Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kapur Chand vs Municipal Committee Alias Nagar Palika ... on 10 February, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1998)119PLR128
Author: Iqbal Singh
Bench: Iqbal Singh
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders Annexures P-2, and P-3 passed by the respondent No. 3. He has also prayed for directing the respondents to restore to him the possession of shop Nos. 9 and 10 situated at Maur Mandi, District Bhatinda.
2. The averments made in the writ petition show that lease of the disputed shops was granted by the Municipal Committee, Maur Mandi on 25.3.1980 to Nand Lal, Rajesh Kumar and Surinder Kumar sons of Raj Krishan on the basis of the highest bid given by them in the open auction. It appears that after having secured the lease, Shri Nand Lal and others transferred possession of the property to the petitioner in the year 1984. In the year 1987, the respondent No. 1 initiated proceedings under the Punjab Public Premises and land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as the act of 1973), by filing petition Under Sections 4and 7 for ejectment of the petitioner and for recovery of the arrears of rent. The same was dismissed on 17.11.1987 by the respondent No. 2. However, in appeal, the respondent No. 3 reversed the order of the respondent No. 2 and directed the ejectment of the petitioner. The review application filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 29.5.1992. In the meantime, the Municipal Committee resumed possession of the disputed shops on the strength of warrant of possession issued by the Sub Divisional Officer, Talwandi Sabo, in view of the appellate order.
3. Shri Ashok Jindal argued that the order of ejectment passed by the respondent No. 3 should be declared as void because no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that notice of the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1 was not served Upon the petitioner, who was at the relevant time, undergoing imprisonment in the Central Jail, Bathinda. Shri Jindal further submitted that the factum of petitioner's confinement in jail was known to the respondent No. 3 but he did not take steps to ensure the service of notice on him. Learned counsel argued that notice allegedly served upon the petitioner's son cannot be treated as a notice to the petitioner. On the other hand, Shri J.S. Bhatti prayed for dismissal of the writ petition by arguing that the petitioner has no right to remain in possession of the shops which were leased out to Nand Lal and others in the year 1980. He submitted the lessees could not have been transferred the possession of the shops to the petitioner and in any case the latter cannot retain possession because he did not pay the rent due to the Municipal Committee. Shri Bhatti submitted that service of notice effected on the petitioner's son should be treated as sufficient in view of Rule 4 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Rules, 1974 (for short 'the Rules').
4. The Act of 1975 has been enacted by the Legislature to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As per the definition contained in Section 2(e), public premises means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State Government and includes any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of any Municipal committee, Notified Area Committee, Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samiti, Panchayat or Improvement Trust............... The term "rent" as defined in Section 2(g) means the consideration payable periodically for the authorised occupation of the premises and, includes any charge of electricity, water or any other service in connection with the occupation of the premises or any-tax payable in respect of the premises where such charge or tax is payable by the State Government or the corporate authority. Section 3 enumerates the situations in which the person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises. One of these situations is where the person concerned has entered into possession of public premises otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant. The other situation is in which the allotment lease or grant has been cancelled in accordance with the terms contained therein and, therefore, allottee, lessee or grantee has ceased to be entitled to occupy or holds such public premises. The third situation is in which any person authorised to occupy any public premises has sublet the premises in contravention of the terms of allotment, lease or grant without the permission of the State Government or of any other competent authority and the fourth situation is in which a person authorised to occupy public premises acts in contravention of any express or implied terms of allotment, lease or grant. Explanation appended to Section 3 clarifies that a person cannot be treated as an allottee, lessee or grantee merely by reason of his having paid rent of the premises. Section 4 lays down the procedure to be followed before an order of eviction can be passed by the Collector. Section 5 empowers the Collector to pass the order of eviction from public premises after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the concerned person. Section 5(2) empowers the Collector or any other officer duly authorised by him to evict the unauthorised occupant if the latter refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction within 30 days of the date of its publication Under Section 5(1). Section 6 contains provision for disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants. Section 7 empowers the collector to recover damages in respect of public premises as arrears of land revenue. Section 8 confers the powers of the Civil Court upon the collector. Section 9 provides for appeal from every order of the Collector made Under Sections 5 or 7. Section 10 confers finality on the orders passed by the Collector and the Commissioner. Section 11 deals with offences and penalties. Section 12 empowers the Collector to obtain information in respect of the unauthorised occupation of any public premises. Section 13 provides for liability of heirs and legal representatives of unauthorised occupants. Section 14 provides for, recovery of rent as arrears of land revenue. Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. Section 17 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the, Act. By virtue of Section 18 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, has been repealed. Section 19 has been inserted to validate various actions taken under the Act of 1959. Rule 4 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Rules, 1974 lays down the manner of service of notice issued Under Section 4(1), Section 6(1) and Section 7(3). Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 provides for service by delivering or tendering a copy of the notice to the person for whom it is intended or to any adult member of his family or by sending it by registered post in a letter addressed to that person at his usual or last known place of residence or business.
Having noticed the scheme of the Act, we shall now decide whether the order passed by the appellate authority is vitiated due to the absence of personal service of notice upon the petitioner. A bare perusal of the order Annexure P-3, shows that the summons issued by the appellate authority for 9.3.1988 were sent to the Tehsildar, Talwandi Saboo for effecting service upon the petitioner. The Process server, who had gone to effect service of notice, reported that the petitioner has been arrested in some case but his son, Krishan Chand, has been informed and he acknowledged the receipt of notice. Thus, it is evident that before deciding the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 3 had ensured that an adult male member of the family of the petitioner had been served with the notice. Therefore, the argument of Shri Jindal that the order passed by the appellate authority should be declared void ab initio due to the violation of the principles of natural justice, cannot be accepted.
5. No doubt, Rule 4 on which reliance has been placed by Shri Bhatti, does not in any term apply to a notice issued by the appellate authority but in the absence of any other provision, the service of the notice in the manner prescribed by Rule 4 can be treated as sufficient.
We are also of the opinion that the petitioner does not deserves any relief under Article 226 because the very act of Nand Lal etc. to transfer possession of the shops to the petitioner was contrary to the terms of lease and on the basis of such illegal transfer, the petitioner did not acquire any right to remain in possession of the property. Issuance of a writ in his favour would tantamount to regularising unauthorised occupation of public premises by the petitioner and we do not find any justification to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 226 for this purpose.
6. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is dismissed.