when the promise was made cannot be presumed but has to be made out with cogent facts. In the facts of the present case, there is a clear absence of dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the appellant during the agreement for sale. We must hasten to add that there is no allegation in the FIR or the complaint indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the appellant right from the time of making the promise or misrepresentation. Nothing has been said on what the misrepresentations were and how the appellant intentionally deceived the complainant/respondent No. 2. Mere allegations by the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the appellant failed to execute the agreement for sale and failed to refund the money paid by the complainant/respondent No. 2 does not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR part with a valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 IPC.
20. On perusal of the allegations contained in the complaint, in light of the ingredients of Section 406 IPC, read in the context of Section 405 IPC, do not find that any offence of criminal breach of trust has been made out. It is trite law that every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence unless there is evidence of a manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation of property entrusted to him. In the case of criminal breach of trust, if a person comes into possession of the property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to its own use against the terms of contract, then the question whether such retention is with dishonest intention or not and whether such retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to establish the ingredients essential to constitute an offence under Section 406 IPC. The complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to place any material on record to show us as to how he had entrusted property to the appellant. Furthermore, the complaint also omits to aver as to how the property, so entrusted to the appellant, was dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his own use, thereby committing a breach of trust.
21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.
22. At this point, we must hasten to add that the complaint was filed after a delay of nearly eight years. Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to impress the Court about the reason for the delay and hence this fact further raises a suspicion about the bona fides of the complainant/respondent No. 2. The delay in lodging of the complaint and FIR, coupled with the vague allegations do not inspire any confidence in the Court to allow the criminal proceedings to continue against the appellant. Further, the complainant/respondent No. 2 had an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit claiming damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights which has not been availed but a route through criminal proceedings, when no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted. Criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas. The appellant therefore, in our view, could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellant are unsustainable.
23. Furthermore, in Inder Mohan Goswami, it was held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. It was further held by this Court that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to continue the criminal proceedings
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR against the appellant herein would cause undue harassment to him because as observed hereinabove, no prima facie case for the offence under Sections 406 or 420 IPC is made out.
24. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ("Bhajan Lal") with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused.
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
25. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judgment in the light of the facts of this case, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the appellant herein have been made with a mala fide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. In our view, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue.
26. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the observations of this Court in Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR 1680 wherein it was observed that in recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 2 has made grave allegations against the appellant herein, he has failed to justify the same before this Court. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts."
(Emphasis supplied) 9.2. The Apex Court in the case of INDER CHAND BAGRI v. JAGADISH PRASAD BAGRI2, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
24. The complainant/respondent No. 1 has an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit to set aside the sale deed dated 20.06.2011 and claim damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights which he is already pursuing vide Title Suit No. 160 of 2012 against the appellant-accused which is currently pending adjudication and hence the route through criminal proceedings, when no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted. Criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas. The appellant-accused therefore, in our view, could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellant-accused are unsustainable.
22025 SCC OnLine SC 2529
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR
25. Furthermore, in Inder Mohan Goswami, it was held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. It was further held by this Court that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to continue the criminal proceedings against the appellant-accused herein would cause undue harassment to him because as observed hereinabove, no prima facie case for the offence under Sections 406 or 420 of the IPC is made out.
26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 ("Bhajan Lal") with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of
- 21 -
NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that thereis sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
27. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellant-accused herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the appellant-accused herein have been made with a mala-fide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal extracted above, squarely applies to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue.
28. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the observations of this Court in Vishal
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 14 SCC 112 wherein it was observed that in recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 1 has made grave allegations against the appellant herein, he has failed to justify the same before this Court. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts."
(Emphasis supplied) In the light of the facts being unequivocal as narrated hereinabove and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment, permitting further investigation to continue in the case at hand, would become an abuse of the process of the law and result in the miscarriage of justice.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER a. The criminal petition is allowed.
b. The crime in Crime No.245/2025, pending on the file of the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Benglauru, qua the petitioner, stands quashed.
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NC: 2026:KHC:14928 CRL.P No. 11726 of 2025 HC-KAR c. The observations made in the course of this order is only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioner under Section 528 of the BNSS and the same shall not bind or influence any proceedings pending against any other accused.
I.A.No.1/2025 stands disposed, as a consequence.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE NVJ List No.: 1 Sl No.: 47