Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Ram Gopal Yadav, S/O Shri Ganaga Ram ... vs State Of Rajasthan on 15 February, 2022
Bench: Akil Kureshi, Sudesh Bansal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 362/2022
Ram Gopal Yadav, S/o Shri Ganaga Ram Yadav
----Appellant
Versus
State Of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr.Amit Kuri with
Mr. Vikram Sharma and
Mr.Aditi Jodha
For Respondent(s) : Mr. RP Singh, AAG with
Mr. Jai Vardhan Shekhawat
Mr. Virendra Lodha, Sr. Adv. assisted
by Mr. Rachit Sharma
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AKIL KURESHI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
Order
15/02/2022
This appeal is filed by the original-petitioners to challenge
the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 04.02.2022. The
State Government has initiated land acquisition proceedings for
acquiring private lands for the purposes of RIICO industrial area
development. Section 6 notification under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 was issued on 03.07.2013. The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act
of 2013') was enacted w.e.f. 01.01.2014. The land acquisition
officer passed award on 01.07.2015. The petitioner challenged this
award in the writ petition contending that in view of Section 25 of
the Act of 2013 the proceedings had lapsed since no award was
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passed within one year as envisaged in the said Section. Learned
Single Judge dismissed the writ petition upon which this appeal
has been filed.
Learned counsel for the appellants drew out attention to a
recent judgment of Division Bench of the Supreme Court in case
of The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Vs. Mahesh
and Ors. in which this very question came up for consideration as
can be seen from the question framed by the Supreme Court in its
decision:-
"Whether the two-year period specified under
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('1894
Act', for short) will apply even after the repeal of the
1894 Act, or the twelve-month period specified in
Section 25 of the 2013 Act will apply for the awards
made under clause (a) of Section 24(1) of the 2013
Act?"
The Supreme Court answered this question in following terms:-
"23. Given the object and purpose behind Sections
24, and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, we notice that
practical absurdities and anomalies may arise if the
two-year period for making of an award in terms
of Section 11A of the 1894 Act commencing from
the date of issue of the declaration is applied to
the awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of
the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against the
underlying legislative intent behind prescription of
time for making of an award in respect of saved
acquisition proceedings initiated under the
repealed 1894 Act, which is two-fold: (i) to give
sufficient time to the authorities to determine
compensation payable under the 2013 Act; and (ii)
to ensure early and expedited payment to the
landowners by reducing the period from two years
under Section 11A of the 1894 Act to twelve
months under Section 25 of the 2013 Act. In case
of declarations issued in January 2012, on
application of Section 11A of the 1894 Act, the
time to determine compensation under the 2013
Act would vary from a day to a month, and while
in cases where the declarations were issued within
twelve months of the repeal of the 1894 Act, the
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landowners would be at a disadvantage as an
award beyond the twelve-month period specified
in Section 25 of the 2013 Act would be valid. In
the first set of cases, given the onerous factual and
legal exercise involved in determination of
compensation and the need to issue notification
under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of
the awards would be impractical. Hasty and
incorrect awards would be deleterious for the
landowners. If the awards are not pronounced, the
acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating the
legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of the
2013 Act to save such proceedings. We would,
therefore, exercise our choice to arrive at a just,
fair and harmonious construction consistent with
the legislative intent. A rational approach so as to
further the object and purpose of Sections
24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. We
are conscious that Section 25 refers to publication
of a notification under Section 19 as the starting
point of limitation. In the context of clause (a)
to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would be no
notification under Section 19, but declaration
under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the
declarations under Section 6 are valid as on 1st
January 2014, it is necessary to give effect to the
legislative intention and reckon the starting point.
In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act,
declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are
no different and serve the same purpose as the
declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.
Consequently, we hold that in cases covered by
clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the
limitation period for passing/making of an award
under Section 25 of the 2013 Act would commence
from 1st January 2014, that is, the date when the
2013 Act came into force. Awards passed under
clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if made
within twelve months from 1st January 2014. This
dictum is subject to the caveat stated in paragraph
16 (supra) that a declaration which has lapsed in
terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act before or on
31st December 2013 would not get revived."
We are of strong prima facie view that the legal contentions raised
by the petitioners is authoritatively answered by the Supreme Court in
above judgment of The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project
(supra). The learned Single Judge therefore in our view prima
facie committed an error in dismissing the writ petition.
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Learned counsel for the respondents however submitted that
the lands of the petitioners are situated in the center of the
industrial area being developed. The majority of the land owners
have already accepted the awards and possession of the land has
been taken over.
These factual aspects, would not change the legal position.
However we will examine what relief can and should be granted to
the petitioners in view of the submissions made by the counsel for
the respondents.
For such purpose, let there be notice for final disposal returnable on 15.03.2021. By way of interim relief both the sides are directed to maintain status quo with respect to the title and possession of the land in question.
(SUDESH BANSAL),J (AKIL KURESHI),CJ N.Gandhi/8 (Downloaded on 16/02/2022 at 09:20:53 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)