Punjab-Haryana High Court
M/S Shakti Impex Ahmedgarh vs Amar Singh on 19 December, 2013
Author: Paramjeet Singh
Bench: Paramjeet Singh
CR No.7796 of 2013 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CR No.7796 of 2013
Date of Decision:19.12.2013
M/s Shakti Impex Ahmedgarh
....Petitioner
Versus
Amar Singh
.....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH
1) Whether reporters of the local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2) To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes
3) Whether the judgment should be reported in Yes
the Digest?
Present: Mr. Rajesh Narang, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
****
PARAMJEET SINGH, J.
Following substantial questions of general importance of law and fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends arise for consideration in this revision petition arising from the order dated 21.11.2013 (Annexure P-2) passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sangrur whereby application filed by the respondent-plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short "the Code") has been allowed and the order Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 2 dated 28.03.2011 passed by the trial Court has been reversed:
(i) Whether possession of a co-sharer is possession of all and what will be the status of a vendee if he purchases the property as a share or specific khasra numbers?
(ii) Whether a co-sharer/joint owner can change the nature of joint agricultural land by raising construction detrimental to the interest of other co- sharers/joint owners without seeking partition by metes and bounds; and change in the nature of agricultural land would be detrimental amounting to taking it out of the purview of provisions of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 for the purpose of partition? In my opinion, the matter in hand requires to be examined in depth as lot of litigation comes in courts on the above questions. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to give the facts which are necessary to put the controversy in its proper perspective.
Plaintiff-Amar Singh filed a suit for prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant-M/s Shakti Implex Ahmedgarh from illegally and forcibly raising any sort of construction in specific khasra numbers of joint agricultural land measuring 119 bighas 5 biswas comprising of various khasra numbers as described in the head-note of the plaint as well as jamabandi for the year 2006, except in due course of law till it is partitioned by metes and bounds. Along with the suit, an application Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 3 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code was also moved for grant of temporary injunction. It is pleaded that the land measuring 119 bighas 5 biswas is a joint property and has not been partitioned by metes and bounds. The defendant is threatening to raise construction on specific khasra numbers touching the metalled road which are more valuable.
Upon notice of the suit as well as application, the defendant put in appearance and filed written statement and reply denying the averments made in the plaint and application. It is pleaded that property in dispute is not joint property, rather khasra numbers 760, 761, 762 and 763 which were part of the disputed land, have been alienated to the defendant vide different sale deeds by a co-owner/co-sharer, who had purchased it from the plaintiff and his brother. The sale deeds have already been executed and registered in favour of the defendant. The defendant is in actual physical possession of the land measuring 24 bighas comprised in khasra numbers 760, 761, 762 and 763.
Vide order dated 28.03.2011, learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), Malerkotla dismissed the ad interim injunction application. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal which has been allowed and order dated 28.03.2011 has been set aside and defendant has been restrained from changing the nature of the suit property by raising construction forcibly and illegally except in due course of law. Hence, this revision petition.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 4 the record.
The main thrust of the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the defendant has purchased the land measuring 24 bighas 5 biswas 2 biswasis vide registered sale deeds during the years 2009 and 2010. The said deeds show specific and exclusive possession of the petitioner on the disputed land with specific boundaries. Reference to jamabandi for the year 2006-07 (Annexure P-4) has been made, however, no sale deed has been shown to the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the agreement dated 07.08.2010 (Annexure P-3) as well as demarcation report dated 26.06.2013 (Annexure P-5) clearly show the exclusive possession of the petitioner over 24 bighas 5 biswas 2 biswasis comprised in khasra nos.760, 761, 762 and 763 and being in its exclusive possession, the defendant has every right to raise the construction.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that trial Court has rightly considered the sale deeds for the purpose of deciding the application for ad interim injunction, however, the lower Appellate Court has not considered the sale deeds as well as their impact with respect to the rights of the petitioner to raise the construction in the disputed land. Learned counsel further contended that possession of one co-sharer is possession of all and injunction cannot be granted against a co-sharer and reference to Bhartu vs. Ram Sarup 1981 PLJ 204 has been made. Learned counsel further contended that construction can be raised by a co-sharer who is in exclusive possession of specific portion Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 5 of land and made reference to Bachan Singh vs. Swaran Singh, 2000(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 70. Both the case laws (supra) have not been considered by the lower Appellate Court correctly. The impugned order is erroneous in law. There was no reason to discard the case laws (supra). In support of his contentions, learned counsel has also relied upon Bal Krishan vs. Ram Singh 2001 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 491, Maman Chand vs. Kamla 1996 (1) R.R.R. 230 and Surjeet @ Surjit Singh Kataria and others vs. Raj Hans and others 2007 (4) PLR 523.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner has purchased the land with specific boundaries and has spent huge amount for the purpose of installation of industry and also obtained CLU, NOC etc. from various departments. The requisite licences have also been taken from the various authorities under the VAT, excise etc. The petitioner has also got electric connection and purchased machinery. The construction of industrial unit is in full swing and also made reference to photographs (Annexure P-6 Colly.) showing construction going on at the spot. Learned counsel further contended that if for the sake of arguments, it is assumed that the suit property is joint, there is no justification to pass any order of temporary injunction, as it would be subject to partition and if the land under possession ultimately falls to the share of respondent on completion of final partition proceedings, the respondent-plaintiff can be suitably compensated.
I have considered the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner.
Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 6
It is settled law that injunction is a relief of equity. A person who seeks equity must do equity. It is a relief of discretion. Needless to mention here that a Court should not grant such a discretionary relief to a person who approaches the Court by concealing facts, who makes an attempt to by-pass the law.
In the light of arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and judgments cited at bar, I proceed to answer the questions framed at the outset. The judgments and decision making are intricately linked but for applicability of ratio of the judgments and proper examination of the case, it is necessary to understand the facts of the case.
Re: Question No.1:
So far as question no.1 is concerned, the same is no more res integra. The same has already been decided by the Full Bench of this Court in Bhartu's case (supra) and Sukhdev vs. Parsi and others, A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 473.
In Bhartu's case (supra), the Full Bench of this Court observed that a co-sharer is always in possession of whole parcel of the land, even if he is not actually in possession. The view of the Full Bench in Bhartu's case (supra) can be gathered from paragraph 4 of the judgment which reads as under:-
"(1) A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession.
(2) Possession of joint property by one co-owner, is Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 7 in the eye of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession.
(3) A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all.
(4) The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession of a co-owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the other as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies that of the other.
(5) Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment.
(6) Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co- owners.
(7) Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented by the other co-owners, it is not open to any body to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition."
In Sukhdev's case (supra), it has been held by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court that a co-sharer who is in exclusive Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 8 possession of any portion of a joint khata can transfer that portion subject to adjustment of the rights of the other co-sharers therein at the time of partition and that other co-sharers' right will be sufficiently safeguarded if they are granted a decree by giving them a declaration that the possession of the transferees in the lands in dispute will be that of a co-sharers, subject to adjustment at the time of partition.
In Bachan Singh's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court on consideration of judicial pronouncements on the subject, was of the following opinion:
(i) a co-owner who is not in possession of any part of the property is not entitled to seek an injunction against another co-owner who has been in exclusive possession of the common property unless any act of the person in possession of the property amounts to ouster, prejudicial or adverse to the interest of co- owner out of possession.
(ii) Mere making of construction or improvement in the common property does not amount to ouster.
(iii) If by the act of the co-owner in possession the value or utility of the property is diminished, then a co-
owner out of possession can certainly seek an injunction to prevent the diminution of the value and utility of the property.
(iv) If the acts of the co-owner in possession are detrimental to the interest of other co-owners, a co- owner out of possession can seek an injunction to prevent such act which, is detrimental to his interest. In all other cases, the remedy of the co-owner out of Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 9 possession of the property is to seek partition, but not an injunction restraining the co-owner in possession from doing any act in exercise of his right to every inch of it which he is doing as a co-owner."
In all the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, it has been held that remedy of the co-owner/co-sharer out of possession of the joint property is to seek partition, but not injunction restraining the co- owner/co-sharer in possession from doing any act in exercise of his right to every inch of it which he is doing as co-owner/co-sharer except in the eventualities mentioned in at points (i), (iii) and (iv) of the judgment in Bachan Singh 'case (supra).
In view of Bhartu's case (supra), if the share is purchased by a vendee, he will be only a co-sharer, subject to that he gets exclusive possession of specific khasra number on which his vendor was in exclusive possession, otherwise he will be deemed to be in joint possession, not in exclusive possession. Even if specific khasra number is purchased, the same will be deemed to be purchase of share and it will be subject to partition.
In the light of decisions referred above, answer to first question is that possession of a co-sharer shall be deemed to be possession of all co-sharers in joint property, however, a co-sharer who is in exclusive possession cannot be ousted except in due course of law. Certainly, a co-sharer in exclusive possession can seek injunction. Re: Question No.2 If a co-owner/co-sharer tries to change the nature of joint Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 10 property detrimental to the interest of others, or if he tries to deny the title of his co-owner/co-sharer, or if he raises a construction in such a manner and to such an extent that it may become difficult or impossible for the co-owner/co-sharer to get an effective partition, such action of a co-sharer/co-owner is detrimental to the interest of other co-owners/co- sharers.
Admittedly, the plaintiff is co-sharer in the property in dispute, however, the defendant is also a purchaser of share as per the revenue record specifically jamabandi for the year 2006-07. In view of settled proposition of law, possession of one co-sharer is to be treated as possession of all and co-sharer has a right on every inch of the common property. As such, other co-sharers cannot be permitted to raise construction which changes the nature of property detrimental to the interest of other co-sharers without getting it partitioned. In other words, a co-sharer cannot change the nature of land i.e. from agricultural to non- agricultural. In Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot vs. Baldev Dass 2004 (4) R.C.R. (Civil) 760 and Makers Development Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M. Visvesvaraya Industrial Research and Development Centre (2012) 1 SCC 735, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that status quo of the property is to be preserved.
Admittedly, the plaintiff has been shown as co-sharer in the revenue record i.e. jamabandi for the year 2006-07 whereas the petitioner-defendant claims its right on the basis of sale deeds of the years 2009 and 2010 and the suit too was filed in the year 2010. Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 11 However, the petitioner could not show any sale deed on record which may indicate that its vendor was in exclusive possession of the property. The petitioner has specifically mentioned with respect to 24 bighas 5 biswas 2 biswasis, as per jamabandi for the year 2006-07, possession over khasra numbers 760 to 763 is joint. The column no.5 of jamabandi, which refers to the person who is cultivating the land reflects it as "Makbooja Malkan" (possession of owners), meaning thereby the possession of all. The plaintiff as well as predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner were also recorded as co-owners/co-sharers. There is no dispute about this fact as per the revenue record. However, the defendant wants to raise construction and he is in haste. It needs to be mentioned here that the petitioner has relied upon compromise (Annexure P-3). Since the said compromise is between the petitioner and his vendors, therefore, the same cannot bind the plaintiff, who is not a party to it and is an independent co-sharer. The petitioner has also relied upon the demarcation report dated 26.6.2013 (Annexure P-5), however, the same cannot be used for determination of possession. The possession is always determined in view of the revenue record i.e. jamabandi and khasra girdawari. Otherwise also, the demarcation report is after the decision of trial Court and it will not affect the merits of the case. The most crucial fact which needs to be mentioned here is that the defendant never claimed that it is in exclusive possession of particular khasra numbers on the basis of any revenue record and the petitioner has also not annexed nor shown to this Court any document from which it Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 12 can be inferred that it had taken exclusive possession and vendor from whom the land was purchased was also in exclusive possession. The trial Court failed to record any finding with respect to non-existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss and injury which are basic principles for ad interim injunction rather the finding otherwise appears to be in favour of the plaintiff which reads as under:
"When suit was filed, jamabandi for the year 2006- 2007 was on record, which shows that plaintiff is entitled to ½ share out of these khasra numbers. But, upon appearance of defendant, it has come on record that defendant has claimed his possession on the basis of sale deeds which cannot be discarded without seeing the proofs of these. However, one thing has become more clear that plaintiff has concealed these facts from the Court. However, it is also clear that it has not even been pleaded by defendant that whole of the land has been sold to him. It has pleaded its claim over only 24 bighas 5 biswas 2 biswasis. Thus, it is clear that when jamabandi does not reflect partition, there may be confusion regarding identity of land. Thus, proper remedy with the parties to move for partition. In the absence of it, it may be inferred that plaintiff has filed this suit to avoid sale deeds. Thus, no ground is there on the basis of which interim relief can be given to plaintiff. Application stands dismissed."
Perusal of order dated 28.03.2011 passed by trial Court reveals that trial Court has failed to even record a finding that the defendant is in possession of any particular part. It has just referred to Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 13 possession on the basis of sale deeds, rather Amar Singh- plaintiff/respondent has been recorded as owner of half share and also in the column of cultivation in the revenue records. The photographs (Annexure P-6) clearly indicate that the construction has been raised after conducting of demarcation on 26.06.2013. The construction, itself, is not of higher level, the construction upto the height of 4 ft. has been raised hastily with the help of large number of labourers and machines. Even structures of sheds have been installed. Meaning thereby, the petitioner has started construction after filing of suit on wars footing.
In Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary And Others vs. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar & Ors. AIR 1983 SC 742, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
"if respondents are allowed to put up construction by the use of the F.S.I for the whole of the land including the land involved in dispute, the situation may become irreversible by the time the dispute is decided and would preclude fair and just decision of the matter. If on the contrary injunction is granted as prayed for the respondents are not likely to be inconvenienced because they are in possession of about 9,000 sq. metres of land on which they can put up construction."
In T.Lakshipathi vs. P. Nityanandan Reddy AIR 2003 SC 2427, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where any property is held by several co-sharers, each co-sharer has interest in every inch of the common property, but his interest is qualified and limited by similar Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 14 interest of other co-owners. One co-owner cannot take exclusive possession of the property nor commit any act of waste, ouster or illegitimate use and if he does so, he may be restrained by an injunction.
In Maharwal Khewaji Trust (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down that during pendency of suit, grant of status quo and to maintain nature of property is proper. In that case, the trial Court granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the construction by defendant which was not accepted by first Appellate Court and thereafter by the High Court, but the Apex Court by setting aside the decision of the first Appellate Court and the High Court restored the order of the trial Court and an observation was made that even if matter remains pending for some time, that cannot be taken to be a ground by claimant to get permission to raise construction.
In the light of above, it is crystal clear that if agricultural land is being converted into constructed area, then it certainly changes the nature of land which will be detrimental to the interest of other co- sharers including the respondent-plaintiff. As per the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, partition of gair mumkin land is excluded from the assessment of land revenue. If the defendant raises the construction, then certainly it will change the nature of agricultural land to non-agricultural which can only be partitioned under the provisions of the Partition Act.
Section 4 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 reads as under:
Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 15
"4. Exclusion of certain land from operation of Act :
(1) Except so for as may be necessary for the record, recovery and administration of village cesses, nothing in this Act applies to land which is occupied as the site of a village and is not assessed to land revenue. (2) A Revenue-officer may define, for the purposes of this Act the limits of the site of a village :
Explanation : - For the purposes of this section a site within the limit of a municipality or a notified area shall not be deemed to be the site of a village.
The above said section provides that when the nature of land which is occupied as the site of a village and is not assessed to land revenue, is changed, the same land is to be excluded from operation of Punjab Land Revenue Act. Change of nature of agricultural land to constructed area will be deemed to be a gair mumkin land (non-
cultivable). The land cannot be reversed to its original state i.e. agricultural. Agricultural land otherwise cannot be converted into commercial or residential land by raising a construction without consent of co-sharers. If at all, the petitioner-defendant wanted to raise the construction, it should have got separated its share and thereafter could have raised the construction. Since the land is joint and even exclusive possession of the petitioner is not there, the conclusions (iii) and (iv) specifically of Bachan Singh's case (supra), are applicable to the facts of the present case. Every judgment has to be considered on its own facts. I have gone through this judgment in depth. In Bachan Singh's case (supra), the Division Bench observed that a co-owner who is not in Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 16 possession of any part of property, is not entitled to seek an injunction against another co-owner who has been in exclusive possession of common property unless any act of person in possession of property amounts to ouster, prejudicial or adverse to interest of co-owner out of possession. Here is a case where the possession of all the co-sharers has been shown to be joint further more construction on the agricultural land will be detrimental to the interest of co-sharers including plaintiff and in fact a prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiff. Besides this, the petitioner-defendant is changing nature of land without partition, it would cause irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiff and fact of the case indicates that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff.
After considering the material placed on record, the lower Appellate Court has rightly reversed the finding of trial Court and allowed the ad interim injunction application. In such circumstances, this Court deems it fit and proper that since the petitioner has started raising construction, the matter should be decided by this Court without remanding the matter to the trial Court for fresh decision. In Makers Development Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra), although construction was already raised on some of the area which was about 80 ft., but it has been said that other side in the event of success may face problem in undertaking the enormous exercise of demolition. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not permit completion of the construction and only observation was made that suit was to be decided expeditiously.Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 17
The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Makers Development Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) read as under:
"...It is the claim of the appellant/plaintiff that on the basis of the contract between the parties, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench should have granted an order permitting the appellant to carry on further construction especially when construction of about 80 ft. had already been raised by the appellant on the suit land. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendant that there is no existing agreement between the parties and the only point is that the parties have agreed to enter into an agreement and, therefore, the learned single Judge as well as the Division bench were not justified even in granting interim order in terms of prayer (g)."
"...The finding of the learned single Judge about the construction of the building to the height of 80 ft. on the suit land by the appellant cannot be ignored. However, whether the defendant permitted the appellant to enter on the suit land and to carry on construction are all matters to be decided in the main suit. The limited relief granted in clause (g) by the learned single Judge is quite understandable, otherwise, it could be possible for the defendant to deal with the suit land with third parties or encumber it before the final disposal of the suit. However, as rightly observed by the learned single Judge as well as Division Bench, if other reliefs which we have already extracted above are granted, in the event of dismissal of a suit, undoubtedly, it would create enormous difficulties for the defendant using the plot or land freely and without any difficulty. In other words, if Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 18 the appellant was allowed to proceed with the construction on the suit land, in the event of dismissal of suit, the defendant cannot use the land in a different manner with the structure without undertaking an enormous exercise of demolishing the same. Further, what was claimed by the plaintiff was not a mere prohibitory order but prayed for positive mandatory injunction which, as rightly observed by the Division Bench, would permit the plaintiff to alter the status quo on the suit land on the date of the suit."
"...The learned single Judge as well as Division Bench on appreciation of entire materials rendered the factual finding that the balance of convenience is not in favour of granting such mandatory interim order as claimed in prayer clauses (a) to (f). It is relevant to point out that though the appellant had stated that it had started construction in the year 1996, even after the information by the defendant to the appellant in 2002 that the BEST had given their `no objection' for the demolition of temporary receiving station and the appellant can proceed with the demolition, however, the fact remains, the height of the construction was only 80 ft. which shows that from the year 2001 to 2007, the appellant had not carried on construction and there was no obstruction from the side of the defendant. In view of all these factual aspects and in the light of the stand of the defendant disputing the existence of the agreement, as rightly observed by the learned single Judge as well as Division Bench, further permission for construction or ancillary works cannot be granted during the pendency of the suit."Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 19
A prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiff from the fact that the plaintiff is original owner of the land to the extent of half share. On the other hand, the defendant has become co-sharer by way of purchase vide sale deeds of the years 2009 and 2010. The alleged CLU etc. which have been taken from various departments will be of no help to the defendant as the same are without the consent of co- sharers. The land is yet to be partitioned by metes and bounds.
A co-owner has a right to come to the Court and get a relief if the acts of another co-owner are detrimental to his interest. So, it can be said that every case has to be viewed from its own angle. In the present case, since the defendant prima facie committed those acts which are definitely detrimental to the interest of the plaintiff, therefore, the first Appellate Court rightly interfered in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice and for the advancement of cause of justice. This revision is against the order of reversal but if the first Appellate Court has shown its maturity in allowing the application of the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, by adopting the salutary and recognized principles of law, the High Court should not interfere in such type of discretion exercised by the first Appellate Court.
As a result of above discussion, it is held that a co-sharer whether in exclusive possession or not in exclusive possession cannot change the nature of agricultural land by raising construction detrimental to the interest of other co-sharers without seeking partition by metes and bounds. Hence, question no.2 is answered accordingly. Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR No.7796 of 2013 20
In view of above, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. However, trial Court is directed to decide the suit expeditiously.
Dismissed.
However, any observation made in this order shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on merits of the controversy raised in the suit.
(Paramjeet Singh) Judge December 19, 2013 parveen kumar Kumar Parveen 2014.01.22 18:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document