Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Janachaitanya Housing Ltd. Rep. By Its ... vs Divya Financiers, A Proprietorship ... on 31 March, 2008
Equivalent citations: AIR 2008 ANDHRA PRADESH 163, 2008 (5) ALL LJ NOC 987, 2008 A I H C (NOC) 606 (AP), (2008) 70 ALLINDCAS 289 (AP), (2008) 3 ANDH LT 409
Author: B. Seshasayana Reddy
Bench: B. Seshasayana Reddy
ORDER A. Gopal Reddy, J.
1. This revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to revise the order dt. 10-10-2007 in IA No.1210/2006 in OS No.291/2000 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Guntur was listed before us on a reference being made by a learned single Judge of this Court to decide the question "whether an application under Section 45 of the Evidence Act filed for sending the signatures for comparison and expert opinion, can be entertained at the later stage, including when coming up for arguments after entire trial?"
When the revision petition came up for admission before a learned single Judge of this Court, it was pointed out the inconsistent views taken by two learned Judges of this Court for maintaining the applications filed seeking expert's opinion at the belated stage of arguments in Kaveti Sarada v. Vemineni Hymavati 2006 (4) ALT 56, Pulaparti Sankuntala Bai v. Mygapula Ramanjaneyulu and Guru Govindu v. Devarapu Venkataramana 2006 (6) ALT 17.
2. Before we proceed to answer the reference, we must say the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 for revising the order impugned is uncalled for at this stage, since the order if allowed to stand will not attain finality, and the learned trial Judge in his discretion, may accept the expert's evidence or may not accept the same. Further, if the trial court decides the issue only on the basis of the expert evidence, the same is capable of correction in appeal, if any, preferred by the aggrieved party. In the absence of any prejudice or manifest injustice would be done to the parties revision itself cannot be entertained as the same will not fall under the exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rao v. Ram Chander Rao .
We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent.
The substratum of the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the trial court committed an illegality in exercising the discretion at the fag end of trial i.e., after closing the evidence, filing of such application cannot be entertained, and allowing IA amounts to reopening the suit for the purpose of leading evidence, which is not at all warranted.
3. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent contended that once the trial court exercised discretion, evidence cannot be shut in and same will not cause any prejudice to the petitioner, who will be provided an opportunity to object the report filed into the court, therefore, the same needs no interference. Reliance is placed on the very same judgments, on which basis reference is made by the learned single Judge.
It is convenient to consider the submissions in the light of the judgments, which were referred in the order of reference.
4. At this stage, we lightly touch the facts in the cases referred to above before answering the reference.
In Kaveti Sarada 2006 (4) ALT 56, the plaintiff filed suit for recovery of a sum on the basis of a pronote. After examining the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, the defendant filed IA under Order 26 Rule 10 CPC r/w Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act with a prayer to send pronote to the hand-writing expert for comparing the signature thereon with her (defendant) signatures in the vakalat, written statement, deposition etc., The trial court upheld the objection of the plaintiff that the application was filed at the belated stage. On filing revision before this court, a learned single Judge of this Court after referring to various judgments, wherein it was held that the opinion of an expert with regard to the signature or handwriting in the disputed document is not conclusive, but is only a piece of evidence and it is for the Court to arrive at its own conclusion on appreciation and while holding that once the Court below in exercise of its discretion concluded that sufficient evidence was already adduced by both parties, it is not necessary to send pronote for expert's opinion dismissed the revision.
5. In Pulaparti Sankuntala Bai , the plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale and after recording of evidence, the defendant filed IA under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act with a prayer to send the agreement of sale for analysis, and opinion by a handwriting expert. The trial court rejected the application by its order dt. 8-9-2004. On a revision being filed, a learned single Judge of this Court while observing:
...If the dispute is, as to the execution of document, by one of the parties to the suit, the application must be filed before the evidence of such party is closed. The reason is that, the witness can be confronted with the document, together with the opinion obtained, in relation thereto, during the course of evidence. Sending a document for expert's opinion, after the concerned witness has been examined in chief and cross; renders the very exercise, almost futile. The witness would not be available for being confronted with the evidence....
The trial Court has already expressed its view, that it can undertake comparison of that document, by itself, under Section 73 of the Act. It is not as if the opportunity for examination of the document, through expert, is closed, once for all. In case, the Court itself finds the necessity of sending the document for expert's opinion, after undertaking a comparison, by itself, it shall always be open to do so. However, this exercise can be undertaken only by the Court, on its own accord, and after recording cogent reasons.
disposed of the revision petition, upholding the order under revision, but with an observation that it shall be open to the trial Court to undertake comparison of the admitted signatures/thumb impressions, of the petitioner, on the one hand, and those on the agreement of sale, dated 10-1-1996, on the other hand, and leaving it open to the trial court to obtain expert's opinion, if it finds that the same is warranted.
6. Guru Gqvindu is a case rendered by the very same Judge, who rendered Pulaparti San Kunt Ala Bai .
In Guru Govindu , the plaintiff filed suit for recovery of certain amount on the strength of a promissory note. The defendant, after completion of plaintiff's evidence and while his evidence was in progress, filed IA under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act with a prayer to send the promissory note for the opinion of an expert in relation to the signature on it. The trial court dismissed the application of the defendant on two grounds. The first is, that it was filed at a belated stage and the second is, that in view of existence of power in the trial Court under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, it may not be necessary to accede to the request to send the documents to an expert's opinion. The learned Judge of this Court while rejecting the first reason assigned by the trial court, observed as under:
It is not as if the application under Section 45 of the Act must be filed soon after the written statement is presented. There may be instances where the necessity to file such application would arise after the oral evidence of certain witnesses is over. In case, the party concerned is able to elicit necessary information or admissions during the course of evidence, the necessity to file an application under Section 45 of the Act may not arise. Nothing prevents the party to a suit to file an application under Section 45 of the Act, even at the stage of arguments.
So far as the second observation is concerned, the very same learned Judge held as under:
...it is always competent for the Court to undertake comparison of signatures of disputed document by itself. The opinion rendered by an expert is only a supporting material and cannot be treated as conclusive. Ultimately, it is for the Court to come to a conclusion as to the genuinity and otherwise of the signatures. If the Court is capable of forming of such an opinion on the strength of oral and documentary evidence before it, in the exercise undertaken under Section 73 of the Act, the necessity to send the document for expert's opinion may not arise. On the other hand, even at the stage of hearing, if the Court feels that it must seek the help of an expert in coming to a proper conclusion, it can send the document on its own accord by requiring the party concerned to meet the expenditure. Therefore, the second reason assigned by the trial Court is not sound and proper.
7. While observing and holding so, the learned Judge dismissed the revision petition directing that the question as to whether the disputed document must be sent for opinion of an expert shall be kept open. In case, the trial court feels that it can record a finding on this aspect, there shall not be any necessity to send the document for an opinion. On the other hand, if it feels that such an opinion is necessary, it can take necessary steps in that regard.
8. The Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India while considering the effect of deletion of proviso to Order 18 Rule 2(4) CPC, which was inserted by Act 104 of 1976 by Act 46 of 1999, held that law prevalent prior to the 1976 amendment would govern. The principles as noticed in regard to deletion of Order 18 Rule 17(A), namely, "even before insertion of Order 18 Rule 17-A, the Court had inbuilt power to permit parties to produce evidence not known to them earlier or which could not be produced in spite of due diligence. Order 18 Rule 17-A did not create any new right but only clarified the position. Therefore, deletion of Order 18 Rule 17-A does not disentitle production of evidence at a later stage. On a party satisfying the court that after exercise of due diligence that evidence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced at the time the party was leading evidence, the court may permit leading of such evidence at a later stage on such terms as may appear to be just" would apply to the deletion of Order 18 Rule 2(4). As the discretion vests with the court for granting such permission prior to insertion of Order 18 Rule 2(4), omission of above provision by 1999 amendment does not take away the court's inherent power to call for any witness at any stage either suo motu or on the prayer of a party invoking the inherent powers of the court.
In view of the same, we are of the opinion that the court cannot lay down any hard-and-fast rules controlling the discretion of the court to send the disputed documents/writings for the opinion of the expert or to examine him in support of such opinion. On sending the document to handwriting expert and on receiving report, parties, on showing sufficient cause, may call upon the court to permit them to examine hand-writing expert or any witness in support or rebut the said opinion.
It is apt to quote here the observation of Justice Vivian Bose in his illuminating language dealing with the Code of Civil Procedure in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah , which reads thus:
It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.
9. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer the reference thus: "No time could be fixed for filing applications under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act for sending the disputed signature or writings to the handwriting expert for comparison and opinion and same shall be left open to the discretion of the court; for exercising such discretion when exigencies so demand, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the each case."
In view of answering the reference, post the revision petition before the learned Judge for disposal.