Punjab-Haryana High Court
V K Sharma vs Poonam Sardana And Others on 16 February, 2026
Author: Amarinder Singh Grewal
Bench: Amarinder Singh Grewal
RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
111. RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) in
RSA No.3831 of 1998
Date of Decision:16.02.2026
V.K. Sharma ...Applicant-Appellant
Versus
Poonam Sardana and others ... Non-Applicant/Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL
Present: Dr. Anmol Rattan Sidhu, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma, Advocate
for the applicant-appellants.
Mr. N. S. Boparai, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Ankit Jangra, Advocate
for respondent No.1.
Mr. Anand Chhiber, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Ateevraj Sandhu, Advocate,
Mr. Inderjeet Singh, Advocate
for respondent No.2.
Name of respondent No.4 deleted vide order dated 14.09.1999.
***
AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL)
C.M. No.1644-C of 2026 Application is allowed as prayed for.
RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M)
1. The present review application under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 151 CPC has been filed by the applicant-appellant (plaintiff) seeking review of the judgment dated 09.10.2025 passed by this Court, whereby the regular second appeal filed by the applicant-appellant was dismissed.
2. The applicant-appellant seeks review of the judgment dated 09.10.2025 passed in the regular second appeal by contending that the same suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record due to mis-appreciation and non-consideration of material evidence.
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3. Dr. Anmol Rattan Sidhu, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma, Advocate, appearing for the applicant-appellant, contends that the admission of documents Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-3 does not establish the case of the non- applicants-respondents (defendants). It is submitted that the non-applicants- respondents have taken contradictory stands regarding permission to transfer the suit property. He refers to documents Ex.D-2 dated 29.06.1984 and Ex.PW-6/A dated 05.07.1984, attested on 10.05.1985 to submit that two different permissions to transfer of the suit property are on record, which create inconsistency and that these documents are not properly appreciated by this court. It is further submitted that, on the one hand, non-applicants-respondents pleaded that permission to transfer of the property had not been obtained as the name of the transferee was not known, whereas Ex.D-2 itself mentions the name of the applicant-appellant V.K. Sharma, and they also took the stand that permission was not required after obtaining a no-due certificate, which, according to the applicant-appellant, is inconsistent with the existence of documents Ex.D-2 and Ex.PW-6/A, which indicate that permission for transfer had, in fact, been sought and processed. It is further contended that the zimni order dated 06.04.1985 records the statement of non-applicant-respondent No.3, V.P. Sardana, expressing readiness to execute the sale deed, whereas the conveyance deed in respect of the plot was executed by HUDA in favour of Poonam and Shelly Sardana only on 03.11.1987. It is submitted that, in the absence of a conveyance deed in his favour, the non- applicants-respondents could not have executed the sale deed on 31.07.1985. It is further contended that contradictory stands were taken regarding the indemnity bond, inasmuch as non-applicant-respondent No.3, in his statement dated 06.04.1985, expressed readiness to execute the sale deed, whereas Vimla Sardana, legal representative of Shelly Sardana, while appearing as a witness, has categorically deposed that "it is incorrect that indemnity bond was to be obtained 2 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -3- by me". It is further submitted that non-applicant-respondent No.3 secured the No Due Certificate merely two days prior to filing of written statement by him before the learned trial Court.
4. Learned senior counsel for the review applicant-appellant contends that the zimni orders relied upon have not been correctly appreciated, inasmuch as the first two orders pertain only to chances of compromise, while the order dated 06.04.1985 records the statement of V.P. Sardana expressing readiness to execute the sale deed. It is submitted that thereafter the applicant-appellant moved an application dated 25.04.1985 seeking production of No Due Certificate, indemnity bond and permission to transfer but the non-applicants/respondents failed to produce the said documents, which, according to the applicant-appellant, have not been properly considered.
5. It is further contended that the factum of the applicant-appellant having a special child was never disputed by the non-applicants-respondents. It is submitted that the minor son of the applicant-appellant was seriously ill since May, 1985 and expired in the last week of July 1985, and during the same period his wife was pregnant and ultimately gave birth to a child on 28.11.1985. It is further submitted that, due to these circumstances, he could not appear on 31.07.1985 when the suit was dismissed in default, and that the suit was subsequently restored in October 1991 after the non-applicants/respondents filed their reply thereto on 15.05.1991. According to the applicant-appellant, these material facts were not properly appreciated.
6. Additionally, it is urged that the conduct of the non-applicants/respondents shows that they were avoiding execution of the sale deed, inasmuch as they opposed the restoration application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC and, despite the statement dated 23.02.1987, attempted to transfer the plot in favour of their mother, Vimla Sardana. It is further submitted that the non-applicants/respondents stated on 3 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -4- 27.04.1985 that permission to transfer could not be applied for due to stay orders; however, they did not disclose on 24.05.1985 that the permission was expiring on 09.06.1985 and, according to the applicant-appellant, they misled the Courts below.
7. Lastly, it is urged that certain material facts were not taken into consideration, including the illness of the minor son of the applicant-appellant commencing in May 1985, his death in July 1985, dismissal of the suit in default on 31.07.1985, and the restoration proceedings culminating in restoration of the suit in October 1991, which, according to the applicant, had a bearing on appreciation of the conduct of the parties and the issue of readiness and willingness. It is also contended that the non-applicants/respondents obtained the judgment and decree in their favour by misleading the Courts below and by relying upon fabricated documents, much less, taking inconsistent stands at different stages of the proceedings, thus, amounting to fraud played upon the learned Courts below. Therefore, the applicant-appellant submits that the impugned judgments and decrees are a nullity in the eyes of law. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1; Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148; and LIC of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491. On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the judgment dated 09.10.2025 passed by this court be reviewed.
8. Mr. N.S. Boparai, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ankit Jangra, Advocate, for respondent No.1 and Mr. Anand Chhiber, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Ateevraj Sandhu, Advocate and Mr. Inderjeet Singh, Advocate, for respondent No.2 contend that the present review petition is wholly misconceived and is an attempt to re-argue the matter. It is submitted that the non-applicants/respondents, being ready and willing to execute the sale deed had applied to HUDA for permission to transfer the suit property vide application 4 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -5- Ex.D-2 dated 29.06.1984. Moreover, the applicant-appellant himself admitted the documents Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-6 in his cross-examination dated 09.11.1993, especially Ex.D-3 dated 10.05.1985 whereby permission to transfer the suit property was duly granted. The respondents further evidenced their readiness by issuing a telegram (Ex.D-4) and a registered letter (Ex.D-5) immediately upon the grant of permission, calling upon the applicant-appellant to execute the sale deed.
9. It is argued that the issue in question had already been examined by the learned trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and the findings were affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 14.09.1998. The record further reveals that vide order dated 11.07.2018, this Court remanded the matter to the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, for limited reconsideration of Reframed Issue No.1. Pursuant thereto, the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula submitted a report dated 11.02.2019 and, particularly in paragraphs 19, 20 and 22 thereof, held that no re-adjudication of Reframed Issue No.1 was warranted. This Court, while deciding the main appeal, specifically considered and rejected the said pleas in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 09.10.2025.
10. Learned senior counsels for the non-applicants/respondents further contend that the reliance placed by the applicant-appellant upon the application dated 25.04.1985 seeking production of the No Dues Certificate, Indemnity Bond and permission to transfer is wholly misconceived. It is submitted that immediately upon the said application, the learned Trial Court, vide order dated 27.04.1985 passed on joint request of the parties, directed the non-applicants/respondents to obtain requisite permission from HUDA within 15 days and to intimate the applicant-appellant telegraphically forthwith. In compliance thereof, the non- applicants/respondents obtained permission vide Ex.D-3 dated 10.05.1985 within the stipulated period and informed the applicant-appellant on the same day through 5 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -6- telegram Ex.D-4 and thereafter by registered post Ex.D-5 dated 11.05.1985. Thus, the grievance raised in the application dated 25.04.1985 stood fully redressed pursuant to judicial direction. It is further argued that the learned trial Court, after appreciating the documents Ex.D-3 to Ex.D-5 duly rendered the finding on readiness and willingness in favour of the non-applicant/respondents. The said finding was further affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, as well as by this Court vide judgment dated 09.10.2025. Therefore, the review application amounts to re-agitation of a concluded factual issue and do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record.
11. Lastly, it is argued that after grant of permission to transfer the suit property vide Ex.D-3 dated 10.05.1985, no impediment remained for execution of the sale deed. Despite repeated opportunities granted by the learned trial Court, the applicant-appellant failed to appear and get the sale deed executed, and the suit was ultimately dismissed in default. It is submitted that the default is solely attributable to the applicant-appellant himself and not to any lapse on the part of the non- applicants/respondents. Placing reliance upon the settled principles under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170; Parison Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715; Sasi (Dead) through LRs v. Aravindakshan Nair, 2017 (2) RCR (Civil) 363; and N. Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria, (2013) 15 SCC 534, it is urged that review jurisdiction is confined to correction of an error apparent on the face of the record and cannot be invoked to re-appreciate evidence or revisit its own decision by the Court.
12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and perusing the entire record, this Court proceeds to examine the maintainability of the present review petition in the light of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Before proceeding with the analysis, this Court refers to the grounds for exercising review jurisdiction Order 6 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -7- XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 ("CPC"). Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC lays down the following grounds for review:
"XLVII. Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applied for the review.
13. The statutory provision permits review only upon (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced at the time of decision; (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) any other sufficient reason analogous to the above grounds. The review applicant-appellant has neither pleaded nor demonstrated discovery of any new material, which was unavailable despite due diligence. The grounds urged pertain to alleged mis-appreciation of documentary evidence, reconsideration of readiness and conduct of parties, and re- agitation of issues concerning permission to transfer and execution of the sale deed, all of which were specifically examined and adjudicated by this Court in the judgment dated 09.10.2025. No patent, self-evident or manifest error has been pointed out; rather, the contentions require a fresh evaluation of evidence and a reappraisal of findings already returned. An error which has to be established by a 7 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -8- long-drawn process of reasoning cannot be termed as an "error apparent on the face of the record".
14. The power of review being an exception to the doctrine of finality, which must be exercised within narrow confines. The maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium mandates that litigation must attain finality, and the principle Actus curiae neminem gravabit is attracted only in cases of fundamental procedural or jurisdictional error causing grave injustice, which is conspicuously absent in the present case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1965) 5 SCR 174; Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC 170; Parison Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715; N. Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria (2013) 15 SCC 534; Sasi (Dead) through LRs v. Aravindakshan Nair 2017 (2) RCR (Civil) 363; and the latest pronouncement in Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1927, decided on 08.09.2025, has consistently held that the scope of review jurisdiction is well settled. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and are strictly confined to the parameters of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable correction of all manner of errors. In exercise of review jurisdiction, an erroneous decision cannot be reheard and corrected, as a review petition cannot be permitted to operate as an appeal in disguise. The power of review is available only for correction of a patent mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and not to substitute one possible view with another. The review court does not sit in appeal over its own judgment, and rehearing on merits is impermissible. The jurisdiction is invoked only to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors, none of which are demonstrated in the present case.
15. Though this Court has already discussed and dealt with the contentions of the applicant-appellant and does not find any error apparent on the face of the record or 8 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -9- any patent illegality resulting in miscarriage of justice, it nevertheless proceeds to deal with the principal contention raised by the applicant-appellant with respect to Ex.D-2 dated 29.06.1984, Ex.PW-6/A dated 05.07.1984 and Ex.D-3 dated 10.05.1985, to demonstrate how a disgruntled litigant does not hesitate to abuse the process of law.
16. The document Ex.D-2 dated 29.06.1984 clearly reflects that the non- applicant/respondents had applied to HUDA seeking permission to transfer the plot in the name of the applicant-appellant. Undoubtedly, another application dated 05.07.1984 (Ex.PW-6/A) is also available on the record, seeking permission to transfer the suit property in the name of the applicant-appellant. However, a perusal of the record reveals that the said permission could not be granted due to a stay order passed by the learned trial Court. The learned Trial Court vide order dated 27.04.1985, vacated the stay to the extent that alienation of the property in favour of the applicant-appellant was made permissible in accordance with law. For the said purpose, the non-applicants/respondents were directed to obtain permission from HUDA within 15 days and to inform the applicant-appellant accordingly. After vacation of the stay, permission was ultimately granted on 10.05.1985 vide Ex.D-3. Interestingly, the order dated 27.04.1985 was passed by the learned trial Court in the presence of counsel for the applicant-appellant. Thus, despite being privy to the order dated 27.04.1985, the contention raised in the second appeal and now reiterated in the present review application, that two applications seeking permission to transfer the suit property, namely Ex.D-2 dated 29.06.1984 and Ex. PW-6/A, were in existence and that a fraud was played upon the Court, is wholly preposterous. Admittedly, in both applications, Ex.D-2 and Ex.PW-6/A, permission was sought to transfer the property in the name of the applicant-appellant only. After obtaining the said permission from HUDA, the applicant-appellant was duly informed on the very same day through telegram (Ex.D-4) and thereafter by 9 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 28-02-2026 00:28:34 ::: RA-RS No.82 of 2025 (O&M) -10- registered post dated 11.05.1985 (Ex.D-5) and was called upon to execute the sale deed. The chronological sequence of events, therefore, clearly demonstrates that the non-applicants/respondents duly proved their readiness and willingness by complying with the order dated 27.04.1985 passed by the learned trial Court, and it was the applicant-appellant, who did not turn up to perform his part of the contract despite due intimation having been given to him vide Ex.D-4 and Ex.D-5 to execute the sale deed. Moreover, it is settled law that even in civil cases, fraud is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, akin to a criminal charge. The applicant-appellant has miserably failed to establish the alleged fraud even on the preponderance of probabilities, let alone proving it beyond reasonable doubt.
17. Thus, tested on the anvil of the aforesaid statutory parameters and settled legal principles, the present review application is nothing but an attempt to reopen and reargue issues, which stood conclusively determined in the judgment dated 09.10.2025 passed by this Court and this Court does not find any patent error apparent on the face of the record or any sufficient reason analogous thereto for invoking review jurisdiction. The mechanical invocation of the phrase "error apparent" cannot enlarge the narrow scope of review jurisdiction. What is sought is, in substance, a rehearing of the second appeal on merits, an exercise which is wholly impermissible under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Judicial discipline demands finality. Review is an exception, not a second inning.
18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present review petition, being devoid of merit and not maintainable in law, is accordingly dismissed. However, this Court refrains itself from imposing exemplary costs.
19. Pending misc. application, if any, also stands disposed of.
(AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL)
JUDGE
February 16, 2025
Pankaj* Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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