Madras High Court
A.P.Abdul Rasheed vs M/S Hotel K.K.Residency on 12 August, 2010
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated :12.08.2010
Coram
The Honourable Mr.Justice G.RAJASURIA
C.R.P.(NPD) No.1929 of 2010
and
M.P.No.1 of 2010
A.P.Abdul Rasheed ... Petitioner
Vs.
M/s Hotel K.K.Residency
rep. by Managing Partner
K.M.Thajudeen ... Respondent
PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25(1) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 against the fair and final order dated 18.03.2010 passed in RCA No.11 of 2009 on the file of the II Additional Subordinate Judge-cum-Rent Control Appellate Authority, Coimbatore, confirming the fair and final order dated 06.03.2009 passed in RCOP No.205 of 2007 on the file of the District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller, Coimbatore.
For Petitioner : Mr.R.Bharath Kumar
For Respondent : Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, Senior Counsel
for M/s M.Venkatesan
O R D E R
Inveighing the order dated 18.03.2010 passed in RCA No.11 of 2009 by the learned II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, in confirming the order dated 06.03.2009 passed in RCOP No.205 of 2007 by the learned District Munsif, Coimbatore, this civil revision petition is focussed.
2. Heard both sides.
3. Niggard and bereft of details, the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this revision would run thus:
(i) The respondent herein filed RCOP No.205 of 2007 seeking eviction on the ground of (i) additional accommodation and (ii) for demolition and reconstruction, invoking Sections 10(3)(c) and 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act']. The matter was contested.
(ii) On the side of the landlord, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were examined and Exs.P1 to P8 were marked. On the side of the tenant, R.W.1 was examined and Exs.R1 and R2 were marked. Ultimately the learned Rent Controller ordered eviction on both the grounds as against which the the appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order of dismissal, this revision has been filed on various grounds.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the grounds of revision would develop his arguments, the gist and kernel of them would run thus:
(a) Both the Courts below failed to take into account the crucial point that additional accommodation is sought for in the petition, not for the purpose of accommodating the requirements of Hotel K.K.Residency, but so as to meet the requirements of Malabar Restaurant which is admittedly being run by one Tajudeen. As such Malabar Restaurant is having nothing to do with K.K. Residency and in such a case, both the Courts below ought to have rejected the ground based on Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.
(b) Even though the learned Rent Controller considered the relative hardship of the tenant, yet the appellate authority went to the extent of pointing out that the hardship of the tenant need not be considered at all, which observation is quite against the ingredients as contemplated in Section 10(3)(e) of the Act.
(c) The prayer for demolition and reconstruction on the part of the landlord is not a bona fide one and the ingredients as found embedded in Section 14(1)(b) of the Act have not been established by the landlord and in such a case, the orders passed by both the Courts below warrant interference.
(d) The landlord is one Hotel K.K.Residency, which is a partnership firm having its hotel building adjacent to the building wherein the demised premises is situated. There is a gap between the said K.K.Residency building and the building in which the demised premises is situated. The demised premises is in a building comprised of two storied building.
(e) In ground floor there are as many as 4 shops and in the first floor one Malabar Restaurant is being run. This building is having nothing to do with the building in which K.K.Residency is running its hotel.
(f) Purely for the purpose of invoking Section 10 (3) (c ) of the Act, the KK Residency partnership did choose to put up an over bridge linking the building in which KK Residency is being run and the building in which the demised premises is situated. As such both the buildings are separate units. Unless it could be shown that the buildings are one and the same, there is no probability of invoking the plea of additional accommodation, as per Section 10(3) (c) of the Act. In other words, the landlord should be in occupation of a portion of the building in which the demised premises is situated and only for expanding his business he could invoke Section 10(3) (c) of the Act.
Accordingly the learned counsel for the tenants prays for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below.
5. Per contra, by way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the tenant, the learned Senior Counsel for the landlord would develop his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus:
(a) The contention as put forth on the side of the learned counsel for the tenant is something untenable for the reason that the RCOP 205 of 2007 was filed by M/s. Hotel K.K.Residency represented by its partner Tajudeen. The fact remains that Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act is sought to be invoked by the landlord for the purpose of additional accommodation for expansion of Malabar Restaurant, which is being run by the landlord viz., Hotel K.K.Residency.
(b) The entire evidence on record would clearly display and demonstrate that after purchasing the building from one Muthu Subramanian, the said building was annexed as part and parcel of the already existing building belonging to KK Residency and it has become one unit.
(c) K.K. Residency filed the RCOP by describing itself as M/s Hotel K.K.Residency represented by its Parner Tajudeen and in fact, Tajudeen while examining himself as P.W.1 clearly and categorically pointed out that the said Malabar Restaurant is part and parcel of Hotel K.K. Residency and nowhere he stated that it is a separate entity. K.K. Residency is also occupying out of the four shops in the ground floor of the building purchased from Muthu Subramanian and the other two shops are in the occupancy of two tenants. Separately RCOPs have been filed for evicting the tenants and this RCOP is one of the said two RCOPs.
(d) In fact, the ground relating to demolition and reconstruction invoking Section 14(1)(b) of the Act has been taken by the landlord purely for the purpose of safeguarding its own interest, because in the event of the landlord carrying out major repairs in the building there should not be any objection from the tenant as though no such permission was sought from the Rent Controller etc. Accordingly, the learned Senior Counsel for the landlord prays for the dismissal of this revision.
6. The points for consideration are as to:
(1) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the orders passed by both the Courts in ordering eviction on the ground of additional accommodation?
(2) Whether the ingredients as found set out in Section 14(1)(b) of the Act have been established before the Rent Controller?
POINT NO.1:
7. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions relating to Section 10(3)(c) of the Act:
(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110 S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:
"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."
11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.
12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.
13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.
14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."
(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152 RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:
"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:
"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."
21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."
8. A mere poring over and perusal of those decisions would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that the Court is enjoined to find out the bona fide attitude of the landlord in seeking eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. No doubt, the landlord should have a business of his own in the premises concerned and then only the question of expanding the business and thereby seeking additional accommodation, would arise. Here, indisputably and unassailably, unarguably and unequivocally, the landlord is occupying two shops among the row of four shops in the ground floor of the building, namely purchased from Muthu Subramanian and the revision petitioner/tenant is having his textile business in one of the shops. In the first floor of the said building, Malabar Restaurant is being run. In fact, even while submitting his arguments, the learned counsel for the tenant produced a few photographs of the two buildings and also argued with reference to the depositions available on record.
9. What I could understand from the evidence concerned is that originally the building belonging to K.K.Residency and the building, which belonged to one Muthu Subramaniam, were situated side by side, in fact, without any gap whatsoever. Indubitably and indisputably, the said building belonging to Muthu Subramaniam was purchased by K.K.Residency partnership and the adjacent shop in the now purchased building actually was demolished and thereby it appears as though there is a gap between the two buildings. Over that gap, an over bridge was constructed admittedly, within two years after 2002, the year in which K.K.Residency purchased the said property from Muthu Subramaniam. It is not found spelt out in the evidence that the said over bridge was constructed only for the purpose of artificially giving an impression as though the two buildings are one and the same. On hearing both sides, the admitted position is that after such purchase from Muthu Subramaniam, K.K.Residencey arranged their affairs in such a manner that any one who wants to visit the Malabar Restaurant, which is an eating place has to enter the main building belonging to K.K.Residency and pass through the said over bridge and enter into the Malabar Restaurant. 10. In my considered opinion, the over all circumstances, which are found detailed and delineated supra, would clearly evince and evidence that after purchasing the building from Muthu Subramaniam, K.K.Residency made certain modifications and admittedly, the separate stair case, which was there in that building for having ingress and egress to the first floor of that building was demolished and the said over bridge, which was newly constructed is the only way for ingress and egress to that Malabar Restaurant, which is being run in the first floor of the building purchased from Muthu Subramainam.
11. The evidence of P.W.1 would pellucidly and palpably point out that the said demised premises under the occupation of the respondent is required for expanding the hotel business which is being run in the first floor under the name and style Malabar Restaurant. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, once it could be found that Malabar Restaurant is also part and parcel of the K.K. Residency, so to say the landlord's business, then it could be held that the ingredients relating to additional accommodation have been satisfied regarding the requirement of the demised premises for additional accommodation is concerned.
12. The learned counsel for the tenant inviting the attention of this Court to the evidence of P.W.2, one Manoj would develop his argument that even though he claimed to be the Manager working for ten years in K.K. Residency he would plead as though he was ignorant about the accounts as to whether the accounts of Malabar Restaurant and K.K. Residency are clubbed together and treated as one for income tax purpose.
13. Whereas, the learned Senior Counsel for the landlord inviting the attention of this Court to the deposition of P.W.1/Tajudeen himself would submit that nowhere Tajudeen ever stated that Malabar Restaurant is a separate unit owned by him and does not form part of K.K. Residency.
14. At this juncture, I would like to point out that there is no denial of landlord and tenant relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. The tenant would candidly admit that the demised premises in which he is occupying belongs to K.K. Residency and he would also admit that in the remaining two shops in the row of four shops, so to say in the adjacent shops, K.K. Residency itself is doing business.
15. Now the core question arises as to whether the first floor of the building is under the occupation of K.K. Residency under the name and style Malabar Restaurant or under the occupation of one person, namely Tajudeen in his individual capacity.
16. At this juncture, I would like to point out that it is not the concern of the tenant to raise all these points once there is over whelming evidence to show that building in which the demised premises is situated after being purchased by K.K. Residency from Muthu Subramanian was partly demolished and altered and ultimately annexed with the main building belonging to K.K. Residency by constructing an over bridge and that the evidence also was speaking to the effect that persons who wanted to have ingress and egress to the said Malabar Restaurant for eating purpose could only pass through the main building.
17. I am at a loss to understand as to how it could be contended by the tenant that Malabar Restaurant and K.K. Residency are separate entities and that K.K. Residency represented by Tajudeen cannot seek for expansion of business of Malabar Restaurant. Even the deposition of R.W.1/tenant also in fact would highlight and spotlight the location of the building and also the feasibility of having ingress and egress only through the main building.
18. The core question arises as to whether the landlord partnership for the purpose of invoking Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is bound to disclose the nature of its partnership relationship among its partners. Undoubtedly, it is Tajudeen who filed this RCOP representing M/s Hotel K.K. Residency; however the tenant would allege that Malabar Restaurant happens to be Tajudeen's individual property and it has nothing to do with K.K. Residency Hotel, but P.W.1 Tajudeen would depose that Malabar Restaurant is part of K.K. Residency. The hairsplitting argument forthcoming from the tenant's side may not be tenable, as the tenant is not expected to call up Tajudeen to prove whether Tajudeen is running Malabar Restaurant in his own individual capacity or as a partner of K.K. Residency and that too when Tajudeen himself filed the RCOP for eviction as against the tenant figuring himself as a partner of K.K. Residency and also deposing before the Court that the said building, i.e. Malabar Restaurant is part of K.K. Residency.
19. It is a trite proposition of law that preponderance of probabilities would govern the adjudication in civil matters and in summary proceedings it is more so. The evidence available on record would clearly highlight that the landlord established that the requirement of the demised premises is only for the expansion of the landlord's business and both the Courts below correctly addressed themselves to the issues and gave their findings.
20. At this juncture, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court relating to Section 25 of the Act:
(i) JT 2000 (SUPPL.3) SC 83 D.RADHAKRISHNAN AND ANOTHER VS. M.LOORDUSWAMY & OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"5. The requirement of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction has been considered and dealt with elaborately by a constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Vijay Singh & Ors. v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal (JT 1996(9) SC 408 = (1996) 6 SCC 475). The only question that arises for our consideration is, whether the findings arrived at by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the appellate authority, could have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act. Though the power of revision of the High Court under Section 25 cannot be held to be similar to the power of civil court under Section 115 C.P.C.,but at the same time, the same cannot be held to be conferring appellate power on the High Court. The High Court is only required to examine and satisfy, whether the procedure followed by the forum below is regular or not and whether there has been any illegality or impropriety of the decisions arrived at.
6. . . . . . While exercising revisional jurisdiction, to find out illegality with the findings or illegality of any procedure, it was not open to reappreciate the evidence, in the light of the object of the Act. In that view of the matter, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and affirm the decision of the Rent Controller as affirmed by the appellate authority. Respondent No.1 is granted six months' time to deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the landlord subject to the usual undertaking being filed in this Court within four weeks from today. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly."
(ii) 2001(2) CTC 95 VALLAMPATI KALAVATHI V. VAJI ISMAI, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"11. . . . The finding recorded by the High Court in the revisional proceedings amounts to taking a view different from those recorded by the Forums below on the evidence available on the record. Was this permissible within the purview of the revisional power vested in the High Court under Section 22 of the Act? The said section reads as follows:
"22. Revision: (1) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under this Act by the Controller in execution under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal under Section 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or of propriety gof such order or proceeding, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings, before the High Court under sub-section (1), shall be in its discretion."
12. As the language of the section suggests, the revisional power vested in the High Court is to be used for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding, and if satisfied that the order/orders suffer any such vice the High Court may pass such order in reference to the proceeding as it thinks fit. The expression 'legality', 'regularity' or 'propriety' are undoubtedly wider than mere correction of jurisdictional error. But even such regional power cannot be exercised to upset the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Forums below merely on the ground that the High Court is inclined to take a different view on the materials on record in the case. We should not be understood to be saying that the concurrent findings of fact can in no case be interfered with in revision. For such interference it has to be shown that the findings recorded by the Forums below suffer from any inherent defect or are based on inadmissible or irrelevant materials or are so perverse that no reasonable person will come to such conclusion on the material."
21. A mere poring over and perusal of the above excerpts, including the whole judgments would amply make the point clear that even though this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is having more revisional powers than exercising its revisional powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 115 of the C.P.C., yet it cannot assume the role of an appellate Court, which is the last Court of facts. Unless there is perversity or gross illegality, the question of interfering in revision under Section 25 of the Act would not arise.
22. It is therefore clear that when both the Courts below gave concurrent findings relating to the factual aspects involved in the matter, it is not open for the revisional Court to interfere and give its own view on it.
23. The learned counsel for the tenant would implore and entreat that even though the Rent Controller gave some reasons though not acceptable reasons relating to relative hardship, the appellate authority gave a go by to all the reasons concerning hardship and went to the extent of holding that the Court need not consider the relative hardship of the tenant at all.
24. In my opinion such an argument may not be correct. No doubt the learned Rent Controller elaborated on the ingredients relating to relative hardship and the consequential benefit that would accrue in favour of the landlord in the event of evicting the tenant.
25. Whenever Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is considered, it is always a must to keep in mind Section 10(3)(e) of the Act and the first proviso appended to it. Hence, those provisions are also extracted hereunder:
"Sec.10(3)(e): The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application:
Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c), the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord.
26. I also recollect the following maxim:
Rerum suarum quilibet est moderator et arbiter : Every one is the manager and disposer of his own matters.
Here P.W.1 as one of the partners of K.K. Residency candidly and categorically pointed out that the demised premises is required for expansion of the hotel business and in fact K.K. Residency partnership is doing hotel business. In such a case, I am at a loss to understand as to what else can be expected from such a landlord to establish his intention to expand his hotel business.
27. I also recollect the maxim:
Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta : Outward acts indicate the thoughts hidden within.
28. Accordingly if viewed, from the objective circumstances alone one could understand what is there in the heart of a person. Here if K.K. Residency is not doing any hotel business but doing any other business and if they for the first time come forward with some averment as though they wanted for hotel business which is not connected with their business, then there could be some ground for doubt. Here it is quite clear that even before purchasing the property from Muthu Subramaniam, K.K. Residency was running hotel business and after acquiring the building they started doing restaurant business and in such a case, their requirement for expanding the restaurant business cannot be found fault with and doubted.
29. The lower Court went to the extent of pointing out that the tenant did not produce any accounts book to show that there were enormous amounts to be collected from its customers and that if the tenant is evicted, he would be in a quandary or put to discomfiture. The Rent Controller also considered the benefit that would accrue to the landlord and it is quite obvious from the reading of the judgment of the Rent Controller. However, the learned counsel is vociferous in finding fault with the appellate authority for his remark that the development of the tenant's business was not the criterion for deciding the hardship. However, he did not simply stop with that. The appellate authority clearly pointed out that the tenant might experience some difficulty, but that cannot stand in the way of the owner requiring the property for his own bona fide purpose. As such, the appellate authority cannot be expected to wax eloquence on relative hardship. Once the lower Court discussed in detail the relative hardship of the tenant and the consequential benefit that would accrue to the landlord, the appelalte authority is expected to scrutinise it and if at all he disagrees with the view of the lower Court, he is expected to furnish his detailed reasons. In summary proceedings the appellate authority is not expected to elaborate over and above what the Rent Controller had discussed and it is sufficient if the appellate authority scrutinises the findings of the Rent Controller objectively.
30. No doubt the learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the appellate authority should not have gone to the extent of saying that the hardship of the tenant should not be considered. The language differs from one to another. I do not think that the appellate authority went to the extent of pointing out that for the purpose of ordering eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the relative hardship of the tenant should not be considered. Perhaps he intended by his language that the development of the business of the tenant should not be taken as the criterion for assessing the hardship, presumably thinking that the future prospects of the tenant are not germane for deciding the hardship. If at all there is anything to show that the lower authority had not considered the ingredients of relative hardship etc., then the question of remanding the matter back would arise as otherwise mere wrong decision on any point would not result in remanding the matter back to the lower authority.
31. Here it is quite clear that the Rent Controller considered the pros and cons of the matter and the appellate authority also felt that the hardship of the tenant would not outweigh the benefit that would accrue in favour of the landlord. The tenant is doing textile business and it is common knowledge that it could be shifted to any place and there would be always demand for textile goods. However, the landlord who is already having restaurant in the first floor cannot be asked to engage a different building for the purpose of expanding its restaurant business and no more elaboration in this regard is required and in my opinion the requirement of the landlord is a bona fide one as correctly pointed out by both the Courts below warranting no interference.
Accordingly, Point No.1 is decided in favour of the landlord.
POINT NO.2:
32. Relating to the ground based on demolition and reconstruction, what I would like to observe from the evidence available on record is that the landlord is not having any intention to demolish the entire structure, but it appears he wants to make some modification by removing the partition walls standing between the shops for expanding its restaurant business and in such a case, I do not think that invocation of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case is required. Accordingly, the findings given by both the Courts below on this ground are liable to be set aside and the accordingly set aside.
33. In the result, this civil revision petition is partly allowed by setting aside the orders of the both the Courts below in ordering eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, however, the order of eviction of the tenant on the ground of landlord's additional accommodation is confirmed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
34. The learned counsel for the tenant would make an extempore submission that sufficient time might be granted for the tenant to vacate the premises as he has been there ever since 1979 and holus-bolus if he is vacated from the premises he would not be able to find suitable accommodation. I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the tenant. Accordingly, six month's time is granted for vacating the premises, subject to payment of rent regularly and an affidavit of undertaking to that effect shall be filed within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
11.08.2010 gms INDEX :YES INTERNET :YES To
1. II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore.
2. The District Munsif, Coimbatore.
G.RAJASURIA.J., gms C.R.P.(NPD) No.1929 of 2010 12.08.2010