Kerala High Court
Chaithanya vs Union Of India on 4 November, 2025
Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025
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2025:KER:82712
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN
TUESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2025 / 13TH KARTHIKA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 1849 OF 2025
CRIME NO.RC-01/2022 OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY KOCHI,
ERNAKULAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.08.2025 IN SC NO.3 OF
2022 OF SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/S:
CHAITHANYA
AGED 30 YEARS
S/O. RAMAIAH, VEERAMMA COLONY, KONDAMODUAREA,
KOTANEMATIPURI VILLAGE, RAJUPALAM MANDAL, GUNTUR
DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH, PIN - 522412
BY ADVS.
SHRI.KALEESWARAM RAJ
SMT.CHINNU MARIA ANTONY
SMT.APARNA NARAYAN MENON
KUM.THULASI K. RAJ
RESPONDENT/S:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY,
KOCHI, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682020
BY ADV SMT.KRISHNA S., CGC
ADV.O.M.SHALINA, DSGI
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
28.10.2025, THE COURT ON 04.011.2025 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025
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2025:KER:82712
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
P.V. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.
..........................................
Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025
..................................................................
Dated this the 4th day of November, 2025
JUDGMENT
P.V. Balakrishnan, J.
This appeal is filed under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Act, 2008 challenging the order dated 29.08.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.131 of 2025, in SC No.03/2022/NIA passed by the Special Court for NIA Cases, Ernakulam, dismissing the bail application filed by the 1st accused.
2. The prosecution allegation in brief is as follows:
The appellant/1st accused, Kambhampati Chaitanya@ Chaithanya @ Surya, got attracted to the ideology of the banned terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) during his college days, and thereafter, he attended various classes and meetings of frontal organisations of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) conducted by the co-accused Pinakapani and Varalakshmi from 2017 to 2019. He got recruited into the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) in January 2019, and thereafter, intentionally conspired with co-accused Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 3 2025:KER:82712 Anjaneyalu and others in the beginning of January 2019, and travelled to Kambamala Estate in Wayanad, with an intention to physically join the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist), and joined the Kabani Dalam (squad), an armed squad of the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) under the Western Ghats Special Zone Committee (WGSZC) of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist). Being a member of this organisation, for furthering the terrorist activities of the proscribed terrorist CPI (Maoist), the appellant, along with other armed PLGA cadres, acted as a gang and visited the tribal colonies in the Kannur and Wayanad districts and propagated CPI (Maoist) ideology by distributing notices, pamphlets, etc., conducting classes, and raising slogans to attract and recruit vulnerable youth into the organisation. The said act was committed to strengthen the proscribed terrorist organisation and with an intention to commit terrorist acts for furthering the activities and objectives of CPI (Maoist), and thereby conspired to wage a war against the Government of India. Further, the appellant, as a member of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist), concealed his knowledge about the designs of waging war against the Union of India by CPI (Maoist) from the Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 4 2025:KER:82712 authorities. Hence, the prosecution alleges that the appellant/1st accused committed the offences under Sections 120B, 121A, 122, and 123 of IPC and under Sections 18, 20, 38, and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter referred to as UAPA for short).
3. Heard Sri.Kaleewaram Raj, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Smt.O.M.Shalina, the learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, appearing for the respondent.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant is totally innocent of the allegations levelled against him. He submitted that the impugned order passed by the special court for the trial of NIA cases, Ernakulam, is unjust and is against the settled principles of law and is liable to be set aside. He submitted that the appellant is in custody from 14.03.2022 onwards, and even though charges were framed on 12.09.2025, there is no likelihood of the trial being completed in near future, since there are almost 57 witnesses to be examined and the trial court has not even scheduled the trial. He, by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [AIR 2021 SC 712], contended that the statutory restrictions based under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 5 2025:KER:82712 will not oust the power of the constitutional courts to grant bail on the ground of long period of incarceration of the accused due to undue delay in conducting the trial, since it violates Part III of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the accused undoubtedly has a right to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in the instant case, where the appellant has already undergone 3 years and 7 months of incarceration without any likelihood of a trial being commenced in the near future, is entitled to be released on bail. The learned counsel, by relying on the decision in Anjaneyalu v. Union of India [2025 KHC OnLine 1843], contended that the co- accused in this case, against whom similar charges have been raised, has already been granted bail by this Hon'ble Court on the ground that he has already undergone 3 years of incarceration. He submitted that the appellant is hence, entitled to be released on bail, based on the principle of parity, as the charges levelled against the appellant are similar to or less severe than those against the co-accused, who has been released on bail. He contended that the trial court has erroneously proceeded as though only constitutional courts would be able to grant bail owing to long incarceration, and the said finding is to Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 6 2025:KER:82712 be set aside. He added that there is no allegation against the appellant that he had involved himself in any overt or direct acts of terrorism, and there is no allegation that he has committed any terrorist act under Section 15 of UAPA.
5. Per contra, the learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, Smt. O.M. Shalina, vehemently opposed the granting of bail to the appellant and submitted that the allegations levelled against him are very serious in nature. She contended that charges have already been framed in this case on 12.09.2025, indicating steady progress of proceedings, and that if this Court gives a specific direction to the trial court, the trial can be completed within 6 to 9 months. She argued that the materials collected during the investigation clearly indicate that the appellant, after joining the Kabani Dalam of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist), had undergone arms training and is involved in a terrorist conspiracy and has conspired with others to wage war against the State. She also contended that the accused is now involved in four other crimes of serious nature, all attracting offences under UAPA. She argued that, the appellant being a native of Andhra Pradesh, there is every chance of his absconding, if he is released on bail. She would Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 7 2025:KER:82712 submit that in the light of the afore facts, the continued detention of the appellant by invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is justified. She would also submit that the appellant cannot claim parity with Anjaneyalu, the co-accused, since his role, conduct, degree of involvement etc. are entirely different, and that the decision in Najeeb's case (supra) has not diluted the statutory bar under Section 43-D(5) of UAPA.
6. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the appellant is in custody from 14.03.2022 onwards. It is also not disputed that the charge sheet was filed before the special court on 03.09.2022 and charges were framed on 12.09.2025. The respondent do not dispute the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that, even though, charges have thus been framed, the trial has not yet been scheduled. It is further not in dispute that there are about 57 witnesses to be examined in this case. It is to be taken note that even the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent is to the effect that if a direction is given by this Court, the trial can be commenced and finished in a time frame fixed by this Court. If so, it can be safely found that there is no likelihood of the trial being completed in the near future.
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7. Now the question to be considered is whether, in the light of the afore facts and circumstances, i.e., undue delay in commencing the trial and the long period of incarceration, the appellant would be entitled to be released on bail. It is true that Section 43-D(5) places an embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release the accused on bail, if it is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. It is also true that the restrictions on granting bail thus specified are in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting bail. Furthermore, it is not disputed that on the earlier occasion, while dismissing the bail application of the appellant on 11.04.2023, this Court, in Crl.Appl.No.1359 of 2022, has recorded that there are sufficient materials to show that the appellant is actually involved in the Dalams of the PLGA of the CPI (Maoist) party.
8. Now be that as it may, it is to be taken note that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in Najeeb's case (supra), while considering the bail application of an accused involved in a case charged inter alia under Sections 16, 18, 19, and 20 of UAPA, and who had undergone a long period of incarceration, Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 9 2025:KER:82712 has categorically held that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India would cover within its protective ambit not only due process and fairness, but also access to justice and speedy trial. The court also observed that once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. It went on to hold that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43- D(5) of UAPA, per se will not oust the ability of the Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India and granted bail to the accused who had already undergone a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted herein below:
"17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 10 2025:KER:82712 period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial."
9. Subsequently, in the decision in Shoma Kanti Sen v State of Maharashtra [AIR 2024 SC 2169], the Apex Court by relying on the decision in Najeeb's case (supra) and rejecting the contentions of the prosecution that unless the conditions specified in section 43-D(5) of UAPA are fulfilled the accused is not liable to be enlarged on bail, held thus:
"38. Relying on this judgment, Mr. Nataraj, submits that bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to be enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences enumerated in Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must fulfill the conditions specified in S.43D(5) thereof. We do not accept the first part of this submission. This Court has already accepted right of an accused under the said offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail founding such right on Art.21 of the Constitution of India. This was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail - restricting provision of S.43D(5) of the 1967 Act.Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 11
2025:KER:82712 Pre -conviction detention is necessary to collect evidence (at the investigation stage), to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being fugitive from justice. Such detention is also necessary to prevent further commission of offence by the same accused. Depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by an accused, detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post - charge sheet stage has the sanction of law broadly on these reasonings. But any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Art.21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure and such deprival must be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would be the overarching principles which the law Courts would have to apply while testing prosecution's plea of pre - trial detention, both at investigation and post
- charge sheet stage."
10. The same principle was also followed by the Apex Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024 SCC Online SC 1693) and Athar Parwez v. Union of India (2024 KHC 6719). In the decision in Athar Parwez's case, the Apex Court after discussing Najeeb's case, went on to observe as follows:
Crl.A.No.1849 of 202512
2025:KER:82712 "At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be appreciated and followed by the Courts. Keeping the statutory provisions in mind but with the passage of time the effect of that statutory provision would in fact have to be diluted giving way to the mandate of Part III of the Constitution where the accused as of now is not a convict and is facing the charges. Constitutional right of speedy trial in such circumstances will have precedence over the bar/strict provisions of the statute and cannot be made the sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the period of incarceration of an accused could also be a relevant factor to be considered by the constitutional courts not to be merely governed by the statutory provisions."
11. In the light of the dictums referred above, in the instant case, it can be stated that eventhough in the initial stage, the bail application of the appellant was rejected by considering the legislative policy enshrined in Section 43-D(5) of UAPA, the rigours of the provision has melted down, due to long period of incarceration and the delay in conducting trial. Ergo, following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and considering the fact that the appellant has been undergoing incarceration since 14.03.2022 and the fact that the trial in this case is not likely to be completed in near future, we are of the considered view that, Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 13 2025:KER:82712 this is a fit case where the appellant can be released on bail.
12. At this juncture, we will also take note of the fact that the co-accused in this case, Anjaneyalu, who faces similar or much more grave allegations than the appellant, has been granted bail by this Court as per judgment in Crl.Appl.No.932 of 2025 dated 30.06.2025, considering his period of incarceration from 12.05.2022 onwards and by following the dictums of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as discussed afore. Hence the appellant is also entitled to claim parity along with co-accused Anjaneyalu, in getting released on bail.
In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed as follows;
1. The order dated 29.08.2025 in Crl.M.P No.131 of 2025 in SC No.3 of 2022/NIA passed by the Special Court for Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam is set aside.
2. Crl.M.P.No.131 of 2025 in SC No.3 of 2022/NIA is allowed subject to terms and conditions as follows;
a) The appellant shall be released on bail on executing a bond for Rs.1 lakh with two solvent sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the special court.
b) The appellant shall not leave State of Kerala till the completion of trial in SC No.3 of 2022.
c) The appellant shall furnish to the Investigating Officer of NIA his place of residence in the State within two days Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025 14 2025:KER:82712 of his release.
d) The appellant shall report before the Investigating Officer on all Wednesdays between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., till the end of trial.
e) The appellant shall use only one mobile number during the period of bail and shall communicate the said number to the Investigating Officer of the NIA. The appellant shall remain accessible on the said number through out the duration of bail and shall not under any circumstances switch off or discard the device associated with it, without prior intimation to the Investigating Officer.
f) The appellant shall not tamper with evidence or attempt to influence or threaten any witnesses in any manner.
g) The appellant shall not engage or associate with any activities, similar to the offences alleged against him or commit any other offence while on bail.
In case of violation of any of the aforesaid conditions, it would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail granted to the appellant, before the special court.
Sd/-
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI, JUDGE Sd/-
P.V. BALAKRISHNAN, JUDGE Dxy