Telangana High Court
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport ... vs M. Pochaiah on 16 March, 2026
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
+W.P.No.31689 OF 2010
% 16-03-2026
# APSRTC and another.
.. Petitioners
Vs.
M.Pochaiah and others.
.. Respondents
!Counsel for the petitioner : Sri U.Shanthi Bhushan Rao
Counsel for the Respondents : Sri V.Narasimha Goud,
learned counsel for R1
<Gist :
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1) (Civil Appeal No(s).8558 of 2018
2) 2014 AIR SCW 6387
3) Civil Appeal No.2974 of 2016, dated 11.09.2025
4) (2013) 5 SCC 136
5) (2014) 7 SCC 177
2
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
HYDERABAD
****
W.P.No.31689 OF 2010
Between:
# APSRTC and another.
.. Petitioners
Vs.
M.Pochaiah and others.
.. Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 16.03.2026
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
_____________________________________
NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J
3
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
WRIT PETITION No.31689 of 2010
Date : 16.03.2026
Between :
APSRTC, Musheerabad and another.
.. Petitioners
and
M.Pochaiah and others.
.. Respondents
ORDER:
This writ petition is filed by the Corporation aggrieved by the Award dated 30.06.2010 passed in I.D.No.67 of 2006 by the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad (for short 'the Labour Court').
2. During the pendency of the writ petition, the 1st respondent died, and his legal representatives were brought on record as respondent Nos.3 to 5. 4
3. Brief facts of the case are as follows :-
(a) The petitioners' Corporation has entrusted the works of sweeping and cleaning the bus station to the Contractor on a contract basis by way of calling tenders, and that the 1st respondent was engaged by the Contractor and was allotted the work of night watchman-cum-
sweeper. The 1st respondent's services were utilized at Siddipet bus station to sweep buses arriving at the said bus station, and to sweep the entire bus station. He attended the duty from 6.00 a.m. to 5 p.m. and also worked in the 2nd petitioner's office. The 1st respondent was not an employee of the petitioners' Corporation. The name of the 1st respondent was not found in the salary bill of employees of Siddipet Depot, and he did not have any staff number allotted by the petitioners' Corporation. The 2nd petitioner orally terminated the 1st respondent from service w.e.f. 01.11.1992.
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(b) The 1st respondent submitted a representation to the Hon'ble Minister for Labour and Employment, Government of India requesting to regularize his services and the Hon'ble Minister gave reply on 05.06.2006 stating that his services cannot be regularized as he was not appointed by the petitioners' Corporation and he worked under a contractor maintaining the works of sweeping and cleaning at Old Bus Station, Siddipet. Questioning the same, the 1st respondent filed I.D.No.67 of 2006, and the Labour Court, vide Award dated 30.06.2010, while setting aside the removal order dated 01.11.1992, directed the petitioners' Corporation to reinstate the 1st respondent into service, but without back wages and continuity of service. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners' Corporation filed the present writ petition.
4. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the 1st respondent was not engaged by the petitioners' Corporation, and it has not allotted any staff number to the 1st respondent. There is no 6 employee-employer relationship between the 1st respondent and the petitioners. There is no oral employment and oral termination by the petitioners.
5. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioners further submits that the Hon'ble Minister for Labour and Employment, Government of India, rightly rejected the case of the 1st respondent for regularization. There is no designation/category as Night Watchmen in the petitioners' Corporation, as claimed by the 1st respondent. The Award of the Labour Court is not in accordance with the law and the facts of the case. The Labour Court erred in entertaining the claim after a lapse of 14 years. The Labour Court, without considering the submissions made by the petitioners, erroneously passed the impugned Award. Therefore, appropriate orders should be passed in the writ petition by setting aside the impugned Award and allowing the writ petition.
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6. This Court, while admitting the writ petition, on 16.12.2010, granted an interim stay for a period of eight weeks.
7. The 1st respondent filed W.V.M.P.No.816 of 2011 along with a counter affidavit seeking to vacate the interim order passed by this Court on 16.12.2010.
8. In the counter affidavit, the 1st respondent stated as follows :-
(a) The petitioners' Corporation has extracted the work from the 1st respondent and paid the salary to him.
To prove the employer-employee relationship, the 1st respondent has produced the record pertaining to his employment. The 1st respondent approached the Labour Court after his representation was rejected in a letter dated 05.06.2006.
(b) The Labour Court vide impugned award dated 30.09.2010 directed reinstatement of the 1st respondent 8 into service without back wages. Challenging the said Award, the Corporation has filed the present writ petition.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent submits that there is no delay on the part of the 1st respondent in approaching the Labour Court, as he approached the Labour Court after rejection of his representation on 05.06.2006. The similarly situated employees were reinstated into service, and their services were regularized and the same was also confirmed by this Court.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent further submits that the Corporation has extracted the work from the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent is the employee of the Corporation. The Labour Court precisely observed that there is an employee-employer relationship between the 1st respondent and the Corporation and passed the impugned Award. However, the Corporation approached this Court and obtained the interim order. 9 There is no prima facie case in favour of the Corporation to continue the interim order; therefore, the same may be vacated, as the Labour Court, after appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, passed the impugned Award. Therefore, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
11. Heard Sri U.Shanthi Bhushan Rao, learned Standing Counsel for TGSRTC and Sri V.Narasimha Goud, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent.
12. In the instant case, this Court, while admitting the writ petition, passed the following interim order :-
"Normally, this Court would insist on compliance with Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short 'the Act'), whenever an interim order is passed in the writ petition, assailing the award passed by the Labour Court.
In the instant case, there is serious doubt as to the very status of the petitioner. Whenever, the Corporation appoints any person, it assigns a number. No such number exists in favour of the 1st 10 respondent. The sole basis for the claim is the Photocopy of the attendance register. The termination is said to be oral. The question as to whether Section 17-B must be followed in this case, can be decided after the 1st respondent enters appearance.
There shall be interim stay to be in force for a period of eight (8) weeks."
13. Against the said interim order, the 1st respondent filed W.V.M.P.No.816 of 2011 along with a counter affidavit stating that the 2nd respondent, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, gave a finding that the 1st respondent is the employee of the Corporation and that there is an employee and employer relationship between the 1st respondent and the petitioners herein. The similarly situated employees who filed different IDs have been reinstated into service, as per the terms of the Awards, and their services have been regularized. As such, the petitioners' action in obtaining the stay order is discriminatory and arbitrary, and is therefore, liable to be vacated.
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14. In support of his contentions, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in DHARAM SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 1, wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-
"..... That application also set out the names of similarly situated daily wagers who were regularized earlier within the same Commission. No rebuttal was filed to the I.A. The unrebutted assertion of vacancies and the comparison with those who received regularisation materially undermine the High Court's conclusion that no vacancy existed and reveal unequal treatment vis-à- vis persons similarly placed.
18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that "ad- hocism" thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If "constraint" is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged 1 (Civil Appeal No(s).8558 of 2018 12 insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running."
15. The above case law is altogether different from the present case. In the above case, the employees were engaged by the Commission between 1989 and 1992 and served as Class-III and Class-IV employees. They were paid daily wages with effect from 08.04.1997 and received consolidated monthly amounts while discharging ministerial and support functions during regular office hours. In that case, there was no appointment order, and the engagement was based on an oral agreement.
16. In the instant case, the contention of the petitioners is that the 1st respondent was not an employee of the petitioners' Corporation and that there was no employer- employee relationship between the 1st respondent and the petitioners. The name of the 1st respondent was not found in the salary bills of the employees of Siddipet Depot, and no staff number was allotted to the 1st respondent. Hence, 13 the above case would not support the 1st respondent's case.
17. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in BALWANT RAI SALUJA AND ANOTHER Vs. AIR INDIA LTD. AND OTHERS 2, wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-
"84. In our considered view, and in light of the principles applied in the Haldia case (supra), such control would have nothing to do with either the appointment, dismissal or removal from service, or the taking of disciplinary action against the workmen working in the canteen. The mere fact that the Air India has a certain degree of control over the HCI, does not mean that the employees working in the canteen are the Air India's employees. The Air India exercises control that is in the nature of supervision. Being the primary shareholder in the HCI and shouldering certain financial burdens such as be entitled to have an opinion or a say in ensuring effective utilization of resources, monetary or otherwise. The said supervision or control would appear to be merely to ensure due maintenance of standards and quality in the said canteen.2
2014 AIR SCW 6387 14
85. Therefore, in our considered view and in light of the above, the appellants-workmen could not be said to be under the effective and absolute control of Air India. The Air India merely has control of supervision over the working of the given statutory canteen. Issues regarding appointment of the said workmen, their dismissal, payment of their salaries, etc. are within the control of the HCI. It cannot be then said that the appellants are the workmen of Air India and therefore are entitled to regularization of their services.
86. It would be pertinent to mention, at this stage, that there is no parity in the nature of work, mode of appointment, experience, qualifications, etc., between the regular employees of the Air India and the workers of the given canteen. Therefore, the appellants-workmen cannot be placed at the same footing as the Air India's regular employees, and thereby claim the same benefits as bestowed upon the latter. It would also be gainsaid to note the fact that the appellants-herein made no claim or prayer against either of the other respondents, that is, the HCI or the Chefair."
18. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in GENERAL MANAGER, UP 15 COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. Vs. ACHCHEY LAL AND ANOTHER 3, wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-
"37. It is by now well settled that to ascertain or rather the relevant factors to be taken into consideration to establish employer/employee relationship would include, inter alia i... appoints the workers; (a) who pays the who (b) salaries/remuneration; (3) who has the authority to dismiss; (4) who can take disciplinary action; (5) whether there is continuity of of service; and (6) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether there exists complete supervision?
43. It was argued before us that in the present case, there is no Contractor involved. In other words, it is not the case that the Society entered into a contract with an individual and that individual hired or engaged the respondents herein to work in the Canteen. But that would hardly make any difference."
19. The above two case laws support the case of the petitioners, as in the instant case, except for the xerox copy of the attendance register, there is no other established proof to demonstrate the existence of an employer- employee relationship between the 1st respondent and the petitioners. The Labour Court passed the impugned Award, 3 Civil Appeal No.2974 of 2016, dated 11.09.2025 16 placing reliance on the xerox copy of the attendance register. Moreover, the main contention of the petitioners' Corporation is that no employer-employee relationship exists between the 1st respondent and the petitioners.
20. With regard to the judicial discretion of the Labour Court under Section 11-A of the I.D.Act, while passing the awards, the Apex Court in ASSISTANT ENGINEER, RAJASTHAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. GITAM SINGH 4, held as follows :-
"Before exercising its judicial discretion under Section 11-A of the ID Act, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors, including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which the termination has been set aside and the delay in raising the industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. A distinction has been drawn between a daily wager and an employee holding the regular post for the purposes of consequential relief. In case of wrongful termination of a daily wager, who had worked for a short period, the award of reinstatement cannot be said to be proper relief and rather award of 4 (2013) 5 SCC 136 17 compensation in such cases would be in consonance with the demand of justice.
22. From the long line of cases indicated above, it can be said without any fear of contradiction that this Court has not held as an absolute proposition that in cases of wrongful dismissal, the dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement in all situations. It has always been the view of this Court that there could be circumstance(s) in a case which may make it inexpedient to order reinstatement. Therefore, the normal rule that the dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement in cases of wrongful dismissal has been held to be not without exception. Insofar as wrongful termination of daily-rated workers is concerned, this Court has laid down that consequential relief would depend on host of factors, namely, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service. Where the length of engagement as daily wager has not been long, award of reinstatement should not follow and rather compensation should be directed to be paid. A distinction has been drawn between a daily wager and an employee holding the regular post for the purposes of consequential relief.
27. In our view, Harjinder Singh and Devinder Singh do not lay down the proposition that in all cases of wrongful termination, reinstatement must follow. This Court found in those cases that judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court was disturbed by the 18 High Court on wrong assumption that the initial employment of the employee was illegal. As noted above, with regard to the wrongful termination of a daily wager, who had worked for a short period, this Court in long line of cases has held that the award of reinstatement cannot be said to be proper relief and rather award of compensation in such cases would be in consonance with the demand of justice. Before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors, including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which the termination has been set aside and the delay in raising the industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute.
21. In the instant case, though the 1st respondent approached with a delay of 14 years, the Labour Court did not consider the issue of delay and laches. Further, there is no established proof of the employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and the 1st respondent, except for a xerox copy of the attendance register. Basing solely on the attendance register, the Labour Court directed the reinstatement of the 1st respondent into service without back wages or continuity of service.
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22. However, while passing the award, the Labour Court ought to have considered the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, the Labour Court passed the award in favour of the 1st respondent without properly considering the relevant facts. For this reason, even at the initial stage, at the time of admitting the writ petition, this Court did not consider the case of the 1st respondent under Section 17-B of the I.D.Act. Moreover, the 1st respondent had worked for only about 270 days, i.e., less than one year of service, and approached the Labour Court after a lapse of 14 years. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the Labour Court erroneously passed the impugned Award.
23. Under beneficial legislation, in cases of this nature, the Labour Court may award some compensation based on the wages drawn by the 1st respondent. However, no material is available on record regarding the wages paid to the 1st respondent during his employment. 20
24. In the present case, the 1st respondent has expired, and his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondent Nos.3 to 5. Therefore, at this stage, the question of reinstatement and continuity of service does not arise. However, considering the fact that the 1st respondent worked as a daily wage employee for a period of about 270 days, this Court deems it appropriate to grant some compensation to the legal representatives of the 1st respondent. However, there is no information on record regarding the salary the 1st respondent received during his employment as a daily wage worker.
25. With regard to reinstatement and back wages, the Apex Court in BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED Vs. BHURUMAL 5, held as follows :-
"The ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally 5 (2014) 7 SSC 177 21 and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Supreme Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice.
Rationale, for shifting in this direction is obvious.
The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non- payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary 22 compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too a after a long gap, would not serve any purpose.
Therefore, this fact becomes relevant when it comes to giving the relief. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that the need of linemen in the Telephone Department has been drastically reduced after the advancement of a technology. For all these reasons, we are of the view that ends of justice would be met by granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
37. In Man Singh³ which was also a case of BSNL, this Court had granted compensation of Rs.2 lakhs to each of the workmen when they had worked for merely 240 days. Since the respondent herein worked for longer period, we are of the view that he should be paid a compensation of Rs.3 lakhs. This compensation should be paid within 2 months failing which the respondent shall also be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of this judgment."
26. In view of the foregoing discussion and in view of the dictum laid down in BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM's case (5 supra), the impugned Award is liable to be set aside, and it is accordingly set aside. However, the petitioners are 23 directed to pay compensation of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to the legal representatives of the 1st respondent i.e., respondent Nos.3 to 5, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
27. With the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________________ NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J 16.03.2026 Note:
LR copy to be marked (B/o) Prv