Madras High Court
Ariyanayagipuram Hindu Nadar vs S.M.Meeramohaideen on 12 October, 2018
Author: M.V.Muralidaran
Bench: M.V.Muralidaran
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 12.10.2018 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.V.MURALIDARAN Cont.P.(MD)No.873 of 2018 in W.P.(MD) No.11666 of 2018 Ariyanayagipuram Hindu Nadar Uravinmurai Committee, Uyar Thuvakkappalli Sangam (Reg.No.13/64), Rep. by its Secretary, P.Arunagirisamy, Ariyanayagipuram, Kadayanallur Taluk, Tirunelveli District. .. Petitioner Vs.
1.S.M.Meeramohaideen, The District Registrar, O/o. The District Registrar, Thenkasi, Tirunelveli.
2.P.Chandrasekaran, The District Education Officer, Tirunelveli, Tirunelveli District. ... Respondents
Prayer: Petition filed under Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, to punish the respondents for the wilful disobedience of the order of this Court passed in W.P.(MD)No.11666 of 2018, dated 30.05.2018, under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act.
!For Petitioner : Mr.S.Louis
^For Respondents : Mr.Murugan (for R1)
Government Advocate
Mr.Aayiram K.Selvakumar (for R2)
Additional Government Pleader
:Order
This petition has been preferred by the petitioner praying this Court to punish the respondents for wilful disobedience in not complying with the order dated 30.05.2018, passed by this Court in W.P.(MD) No.11666 of 2018.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that this Court, vide order dated 30.05.2018, in the above writ petition, had directed the respondents in the writ petition to consider the Form-VII dated 11.5.2018, submitted by the petitioner society and the proposal dated 12.5.2018, and pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondents have not complied with the said order, prompting the petitioner to file this contempt petition.
3. Though the petitioner pleads as above, the respondents counter the same by submitting that the order passed by this Court has been complied with, with due notice and intimation to the petitioner, as stipulated in the order and, therefore, the filing of the present contempt by the petitioner is nothing but an abuse of process of law, which has to be viewed very strictly with imposition of punishment/costs.
4. To appreciate the contentions advanced, it would be worthwhile to narrate the sequence of facts as stands unfolded from the writ petition till the present proceedings for contempt.
5. The School, an aided private institution, is being managed by the School Committee. The election to the petitioner society was held way back on 05.04.2015, which gave rise to various civil suits and election disputes, which are said to be pending as on date. Due to management disputes, the Hindu Nadar Uravinmurai Committee Higher Secondary School, Ariyanayagipuram, Kadayanallur was brought under direct payment on and from 11.02.2014. Approval was given to the previous school committee on 02.11.2015, which took over the Management of the School. However, the 3rd respondent in the writ petition, viz., The District Elementary Education Officer, Tirunelveli District, on noticing that the Form-VII submitted by the previous Management was yet to be approved by the District Registrar, passed an order dated 14.01.2016, cancelling the approval given to the School Committee, which was alleged to have been elected on 15.04.2015. Challenging the said cancellation of the approval the then School Committee filed W.P.(MD) No.1671 of 2016 in which this Court granted an order of injunction. Pursuant to the same, the 3rd respondent in the writ petition passed a subsequent order, dated 31.08.2016 restoring the order of approval granted to the School Committee on 02.11.2015. In the above backdrop, the School Committee continued to run the administration of the School. The term of office of the said school committee came to an end on 4.4.2018, whereupon, the general body meeting was alleged to have been convened on 02.05.2018; office-bearers were elected and the Executive Committee Meeting was also held on 10.05.2018. Consequent upon the said selection and meeting of the Executive Committee, Form-VII was submitted on 11.05.2018 to the 1st respondent enclosing the necessary documents for approval. The proposal for approval of the newly elected School committee dated 12.05.2018, has also been submitted to the respondents 2 and 3, which were said to be pending. In such a backdrop, the above writ petition was filed praying this Court for a direction on the respondents in the writ petition to approve the proposal.
6. In the above writ petition, this Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, with the consent of the parties, passed the following order :-
?6. In view of the above facts and circumstances, without expressing any opinion on the claim made by the petitioner, the first respondent is directed to consider the Form-VII, dated 11.05.2018, submitted by the petitioner Society and the respondents 2 and 3 are directed to consider the proposal dated 12.05.2018, submitted by the petitioner and pass appropriate orders on merits in accordance with law within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, after affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.?
7. It is the contention of the petitioner herein that though the order was communicated to the respondents therein on 14.6.2018, the respondents have not complied with the directions issued by this Court even till the issuance of the statutory notice on 27.6.2018 and, therefore, the respondents have committed contempt in not complying with the orders passed by this Court, which has to be dealt with, with iron hands so as to upkeep the majesty of this Hon?ble Court and the rule of law.
8. Per contra, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the order passed by this Court has been complied with and intimation regarding the same has been sent to the petitioner way back on 21.6.2018, which has been duly acknowledged by the petitioner. However, suppressing the above facts, since the order has gone against the petitioner, to wreck vengeance, the petitioner has filed this contempt petition on 21.6.2018 and has misled the Court into issuing the statutory notice on 27.6.2018, by submitting that no orders have been passed, but knowing fully well that the direction issued by this Court has been complied with by passing order on 20.6.2018 and intimation sent with regard to the same has also been received by the petitioner on 21.6.2018. It is therefore submitted that it?s not the act of the respondents, which is contemptuous, but it is the act of the petitioner, which is per se contemptuous, thereby, demeaning the majesty of the Court and taking the Court for a ride to enrich its wishes, which is in total contravention of the procedures and safeguards prescribed by law. Therefore, it is prayed that the act of the petitioner should not only be deprecated, but the abhorrent act should be dealt with sternly so that a warning is sent to all the four corners of the country that the Court cannot be made a puppet in the hands of unscrupulous persons, like the petitioner, who try to enrich themselves at the cost of the court.
9. This Court bestowed its best attention to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on either side and also perused the materials available on record.
10. The issue that falls for consideration of this Court is whether the respondents/contemnors have willfully disobeyed the orders of this Court and have, in essence, committed contempt of the orders passed by this Court.
11. If the above questioned is answered in the negative, the ancillary question that would crop up before this Court is whether the order passed by the respondents in obedience of this Court?s order has been suppressed by the petitioner for its own benefit and feathering its nest and if so, what is the action that could be taken against the petitioner.
12. On the issuance of statutory notice on 27.6.2018, the respondents were present before this Court along with the files. A copy of the order passed rejecting the Form VII submitted by the petitioner has been placed before the Court. The documents in the files reveal that in compliance of the Court?s direction, order has been passed on 20.6.2018 and the same has been communicated to the petitioner. A perusal of the order further reveals that notice was issued to the petitioner for his appearance before the office of the 2nd respondent on 15.6.2018 and communication to that effect has been sent to the petitioner on 11.6.2018 under due acknowledgement. However, the date of hearing was postponed to 18.6.2018 for reasons stated in the order. The petitioner appeared on 18.6.2018 and orally requested for an adjournment of the matter to 19.6.2018 citing personal reasons and, accordingly, the matter was taken up on 19.6.2018 on which date the petitioner was not present. However, a letter was received from the counsel for the petitioner seeking adjournment. Since there was a direction from the Court to pass orders on the matter within a period of two weeks, else contempt action would be initiated, the 2nd respondent herein proceeded further to take up the matter in accordance with law.
13. In the above backdrop, the 2nd respondent considered the documents submitted by the petitioner for approval of Form VII and after consideration of the matter, held that since the rules relating to Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Rules having not been followed and only the bylaws of the society having been followed and no documents having been filed to show that the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Rules have been followed before convening the General Body Meeting, the 2nd respondent rejected the documents submitted by the petitioner for granting approval as the mandate made under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Rules have not been followed. This order has been passed by the 2nd respondent on 20.6.2018 and communicated to the petitioner on 21.6.2018 under due acknowledgement.
14. From the above records, which have been carefully perused by this Court, this Court is of the considered view that the direction issued by this Court to pass orders on the Form VII and proposal submitted by the petitioner has been duly complied with.
15. In the above factual scenario, this Court would very well have closed the contempt proceedings, but for the attitude and behavior of the petitioner and its counsel, which the Court will hithertofore set out hereunder.
16. When the matter was taken up by the Court on 21.6.2018, learned counsel appearing for the contemnors/respondents submitted that the order passed by this Court has been complied with. However, on being queried by the Court, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that no such order, as stated by the respondents has been passed. In such circumstances, the Court, on the assurance of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no order has been passed, issued statutory notice to the respondents.
17. Accordingly, statutory notice was issued to the respondents and the respondents were present in Court on 25.7.2018, along with the records, which was perused by this Court as detailed above and found that not only the order has been passed, but the same has also been communicated to the petitioner way back on 21.6.2018. It is further to be pointed out that the order has been passed within the time frame fixed by this Court.
18. It is to be stated here that though the petitioner had received the copy of the order on 21.6.2018, curiously the contempt petition has been filed on the very same day in the Registry. Suppressing the receipt of the order, the contempt petition was numbered and was listed before the Court on 27.6.2018 and, as stated above, on the assurance of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner stating that the order has not been complied with, statutory notice was issued.
19. When the above details were brought to the notice of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that though this Court had directed to pass orders within a period of two weeks, however, the same has not been passed within the time frame fixed by this Court and, therefore, the contempt has been made out irrespective of an order being passed by the respondents.
20. The above submission of the learned counsel is not borne out by records. A careful perusal of the records, with the learned counsel on either side, revealed that even before the expiry of the period of two weeks as prescribed by this Court, the order has been passed. It is more relevant to point out that even in the order passed by the 2nd respondent, the necessity of passing an order within the time frame as fixed by this Court has been mentioned, which only shows the inclination of the respondents to adhere scrupulously to the direction issued by this Court, though the petitioner had sought for adjournments twice and also did not appear on the second occasion, when it is his grievance that the approval has not been granted. This clearly reveals that the petitioner was trying to force the respondents to over shoot the time period, so as to make out a case of contempt, may be knowing fully well the documents filed by him are not in compliance with the laws of the land.
21. Further, a perusal of the order passed by the respondents reveals that the order has been complied with in letter and spirit. However, neither the counsel for the petitioner, nor the petitioner, had courtesy enough to stand up before this Court and accept their fault and get themselves purged from contempt. Rather, both the counsel as well as the petitioner had the temerity to stand up before this Court and submit that the respondents have committed contempt in not complying with the order passed by this Court, while in actuality, it is the petitioner and it?s counsel, who have suppressed material particulars, including the receipt of the order passed by the respondents. Inspite of the said lapse on the part of the petitioner, the petitioner and its counsel are still agitating the matter, without an iota or a semblance of sense that it is the petitioner, who has willfully suppressed the receipt of the order and wasted not only the time of the respondents and made them appear before this Court, but also wasted the valuable time of this Court and taken this Court for granted that it will dance to their whims and fancies. In such circumstances, it is the petitioner, who has to be penalized for the wrongful act committed by them with full knowledge and not the respondents.
22. The law on contempt has been succinctly dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204, wherein the necessity of the contempt jurisdiction of the Court has been explained and the power of the Court under the said jurisdiction has been explained. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted hereunder:-
?11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts power to punish an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities.
12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is ?wilful?. The word ?wilful? introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of one?s state of mind. ?Wilful?
means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a ?bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely?. Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. ?Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct.?
(Emphasis supplied)
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court, yet again, in the case of Commr., Agra v. Rohtas Singh, (1998) 1 SCC 349, has held that the courts? power to punish for contempt is a power which is required in furtherance of proper administration of justice and preserving the authority of the court. The relevant portion of ratio decidendi is extracted hereunder:
?6. A contempt proceeding is often described as a quasi-criminal proceeding because it results in punishment for the contemner. The proceeding, however, cannot be equated with the prosecution of a criminal by the State. Contempt proceedings are essentially a matter between the court and the contemner. Contempt jurisdiction enables the court to ensure proper administration of justice and maintenance of the rule of law. It is meant to ensure that the courts are able to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and unsullied by wanton attacks on the system of administration of justice or on officials who administer it, and to prevent wilful defiance of orders of the court or undertakings given to the court. That is why the Supreme Court and the High Courts have an inherent power to punish for contempt even dehors legislation pertaining to contempt of court.
7. This is apparent also from the definition of ?contempt? under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Two types of contempt are defined. Under Section 2(b), civil contempt means wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. While criminal contempt is defined under Section 2(c) to mean the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise), of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which ? (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. From this definition it is clear that the courts? power to punish for contempt is a power which is required in furtherance of proper administration of justice and preserving the authority of the court. This power is expressly preserved under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. That is why the question of contempt is a question which is essentially between the court and the contemner.?
(Emphasis supplied)
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481), defining the scope of contempt jurisdiction of the Court and the reliefs that could be granted and the power of the court to punish the person, who has come before the Court with unclean hands by suppressing facts, highlighting the law as laid down by the British Courts, held as under
:-
?34.The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
35.The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] in the following words: (KB p. 514) ?? it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts?it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it?the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.?
36.A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, ?We will not listen to your application because of what you have done.? The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.
37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96) ?? Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits.
This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit.?
38.The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play ?hide and seek? or to ?pick and choose? the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because ?the court knows law but not facts?.
39.If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs.[(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and ?clean breast? cannot hold a writ of the court with ?soiled hands?. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.?
(Emphasis supplied)
25. From the above referred to decisions, it is clear that not only the person, who has willfully disobeyed the orders of the court is liable for contempt, equally and more so, the person, who has come before the Court with unclean hands by suppressing materials, alleging commission of contempt against the other party, which have a bearing on the outcome of the contempt proceeding is also liable for punishment under the contempt laws. Any person, who abuses the process of court, requires to be dealt with for contempt with iron hands.
26. It is more useful to point out that the Bombay High Court in Kapol Co- operative Bank case (supra) has even gone to the extent of stating that mere expression of unconditional apology in words would not suffice and it is more the intent, which is necessary rather than words.
27. In the case on hand, neither the petitioner nor its counsel had placed the material particulars with regard to the order passed by the respondents in obedience of the orders passed by this Court. They allowed the process of the court to take its course, thereby, not only wasting the time of the court, but also bringing the respondents before the court, even though the respondents had complied with the directions issued by this Court and had passed the order well within the time frame. Not only by this callous attitude the petitioner has committed contempt, but the petitioner and its counsel did have the temerity not to plead for mercy before the majesty of the Court, but equally challenged the respondents in saying that they had not passed the order within the time frame stipulated by this Court, which, the records proved to be wrong. The callous and indifferent attitude of the petitioner in suppressing material facts and making false submission; not filing the rejection order before the court even after receipt of order and not apologizing to the Court for the wrong doing not only amounts to playing fraud on the court, but also demeaning the authority of the court and the majesty of law. The intent of the petitioner is clear, in that the petitioner wants to gratify itself with an approval order from the respondents by misleading this Court with false averments and submissions. The abovesaid conduct of the petitioner not only deserves to be deprecated, but such act should not be allowed to demean the majesty of the court and cannot be used as a weapon by unscrupulous persons to get their demands settled.
28. It is the duty of the Court to see that while the wrong doer suffers, the innocent persons should not be allowed to suffer. The act of the petitioner in misleading the court by suppressing the receipt of the order and not tendering an apology, even on the court pointing out the fallacy in the petition, deserves to be deprecated and the petitioner deserves to be penalized for his contemptuous act, else this will send a wrong signal to other persons to approach this Court by filing such frivolous petitions and, thereby, wasting precious judicial time.
29. Without tendering apology and accepting his fault, even after being caught red-handed, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that this Court may grant liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order of the District Registrar in rejecting the Form VII approval. This Court is at a loss to understand as to how the order of the District Registrar declining to approve the Form No. VII can be challenged by way of a writ petition. The normal course available to the petitioner is only to challenge the said order before the Civil Court by filing a suit as the order of the District Registrar is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the liberty, as sought for by the learned counsel for the petitioner to move this Court by way of a writ challenging the order of the District Registrar cannot be granted and the said request is liable to be rejected. However, this Court, while not granting any liberty to the petitioner to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, makes it clear that it is open to the petitioner to challenge the rejection order of the District Registrar in a manner known to law, if so advised.
30. Coming back to the contemptuous act committed by the petitioner and its temerity to stand by its words rather than bowing down to the mercy of this Court, on an overall consideration of the entire matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that while the contempt petition is devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed, needless to state that the suppression of facts, which are pertinent to the case on hand, by the petitioner warrants imposition of exemplary costs against the petitioner, as such attitude, if left unpunished, the unrepentable petitioner and persons alike, will make a mockery of justice by moving the judicial forum wasting precious judicial time to the detriment of the most deserving litigants.
31. In such view of the matter:
(a) this contempt petition is dismissed with a cost of Rs.50,000/-
(Rupees Fifty Thousand only), which shall be paid by the petitioner to the Chief Minister?s Distress Relief Fund, Government of Kerala, towards flood relief;
(b) the costs, as ordered above, shall be paid within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order;
(c) the petitioner is directed to pay the cost by way of demand draft and produce the copy of the demand draft before the Registrar (Judicial), Madurai Bench of Madras High Court;
(d) the Registrar (Judicial), Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, is directed to pursue this order that if the petitioner has failed to pay the cost and produced the receipt and Xerox copy of the demand draft before him within the stipulated period of time, the Registrar (Judicial) should take appropriate action for recovery of the amount from the petitioner.
To
1.S.M.Meeramohaideen, The District Registrar, O/o. The District Registrar, Thenkasi, Tirunelveli.
2.P.Chandrasekaran, The District Education Officer, Tirunelveli, Tirunelveli District.
.